

SRĪ BHĀSHYAM

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TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY

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FOREWORD

IN placing an English translation of the *Sri Bhāṣhyam* before the public a few words of explanation are needed. The view is held by western sanskrit scholars that the *Veda* consists of portions written by different persons at different times, and that therefore conflicts of opinion must necessarily follow. This is not the view held by such eminent *rishis* as *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa*, and by a host of other *rishis*, who have written *kalpa sūtras*, *smṛitis*, *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*. They were of opinion that the *veda* was not written by any one; that it is one work; and that therefore no text of the *veda* should conflict with any other text. It is in this view that *Bādarāyaṇa* wrote his *sūtras*, and that *Sri Rāmānuja* wrote his *Sri Bhāṣhyam*.

2. Readers of the *upaniṣads* will observe that reference is made in them to three *tatvas* or substances—matter, the *jivas* and *Īśvara*. Certain texts state that they are different from one another in their *svarūpas* (substance) and in their natures. Matter serves the *jivas* by undergoing transformations, and appearing as objects of enjoyment, as bodies in which the *jivas* dwell, and as senses and organs of action, which they use as instruments of enjoyment. The *jivas* utilise the

bodies, the senses and the organs of action, and experience pleasure or pain from material products. And *Īṣvara* gives the *jivas* the fruits of their past *karmas*, and makes matter undergo such transformations as are needed for this purpose. Certain other texts of the *veda* state that *Īṣvara* is identical with the universe, consisting of the *jivas* and material products. How is this apparent conflict to be explained? The *veda* itself replies by stating that all objects are the bodies of *Īṣvara*, and that He is their *ātmā*. It is usual in the world to speak of the body and *ātmā* as being identical, as in the statement '*Devadatta* is stout'. The term '*devadatta*' denotes a *jiva*, and the term 'stout' refers to his body. The *jiva*, being atomic in size, cannot be said to be stout or lean. Similarly, the *veda* speaks of *Īṣvara* and the universe as one, as they bear to each other the relation of *ātmā* and body. In this explanation all *vedic* texts are accepted as of equal validity; and there is no need to regard one set of texts as nullified by another set. Accepting this explanation, which was that suggested by the *ṛishi* (seer) *Kāṣakṛitsna* (see *sūtra* I-4-22), the *sūtras* are interpreted in the *Sri Bhāṣyam*.

3. Other commentators of the *sūtras* accept the texts affirming identity as stating the truth, and explain the texts stating the *tatvas* to be different from one another. *Śankara* is of opinion that *Brahma* alone exists; nothing else; and that the appearance of the universe, consisting of numberless persons that perceive, and of numberless objects that are perceived, is illusion;

and that this is brought about by an unreal *avidyā* resting on *Brahma*. *Bhāskara* explains that *Brahma* Himself becomes *jivas* by contact with *upādhis*, i.e., atomic substances known as *antaḥ karaṇa* (mind). The places in *Brahma* not so contacted is *Brahma*. *Yūdava Prakāṣa* states that the same substance, which he calls *sat*, appears in three forms—as *Īṣvara*, as *jivas* and as matter. The theories of these commentators are examined in *Srī Bhāṣyam* in the sub-sections noted on the margin and shown to be untenable. This examination

Chapter I, section 1, sub-sections 1 and 4; and chapter II, section 1, sub-section 6.

has been taken out and translated as a separate work with the title “The Three *Tatvas*”. The *Srī Bhāṣyam* is intended to be a practical guide to enable the *jivas*

to get rid of their *samsāra* (cycle of births and deaths), and to attain bliss in no way alloyed with pain and enduring for ever. It shows for this purpose that there is a Being known as highest *Ātmā*, who is free from every imperfection, and who is the seat of numberless, infinitely high, noble qualities; that the way to reach Him is by continuous, vivid and loving meditation on Him; and that when this meditation is established, all the *jiva*’s past *karmas* are destroyed; that such *karmas*, as are not consciously done, will not touch him; that with the grace of the highest *Ātmā*, who abides in his heart as his *ātmā*, he will rise from his body through a blood-vessel that goes to the top of his head; that he will travel along a path known as *devayāna*, and that on reaching the highest *Ātmā* in a place beyond this world of matter, he will attain his own nature, and thereafter

enjoy the highest *Ātmā* and His noble qualities, and that he will never return to *samsāra*. Most readers will be satisfied with the *Srī Bhāṣyam* without the controversial portion. It has therefore been taken out. Those, that wish to know how the other theories are unsound, may read "The Three *Tatvas*".

4. Certain followers of *Śankara* have criticised the interpretations of the *sūtras* given in the *Srī Bhāṣyam*. They have been answered by *mahāmahopādhyāya* Kapiśtalam Desikacharyar, and Mr. A. V. Gopalacharyar, M.A., B.L. A third work is ready, having been written by Agnihotram Tata Desika Tatacharyar of Kumbakonam. All these are in Sanskrit. If there is a general desire in the English-knowing public to know what they say, a brief *resume* of the contents of these works will be prepared with the consent of their authors.

5. With the omission referred to in para 3, the translation keeps close to the original. I have availed myself of some latitude in order to make the translation intelligible. Portions of the commentary known as *śrūta prakāśika* have been incorporated in the text, where the text would be unintelligible without the commentary. Portions of the text, which treat of small matters, or quote *vedic* and *smṛiti* texts, which are well-known, have been put in the form of foot-notes. Not one grain of matter has been omitted, and the translation faithfully reproduces the original. The *vedic* texts considered in the various sub-sections have been separately translated, with an abstract of the contexts in which they occur, and with copious notes from the

upanishad bhāṣya of Ranga Rāmānuja. Sanskrit terms have been translated within brackets, wherever they occur; nevertheless a glossary of the terms has been appended at the end. It is difficult to prepare an index; but the table of contents, which will be found at the beginning, will serve the purpose of an index to some extent.

6. No pains have been spared to make the translation intelligible by itself. It was prepared several years ago; and it has undergone revision twice, not to mention minor alterations made in passing the proofs. My thanks are due to (1) Mr. K. Śadagopa Aiyangar, retired Salt Inspector, Kumbakonam for examining the translation with the original, and for correcting the proof sheets; (2) to Sinnāmu Srinivāsa Patrācharyar of the same place for valuable help in the elucidation of difficult points; (3) to Mr. A. K. Sitarama Sastriar, Superintendent, Vasanta Press, Adyar, Madras, for careful printing and neat execution; and lastly (4) to my Guru (Srimad Āndavan of Srirangam), who gave me permission to print the translation, and whose blessing has brought the printing to a successful end.

7. An explanation of abbreviations used in the work is subjoined.

Kumbakonam

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1 November, 1930

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Adhi.</i>	Adhikaraṇa Sārāvali of Sri Desika.
<i>Aita.</i>	Aitareya upanishad.
<i>Āna.</i>	Ānandavalli.
<i>Bṛihad.</i>	Bṛihad Āraṇyaka upanishad.
<i>Bhāva.</i>	Bhāvaprakāṣika of Ranga Ramanuja.
<i>Bhṛigu.</i>	Bhṛiguvalli.
<i>Chāndo.</i>	Chāndogya upanishad.
<i>Īṣā.</i>	Īṣāvāsyā upanishad.
<i>Kaṭha.</i>	Kaṭhavalli.
<i>Kaushī.</i>	Kaushītaki brāhmaṇa.
<i>Muṇḍa.</i>	Muṇḍaka upanishad.
<i>Nārā.</i>	Nārāyaṇam of Taittirīya upanishad.
<i>Puru.</i>	Purusha sūkta.
<i>Śveta.</i>	Śvetāśvatara upanishad.
<i>Subā.</i>	Subala upanishad.
<i>Taitti.</i>	Taittirīya upanishad.

SRI BHĀSHYAM

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ERRATA—SRĪ BHĀSHYAM

CHAPTER I

<i>Reference</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
PAGE		
83, line 11	or	on
109, line 13	Being	being
146, line 10	the	in
146, note 2, last line	subtler matter	subtle matter
but one	<i>mṛityu</i>	(<i>mṛityu</i>)
155, note (1), line 8	all form	all forms
167, line 8	<i>māndhyamikas</i>	<i>māndhyandinas</i>
179, line 17	<i>ekahūyani</i>	<i>ekahūyanyā</i>
188, line 8	denoting <i>jivas</i> , denote	Delete comma
198, line 1	whom	which
198, line 20	whom	which
208, line 10	I meditate	I know this, <i>viz.</i> , me- ditating here
226, note (1), line 3	<i>devatā, Indra</i>	Delete comma
295, last line	he is	Delete 'is'
366, line 2	<i>āne</i>	<i>āna</i>
380, line 1	term, <i>avyakta</i>	Delete comma
401, line 5	before stating the creation	before stating creation the

श्रीमतेवेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकायनमः ।

SRI BHĀSHYAM

INTRODUCTION

Sri Bhāshyam is the commentary by Śrī Rāmānuja on the *Brahma Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa *alias Vyāsa*; and these *Sūtras* form a commentary on the later portion of the *Veda*, known as the *Upanishads*.

2. The *Veda* is the highest authority among the Hindus, and holds the same position in their estimation, as the New Testament does in the estimation of the Christian world. There is, however, a difference between them. While the New Testament was admittedly written by different authors, the *Veda* was never written by any one. It has been handed down without interruption from teacher to student, and its texts have consisted of the same words in the same order as at present. In this sense they are said to be eternal. This point is considered in Chapter I, Section 3, Sub-Section 7.

Not having been written by any one, it is free from defects, which characterise human productions.

3. *What the Veda teaches.* It points out to every one the means to the ends which he has in view ; and these ends are different for different individuals. If they identify themselves with their bodies, the enjoyments which they seek will be of the sensual kind, *i.e.*, what appeals to the senses. This is known as *aihikam*, *i.e.*, enjoyment here and now. If they learn that they are other than the bodies, they will be disgusted with the pleasures of this world, as they are attained with effort ; and are alloyed with pain. They will seek a superior kind of enjoyment, and will be willing to take very great trouble to procure it and to wait for its coming. This is known as *āmushmikam*, *i.e.*, enjoyment there, *i.e.*, in *svarga*. This has its own defect ; for it is short-lived and in most cases, those who go thither have to serve the heaven-dwellers. When the good *karma*, which took them to *svarga*, is expended, they return to the earth-world. If after wide experience, they are disgusted with this kind of enjoyment also, they will begin to enquire whether there is not enjoyment of a still superior kind, which will endure for ever. They will learn that there is such enjoyment, which is called *niṣ-ṣreyasam* or the highest good. All these fruits, which man may seek—*Aihikam*, *āmushmikam* and *niṣ-ṣreyasam*—are known as *purushārtha* (that sought by an intelligent being). To distinguish the last from the others, the term *parama*—highest—is added to the term. Each of these kinds of enjoyment has its appropriate means, which

are pointed out in the *veda*. The means for attaining *aihikam* and *āmushmikam* are offerings of various kinds to *devatās*, and they are described with great minuteness in the earlier portion of the *veda*. The means to *niṣ-
sreyasam* is various modes of meditation on *Brahma*, and this is dealt with in the later portion. All these means are collectively known as *hita*. The *veda* then gives instruction in regard to truth, the goal to be striven for and the means thereto, i.e., in regard to *tatva—hita—purushārtha*. It does not deal with what one can find for himself; it shows only what he cannot know without it. Most men are unable to look far ahead, and they prefer the *aihikam* or *āmushmikam* and the portion of the *veda*, which deals with them, therefore comes first.¹

¹ In addition to the division of the *Veda* into the earlier and later portions, there are two other divisions. One is the division into *Brāhmaṇa*, *mantra* and *arthavāda*. The first consists of commands and prohibitions like the following: "Let one who desires *svarga* do *yāga*" (*Svarga* is a place of unalloyed enjoyment; *Yāga* is the giving up of a material possession to a *devatā*; This is a Being superior to man and invested with certain powers by *Īṣvara*.) "Do not inflict pain on any one." Certain other texts describe how a *karma* (act) that has been prescribed should be done, and they are recited when the act is performed, to remind the doer of what has to be done and how it should be done. They are known as *mantras*. The remaining texts either praise the *karmas* prescribed or condemn those that are proscribed. These are known as *arthavādas*. The other is the division into *rik*, *yajur*, *Sāman* and *Atharvan*. One who performs a *yāga* requires the services of helpers, known as *ritvik*, their number depending on the particular *yāga*. One of them known as *adhvaryu* does all the manual work,

4. The texts of the *veda* are not always clear; and the meaning that is first conveyed is not always correct. The *veda* being one work, it has to be interpreted in such a manner that one text may not conflict with the others. A critical examination is therefore necessary, and this was undertaken by three *rishis* (those who see far beyond ordinary men)—*Jaimini*, *Kāsakritsna* and *Bādarāyaṇa*. They embodied the results of their examination in *sūtras*,—short, condensed, yet clear statements in prose. The *sūtras* of the first two *rishis* deal with the earlier portion of the *veda*, and those of the third with the later portion or *Upanishads*. The examination of the teaching of the *veda* as a whole is known as *mīmāṃsā*, the examination of the earlier portion being *pūrva mīmāṃsā* and that of the later portion being *uttara mīmāṃsā*. Both the enquiries or *mīmāṃsās* form one work. For, the subject of enquiry is the same in both, *viz.*, the *veda*; the same mode of enquiry is pursued in each; and the same result is reached, *viz.*, a correct

including the preparation of the materials, the handling of the instruments and the making of the offerings. The *yajur Veda* instructs him. Another known as the *hotā* recites certain verses, when offerings are made; and these verses are collected and arranged in the *rik veda*. A third helper known as *udgātā* recites verses set to music, before certain offerings are made in *soma yāgas*: and these songs form the *sāma veda*. The importance of these portions from the point of view of *yāgas* is so great, that the *veda* is often known as *trayī*—a whole consisting of three parts. The fourth, the *atharvaṇ* is not now studied, except its later portions.

understanding of its contents. The *Brahma Sūtras* are a continuation of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*.

5. The conclusion stated at the end of the preceding para is not accepted by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, i.e., one who has commented on *Jaimini's sūtras*. His objections are: First, the topic in the first enquiry is the nature of *karma*, i.e., *yūgas* of various kinds, while in the second it is the nature of *Brahma*. The result also is different. For after the first enquiry one will turn away from *karma*; after the second he will be drawn towards *Brahma*. Again, the authors are different. *Jaimini* wrote the first twelve chapters and *Kāśakritstna* the next four chapters; while the author of the *Brahma sūtras* is *Bādarāyaṇa*. We reply. These considerations do not count for much. As the first twelve chapters treat of *karmas*, and the next four chapters of *devatās*, the last four chapters treat of *Brahma*. As the first sixteen chapters are regarded as one work, so all the twenty chapters may be regarded as one work. If the topics are different, that is a reason for dividing the work into parts, chapters, sections, and so on, but not for making it into as many works as there are topics. As to the difference in the authorship, we draw his attention to the analogous case of a tower—built by many persons working for different periods of time; but the tower is regarded as one piece of work. The *sūtras* of *Pāṇini*, the grammarian, were commented on by two persons, and yet their commentaries are treated as one work, known as *Kāṣikāvritti*. This is exactly analogous to the present case.

6. Secondly, some of the conclusions reached in the former *mīmāṃsā* are repeated in the latter, which would not happen, if they formed one work. Reply—the repetition occurs in four cases; the object being to refute certain objections raised and to confirm the conclusions. In the first case, it had been decided that the *Sūdra* was unfit to learn the *veda*, and he would therefore be unfit also for *Brahma-vidyā*, which requires a knowledge of the *vedic* teaching. In the *Chāndogyā Upanishad*, a student, who applied to a teacher for instruction on *Brahma-vidyā*, was addressed as *Sūdra*, and this raised a doubt as to whether a member of this caste could not obtain the requisite knowledge from sources other than the *Veda*. It is shown (Chapter I, Section 3, *Sūtra* 33) that the term *sūdra* does not mean a member of the *Sūdra* community, and that it means merely one who is unhappy. The next two cases relate to the conclusion that a *smṛiti* opposed to the *Veda* should be rejected. Nevertheless, two sub-sections are added (Chapter II, Section 1, Sub-Section 1 and Section 2, sub-section 7) to show that the *Sāṅkhya Smṛiti* and the *Pāṣupata āgama* should not be respected in consideration of the high position and great reputation of the authors. In the last case, it was shown in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, that two *karmas*, which formed the subject of similar injunctions, and which were of the same character, bore the same name and yielded the same fruit, were one; and this conclusion is equally applicable to two or more *Brahma vidyās* subject to the same conditions. But as a text of the *Muṇḍaka*

Upanishad appeared to prescribe a particular ceremony known as *sirovratam* as a preliminary to *brahma vidyā*, the subject had to be examined again. (Chapter III, Section 3, sub-section 1).

7. Lastly, there are some points of difference between *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa*. They are briefly explained below :

(a) In chapter I, Section 2, *Sūtra* 1 *Jaimini* states that the purpose of the *veda* being to stimulate the doing of *karmas*, such texts as do not perform this function, but merely state facts, are no authority. This would mean that the texts in the *vedānta*, being mainly of this character, do not possess any validity. The explanation is that *Jaimini* laid down a general rule, and that *Bādarāyaṇa* pointed out an exception, when the texts mention a desirable fruit for which an intelligent person may strive. As *Jaimini* dealt only with *karmas*, he had no occasion to refer to the exception. This defect was supplied by *Bādarāyaṇa* in Chapter I, Section 1, *Sūtra* 4.

(b) *Jaimini*, it is stated, denied the existence of *devatās* in the form of intelligent beings. He had to contend with opponents to establish two points—the supreme authority of the *veda*, and the need for performing the *karmas* enjoined in it. He found it necessary to concede certain matters to gain his end, and he did so in the hope that when he won, they could be set right. That this was his real attitude may be seen by considering his view stated by *Bādarāyaṇa* in three *sūtras*. In the first (Chapter 4, Section 3, *sūtra* 11)

Jaimini recognised the existence of *Īṣvara*, the supreme *devatā*; in the second (Chapter 4, Section 4, *Sūtra* 5) the possession of certain qualities by Him, and in the last (Chapter I, Section 2, *Sūtra* 32) meditation on Him as the means of reaching Him. This is proof that he believed in the existence of the lesser *devatās* also.

(c) In Chapter VIII, Section 1, *Sūtra* 32, it was stated that in copying from a model the ritual for performing a particular *yāga*, for which a special ritual has not been prescribed, one should be guided by the material to be offered in preference to the *devatā*, in case they indicated different models. This is held to imply a denial of the existence of *devatās*. This view is incorrect. The preference of the material to the *devatā* was based on the fact that the material is close to the act of offering, while the *devatā* has to be thought of by the mind. In fact, the whole of the *mīmāṃsā* rests on the principle that what is recognised at once possesses a greater validity than another, in which there is some delay.

8. The foregoing disposes of the objection that there are points of difference between the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* and the *Brahma sūtras*. In the latter set itself *Jaimini* is stated to have held certain views, and they are shown to be erroneous. Here are some cases:

(a) In Chapter 3, Section 4, *Sūtra* 2 *Jaimini* is stated to have contended that the mention of fruit in the texts of the *vedānta* should be treated as *arthavāda* as in the earlier portion of the *veda*, and that the *vedānta* is subsidiary to the earlier portion, on the plea that it

points out the real nature of the *jīva*. This could not have been *Jaimini*'s real view for the reason stated in para 7 (b) *supra*. This view having been put forward by him in the context with his opponents, people might accept it as correct; and to prevent this *Bādarāyaṇa* first states the view and then refutes it.

(b) In *sūtra* 18 of the same section it is stated that *Jaimini* denied the existence of stages of life other than that of the house-holder. This is negatived by the fact stated in *sūtra* 40 of the same section that he would not accept one fallen from these stages as qualified for *Brahma Vidyā*. His real intention was, one may therefore presume, to discourage the entry of one on these stages, unless he was really disgusted with the world.

(c) In Chapter 3, Section 2, *sūtra* 39, *Jaimini* is stated to have held the view that *karma* through *apūrvam* yields its fruit. *Bādarāyaṇa* rejects this view, and states that all fruits are bestowed on the worshipper by *Īṣvara* Himself. There is no material difference between these views. *Īṣvara* bestows the fruits only with reference to the *karma*; but He is the principal cause, while *Jaimini* lays stress on the *karma*. This slight difference is not of such importance as to militate against the view that the two *mīmāṃsās* form one work.

(d) Lastly, in chapter 1, Section 3, *Sūtra* 30, *Jaimini* denies the fitness of *devas* for *Brahma vidyā*. This is not of importance; but it is proof of the fact that he recognises the existence of *devas*, in whom the *devatās* are included.

9. The conclusion that the two *mīmāmsās* form one work has the support of the author of the *vṛitti*, who observes "This *ṣārīraka* is a continuation of the sixteen chapters of *Jaimini*. Hence the work is one". And the author of *Srī Bhāshyam* also observes 'The difference between the former and latter *mīmāmsās* should be treated like the differences between the parts and between the chapters resulting from differences in the topics dealt with. The work begins with the first *sūtra* of *Jaimini* and ends with the last *sūtra* of *Bādarāyaṇa*. The order of the topics is determined by the connection between every two of them.'

10. The author of the *Brahma sūtras* has accepted the conclusions drawn, and the rules of interpretation deduced, in the *pūrva mīmāmsā* and takes very many illustrations therefrom. For a full understanding of the *Srī Bhāshya* it is necessary to know what the *pūrva mīmāmsā* teaches, at least briefly. The following is a summary: The *first chapter* deals with *pramāṇas*, i.e., the authorities on which statements are accepted, or injunctions are obeyed. The *pramāṇas* are three—the *Veda*, *Smritis* and *āchāra* (the practice of great men). Of these the *Veda* possesses the highest authority. In the *Veda* itself the *brāhmaṇas* are of themselves authority, and they require no proof for their acceptance. *Mantras* and *arthavādas* are authorities in so far as they are connected with the *brāhmaṇas*, the former by showing how the *karmas* enjoined by them should be done, and the latter by praising the *karmas* (Section 2, sub-sections 1 and 4). *Smritis* come next. They are works

written by great *rishis*, who knew the *veda* fully. The presumption is that they are based on *vedic* texts. It follows that a *smṛiti* opposed to a clear text of the *veda* should be rejected. (Sub-Sections 1 and 2). *Āchāras* come last. *Smṛiti*-writers have brought only the main points into their books, leaving the details to be gathered from their practice. It may be presumed that they remembered the *vedic* teaching, and acted in accordance therewith. A practice which has sprung up in recent times in opposition to a *smṛiti* text should be rejected. (Section 3, sub-sections 4 and 5).

11. In this chapter certain matters connected with words are discussed, and as reference is made to them occasionally in the *Srī Bhāshya*, they must be stated here. The meaning of a word established by usage should always be taken; for this comes to one's mind quickly. Where this meaning is not available, or where it is unsuitable in a sentence, the meanings of the root and termination are taken and put together, and the meaning of the word as a whole is ascertained. In the *darṣa* and *pūrṇa māsa ishtis* the *adhvaryu* gives this direction—Place the *prokshaṇī* (on the *vedi*). *Prokshaṇī* is a basin of water, which on being placed on the *vedi*, is purified and is used for sprinkling. Obviously the word *prokshaṇī* cannot denote the purified water, when the direction was given. As there is no meaning established by usage, the meaning by derivation is taken. A word is said to denote its meaning by *rūḍhi*, when it has been established by usage; and by *yoga*, when it is derived from its etymology (Section 4, sub-section 9).

12. What do words denote, leaving out those that are arbitrarily fixed as the names of things? Take the word 'go' (cow) for instance. Does it denote a form common to all cows (*ākṛiti*) or an animal having this form? In the opinion of the *mīmāṃsaka* the primary meaning of a word is the *ākṛiti*; and when it is used in a sentence "Bring the cow" it is used in a secondary sense, and means an animal having this *ākṛiti*. If it did not do so, the direction could not be carried out. The extension of the meaning of a word in this manner is known as *lakṣhaṇa*; and the reasoning on which it is so extended is *ākṣhepa* (Section 3, Sub-section 10).

13. Chapter 2 treats of *karmas*. First, in all finite verbs there is a common element. The word *yajati* means does a *yāga*; the word *pachati* means does cooking; and so on. This common element is denoted by the termination in the verbs; and it is an action that serves to bring about what is desired. It is known as *bhāvanā*. In connection with it three questions arise—what does it produce; with what instruments; and with the help of what. In the three offerings known as *darṣa isṭi* what is produced is *svarga*; the instruments are the three offerings; and those which help them are other offerings known as *prayājas*, *anuyājas*, *ājyabhāgas* and *svishtakṛit*. These are denoted by the following sanskrit terms—*svarga* is *phalam*; the three offerings are *karana*; and the other offerings are *itikartavyatā*. The injunction *yajeta* means with a *yāga* bring about what is desired. The *bhāvanā* being important, every word in a sentence

is directly connected with the termination, which denotes it (Section 1, Sub-section 1).

14. It has just been stated that by the three offerings *svarga* is produced. Now, these offerings disappear, as soon as they are made ; and *svarga* will come at the end of this life. What is there to connect the *karana* and the fruit ? The *mīmāṃsaka* therefore assumes that a capacity is created by the offerings in the person who makes them, which remains till it yields the fruit. This is known is *apūrva*. Each offering produces its own *apūrva* ; so do all the subsidiary offerings ; and they all combine to produce the fruit-yielding *apūrva* (Section 1, Sub-section 2).

15. *Karmas* are enjoined by different texts ; and it has to be ascertained whether they are the same *karma* or different *karmas*. They are different in the following cases :

(i) When the words conveying the injunctions are different. For instance, the *karmas* enjoined by *yajati* (do *yāga*), *dadāti* (give) and *juhoti* (do *homa*) are different, the words being different (Section 2, sub-section 1).

(ii) When the same word is repeated without difference. For instance, in “*Samidho yajati*” “*tanūna-pātam yajati*” the word *yajati* is repeated. Unless the *karmas* be different, one of the directions will serve no purpose, a fault which in the opinion of the *mīmāṃsaka* is a serious one, as every text of the *veda* should serve some purpose. If the repetition be for the purpose of indicating a material for offering, or give some other direction,

there will be no objection. In the present case it is not so (Section 2, Sub-section 2).

(iii) When a number is stated—for instance, in ‘make three offerings’ each offering is different from the others (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 7).

(iv) When the names of the *karmas* are stated—as in “Now this *jyotis*; now this *viṣva jyotis*; now this *sarva jyotis*”. These are names of different *soma yāgas*. (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 8).

(v) When a *devatā* has to be found for an offering. Here is a text “on boiling milk drop curd; it is *āmikshā* for the *devatā viṣve devas*; *vājīnam* for the *vājīs*.” The hard part, when the milk separates into two portions is *āmikshā*; and the watery portion is *vājīnam*. Now, the *āmikshā* being connected with the *viṣve deva yāga* by the very text which prescribes it, its requirement is satisfied. The bye-product *vājīnam* cannot therefore be combined with the *āmikshā* or be made to take its place. It requires a new *devatā*, and its offering is a different *karma* (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 9).

(vi) When the context differs—The daily offerings at sunrise and sun-set known as *Agnihotram* are prescribed in one place; and the following text appears in another place: “Having done the *upasad yāgas*, the *agnihotram* should be done for a month.” The contexts being different, the latter *karma* differs from the former (Section 3, Sub-section 11).

16. *Karmas* prescribed in different places are the same *Karma*,—when the six causes mentioned in the preceding para are absent. That is, if they have the

same forms, yield the same fruits, have the same names, and are prescribed in the same words, they are one. The *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa ishtis* are of this description, the former being the name for three offerings made on the first day after the new moon, and the latter for three offerings made on the first day after the full moon. The forms of *karmas* are the *devatās* and the materials offered to them (Section 4, Sub-section 2).

17. At the end of section 1 of this chapter, it is explained how, when a sentence is incomplete, the ellipsis may be supplied. The addition of a word, which appears in the previous sentence, is known as *anushanga*, and the addition of a new word altogether is *adhyāhāra*. In making the *anushanga* care should be taken to see that the word is in the mind. Take the following, which the *yajamāna* (one who makes a *yāga*) addresses to the goat that is to be offered—"May your *prāṇa* unite with the wind; your parts with those who do *yāgas*; may the *yajamāna* with his wishes". The verb *gacchatām* occurs in the first clause only and is in the singular number; in the others it is absent, the prefix *sam* only being found. The same verb is added in these clauses, in the plural number in the second, and in the singular in the third; but these additions are not *anushanga*. For the word in the second clause, being in the plural, differs from the verb in the first clause; and the word in the third clause is separated from it by the plural verb in the second clause. These are therefore cases of *adhyāhāra* (Section 1, Sub-Section 18).

18. *Chapter 3* treats of the relation of *anga* and *angi*. Whatever renders a service to another is an *anga*; and that which receives the service is *angi*. The terms *śesha* and *śeshī* also are used to indicate the same relation. This relation is indicated by six *pramāṇas* as shown below :

(i) *Śruti*. In the text "*dadhnā juhoti*" (make the *homa* with curd) the termination in the first word, which expresses instrument, is *śruti*; and it makes curd an *anga* of the offering.

(ii) *Lingam*. This is capacity (of a word to indicate something). In the *mantra* "I cut the *barhis* (*kuṣa* grass) the seat of the *devas*" the word 'cut' indicates that the *mantra* should be recited, when the grass is cut. The *mantra* is therefore an *anga* of the cutting (Section 2, Sub-section 1).

(iii) *Vākya*. This is two or more words put together. "In the text with *rik* work is done in a high tone (*ucchais*); with *yajur* in an under-tone; with *sāman* in a high tone" the juxtaposition of the words *ucchais* and *rik*, which is *vākya*, makes a high tone an *anga* of *rik* *mantras*, which should therefore be recited in a high tone (Section 3, Sub-section 1).

(iv) *Prakaraṇa*. This is two or more sentences connected by mutual need, which makes them a context. In the place where the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa* offerings are prescribed, five *prayāja* offerings also are enjoined, but without mention of a fruit. They therefore seek the *yāgas*, which should receive their service; and the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa* offerings seek helpers. This

mutual need connects them together, and *prayājas* become their *angas* (Section 3, Sub-Section 4).

(v) *Sthāna*. The three *pūrṇamāsa* offerings are prescribed in one place, and their *mantras* in another. As two sentences are connected by mutual need, so the two places are connected by mutual need, and the *mantras* become the *angas* of the offerings—the first *mantra* of the first offering; the second *mantra* of the second offering; and the third *mantra* of the third offering (Section 3, Sub-section 5).

(vi) *Samākhyā*. This is the meaning of words by *yoga* (Para 11). The term *houtram*, referring to the *rik veda*, connects it with the *hotā*, who alone is authorised to recite its verses. Similarly *ādhvaryavam* connects the *yajur veda* with the *adhvaryu*; and *āudgātram* connects the *sāma veda* with the *Udgātā* (Section 3, Sub-Section 6).

19. It often happens that more than one *pramāṇa* are applicable in the interpretation of a text; and the question arises which of them should be followed. It is laid down that of the six *pramāṇas*—*Śruti*, *lingam*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇam*, *sthānam*, and *samākhyā* each is weaker than the preceding one. For *śruti* being the highest authority, everything else should be connected with it. In regard to *lingam* it must be inferred that there is a *śruti* in its support; and this means delay, while the authority of the *śruti* is quickly accepted. *Śruti* therefore prevails over *lingam*. As between *lingam* and *vākya*, a capacity has to be assumed in the latter, which must then be connected with a *śruti* by inference.

It is therefore weaker than the other. As between *vākyam* and *prakaraṇam* two sentences must be connected to form a *vākyam*; this must then be connected with a *lingam* and through it with a *śruti*. *Prakaraṇam* is thus removed from *śruti* by the intervention of *vākyam* and *lingam*, while there is but *lingam* between *vākyam* and *śruti*. *Prakaraṇam* is therefore weaker than *vākyam*. Similarly with regard to the others.

20. The following is an illustration. "With *aindrī* mantra praise the *gārhapatya* (One of the three fires maintained by the householder). The termination of *aindrī* is *śruti*, and makes the *mantra* an *anga* of the praising. But the term means a *mantra* of which *Indra* is the *devatā*; and it cannot appropriately be used in praising the fire. Here the indication of the *devatā* *Indra* is *lingam*, which is weaker than *śruti*, and is over-ruled. The meaning of the word *Indra* established by usage is abandoned, and the meaning by *yoga* is adopted. This is the highest ruler, and it is not inappropriate to the *gārhapatya* fire, which is of greater importance than the other two (Section 3, Sub-Section 7).

21. In this third chapter four important rules are deduced, to which reference will be made in the *Srī Bhāshya*. They are:

(i) *Aruṇā adhikaraṇam*. Here is a text—"with a red, reddish-brown eyed, one-year-old cow purchase the *soma*" (creeper). In the *mīmāṃsaka*'s view the word *aruṇayū* (red) denotes a quality only. By its termination, which is *śruti*, it makes the quality

a means for the purchase; and the question is whether it can be the means. The first view is that it cannot be, and that the *ṣruti* cannot indicate the relation of *anga* and *angi*. The word *aruṇayā* should therefore be separated from the text. Then the *prakaraṇam* will come in; the *ṣruti* in the word will refer to everything mentioned in the context, and the other part of the word will prescribe the quality for all of them. The final decision is that the quality being stated by the *ṣruti* as a means of purchase, we must accept it. This cannot happen except through something having a form, and this is available here in the form of the one-year-old cow (Section 1, Sub-Section 6).

22. (ii) *Graha-ekatva rule*. Here is a text 'With the *dasā pavitram* wipe the *graha*.' *Graha* is a wooden vessel in which the juice of the *soma* is received and offered to various *devatās*; when it is filled, it should be wiped with a towel to prevent any drop from falling down. Here wiping is enjoined; and the only question is whether oneness also is prescribed. This cannot be; for then the meaning would be—wipe the *graha*, and the *graha* to be wiped is one. There would be two sentences, while the text can be understood as one sentence only. To make two sentences in such a case is a serious fault. Hence in giving the direction it was not the intention to refer to the number. The subject in regard to which an injunction is given is known as *uddeśya*; and the rule is—the number of the word denoting the *uddeśya* should be neglected (Section 1, Sub-section 7).

23. (iii) *Vājapeya yūpa* rule. "Seventeen-aratni high is the *yūpa* of *vājapeya*." *Yūpa* is a post to which the goat to be offered is tied. The view that the first word should be connected with the word *vājapeya*, which is next to it, is overruled by the fact that it and the word *yūpa* have the same case-ending. The *yūpa*, though not an *anga* of *vājapeya*, which is a *soma yaga*, yet it is an *anga* of the *paśu yāga*, which is itself an *anga* of *vājapeya*. Hence the *yūpa* may be an *anga* of *vājapeya* through its *anga* (Section 1, Sub-Section 9).

24. (iv) *Upakrama adhikaraṇa*. Refer to the text quoted in para 18 (iii) *supra*. It comes at the end of a context, while its beginning refers to the three *vedas* thus—"The three *vedas* were born; from *agni rik veda*; from *vāyu*, the *yajur veda*; from *āditya* the *sāma veda*". The terms *rik*, *yajur*, and *sāman* denote *mantras*; this is their primary meanings. Though the commencement is *arthavāda*, and the text at the close contains injunctions, and therefore possesses greater force, yet the close should not override the commencement. The commencement created the first impression. The text at the end did not then exist; it attained an existence afterwards so as not to conflict with the first impression; for it forms with the beginning a connected whole. Hence the words *rik*, *yajur*, and *sāman* mean the respective *vedas*: and the high and under tones are connected with them through the *mantras*, which are contained in them. The result of this discussion is that under this decision, the *rik* (verse) in the *rik veda* alone

should be recited in a high tone, but not the *rik* (verse) in the *yajur veda* (Section 3, Sub-section 1).

25. *Chapter 4* deals with *prayukti*. That is, it determines whether a thing that is prescribed helps an offering or whether it confers a benefit on the person who makes it. An example of the first is *prayāja* offerings. Without them, the principal offerings will not be effective; but they confer no benefit on the *yajamāna*. An example of the second is given in the following text—"For one who desires cows—in the vessel in which cows are milked". This refers to the carrying of water in a *chamasa* (a four-sided wooden basin with a handle) and placing it to the north of the *āhavanīya* fire for making fried rice flour into a ball. The *ishti*, in which this is done, may be completed without the milking vessel. Hence, the use of the vessel is only for the *yajamāna*'s benefit (Section 1, Sub-section 2).

26. *Chapter 5*. Deals with the order in which principal *karmas* and their *angas* should be done. The order is determined as follows:

(i) By *śruti* or express statement, as by the use of the participle ending with the termination *tvā* or its substitute *ya* (Section 1, Sub-Section 1).

(ii) By the nature of things. }

(iii) By the reading in the *veda*. }

In the text.

"He does the *agnihotra homa*; he cooks gruel" the order is that of the reading in the *veda*; but as it is the gruel that is to be offered, it should be cooked first, and then the offering should be made. This order is

determined by the nature of things (*artha-krama*), and it over-rides the *pātha krama*. (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 2).

The order of reading in the *mantras* prevails over the order of reading in the *brāhmaṇas*; for the work of the latter is done, when the injunctions are given; it is the *mantras* that are concerned with the performance (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 9).

(iv) By the order of the first operation. In the *vājapeya* seventeen goats should be offered to the *devatā prajāpati*; and every one of them should be dedicated, then tied to a post, and sprinkled with water. Ghee should be rubbed on its head, and live coal should be carried round it. Each operation should be gone through for all of them before the next operation is taken up. The first operation may be done in any order; but when this order has been determined, it should be followed for all the other operations (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 5).

(v) By the place of the *karmas*. In a *soma yāga* known as *sādyaskram* the three *pasu yāgas*, which should be done respectively on the fourth day, on the fifth day and after the bathing, are done on the same day. The second *yāga* retains its place, while the others are shifted from their places. The second *yāga* therefore comes first, and the others in their natural order (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 6).

(vi) By the order of the principal *karmas*. In the *Chitrā yāga*, a variety of the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa* *ishtis*, seven offerings are made, of which the fourth and fifth are to *Sarasvatī* (a female *devatā*) and *sarasvān* (a

male *devatā*). By a rule of grammar one word in the dual number denotes both the *devatās*, and this word is used in the injunction text. The order of the offerings is determined by the *hotā's* *mantras*, and the offering is made first to *Sarasvatī* and then to *Sarasvān*. In the preparation of the offerings also the same order should be followed (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 7).

27. One other case of order should be mentioned here. In the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa ishtis* the offerings commence with the placing of fifteen twigs on the fire, one after another, with a *mantra*, and the number of *mantras* is therefore fifteen. But in certain *yāgas* performed like the *ishtis*, the number of *mantras* is raised to twenty-one. The additional *mantras* are brought in from a place, which the *veda* indicates. The question is where they should be placed. As there is no reason why the order fixed in the *ishtis* should be broken, the new comers should be placed at the end. An exception is made in the case of two *mantras*, which by express direction should be placed between the eighth and ninth *mantras* (Section 3, Sub-Section 3).

28. *Chapter 6* deals with the qualifications for the performance of *yāgas*. They are a desire for their fruits, a knowledge of their ritual, and capacity for doing them. Every one may desire the fruits; and a student of the *veda* and of the *kalpa sūtras* will have the necessary knowledge. The question of capacity alone has to be considered.

(i) First, the blind, the deaf, the mute and the maimed are obviously disqualified. The first cannot see

what is going on ; the second cannot hear, when addressed by the *adhvaryu* ; the third cannot recite the *mantras* ; and the last cannot move about (Section 1, Sub-section 2).

(ii) One labouring under a bodily infirmity, which can be removed, remains disqualified, until the removal takes place (*Ibid.*, Sub-Sections 9 and 10).

(iii) Poverty is not a disqualification. A poor man becomes qualified on obtaining the necessary means (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 8).

(iv) Sex is no disqualification. In the text "One desiring *svarga* (*Svarga-kāma*) should do a *yāga*," the masculine gender of the word denoting the *uddesya* was not intended ; for the same reason that the number was not (See para 22 *supra*.) But the wife cannot perform a *yāga* apart from her husband ; nor the husband apart from his wife ; for each has to perform certain functions in the *yāga* (*Ibid.*, Sub-Sections 3 and 4).

29. The *sudra* is not qualified ; for he does not possess the requisite knowledge, which should be obtained only from the *veda*. As there is no injunction to do *upanayana* for him, he cannot do *adhyayana*, of which this ceremony is an *anga*. The *yāgas* prescribed by the *veda* do not seek him, as they find qualified persons in the other castes. (Section 1, Sub-Section 7). There are, however, two exceptions :

(i) Here is a text 'In the rainy season a *rathakāra* should do *adhānam*' (establishing the three fires). One may take the meaning of the term *ratha kāra* by *yoga*, and say it means "one who makes a car". But by *rūḍhi*

it denotes a member of a mixed caste ; and *rūḍhi* prevails over *yoga*. One born of a *Vaiśya* woman to a *kshattriya* is known as *māhishya* ; a woman born of a *sudra* woman to a *vaiśya* is known as *Karaṇī* ; and one born of a *karaṇī* to a *Māhishya* is a *ratha kūra*. In his case there is express authority (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 12).

(ii) In connection with the offering of cooked rice to the *devatā Rudra*, there is a text ' By this help a. *nishāda-Sthapati* to do a *yāga* '. The compound word may be taken to be *Tatpuruṣa*, and explained as meaning the *sthapati* or head of *nishādas*, and this head may be a member of the higher castes. The term *nishāda* would then be used in a secondary sense, meaning one connected with *nishādas* ; this would be *lakṣhaṇā*, which is a fault. Hence the compound word should be taken as *karmadhāraya* to mean a *nishāda*, who is a *sthapati*. Being a member of a mixed caste, he cannot learn the *veda* ; but on the authority of the text, the requisite knowledge should be obtained from a teacher at the time (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 13).

30. Section 5 of this chapter lays down the *apaccheda* rule, to which reference is made in the *Sri Bhāṣya*. On the principal day of a *soma yāga* the *yajamāna* and five helpers go in procession from the east door of the *havirdhāna* to the north-east corner of the Sacrificial ground, and then sitting down the *udgātā* and his two assistants sing the *stotram* known as *bahish pavamāna*. In the procession they go one behind another, holding him by the hand, and until they reach

the place, the chain should not be broken. If the *udgātā* lets go his hold, the *yāga* should be completed without distributing the promised rewards to the helpers, and it should be re-done. If the offender be the *pratihartā*, the penalty is that the *yajamāna* should give away all his wealth as rewards. Now, if both the breaks (*apaccheda*) take place at the same time, one or the other penalty may be paid at the option of the *yajamāna*. If they take place one after the other, the penalty for the later break should be paid. Here the two breaks are in no way connected, and either may happen first, or may not happen at all (Sub-Sections 18 and 19).

31. *Chapters 7 and 8.* The first six chapters give all the instruction needed for the performance of *yāgas* and are known as *upadeśa* part. The next four chapters deal with *atideśa*—i.e., with the application of the ritual of *prakṛiti yāgas* to those known as *vikṛiti yāgas*. The *prakṛiti yāgas* are *agnihotram*, *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa ishtis*, and *agnishṭoma soma yāga*; and for these the ritual is explained in full detail. For the *vikṛiti yāgas* the *veda* states merely their *devatās* and the offerings, and gives the *mantras* for making those offerings. The ritual of some *prakṛiti yāga* has to be selected and applied to them.

This selection is made in the following ways :

(i) *By express direction.* *Śyena* and *ishu* are two *soma yāgas* to which the ritual of *agnishṭoma* is applied. Certain special items are prescribed for the *śyena*, and a special item for the *ishu*; and it is added 'The others

(*Itarat*) are the same as in the *ṣyena*.' Thus, the *ṣyena* is expressly stated to be the *yāga* from which the ritual should be taken for the *ishu*. Now, does this application refer to all items or only to the special items? The reply is given that the term 'others' refers to something that has been stated; and that therefore it refers to the special items only (Chapter 7, Section 1, Sub-Section 2).

(ii) *By the name of a yāga*. Refer to the text in para 15 (vi). The name *agnihotra* indicates that the ritual should be taken from the *agnihotra* done throughout one's life (Chapter 7, Section 3, Sub-Section 1).

(iii) *By marks* showing closest resemblance to the *vikriti yāga*. In the offering of cooked rice to the *devatā sūrya* the *devatā* is single, and the offering is a vegetable product. These marks are found in the first offering of a *purodāṣa* to the *devatā agni* in the *pūrṇamāsa ishti*. Hence this is selected. *Purodāṣa* is a ball of fried rice flour. In the offering of a *purodāṣa* to the *devatā Indra cum agni* the selection should be of the third offering in the *pūrṇamāsa ishti*, in which also the *devatā* is double—viz., *agni cum soma*. In the offering of a *paṣu* (a four-footed animal) to the *devatā agni cum soma*, which is an *anga* of a *soma yāga*, the selection should be of the offering of milk to the *devatā Indra*, the second *yāga* in the *darṣa ishti*. The offering in this comes from an animal, and parts of an animal's body are offered in the *vikriti yāga*. In addition to this mark, there are two others, viz., *prayāja* and *āghāra* offerings found in both (Chapter 8, Section 1,

sub-sections 2 and 4, and section 2, sub-sections 2 and 3).

32. When a *prakṛiti yāga* is indicated by the offering, and another by the *devatā*, the former should be selected. The material to be offered is close to the act of offering, while the *devatā* has to be thought of by the mind, and is therefore remote. (Chapter 8, Section 1, Sub-Section 17).

33. Chapter 9 deals with *ūham*, i.e., changes to be made in *mantras*. When the ritual is taken along with *mantras* from a *prakṛiti yāga*, and is applied to a *vikṛiti yāga*, some *mantras* may be found to be unsuitable. For instance, the *mantra* for taking paddy from a bag contains the word *agnaye* (for *agni*). This being unsuitable to the *yāga* of the *devatā sūrya* referred to in para 31 (iii), the word should be replaced by the word *sūryāya* (for *sūrya*); and this change in the *mantra* is *ūham*. (Section 1, Sub-section 13). In most cases the only change that need be made is to change the number or gender of a word.

34. This chapter contains the *pāṣa* rule, to which reference will be made in the *Srī Bhāshya*. When the goat in a *paṣu yāga* is killed by suffocation, the *adhvaryu* goes to the place and unties the rope on its leg, with the *mantra*, 'May *aditi* untie these ropes'. There being but one animal and one rope, the plural *pāṣān* is unsuitable. May it be changed? Reply. Not necessary. The word consists of three elements—*pāṣa* (rope), the termination showing it to be the object of untying, and the termination denoting its number. Of

these the first is the most important, showing the object to be dealt with. The next element shows its relation to the work, and comes next; and the third element is the least important. As the first and second elements are not unsuitable, to fix attention on the least important element, and hold the whole *mantra* as unsuitable is not legitimate. No change need therefore be made (Section 3, Sub-section 5).

35. Chapter 10 deals with *bādha*, i.e., the annulment of an item coming in by *atideṣa*. This will occur in three ways:

(i) By the service to be rendered by the item not being required. In an offering to the *devatā prajāpati* the material consists of a hundred *krishṇalas* (small pieces of gold) cooked in ghee. By *atideṣa* the husking with a pestle and mortar comes in; and its service is to remove the husk from paddy. As this is not needed, the husking operation is dropped (Section 1, sub-section 1).

(ii) By the prescription of a special item. Regarding the *paṣu yāga* to the *devatā agni cum soma*, it is stated that the *prayājas* are eleven. This item comes in by *atideṣa* with the number five from the *darṣa isṭhi*; but by the number eleven the number five is annulled. (Section 3, sub-section 1).

(iii) By the use of the negative particle *na*—Regarding the *soma yāga* known as *atirātra* there are two conflicting texts—"fill the *shodaṣi graha* in *atirātra*;" "Do not fill the *graha* in *atirātra*". Here the injunction and prohibition relating to the same matter, option is

given to fill the *graha* or not to fill it (Section 8, sub-section 3).

36. Option (*Vikalpa*) is considered to be faulty in eight ways, and is avoided, wherever possible. For instance, in the text 'In *anuyājas* do not recite *ye yajāmahe*', the particle *na* may be joined to the verb as in the translation of the text here, or it may be connected with the word *anuyājas*. In the former case, it prohibits the recitation of the *mantra*; in the latter the meaning will be 'Recite the *mantra* in offerings other than *anuyājas*. In the former case it is *prati-shedha*; in the latter *paryudāsa* (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 1).

37. Chapters 11 and 12 deal with *tantra* and *prasanga*. The five *prayāja* offerings serve the three principal offerings in the *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa isṭhis*. They are offered at the same place and time and by the same person. Should the *prayājas* be offered separately for each? Reply. No; they serve them all by being done but once, as a dancer pleases the whole of an audience by dancing before it, but not separately for each person. To do a thing once in this manner is known as *tantram* (Chapter 11, Section 1, Sub-Section 10).

38. In the case considered in the last para all the three offerings are of equal importance. Where an offering comes between two offerings and is connected with them, but is of minor importance, it profits by the service rendered to the principal offerings. In the *paśu yāga* to the *devatā agni cum soma*, the first is the offering of the *vapā* (the membrane covering the animal's

stomach), and the second is the offering of two bits from each of eleven parts taken out of its body. Between them comes the offering of a *puroḍāsa* to the same *devatā*. This occupies a subordinate position; and it profits by the *prayāja* offerings made for the principal *yāgas*. The receipt of service in this manner is known as *prasangam*. The difference between *tantram* and *prasangam* is that in the former it is the intention to serve them all; and that in the latter the subordinate *yāga* is not considered, when the service is rendered. (Chapter 12, Section 1, Sub-section 1).

39. Sections 3 and 4 of the last chapter discuss the question whether two or more things prescribed should be combined, or whether one or another of them may be done at one's option. Regarding *āghāra* offerings in the *darśa* and *pūrṇa māsa ishtis* it is stated "Make the *āghāra* in a straight line; make the *āghāra* continuously". Here as service is rendered in different ways, both the operations should be combined. Regarding the *ishtis* there are two texts—"Do the *yāga* with paddy; and 'do the *yāga* with *yava*' (another grain). The service to be rendered is in the making of the *puroḍāsa*; and this service being one, it may be done by either grain. In this case there is no combination, but only option to be exercised at the *yajamāna*'s choice (Section 3, Sub-sections 3 and 4).

40. To proceed to the *Brahma sūtras*. They number 545, and are divided into four chapters, each of which is sub-divided into four sections. The first chapter establishes *Brahma* as the only cause of the

evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the Universe, the cause being both operative and material. The second chapter confirms this conclusion by removing every objection that may be urged against it. The remaining chapters deal respectively with the means by which *Brahma* may be reached, and with the nature of the goal. The first two chapters are concerned with what already exists—*i.e.*, *Brahma*, while the last two chapters relate to what has to be brought about—*i.e.*, the means and the goal. Each section discusses a number of topics. The *sūtra* or *sūtras* dealing with one topic form an *adhikaraṇa* or sub-section. In each of them a *vedic* text is taken; the views which may be held regarding it are examined and a final decision is arrived at. The first or superficial view is known as *pūrva paksha*, and the final decision as *Siddhānta*. The number of sub-sections is one hundred and fifty-six, distributed as shown below :

CHAPTER	SECTION				TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	
I.	11	6	10	8	35
II.	10	8	7	8	33
III.	6	8	26	15	55
IV.	11	11	5	6	33
Grand total					156

The distribution of the *sūtras* among the sections is as follows :

CHAPTER	SECTION				TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	
I.	32	33	44	29	138
II.	36	42	52	19	149
III.	27	40	64	51	182
IV.	19	20	15	22	76
Grand total					545

41. It will be convenient to the reader to take a bird's eye-view of the contents of the *sūtras*. The first four sub-sections are preliminary, and remove four objections which bar the proposed enquiry. The objections are—(i) As the *Upanishads* state what is, but do not direct the doing of an action, they can convey no meaning; (ii) The definition given of *Brahma* is faulty. (iii) As *Brahma* can be known from inference, there is no need to examine the *veda*; and (iv) The statements made therein being mere praise, there is no guarantee that what is stated is true.

42. In the next three sub-sections creation texts are examined to see who *Brahma* is. Taking first the *Sat Vidyā*, (Chapter VI of the *Chandogya*), it is shown that *prakṛiti* (matter) cannot be the Being under enquiry. For 'He willed, I will become many' (*Ibid.*, VI, 2-3) and evolved successively as fire, water and earth. This

clearly indicates an intelligent Being. In the *Ānanda-valli*, the world-cause is stated to be *ānandamaya*, i.e., possessing by His nature, bliss in a degree beyond thought or speech (IV, 1); and this mark separates Him from the *jīva*, whether bound or free. Sub-section 7 draws attention to an exquisitely brilliant body with lotus-like eyes, in which He appears both in the sun and in the eye as seen by *yogis*. A Being answering this description is *Nārāyaṇa* Himself. This body is not one made by *karma*; for this Being is said to have risen above all evil; which term evil (*pāpma*) includes both good and bad deeds.

43. *The remainder of Chapter I*, excepting five sub-sections, examines twenty-three passages taken from different places, and decides that reference is made in them all not to a *jīva* nor to a product of matter, as contended by the *Sāṅkhya*, but to *Brahma* Himself. This examination is needed in support of the conclusion already drawn. The sub-sections are grouped into four sections, as the marks on which the *first view* is based are very indistinct in the first section; indistinct in the second; and distinct in the third; and as in the fourth passages resemble the descriptions in *Sāṅkhya* books. Of the omitted sub-sections, three deal with the fitness of the *devas* for *vidyās* in general, and for the particular *vidyā* known as *Madhu vidyā*, and with the unfitness of the *sudra* for all *vidyās*. These three sub-sections come in incidentally. The fourth affirms that *Brahma* is material, as well as the operative cause of the Universe. The last sub-section concludes by referring

to the arguments set out in the preceding *sūtras* for explanation of passages, which have not received special attention.

44. *Chapter II, Section I.* The conclusion stated in the first chapter that *Brahma* was both the operative and material causes, brings a host of opponents upon the author.

(i) The first objection is that the *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga sūtras* should not be ignored, as they were purposely written to elucidate the *vedānta*. The reply is that the works of *manu* and *Parāśara*, which are consistent with the *Vedānta*, are available; while the works of *Kapila* and *Hiraṇyagarbha*, which conflict with it, should be rejected. (Sub-Sections 1 and 2).

(ii) The *vaiśeṣhika*, the *Saugata* and the *Ārhata* come forward, and however much they may cut one another's throat, they join hands in attacking the author for not accepting evolution from minute atoms. The author dismisses them contemptuously with the remark that mere speculation cannot lead to a final result. (Sub-Section 4).

(iii) The *Sāṅkhya* re-appears and contends that there must be similarity between the cause and the effect; and that this does not obtain between *Brahma* and the universe. The reply is that the similarity as understood by the opponent is not uniform; for a scorpion comes forth from a handful of cow-dung, and a wasp from a worm. (Sub-section 3).

(iv) The *vaiśeṣhika* now appears on the scene, and urges that *Brahma* cannot evolve as the universe,

as the cause and the effect are always distinct. His arguments are criticised, and the *Sat Kārya* theory is established. A by-stander, who hears this decision, comes forward to say that if this be so, *Brahma*, and the *jīva* being one, the evolution should be entirely different, and not be a matter of great disadvantage to Himself as the *Jīva*. The author replies that *Brahma* is different from the *jīva*, and that He is one with the *jīva* in the sense of forming an aggregate with him and with matter, which aggregate evolves from the subtle to the gross condition. (Sub-Sections 6 and 7).

(v) The remaining objections consist of four items :

(a) The potter, though with a lump of earth before him, and though capable of making it into various articles, is yet helpless without his wheel and rod. Is not *Brahma* equally helpless in the absence of the necessary instruments. For before creation they did not exist. Reply. Being omnipotent, He evolves independently of help, as milk changes into curd, and water changes into ice. (Sub-Section 8).

(b) The potter's lump of earth is either wholly expended in the making of vessels, or a portion remains unworked up ; and this alternative is possible, as it is divisible. Is *Brahma* fully expended, when He becomes the *ātmā* of every aggregate, or Is any portion left over? The latter alternative is out of the question, as He is indivisible. Reply. He is the *ātmā* of every aggregate, and has also a separate existence ; for it is so taught. In a matter, which is wholly beyond the

senses, the facts should be accepted as they are stated by the *Veda*. Being an unique Being, He should not be tested by what is seen in the world. (Sub-section 9).

(c) The potter works in a body. Does not *Brahma* need a body likewise: The reply is the same as in (b) *supra*. (Sub-section 9).

(d) The potter works' to earn his livelihood. Why does *Brahma* work? Is it not stated that He has everything that one can ever desire to possess? The reply is that it is mere play. This does not, however, imply partiality and cruelty on His part—partiality in making some *jivas* as *devas*, others as men, and still others as beasts or plants and trees; and cruelty in making them suffer misery now and tortures in hell hereafter. The reply is that He is a common agent, and rules impartially, giving to each what he has earned by his own *karma*. (Sub-section 10).

45. *Chapter II, Section 2*. In this, the author carries war into the opponent's camp, and exposes their faults, in order that one may not be deluded into thinking that there is something of value in their systems. He examines them as shown below :

	Sub-section
<i>Sāṅkhya</i> system	1
<i>Vaiṣeṣhika</i>	2
<i>Soutrāntika</i> and <i>Vaibhāṣhika</i> 's	3
<i>Yogachār</i> 's system.	4
<i>Madhyamika</i> 's theory	5
<i>Arhata</i> system	6
<i>Pasupata</i> system.	7

In the last sub-section, he defends the *Pāñcharātra*, the teaching given by Īṣvara Himself to several individuals at different times, and shows that the objections raised against it are due to misunderstanding.

46. *Chapter II, Sections 3 and 4.* In these, the question of evolution is examined from the point of view of the products. 'It is shown that everything evolves from *Brahma*, except the *jīva*,—ether and air, and the instruments of the *jīva*, the *mind*, the five sense organs, the five organs of motion and *prāṇa*. (Sub-sections 1 and 3).

(ii) It is also shown that the five elements evolved directly from Him, and it is affirmed very clearly that the meanings of words are primary, not secondary, when they denote *Brahma* (Sub-section 2).

(iii) This evolution is known as *samashṭi*—creation without diversity. In the evolution, which followed it also, known as *vyashṭi*, i.e., creation with diversity, it is He that works, but through His agent *Brahmā*. (Section 4, sub-section 8).

(iv) Some minor matters are dealt with. The number of senses is eleven, including the mind; these and *prāṇa* are of minute size; *prāṇa* is a product of air; but it is neither air nor its activity; it is an instrument of the *jīva*, but not like the mind and the senses; for, its function is to regulate the vital processes; and though its activities are five-fold, it is regarded as one.

47. *Section 3, Sub-sections 4 to 6.* These deal with the *jīva*, and come in incidentally in connection with the question whether he is made like

ether or not. First, the view of the *Sāṅkhya*, that the *jīva* is merely *jñānam* (self—revealed) and not a knower, and the view of the *vaiśeṣika* that he possesses the attribute *jñānam* only as an accident are refuted, and it is shown that he is both self-revealed, and is by nature the owner of the attribute *jñānam*. In support of this conclusion, it is proved that he is atomic in size, that he abides in the heart, and knows everything with the attribute *jñānam*, which spreads all round him within the body. It is also shown that he acts, and is a responsible agent ; but that this capacity is limited by the control of *Brahma*. The author refutes the *Sāṅkhya*'s view, that the *jīva* does not act, having nothing to gain by action, and that what acts is matter in the form of the mind. His responsibility is not, however, incompatible with control by *Brahma*. For He first looks to the *jīva*'s resolve. ' I will do this ' and then accepting it, moves him. As the world-ruler He gives to each a body, and the mind and the sensory and motor organs, and confers on him the capacity to control them. He gives him the *veda* to know what *karma* is good and what is evil. He supports him by His presence within him, and except in the first choice he co-operates with him, every action being done by both. In so far as He does these things, He treats all alike and is thoroughly impartial. The *jīva*, being thus helped, begins to do good or evil deeds, as his desire prompts him ; and *Brahma* rewards or punishes him as he deserves.

48. *Chapter III.* This chapter deals with the means by which the *jīva* may attain release ; but a disgust

should first be created for his condition of bondage and a yearning to reach *Brahma*. Section 1 has the first object in view. When the *jiva* goes after death to *svarga*, he goes in a subtle body fashioned out of the last earthly body; and he returns in the same body, which forms the nucleus of the new earthly body (Sub-section 1). All his past *karma* is not expended; but he returns with a load of what has not yet matured (Sub-section 2). Even this short-lived enjoyment is denied to most *jivas*, who quickly return to earth-life. All those who do not enter a mother's womb to be reborn are of this class (Sub-section 3). Sub-sections 4 to 6 explain that on the return journey the *jiva* in his subtle body is merely in contact with various things, such a contact as prevents his being recognised. If he were a *devatā* controlling them, or had a body made of these materials, he might have had enjoyment of a sort; but this is denied; and he is said to be in a sleepy condition. If he were born as a plant or a tree, he might be useful to men and accumulate merit; this also is denied. This is sufficient to make any one be disgusted with material existence, if he turns his attention to the matter.

49. *Chapter III, Section 2.* The object of this is to create in the *jiva* a yearning to reach *Brahma*. He creates a dream-world to the sleeping *jiva*, as reward or punishment for *karma* of a petty kind. As his Inner Ruler he receives him during deep sleep and gives him a short respite from the turmoils of the day (Sub-sections 1 and 2). This union of the *jiva* with his Maker is not final release. For he soon resumes his

previous name and form (Sub-section 3). The next sub-section, shows *Brahma* to be free from all imperfections and to be the seat of every estimable quality. Though this is clear from numerous texts, several misconceptions have to be removed. These are—

(i) He must suffer pleasure and pain like the *jiva*, as he is within his body. It was pointed out in Chapter I, section 2, *sūtra* 8, that not being the owner of the body, He remained unaffected. It is now urged that the *jiva*'s body, being in every way undesirable, entry into it, even of His own choice, must pollute Him. The reply is that this does not happen, as there are express statements to that effect.

(ii) As the maker of diverse names and forms, He himself is *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kshattriya* and so on, and becomes subject to the performance of all the duties pertaining to them; this is bondage. The reply is that though He takes the forms and names, He is practically without them; *i.e.*, He is free from their effects.

(iii) Being Himself *Jñānam* (self-revealed), he cannot possess qualities. The reply is that the text relied on merely makes an affirmation; and that no denial is implied. If he be accepted as *jñānam* on the authority of one text, He should be accepted as the seat of good qualities on the authority of other texts. The denial of attributes in a *Bṛihad Āraṇyaka* text means that the forms expressly taught in that place are not His only forms.

It is next shown that no being is higher than He, and that it is He who gives all fruits, not only

release, but even worldly enjoyment. (Sub-Sections 7 and 8).

50. *Chapter III, Section 3.* The instruction conveyed in the two preceding sections should make one anxious to begin *Brahma vidyā*, and this is considered in this section. The first question is whether two or more places in the *Upanishads* teach the same *vidyā*. This is determined by four marks—the form of the injunction, the substance of the meditation, the fruit promised and the name of the meditation. If these be the same, the *vidyā* is one. This test is applied in 17 cases as shown on the margin :

	Sub-Sections
(i) <i>Udgītha vidyā</i>	2, 17, 22, 26
(ii) <i>Dahara vidyā</i>	16, 18, 19
(iii) <i>Prāṇa vidyā</i> .	3, 5
(iv) <i>Purusha Vidyā</i>	9
(v) <i>Vaiṣvānara vidyā</i>	23
(vi) <i>Śāṇḍilya vidyā</i> .	6
(vii) <i>Other vidyās</i> .	7, 8, 10, 15, 20

The remaining sub-sections deal with the following topics common to all *vidyās* :

(a) Those attributes, without which *Brahma* cannot be recognised, should form the subject of meditation in all cases (sub-section 4). This conclusion is extended to the negative attributes enumerated in *Mundaka* (I, 1-6). (Sub-Section 14).

(b) As the meditator also enters into the meditation, he should think of himself as he would be

in release, *i.e.*, as possessing eight qualities in common with *Brahma* (Sub-section 21).

(c) Along with the principal meditation, there should be two subsidiary ones—(i) on the *devayāna* (the path by which the freed *jīva* goes up,) and (ii) on the separation of his good and bad deeds, when meditation is established, and on the transfer at his death of the good deeds to his friends, and of the bad deeds to his enemies. The transfer takes place at the point of death, but not some portion then and the remainder on crossing the *virajā*. The subtle body, in which he travels, though not originated by *vidyā*, is yet retained under its power as the necessary means of the journey (Sub-sections 11, 12 and 13).

(d) The *Brahma vidyās* are not the same, though the object meditated on is *Brahma* in all of them; for the form of meditation is not the same, but differs in each case (Sub-section 24). But as the fruit of all is the same, *viz.*, the getting out of the beginningless *karma*-stream, and the enjoyment of *Brahma*, it is left to each to choose any one *vidyā*. In the case of other fruits, which are limited, the combination of many means is intelligible; but *Brahma* is a fruit which is in no way limited (Sub-section 25).

51. *Chapter III, Section 4.* In this section, the helps to *Brahma-vidyā* are examined; but first the relative importance of *vidyā* and *karma* (*yāgas* enjoined in the earlier portion of the *veda*) is fully discussed. The helps to *vidyā* are of four classes:

(a) The duties of one's stage of life prescribed by the *Veda*. (Sub-section 5).

(b) Control of the mind and the rest stated in the text "Hence, one who knows this, controls the mind, controls the senses, withdraws from prohibited and fruit-yielding actions, bears with equanimity whatever comes, and preserves a serene mind, and thus equipped he sees *parama ātmā* in himself". The helps of the first kind do not conflict with the control of the mind, as they relate to different matters. The former variety relates to what is enjoined, and the latter to everything else. Nor will the performance of *karmas* continue evil tendencies, if they be performed as worship of *Brahma*; for it has the reverse effect (Sub-section 6).

(c) Control in the matter of food. This is a particular form of the control already prescribed; but its importance deserves special mention (Sub-Section 7).

(d) Three duties mentioned in the text— "Hence, one who has learned the *veda* should attain *pāṇḍityam*; having done this, he should be like a child and do meditation; having acquired *pāṇḍityam* and child nature, he should become *muni*". The term *pāṇḍityam* means such a grasp of *vedic* learning, as will make one separate the wheat from the chaff, and produce a disgust for worldly things. To be like a child is to abstain from parading one's greatness; and to become a *muni* is ever to dwell on the object of meditation, whenever one is disengaged, the object being to prevent the mind from turning to worldly matters. (Sub-Sections 12 and 13).

52. In chapter I, Section 4, sub-sections 7 to 9, the fitness for *vidyā* was examined, with reference

to the main division of *jīvas* as *devas* and men, and the sub-division of men into castes (*varṇas*). It is now considered with reference to the stages of life. Men in all stages are fit, as also the widower, who remains outside. Examples of such men are found in *Bhīshma* and *Raikva*. But one, who has fallen from the stages other than that of the house-holder, remains ever unfit, however much he may expiate his fall by penance (Sub-section 10).

53. *Chapter IV, Section 1.* The last chapter deals with the fruits of meditation; but the form of meditation is first described. It was not considered in Chapter III, Section 3, its proper place, in order to show that a loving meditation is itself a fruit. The meditation should be continuous.

(ii) *Brahma* should be thought of as the *ātmā* of the meditator, *i.e.*, as one who rules him from within. For, this is the truth, and he must realise his position in release as dependent on that Being, and as existing only for Him. The meditation should be in the sitting posture. No other condition is prescribed. The point to be remembered is that the place, time and conditions selected should be such as will be conducive to one-pointedness. It should be continued up to the moment of departure from the world (Sub-sections 1, 2, 5 and 6).

54. The fruits of meditation are of four classes. Separation of *karma* from the meditator, his rising through the blood vessel going from the heart to the top of the head, his journey along the path known as *devayāna*, and his enjoyment in the highest heaven.

Sub-sections 7 to 11 deal with the first variety. When meditation is established, past *karma* is destroyed, and future *karma* will not pollute the meditator. This is a very merciful dispensation. If all past *karma* were to be wiped out by enjoyment, there would be no release whatever; for such wiping out the possession of a body would be *sine qua non*; and in that body the making of more *karma* would be inevitable. The non-attachment of future *karma* should be restricted to such as take place in sleep, and without intention (Sub-section 7). What has been stated is limited to the past *karma*, which has not begun to yield fruit. If all *karma* were intended, then the body should be thrown up at once; but its continuance for some time is a fact. The body therefore continues till *prārabdha*, that is *karma*, which has begun to yield fruit, is wiped out. (Sub-section 9).

55. *Chapter IV, Section 2.* This deals with fruits of the second class; but before considering them, it should be known for certain that the *jiva* to be released departs at all from his body. For a doubt is created by a text of the *Kāṭhāvalli*, and it is removed (Sub-Section 5). The rising from the body is described in sub-sections 1 to 4, 6 and 7, and happens in this manner. The tongue and other senses unite with the mind; the mind with the senses unite with *prāṇa*; this unites with the *jiva*, and with him unites with the five elements of his body in a subtle form; and the whole unites with *Brahma* in the heart. As in the case of sleep the departing *jiva* derives comfort after the turmoils of the

earth-life which has come to end. So far the rising from the body is common to all *jivas*. Here begins the difference. The *jiva* to be released rises along the blood vessel going from the heart to the head. By the grace of *Brahma* the end of the heart begins to shine, and he is able to see the entrance into the blood-vessel (Sub-section 8). He then journeys to the sun along his rays; which connect this world and the sun, as a road connects two villages (Sub-section 9). There is no restriction in his case as to the time of departure; it may be the day or the night; the six months of the sun's northward progress or the other part of the year. These restrictions apply to one who is to be re-born; but in the case of the *jiva* to be freed there is delay only till his body is thrown up. He has no more *karma* to be wiped out, and there is therefore no need for another earth-life (Sub-sections 10 and 11).

56. *Chapter IV, Section 3.* This deals with the third variety of the fruits. It decides that there is but one path known as the *devayāna*, and settles who are the beings that take the freed *jiva* on, and in what order. The last sub-section shows where the freed *jiva* is carried. The *rishi Bādari* was of opinion that he is taken to the creative agent *Brahmā*; and this view is refuted.

57. *Chapter IV, Section 4.* This shows that the freed *jiva* attains his true nature, including the full expansion of his attribute *jñānam*. He realises his oneness with the *Brahmā*, and thenceforward he has no interest except in co-operating with him and serving

Him. He is not merely *jñānam* (Self-revealed), but attains the eight qualities in common with Him. One of these is the capacity to compass anything by mere willing. He may take one or more bodies, as he needs for His service. If he does so, he may create such things as are required, as he did in the waking condition during bondage. If he does not take up any body, he derives enjoyment from things created by *Brahma*, as he did formerly in the dream condition. He has the same enjoyment as He Himself; and there is nothing excluded from such enjoyment, and the degree of bliss attained is the same. Finally, there is no return to this earth life; for having become all-knowing, there will be no desire on his part to do so; nor will *Brahmā* send him away, after all the trouble that He took to bring him to Himself. This bliss endures for ever.

58. In conclusion, the lines, on which the translation has been made, should be explained. The text of the original is not followed closely; but the substance has been taken and expressed in English. Repetitions have been avoided, wherever possible. The vedic texts, which are considered in the original, have been separately translated with the help of the *Upanishad Bhāshya* by *Ranga Rāmānuja*, and copious notes have been added therefrom. Hence, the portions of *Srī Bhāshya*, which quote the texts at great length, and explain them in detail, have been omitted; but are embodied in the translation of the vedic texts. Finally, minor matters, discussed at great length and breaking the continuity

of the main topic have been taken out of the text and added as foot notes.

59. The detailed criticism also of the views of *Ṣankara*, *Bhāskara*, *Yādava Prakāṣa* and *Vāchaspati* contained in chapter 1, section 1, sub-sections 1 and 4, and chapter 2, section 1, sub-section 5 has been omitted. From its large size it should form a separate work. It has been translated with the title "*Three Tatvas*" and is ready for publication.

60. The *Sri Bhāṣhya* cannot be fully understood without the help of the voluminous commentary named *Ṣruta Prakāṣika*. It was written by a teacher, who was removed from *Sri Rāmānuja* by three teachers only, and who may therefore be supposed to have known his meaning fully. It deals with three matters. It elucidates the *Sri Bhāṣhya*, explains vedic texts, and criticises in detail the interpretations of the various *Sūtras* given by other commentators. The first has been embodied in the translation in the body of the text, or has been added as foot-notes. The second has been embodied in the 'Vedic texts,' and the third has been omitted for the reason stated in para 59. It has not, however, been incorporated in the "*Three Tatvas*". The *Adhikaraṇa Sārāvali* of *Sri Desika* and the *Bhāva Prakāṣika* and *Ṣariraka Ṣūstrartha Dipika* of *Ranga Rāmānuja* have also been largely utilised.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER I

SECTION 1

PRELIMINARY

THE author in beginning his work offers a prayer to the highest Being :

Verse 1

May *Ṣemushi* (thought) in the form of loving meditation on *Srīnivāsa*, the highest *Brahma* (1), come to me,

(1) *Brahma* is a general term, and *Srīnivāsa* is a particular term, and when they are used together, the general term is synonymous with the particular term. This is the rule laid down in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. There is a direction —“Do the *yāga* with a *paṣu*”; and there is the direction to the *hotū* (one of the helpers in a sacrifice) to recite the appropriate *mantra* for the offering of the *vapū* of the *chāga* (goat). *Paṣu* is a general term, meaning any four-footed animal; and the term *chāga* is a particular term. The general term *paṣu* therefore refers to the goat (*Mīmāṃsā*, VI-8-9). Following this rule, we should understand that the general term *Sat*, *brahma*, *ātmā* and the like, which are used in the *Upanishads*, denote *Nārāyaṇa*, which is a particular term also found therein. Both the general and

the Being to whom (2) the evolution, sustenance and dissolution and the like of all created things is mere play;

particular terms are used in the verse to point this out. The term *Srinivāsa* by its etymology indicates that this Being appears with an exquisitely fine body in a world without changes brought about by time; and by its established usage, it exposes the error of the views held by some (i) that the three Beings—*Brahma*, *Vishṇu* and *Rudra*—are of equal importance; (ii) that they are one Being in three forms; (iii) that *Brahma* is above them all; and (iv) that *Īṣvara* alone is *Brahma*, that he is other than the three beings mentioned, that he is ever bliss, and that the three beings are subject to him. The term highest (*parasmin*) qualifying the term *Brahmaṇi* indicates that no other Being need be approached by one for gaining his end, and that He who is the highest bliss is also the means thereto. It also indicates that He is free from ail imperfections.

Similarly, the term *ṣemushī* (thought) in the original is a general term and *bhakti* (loving meditation) is a particular term; and their use in the verse is to show that the terms to know, to think and the like used in the *Upanishads* mean only loving meditation. By the term 'thought' the view that release is obtained by both *jnānam* (thought) and *karma* (action) is shown to be erroneous; and by the term *bhakti* (loving meditation) the view that the mere understanding of a text is such means is refuted.

(2) *The first adjectival clause*—'created things'. This is the meaning of the term *bhuvana* in the original. It means what becomes—*i.e.*, evolves. All created things—in whatever worlds they may be, and not merely in this our world, in which the creative agent, the four-faced *Brahmā* holds sway; also all things that existed in the past, that exist at present and that may come into being in the future. The sanskrit for 'ail' is *akhila*, which denotes that nothing is omitted from the scope of creation. It is therefore a stronger word than *Sakala* (ail). The term *nikhila* will perform the same duty; but *akhila* is better, as the first letter in it means *Vishṇu*, and is therefore auspicious in the

whose (3) main resolve is to protect all those who know Him and approach Him in all humility; and also all those who are related to them; and who (4)

commencement of a work. *Sustenance*—This is done by entry into all things, and by controlling them, by *avatāras*, and by influencing the world-rulers, *manus*, kings and parents. The words 'and the like' refer to the entry into every thing and its control. It does not include the giving of *moksha* (release from bondage to matter); for from its importance it deserves separate mention; and this is done in the second adjectival clause. The term 'play' indicates that this Being has every object of desire; that therefore He has nothing to gain for Himself by this work; and that He acts of His own choice, and not from compulsion by any outside agency.

(3) *Second adjectival clause*. "Those who know Him"—This is the meaning of the term *bhūta* in the original. Those who do not know Him may be said to be non-existent. 'Approach in all humility' refers to loving meditation on Him and to *prapatti*. This is to point out one's helplessness and to request Him to save him without the meditation. Those who approach Him in this manner are of many kinds—*devas* and men; among men they are in all stages of life—students, house-holders, forest-dwellers and those who have renounced the world. His love for them is so full, that it does not stop with them, but over-flows towards all those who are in any way related to them. To 'protect' them is to avert from them what is undesirable, and to give them what they desire. His main resolve is to do this work; for He regards it as of greater importance than any connected with Himself. The term *dīkshā* in the original, which means resolve, indicates that this protection is His own gain, and that any failure in this matter is to his own detriment.

(4) *Third adjectival clause*. The term *śruti*—meaning what is ever heard—indicates that the *veda* was not made by any one, that it is eternal and that therefore it is free from imperfections of every kind. The *Upanishads* form an

clearly shines in the principal portion of the *śruti* (*Veda*). (5), (6), (7).

important portion of the *śruti*, as the head is an important portion of the body; and this importance is due to their treating of the Highest *Brahma* as their main topic. He shines in the earlier part of the *veda*; for though it refers to *agni*, *Indra* and other *devatās*, they are in reality the forms in which He appears. In the *Upanishads*, however, He appears in His own form. The earlier part again deals with the means to enjoyments of a petty nature, which are mixed with suffering; but the *Upanishads* deal with the highest *Brahma*, who is bliss beyond thought or speech, and who is therefore the highest goal, which man can seek.

(5) By the first clause the greatness of *Brahma* is indicated, and by the second his accessibility. Both these are necessary, so that one may approach Him and beg for release. There is a hill named *meru*, which is said to be pure gold; but it cannot be reached. Pot shreds abound in the street; but they are of no value.

(6) In addition to containing a prayer, the verse briefly indicates the contents of the *sūtras*—By the first clause the subject of the first chapter, which is that *Brahma* is the cause of the evolution of the world, and that nothing else is. In the second chapter all objections to this conclusion are answered, and this is indicated by the term play (*līlā*). The terms *vinata* (approaching in all humility) and *rakshā* (protection) in the second clause indicate the subjects of the third and fourth chapters. To evolve the world, and to give *moksha* (release) are the peculiar functions of *Brahma*. The third clause indicates the first four sub-sections. If the words in the *Upanishads* do not convey any meaning, or if the definition of *Brahma* be faulty, *Brahma* cannot be said to shine in the *veda*. His shining clearly in the *Upanishads* indicates the fourth sub-section, which shows that *Brahma* is the highest bliss, and that therefore an examination of the *Upanishads* is highly profitable.

(7) The verse also indicates dissent from many erroneous views current in the country at one time or another. One

The author next states the subject of his work, and the need for writing it—

Verse 2

May the pure-minded on earth daily drink the nectar (1) of the words of *Parāśara*'s son, (2) which have

view is that *Īṣvara* merely looks on, while evolution takes place. Another is that evolution of the world does not take place at the same time, nor its dissolution. Still another view is that there are not many *jīvas*, and that the *jīva* and *Brahma* are one. The *chārvāka*, *bauddhas* and *jainas* do not accept the authority of the *veda*; the *Vaiśeṣhika* (the logician) holds the view that *Īṣvara* can be known by inference. He advocates evolution of the world from atoms, without the control of *Brahma*; while the *Sāṅkhya* is of opinion that evolution takes place from *pradhāna* independently; and he does not recognise the existence of an All-Ruler. The *pāṣupata* regards *Paśupati* as the highest Being. All these views are held to be erroneous, and this is indicated by the several words in the verse.

Verse 2. (1) Reference is made to the puranic story of the churning of the milk ocean by the *devas* and *asuras*, of the coming out of nectar (*amritam*) from it, and of its being drunk by the *devas*, who thereby obtained immunity from death. The *Upanishads* are like the milk ocean; the *sūtras* of *vyāsa* alias *Bādarāyaṇa*, the son of *Parāśara*, are like nectar; and the study of the *sūtras* and the adoption of the means therein pointed out will lead to freedom from the cycle of births and deaths, as the nectar gave immortality to the *devas*. The author invites all men, who are able to separate the essential from the non-essential, to read them with his commentary every day and enjoy them. For, they will give the same enjoyment, as the nectar did to the *devas*.

(2) Thus the subject of the commentary is the *sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa*; their subject is the *Upanishads*; and their subject again is *Brahma*. Thus the commentary deals with *Brahma*, His nature and attributes, the attainment of immortal life and the means therefor.

been taken out from the middle of the milk ocean of the *Upanishads*, (3) and which are calculated to give immortal life to those, from whom *Brahma* has ever been absent owing to the continuous burning of the fire of *samsāra* (4) (cycle of births and deaths). Though the teaching given by them was carefully (5) preserved, by the older teachers, yet owing to many views, which have been put forward in recent times, and to the conflict among them and

(3) By stating that the *sūtras* were taken out from the *Upanishads*, it is indicated that other *sūtras*, like those of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *vaiśeṣika* are not based on proper authority. By reference to the older teachers, it is indicated that the author's commentary is based on their works, and that other commentaries on the *sūtras* of *Būdarāyaṇa* do not deserve respect. By comparing the *Upanishads* to the ocean of milk, it is shown that they are of greater value than the earlier portion of the *veda*; by the word ocean (*abdhī*) they are shown to be numberless; by the word middle it is indicated that the primary meaning of no one text is departed from. For, the middle of a thing is at the same distance from the sides.

(4) By comparing *samsāra* to fire, it is shown that it is full of suffering—suffering caused by one's own body, by the elements and by the *devatās*; and that even in *svarga*, which is regarded as a place of pure enjoyment, there is the fear ever present that it will come to end. By the word 'burning,' it is meant, that until one begins to meditate on *Brahma*, the fire is never extinguished, and that it causes suffering in many ways—bodily suffering and mental suffering. The original for "has been absent" is *vyapagata*; the prefixes therein show that this absence has had no beginning, and that it relates to many matters, knowing, seeing and reaching *Brahma*.

(5) *Preserved*—not merely by teaching, but by written works also; by the older teachers *sankara* and other recent commentators are excluded.

with it, it has stood at a distance. It is brought back by my commentary.

The author next explains why the works of older teachers are not resorted to, and why the trouble of writing a new work, and of publishing it is undertaken.

Commencement

BHAGAVĀN *Bodhāyana* (1) wrote a voluminous commentary on the *Brahma sūtras*; and this *Dramiḍa* abridged. Following (2) their views, the *sūtras* will be explained having regard to their wording (3).

(1) By the term *bhagavān* it is shown that *Bodhāyana* is our best friend, and that we may rely on him. By the term 'voluminous' it is meant that if one lived the full span of a hundred years, and if all his life he studied it, *Bodhāyana's* commentary would serve its purpose; but these conditions do not generally exist. *Dramiḍa*, on the other hand, went to the other extreme, and omitted the refutation of rival systems. If all men were naturally intelligent, this defect would not matter much. But they are not. Hence a commentary is needed, which avoids both the extremes, and which, while pointing out the faults in the other systems, is such as can be easily mastered.

(2) *Following their views*—but not putting forward a new view spun from his own brain.

(3) *Their wording*—Paying particular attention to the roots and terminations of the words in the *sūtras*; but not attempting to suit the *sūtras* somehow to some view of one's own.

SUB-SECTION 1

In this sub-section it will be shown that the words in the *Upanishads* can convey their meaning, and that therefore the proposed enquiry into *Brahma* may be made :

१. अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ।

After this and for that reason enquiry into *Brahma* should be made.

1. *Meaning of the sūtra* (1). The first word *atha* means in this place 'after,' and indicates that something has been completed, and that another matter is taken (2)

Para 1. (1) The commentary on a *sūtra* consists of five processes: the breaking up of the *sūtra* into its component words, the statement of their meanings, the breaking up of compound words, the statement of the meaning of the *sūtra* as a whole and replying to objections. The author therefore begins by stating the meaning of the first two words.

(2) The word *atha* has many other meanings; but they are not suitable here. For instance :

(a) It indicates that a subject is begun. When a beginning is made, the fact is perceived, without its being stated. In such *sūtras* as *atha yogānuṣṅsanam* (the teaching of *yoga* is begun) this meaning cannot but be accepted, as it is not possible to point to some matter which preceded it.

(b) It marks an auspicious beginning. This it does by its very sound, and it can do this, while conveying some other meaning. If it be regarded as expressing auspiciousness, *atha* would qualify the term *brahma-jijñāsā*, and the meaning would be that the enquiry into *Brahma* is good. It would then praise the enquiry, and make the *sūtra* an *artha-vāda* (page 3, note !), not a statement of reason, which it is-

up. The next word *atah* (3) gives the completed matter as a reason for the next step. When one has learned the *veda*, including its later portion, (4) and the six branches

If *atha* did not qualify the term, the meaning would be the enquiry should be made and it would be good. Thus, there would be two sentences, which is not legitimate, if the *sūtra* can be understood as a single sentence. (Intro., para 22.)

(c) It indicates the passing from one alternative to another; but it cannot do this here, as there are no alternatives.

(d) It indicates a question. The meaning would then be, should enquiry into *Brahma* be made? There should be an answer to the question; but there is no answer here.

(e) It expresses entirety; if the question were—whether *Brahma* should be enquired into fully or only in part, the *sūtra* would reply—not in part, but wholly. But no such doubt has arisen. The only doubt is whether the enquiry should be made at all. Thus, the only suitable meaning is that stated in the text.

(3) This is confirmed by the two words, which follow. In the term *atah* the root is a pronoun, and it makes reference to something, which has gone before. It therefore shows that something has been done, and that is assigned as a reason for the matter now taken up. The next term *brahma-jijnāsū* also leads to the same conclusion. *Brahma* is the subject of the enquiry to be taken up. Its being dealt with in the later portion of the *veda*, it leads to the inference that the completed matter was enquiry into the earlier portion.

(4) *Including its later portion.* This shows that the whole of the *veda* has been learnt. The six branches are: *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), *nirukta* (glossary of vedic terms), *Śikshā* (pronunciation of vedic words), *Chandas* (metre of vedic verses), *kalpa* (ritual for the performance of the *karmas* enjoined in the *veda*), and *jyotisham* (so much of astronomy as is needed for determining the proper days for

of learning attached to it, he will examine the *veda*, beginning with its earlier portion. He will then perceive that the *karmas* therein enjoined can of themselves yield only petty and short-lived fruits. He will then desire *moksha* (release from *samsāra*), and will begin an enquiry into *Brahma*, who is bliss unlimited in its nature and enduring for ever. Hence the completed matter (5) is an examination of the *karma-kānda* of the *veda* (6).

2. The third word is a compound, of which the first member is *Brahma* (1). From its etymology it denotes a thing which has the attribute of being immeasurably great in its substance and in its attributes. This is its primary meaning; and the Being, who answers this

their performance). The learning of these would enable the student to understand the *veda*, though superficially.

(5) The completed matter is the enquiry into the nature of *karmas* and of their fruits. This will create a disgust for such *karmas*. The understanding of the later portion of the *veda* will create a desire to obtain the fruits, which it promises. Both the disgust and this desire will prompt the enquiry into *Brahma*. Both are necessary. In the absence of either it will not be taken up.

(6) It should be noted that the *karmas* referred to are such as are done without knowing that they are the worship of *Brahma*, and that they are therefore an end in themselves.

Para 2. (1) The word *brahma* denotes, besides the All-ruler, *prakṛiti*, the *jivas* and the *veda*. In all of them the attribute of being great is found. Unless a limitation of some kind is expressly stated, words naturally denote a thing which has the connoted attribute in full measure. Hence, the primary meaning of the word *brahma* is as stated.

description, is *Purushottama*, the ruler of all. For by nature, He is free from every imperfection, and is the seat of hosts of good qualities, the excellence of which has no limit, and which cannot be counted. When the word denotes any other thing, it is used in a secondary (2) sense, as possessing a tittle of this attribute. This conclusion, which has been reached by considering the etymology of the word, is confirmed by the nature of things. The Being, who is approached for release by those, who are miserable, must by nature, be free from all imperfections; for a prisoner in chains is not approached for help by those similarly situated.

(2) *In a secondary sense.* The question may be asked why the word *brahma* should not denote the All-ruler and the other things mentioned in primary senses. *Reply.* The word would then have many meanings. This will not be legitimate, if all the uses of the word can be explained with one meaning. The word will denote a thing in its primary sense, when it has the connoted attribute in full measure, and the others in a secondary sense. It is only when this is not possible, that more than one meaning should be given to the word. The case of the word *bhagavān* is analogous. It denotes one who possesses *bhaga* or the six qualities—*jñāna*, *bala*, *aiśvarya*, *vīrya*, *śakti* and *tejas*. *Jñāna* is the capacity to know; *bala*, the capacity to support; *aiśvarya*, the capacity to control; *vīrya*, freedom from fatigue by knowing, supporting or controlling; *śakti*, the ability to do what others cannot; and *tejas* the power to overcome others, and not being overcome by others. These six qualities are found in full measure in the All-Ruler. For He can see all things at the same moment by sense perception, and He has this power, not as a gift from another. He supports the whole world and controls it. To Him this is mere play, and causes no fatigue. His *śakti* and *tejas* are unquestioned. The word *bhagavān* therefore denotes

3. The second member of the compound word means a desire to know. Knowledge here is the particular variety consisting of critical examination. The words 'should be made' should be supplied to complete the sentence; and they should be connected with knowledge (1); not with desire; for desire depends upon the nature of the object, and is not amenable to an injunction; and as the desire exists for the acquisition of the knowledge, the latter is the more important of the two. The connection between the two members of the compound is expressed by the ending of the sixth case, which was dropped, when the compound was formed. It shows *Brahma* to be the object of the examination (2).

Him in its primary sense, and those who possess something of these qualities in a secondary sense.

Para 3. (1) Connected with knowledge. Illustration.

• 'Having bathed, take your food.' 'Take your food, sitting with your face to the east.' No one need be directed to take his food; he will do it of his own motion. Bathing before taking the food, and doing this in the particular posture stated would not happen, but for the injunctions. A direction serves its purpose, when a thing would not happen without it. Similarly here also. *Question*: Why then is the termination added, which expresses desire? *Reply*: It is to indicate that even to know *Brahma* will give pleasure.

(2) *The object of the examination.* This follows from *Pāṇini's sūtra*, II-3-65. *Question*: The ending shows relationship in general. If this be taken, the examination will relate to *Brahma* and to everything connected with Him. Why is it not taken? That *Brahma* is the object of the examination will follow, as the verb in *jijnāsa* needs an object. *Reply*: Here the *sūtra* expressly states *karma* (object) to be the meaning; while by following your

4. The *sūtra* therefore means—As the earlier portion of the *Mīmāṃsā* shows *karma* to be productive of only petty and short-lived fruits, and as the later portion holds out the promise of imperishable and immeasurably superior fruit to one who meditates on *Brahma*, on completing the former enquiry, and because it does not satisfy for this reason alone, the latter enquiry should be made. This is supported by *Dramiḍa* who observes “*Karma* has been examined; next comes the enquiry into *Brahma*”.¹

5. It only remains to refute certain views in regard to what preceded the enquiry under consideration. For this purpose it is necessary to explain more fully the natural order of things indicated briefly

suggestion one must depend on mere implication. The former is preferable. For, that *Brahma* is the object will occur at once from the express statement in the *sūtra*; while by taking the suggestion one must first think of the relation, and then enquire what the particular relation in the present case is. This will involve delay. In every case that, which suggests a thing quickly, possesses greater strength than another, which suggests it after some delay. Hence, the *sūtra* cited is followed. *Brahma*, the principal thing, will be the object; and what is connected with Him will come within the scope of the examination by virtue of their connection with Him. *Further question*: When the sixth case is enjoined with reference to particular words, the compound cannot be formed. Is this not so (*Vārtika* under *Sūtra*, II-2-10). *Reply*: See the *Vārtika* (under *Sūtra*, II-2-8), which states an exception, and this comes under the exception.

¹ Here the original states that the two enquiries form one work. This is embodied in Introduction, para 9, which please see.

at the end of para 1. The injunction is given by the *Veda* '*Svādhyāya* should be learnt by *adhyayana*'. *Svādhyāya* means the text of the *veda* or (as the original puts it) the collection of letters known as the *veda*. This is to be learnt only by *adhyayana* (1). Is it to recite a text but once or many times? May this be done by the student by himself, or only after recitation by another? In what manner should it be done? The following texts from the *Veda* and the *smritis* give replies "Do the *upanayana* (2), (3) ceremony to a *brāhmaṇa*

(1) *Only by adhyayana*, but not by reading from a book. The *veda* may be learned in two ways—from a teacher or from a book. The former method is the one to be followed; but not the latter. A rule of this kind is known as *niyama vidhi* (restrictive injunction). The following example is given in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā-vṛhīn avahanti* (They husk the paddy—i.e., the paddy taken out of a bag for making an offering). Though it is in the form of a statement of what is being done, it is really an injunction—'husk the paddy'. This may be done either by using a mortar and pestle or with the nails of one's fingers. The text requires that the husking should be done in the former way only. This is a *niyama vidhi*. (*Mīmāṃsā*, IV-2-11).

(2) *Upanayana*—The sanskrit text is "*brāhmaṇam upanayita*". The first word being in the objective case, it is clear that a qualification is given to the *brāhmaṇa* boy by the ceremony—i.e., fitness to learn the *veda*. The leading case on the point is again *vṛhīn avahanti*. By the husking in the manner pointed out, an efficacy is given to the paddy, and the husked paddy or rice becomes fit for offering (*Mīmā.*, III-1-4).

(3) The student receives a qualification from the *upanayana* and he does the *adhyayana*; hence, *upanayana* is an *anga* of *adhyayana* (*Mīmāṃsā*, II-1-3); for it renders a service to it by giving a qualification for learning it. Hence, the

boy in the eighth year of age; make him learn the *veda*" (4), (5), (6) (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇam*). "A *brāhmaṇa*

time prescribed for it—eighth year of age—though it is prescribed for *adhyayana* also. In other words, at an age at which the student is not fit for learning anything else, he is required to get the *veda* by heart.

(4) *Make him learn the veda*—This is not an injunction to the teacher? For he would himself seek students and teach them, prompted by the desire to earn money. No injunction is therefore needed. Further, if it were an injunction to the teacher, his qualification would be stated; but it is not. The intention of the text is therefore that the student should recite the vedic texts, after they are recited by another.

(5) Next, should the recitation by the teacher and repetition by the student be done once? No. It should be done as many times as may be necessary for his getting the *veda* by heart. Here again the leading case is '*vrihīn avahanti*'. The object being to remove the husk, it is not sufficient to raise the pestle once and bring it down on the paddy in the mortar. This operation should be continued until the husk is completely separated from the grain. It is only when the end in view cannot be seen, to do a thing but once is sufficient compliance with an injunction (*Mīmā.*, XI-1-5 and 6). Applying this rule, as the end in view is to get the *veda* by heart, and as this is an object that can be seen, the recitation by the teacher and repetition by the student should be continued many times.

(6) Thus, the nature of *adhyayana* has been explained; also the time for beginning it; and some *angas*; for the qualifications of the teacher are practically for the benefit of the student. *Upanayana* is another *anga*. Other *angas* are stated in the *smṛiti* text. They are beginning it in one of the months stated and the observance of certain restrictions. The student should not recite in particular places as in the hearing of the *sūdra*, or on prohibited days; and there are certain restrictions in regard to food and

should begin in the prescribed manner in the *śrāvaṇī* or *proshthapadī* month, and learn the *veda* for four and a half months, living a life of discipline. After that he should read the *veda* in the bright fortnights and all its *angas* in the dark fortnights" (*Manu*, 4-95). The student should go to a teacher possessing the following qualifications: He must have come of a good family; he must know the *veda*; he must possess good qualities, especially control of temper; and his conduct must be unexceptionable. Such a teacher should do the *upanayana* for him. He must begin in the month stated and observe certain restrictions; and as the teacher recites a text, he should repeat it after him. This is *adhyayana* contemplated by the *vedic* text. This should be done until the text is learnt by heart.

6. *Adhyayana* imparts an efficacy (*samskāra*) to the *veda* learnt by the student; for, in the first text quoted in the preceding para, the term *svādhyāya* (*veda*) would be in the objective case, if put in the active voice (*Mīmā.*, II-1-3). (1) *Samskāra* is the giving of a fitness

sleep. He should learn the whole of the *veda*; for the word denoting it in the text is in the plural—*Chandāmsi*; and he should study the six *angas*, for which vide note (4) on page 59.

(1) This para removes a doubt suggested by the text '*Saktūn juhoti*' *Saktu* is rice flour; and the text directs that the rice flour should be taken by the doer of a *soma yāga* in both the palms joined together, and offered into the fire at the close of the *yāga*, when the sacrificial grounds are set fire to and burn. Here, though the term *Saktūn* is in the objective case, no fitness for work is imparted; for the rice flour is consumed in the fire and no longer exists. The offering, however, creates an *apūrva*

for some work. And it is proper that the *veda* should receive a fitness; for it will then teach the four objects sought by men—*dharma*, wealth, love and release from bondage to *karma*—and the means for attaining those objects. And the texts themselves by being repeated a number of times (*japa*) give those fruits. Thus, the injunction regarding *adhyayana* ends in the learning of the text only of the *veda*, as in the case of *mantras* (2)

(Intro., para 14). Is not the case of *svādhyāya* exactly similar? The *adhyayana* will create an *apūrva* in the student, and lead to some enjoyment in due time. The text of the *veda* need not be learnt by heart; it will suffice to recite it but once. The reply is that the two cases are not similar. In the case of the rice flour, there is nothing to receive a fitness for future work; but in the present case the *veda*, when learnt by *adhyayana*, has some work to do, and this is pointed out in the para.

(2) The paragraph concludes with the statement that by *adhyayana* the student learns only the text of the *veda* and not its meaning also. And two examples are given. In beginning *adhyayana* each day both the teacher and the student recite certain *mantras*, and they do not know the meaning, especially the student; nor is the knowledge of the meaning needed. The mere recitation suffices. Next, boys at the time of the *upanayana* are required to recite certain texts; and when they do the daily *sandhyā upāsana*, they recite certain other texts. But they do not know what they mean. Further, here is a verse defining certain terms—"By learning a little of the *veda* one becomes a *brāhmaṇa*; by learning the whole of a branch a *śrotriya*; by learning the *angas* also an *anūchāna*; by learning the *kalpa* (ritual of *yāgas*) a *rishi*; and by teaching *kalpa sūtras* to others, a *bhrūṇa*." One who learns only a portion of his own branch of the *veda* has no knowledge of the contents of the whole, nor can one know what the *veda* teaches, if he has not studied its *angas*. What then is the purpose to be served

and of recitations under particular conditions. (3), (4)

by *adhyayana*? We reply—to get by heart the text of the *veda*. This is near at hand; and contains certain terms like 'hum,' which have no meaning. On the other hand, knowledge of the meaning is one degree removed, and will not extend to the meaningless terms. Hence, the conclusion stated in the para stands.

(3) It may be asked why so much stress is laid on this point. Reply—only then will the enquiry into *Brahma* be needed. There are injunctions, which require the student on completing the learning of the *veda* to become a householder; and the householder's duty is to perform *yāgas* of various kinds. Hence the knowledge of the *veda* acquired will be regarded as obtained for the purpose of the *yāgas*. Now in this knowledge, the knowledge of *Brahma* taught in the *Upanishads* is included, and a text of the *veda* states 'This *ātmā* is *Brahma*'. The knowledge of the *ātmā* will thus become subsidiary to *yāgas*; and *ātmā* will be connected with them through its knowledge. Example—The text '*vṛhīn prokshati*' (Sprinkle paddy taken out for offering with water) makes sprinkling an *anga* of paddy, which is an *anga* of a *yāga*. Sprinkling will through the paddy become an *anga* of the *yāga*. Similarly, the *ātmā* will become an *anga* of *yāgas*, and an *ātmā*. who is this, is a *jiva*. There will then be no proof that a Being exists, who is other than the *jiva*, and the enquiry into *Brahma* will not be needed.

(4) Before leaving this subject, it is necessary to refute the view of *Prābhākara* (One school of *pūrva mīmāṃsā*) that *upanayana* is subsidiary to *adhyāpana* (teaching), but not to *adhyayana* (learning). *Prābhākara*—Your view stated in note 3, under para 5, is not correct. Here is my authority—'One, who having done *upanayana* to a student, (*upaniya*) teaches him the *veda*, including *Kalpa sūtras* and the *Upanishads*, is stated to be *achārya*.' Here the participle shows *upanayana* and teaching as the work of one person. Hence the first operation is an *anga* of the second. The termination 'ya' in the participle is *ṣruti*; while you rely on the qualification imparted by *upanayana* being in the

7. One, who has learned the *veda* along with its *angas*, will perceive (1), (2) that it points out the means (3)

student, who learns. This is *lingam*; it cannot override *ṣruti* (Indro., para 19).

Reply. Your *ṣruti* is in a text of the *smṛiti*, and the text is an *anuvāda* (repetition); for it contains the pronoun *ya*. Being in a *smṛiti*, one has to seek the *vedic* text, which it reproduces; and being a repetition, the original text has to be found. There will be delay in both these respects. What you state to be a *linga* results from a *ṣruti* text, which is present. Again, the verse quoted by you is for the purpose of defining the term *achārya*, and cannot be authority in this matter. Further, in the term '*upanayita*' in the *ṣruti* text quoted by me, the root is *nī* and it has the termination known as *ātmanepada*! and this by a *sūtra* (1-3-72) of *Pāṇini*, the grammarian, should be added, when the fruit of an action goes to the person who does it. Another *sūtra* (*Ibid.*, 36) requires the same termination to be added to the same root *nī*, in certain cases, of which the present case is one. The commentator on *Pāṇini's sūtras*, a high authority, states that in repeating the direction the intention was that the fruit of the action should go to one other than the person who does it. Hence, the fruit of the *upanayana* goes to the student, but is not reaped by the teacher. For these reasons the view stated is perfectly sound.

(1) The *mīmāṃsaka* puts a question—If one learns only the text of the *veda*, there will be no need to examine it. This paragraph gives a reply.

(2) Having learned the text, the student knows its contents; knowing its contents, he performs the *yāgas*, and attains *svarga*. Thus, *adhyayana* leads step by step ultimately to *svarga*. Even, in the view of the opponent *svarga* is not reached directly from the knowledge of the *veda*. The performance of *yāgas* intervenes.

(3) The *means* are *yāgas* of various kinds leading to enjoyment in the place called *svarga*. These are stated in the earlier portion. The means pointed in the later portion

to the attainment of some desirable ends. For, it is the nature of words (4) to convey their meanings, and the *veda* is no exception. Even without a critical examination, he will see these things, and in order to know what they are, (5) and what are connected with them, he will himself (6) begin an examination of the *veda* ; this is the *mīmāṃsā* (7).

are diverse meditations taking one to *Brahma* in a changeless world.

(4) *Nature of words.* No injunction is needed for words to convey their meanings.

(5) *In order to know what they are*—Why is this examination needed? If it be replied that the knowledge obtained may be liable to doubt or misconception, then the further question is—does not the *veda* show things as they are? Reply—yes, it does ; when helped by a critical examination. The eye shows the shape and colour of objects ; but it requires the help of a light. So with the *veda* also.

(6) The opponent appears again, and raises an objection. You say, “He will himself begin? This is not likely. The learning of the *angas* will, like the learning of the *veda*, be confined to the text only. Their meaning not being known, it will not be possible to know the contents of the *veda*. Reply—*Vyākaraṇa* (grammar) is an *anga* ; that is, it must render the *veda* some service ; otherwise, it will not be an *anga*. It cannot be alleged that the service is *adrishtam* (unseen) ; for, when a service, which all can see, can be pointed out, to fall back on *adrishtam* is not legitimate. Hence, grammar and glossary should be fully learned, and the meaning of the *veda* being then perceived, the *mīmāṃsā* will be commenced.

(7) The opponent shifts his ground and puts forward another objection. If it be left to one to commence the *mīmāṃsā* of his own motion, *i.e.*, without an injunction, it will not be begun at all. For, a *smṛiti* text states ‘Having learned, do the *samāvartana* ceremony.’ This is a preliminary

8. When the vedic injunctions prescribing *karmas* are examined, it will be observed that the fruits of *karmas* are petty and unenduring. The *Upanishads*, on the other hand, contain texts referring to immeasurably superior and enduring fruits in the form of immunity from death ; and this being known, in order to ascertain whether they are so, the examination of the texts of the *vedānta* will be taken up, and this is *Śāriraka mīmāṃsā*. Here are some of these texts, which confirm what has been stated here.

(1) As the fruit earned by *karma* perishes here, so does the fruit of good deeds perish there (*Chando.*, VIII-1-6); (2) The *karmas* performed by him have surely an end (*Bṛihad.* V-8-10); (3) It is not attained by perishable *karmas* (*Katha*, 2-10); (4) These rafts in the form of *yūgas* are not strong (*Munda.*, I-2-7); (5) One who meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest (*Ānanda*, I-1); (6) He is not again handed over to *moha* (not knowing the *ātmā* as he really is); he sees him only; (7) The meditator does not see death (*Chando.*, 7-26-2); (8) He becomes his own master (*Ibid.*,

to the entry on the house-holder's stage of life. Having learnt the text, he must become a house-holder at once. When is the critical examination to be made? Reply. The termination in the participle having learnt, (*adhītya*) shows merely that the two operations should be done by the same person, and that one should follow the other ; but not that the second operation should be done immediately. There is therefore room for making the *mīmāṃsā*. Even if *samāvartana* takes place immediately, the examination may be done after it. Surely time can be found for it. The injunction "All life one should do *aynihotram* does not prevent one's earning the means therefor, and this is not enjoined by an injunction. Similarly, the injunction quoted by the opponent does not prevent the examination, as it is needed for the due performance of the *yūgas*.

25-2); (9) One who meditates on Him here in this manner becomes immortal; No other path exists for going thither (*Puru*, 20); (10) Knowing the *ātmā* and Him, who controls him, to be separate, one attains immortality by such meditation, through the grace of that Being pleased with it (*Sveta.*, 1-6).¹

¹ (1) The question may be asked why the first four texts are quoted. The nature of the fruits yielded by *karmas* are already known from the *purva mīmamsa*. Reply: It is to confirm by these texts what has been learnt already; the statements regarding the fruits of meditation on *Brahma* will then be accepted as stating what is true.

(2) *Second text*. From the context it will be seen that reference is made to *karmas* performed without a knowledge of *Brahma*, even though they be done for a long time, and even though they be of many kinds. By the '*karmas*' having an end, reference is made to their fruits. Actions disappear soon after they are done. This does not require to be taught. Hence the first text is stated first.

(3) It may be thought that the fruits earned by worldly men are perishable; but that by *karmas* enduring fruits may be obtained. The third text is quoted to remove this misconception. 'It'—enduring fruit.

(4) To explain the third text the *fourth text* is quoted.

(5) Here two verses from the *Mundaka Upanishad* are quoted in the original, which fully agree with the meaning of the *sutra* given in para 4. They are omitted here, but are embodied in the '*Vedic texts*,' which please see.

(6) *Fifth text*. In an *anuvaka*, which follows it is stated that the intensity of bliss of *Brahma* has no limit, which can be thought of or expressed in words. Hence it is clear that the fruit is immeasurably high and enduring.

(7) *Sixth text*. It may be doubted whether the attainment of this fruit may not be merely temporary. To remove this doubt this text is quoted. The two texts may also be understood differently. The first shows that *Brahma* is reached by meditation; and the second that it is preceded by the disappearance of all impediments.

(8) *Eighth text*. His own master—no longer subject to *karma*.

(9) *Ninth text*. This indicates that immunity from death is not attained, as stated by *Sankara*, by knowing *Brahma* to be without differences and to be mere *jñānam* (light), or as affirmed by others, by meditating on other *devatas*.

(10) *Tenth text*. This indicates that the meditation, which is the means to release from *karma*, is not meditation that *Brahma* and *atma* are one.

9. We may now examine the objections. The first objection is: A student, who has learnt the whole of the *veda* with its *angas*, knows that *karmas* take one to *svarga*, and that this and similar fruits come to an end. He may then, if he desires release from *karma*, commence an enquiry into *Brahma* at once. Why is it necessary for him to enquire into *karma*? We ask him in reply—why is even this enquiry needed. From the mere learning of the *veda* with the *angas* he knows everything. The objector replies—one cannot be sure that the knowledge acquired is free from doubt or misunderstanding. A critical examination is necessary. We answer: The same reasoning applies to the examination of the earlier portion also; and until this is done, one cannot be certain as to the inferior character of the fruits of *karmas*.

10. *Second objection.* What is invariably needed for enquiry into *Brahma* should be stated as having preceded it. It does not need enquiry into *karma*; for even one, who has learned the *Upanishads*, (1) but not the earlier portion of the *veda*, and who therefore does not know about *karmas*, may fitly examine the *Upanishad* texts. Here a question is put to the objector. Certain meditations on *udgītha* are considered in the

(1) *Learned the Upanishads.* One, who has learned these, knows their contents, and may desire to examine them fully. He does not know *karmas*, and there is no question of an enquiry into them. This therefore does not precede the *śāṅkara mīmāṃsā*. Even though he has learned the whole of the *veda*, as the result of good deeds done in past births, he may desire to take up the later enquiry at once.

Upanishads ; *udgitha* is the second part of vedic verses sung by the helper named *udgātā* in a *soma yāga*. As the meditations are connected with *karmas* and their *angas*, how can they be considered by one who does not know about *karmas* (2) ? The objector replies—you do not know which is the main thing in the *śārīraka mīmāṃsā*. I will tell you. Men are drowned in an ocean of misery, consisting of birth, old age, death and the like, which come round and round, and which are inevitable, so long as they are bound by matter ; this misery is due to their perception of many different things (3), while *Brahma* alone exists ; and this again is due to beginningless *avidyā* (ignorance). To remove this misperception (4), what should be grasped by them is that *ātmā* is one. Where is the knowledge of *karmas*, which are connected with differences, useful (5) in their case ? Far from being useful, it is an impediment (6). As to the

(2) The questioner's meaning is that though *karmas* are not known for the purpose of ascertaining which *karmas* should be rejected, they should be known at least for understanding the later enquiry.

(3) *Many different things*. Persons who know ; things which are known ; and perceptions ; in each class numerous things are perceived.

(4) *To remove this misperception*. To one who imagines a rope to be a snake, what is required is the knowledge of the true nature of the rope ; but not any particular *karma*. It is so here.

(5) *Where is the knowledge of karmas useful*. The meaning is that it is not useful anywhere—in creating the knowledge of oneness, in removing the misperception which *avidyā* creates, or in helping what creates the knowledge.

(6) *An impediment*. By strengthening the tendency to perceive differences.

consideration of meditation on *udgītha*, they serve only *karmas* ; because they are meditations, (7) their consideration is included here ; but it is not directly connected with the main topic. Hence, what is needed by the main point should be stated as preceding the later *mīmāṃsā* ; it is not enquiry into *karma*.

11. Another question is put to the objector by a follower of *Bhāskara*.—What is needed by the main point is knowledge of *karma*—the very thing which you say is not needed. It is by knowledge helped by *karmas* that release is obtained. So states the *veda*, and so does the author of the *sūtras* (3-4-26). If one does not know *karmas*, how is he to know which *karma* (1) will help knowledge, and which will not. Hence, enquiry into *karma* is what precedes *śārīraka mīmāṃsā*. The objector replies : What you say is not sound. The goal in view is the removal of *avidyā* (ignorance), and this

(7) *Because they are meditations*. By their likeness to other meditations, they came into the author's mind, and he included them ; but not as serving the main topic in any way.

(1) *Which karma will help*. In section 4 of Chapter 3 of the *sūtras* those who marry and live with their wives, those who do not marry, and widowers are stated to be qualified for meditation on *Brahma*. The *karmas*, which help meditation, are not the same for them all ; but are different for each class. Reference is made to this in the text. The author may also have contemplated the distinction in *karmas* as compulsory (*nitya*) *karmas* ; those to be done on the occurrence of contingencies (*Naimittika*) ; those that are prohibited ; and those that are done as the means to some fruits (*Kāmya*).

alone is *moksha* (2). This is effected only by knowing (3) *Brahma* to be an enemy to all difference (4) and to be only *jñānam*. *Karmas* are the seats of endless differences. The *karmas* of each caste (*varṇa*) are different. So also are the *karmas* appropriate to each stage of life (*āśrama*); and each *karma* procures its own fruit, and is helped by its subsidiary *karmas*. This being so, how can they be the means to the removal of the perception of all differences and of its root-*avidyā* (ignorance). Next, the fruits of *karma*, being perishable, how can they procure *moksha* (5), which once attained endures for ever? Are they not opposed to *moksha*? Hence, knowledge alone is the means to *moksha*. The

(2) *This alone is moksha*—but not the reaching of *Brahma*; for He is ever with the knower. The goal is therefore single; but not two-fold.

(3) *Only by knowing*. Similarly the means is also single; but not two-fold.

(4) *Enemy to all differences*. Differences from objects of other classes, and from objects of the same class. For instance, a cow differs from sheep, and from other cows. Similarly, if objects existed other than *Brahma*, he would differ from them. In other words their differences would be found in Him; but as He alone exists, He is without differences of any kind. He is *nir-viśeṣha*. By the term 'enemy' it is meant that at no time is He fit to be *saviśeṣha* (with difference). By the term 'only *jñānam*', it is meant that He is devoid of all attributes.

(5) *How can they procure moksha*. If *moksha* were attained by *karma*, it would not endure; if it endures, *karma* cannot be the means thereto; for it is the nature of *karma* to yield only perishable fruits.

statements made are supported by the following *vedic* texts (6):

(1) The *karmas* performed by him have surely an end (*Bṛihad.*, V-8-10); (2) As the fruit earned by *karma* perishes here, so does the fruit of good deeds perish there (*Chando.*, VIII-1-6); (3) 'One who knows *Brahma* reaches the highest' (*Ānanda*, 1-1); (4) If one knows *Brahma*, he becomes *Brahma* indèed. (*Munda.*, III-2-9); (5) Only by knowing Him, one overcomes death (*Sveta.*, 3-8).¹

I have thus shown that *karma* cannot be the means to the goal along with knowledge; I will next show that it does not serve knowledge in any way. You referred to the author of the *sūtras*, who relied on the *vedic* text:

Him students of the *veda* wish to know by continual recitation of the *veda*, by *yūgas*, by giving, by *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment) and by fasting' (*Bṛihad.*, 6-4-22.)

Consider the wording of the text. The term 'wish to know' (*vividishanti*) by its termination shows desire,

¹ (6) *First text.* See note (2) under para 8.

(a) *Fourth text.* This is quoted to show that one who reaches and that which is reached are one—that is, the *jīva* and *Brahma* are one.

(b) *Fifth text.* This is quoted to show that the removal of impediments is effected by knowledge alone, but not by *karma*. The questioner had in his mind the *vedic* text "*vidyā* (knowledge) and *avidyā* (what is other than *vidyā*)—one who knows both these, overcomes impediments by *avidyā* and enjoys *Brahma* by *vidyā*". This is a single text; it is ambiguous; and is not supported by valid arguments. On the other hand, many texts have been quoted; their meaning is clear; and there are valid

and to this desire the *karmas* mentioned are the means, through purity of the mind; but not to the attainment of the fruit (7). The incompatibility of *karma* with knowing has been already shown. When the desire is created, what conduces most intimately to knowing is control of the mind (*śama*) and the rest; and nothing else (8); and this is stated by the *veda* itself:

Controlling the mind, controlling the senses, withdrawing from worldly pursuits, taking good and evil with serenity and with the mind one-pointed, see the *Ātmā* in yourself alone (*Bṛihad.*, 6-8-23).

arguments in their support as stated in the text. Hence that text must be construed so as not to conflict with these texts.

(7) *Not to the attainment of the fruit.* The text states 'wish to know'; but not 'they are released'. By the term 'fruit' reference will then be made to release. It may also refer to the creation of the knowing; for it is the fruit of desire; and the *karmas* stated will be the means. It may also have been intended that when the knowing has been brought about, the *karmas* co-operate with it in the attainment of release. This will be on the analogy of the co-operation of the five offerings known as *prayūjas* with the principal offerings in creating the fruit-yielding *apūrva*. The help rendered by the *karmas* may be in any of these ways; but such help is denied.

(8) *And nothing else.* This is the implication contained in the word 'eva' (only) in the original. Control of the mind is stated in the text; *karmas* cannot work along with it; for they require the mind to work in many ways along with the senses. *Karmas* are therefore incompatible with control of the mind. Nor can it be maintained that either control of the mind or *karmas* create the knowing; for they are not of equal strength. Control of the mind is stated by the text to be the direct means to knowing; and no consideration is needed. This relationship to the knowing

Thus by doing *karmas* in a hundred births without looking forward to any fruit, the mind becomes pure ; and a desire to know *Brahma* springs up. Then vedic texts like the following (9) produce an understanding, which removes *avidyā* (ignorance) :

(1) ' You, fit for *soma yūga*, this was *sat* only before' ; one only ; without a second (*Chando.*, VI-2-1) ; (2) unchanging, shining, and without limitations is *Brahma* (*Ana.*, I-1) ; (3) ' Without parts, without action, and devoid of the six evils ' (*Sveta.*, VI-19) ; (4) " This *ātmā* is *Brahma* " (*Bṛihad.*, VI-4-5) ; and (5) " That thou art " (*Chando.*, VI-8-7).

12. Here a question is interposed by one who heard the last words : Is it not enjoined that one should hear about *Brahma* ; that he should think about Him ; and that He should meditate on Him ? If the mere understanding of a text or texts removes *avidyā*, does

is quickly perceived. On the other hand, the term *vividi-shanti* (they desire to know) naturally shows *karmas* to be the means to desire. If this be rejected and reliance be placed on the analogy of the sentence ' He wishes to kill with the sword,' the relationship of *karmas* to the knowing will take time to be perceived. This will therefore possess less force. This view is implied in the words ' by the *veda* itself '.

(9) *Texts like the following.* The first text shows *Brahma* to be the cause of the universe ; the second removes from Him the imperfections which may be presumed from His being the world-cause ; the third text shows what these are ; the fourth text shows *Brahma* and the *jīva* to be one ; and the fifth text is for the same purpose. It has the advantage of proving the oneness by six marks, which indicate an author's meaning. The last text shows *Brahma* and ' a particular *jīva* to be one ; to show that this is true of all *jīvas* the fourth text is quoted.

not the injunction become purposeless? The objector replies: The hearing, thinking, and meditation are useful for the understanding of the texts. Hearing (*śravaṇa*) means to learn from a teacher, who sees the truth, that *Upanishad* texts show that the *Ātmā* is one. Thinking (*Manana*) means for the student to consider within himself with arguments 'This alone is fitting'. To think of this without a break is meditation (*nididhyāsana*), the object being to get rid of the tendency to perceive differences, which has existed without a beginning. When by these the tendency is completely destroyed, the understanding of *vedic* texts, removes *avidyā*. What is necessarily needed for a hearing of this nature should alone be stated as preceding the enquiry into *Brahma*. And (1) that is—(a) The separation of what is enduring from what is perishable; (b) control of the mind and the other helps stated in the *vedic* text; (c) absence of desire to enjoy fruits here or in *svarga*; and (d) a desire for release. These four are the necessary qualifications; for without them the enquiry cannot take place. From the very nature of things, this alone should be stated as what has preceded the enquiry under consideration (2).

(1) *And that is*—The first qualification creates a dislike for the perishable fruits to be had in *samsāra*, and a desire for the goal which endures. One then goes to a teacher for instruction. The second qualification makes him fit to receive it fully.

(2) Here a summary of the points contained in paras 10, 11 and 12 is given in the original; but it is omitted here to avoid repetition.

13. We reply to the objection stated in paras 10 to 12. You hold the view that the means to *moksha* is understanding of some *vedic* texts.¹ This is unsound. The means, which the *veda* teaches, is continuous, vivid, and loving meditation on *Brahma*, practised until one departs finally from this world. (*Vide* chapter 4, section 1, sub-sections 1 and 6.) The other view also that *karmas* are incompatible with *vidyā* (meditation) is unsound. If they are done without looking forward to their fruits, they make the mind pure, enable the *vidyā* to grow in vividness, and make the love for *Brahma* become more and more intense. This point is established in chapter 3, section 4, sub-section 5. Hence *vidyā* needs all the *karmas* appropriate to each *āśrama* (stage of life). The knowledge of their nature and of their fruits being low and perishable, when they are done for fruits, should be obtained from an enquiry into the earlier part of the *veda*. This should therefore be stated as the completed work.

14. Your view that what precedes is the four qualifications is untenable. For they cannot be obtained without a study of the *pūrva* and *uttara mīmāṃsās*. (1) One should know the ends which are sought (2), the means

(1) *Pūrva and uttara mīmāṃsās*. The four qualifications will result only when both these enquiries are completed.

(2) *Ends which are sought*. Enjoyment or release; the means are *yāgas* or *vidyās*. What serves them are the

¹ The original here dwells on these very fully. This portion of the original is omitted here, and will be embodied under the sections stated.

to those ends, and what serve them in this matter; also who are qualified to perform them. Without knowing these for certain, one cannot understand what the *karmas* are (3); what are their fruits; which of them are enduring, and which are perishable, whether the *ātmā* is eternal and the like. Further, that control of the mind and the rest are helps should be known only by the means which determine which things render service and which receive the service. These means are *śruti*, *lingam* and the rest taught in the third chapter of *Jaimini's sūtras* (4). For this reason also the enquiry into *Brahma* cannot be made without the help of the enquiry into *karma*. This should therefore have precedence.

offerings known as *prayājas* and the rest, or the seven qualifications; and those who are qualified are those who desire enjoyment or long for release.

(3) *What the karmas are.* The term *karma* here includes *vidyā* (meditation) also; for it is thought repeated continuously, and this needs effort.

(4) It is only when both the enquiries are completed that one can separate the enduring from the perishable; from this will result a disgust for enjoyment of fruits here and in *svarga*, and a longing for release. As to control of the mind and the rest it is in *śārīraka mīmāṃsā* that their nature is examined. If therefore it is contended that the four qualifications precede the later enquiry, it is open to this objection. When they are obtained, one may enquire into *Brahma*; after this enquiry they are obtained—that is arguing in a circle. Here the following questions are put:

(a) May not the first qualification be obtained from the first impression made on the mind by learning the *veda*? Reply: No; the earlier portion contains statements of enduring fruits being yielded by *karmas*; and the later portion refers to perishable fruits coming from *vidyā* (meditation).

15. You referred to meditations on *udgītha*, and observed that their consideration in the *Brahma sūtras* was casual and not connected with the main subject. This view cannot be accepted. For though their object is to make *karmas* more effective, yet as the *udgātā* has to meditate on the *udgītha* as *Brahma*, they require a knowledge of *Brahma*. Hence, the *Brahma sūtras* are the proper place for their consideration. The *karmas*, for which *udgītha* is meditated on as *Brahma*, if done without a desire for their fruits, will bring about *Brahma vidyā* (meditation or *Brahma*) quickly, even though there be serious impediments. Thus, as *udgītha*

Further, while the first impression is common to both the enquiries, why should one neglect the earlier portion of the *veda*, which comes first, and proceed to the later portion ?

(b) May not the qualification be obtained from other sources ? Reply : No ; for the student in the eighth year of age begins the learning of the *veda*, obeying the *vedic* injunction. If the other sources be the works of the *Sāṅkhya*, the *vaiśeṣika* or the *pāṣupata*, they advocate many matters opposed to the teaching, of the *Upanishads*, such as evolution of the world from matter uncontrolled by *Brahma* ; evolution from atoms ; *Brahma* being the operative cause only, and not the material cause also. Hence it is not fitting that the qualification obtained from them should precede the enquiry into the *Upanishads*. Further, as they teach the knowledge of six substances or of sixteen substances as the means to *moksha*, the enquiry into the *Upanishads* would be unnecessary.

(c) If the other sources be *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*, one may learn about *Brahma* from them alone, and no enquiry into the *Upanishads* need be made. If the objector should give a reply similar to the one stated in para 9, we may turn it against him.

vidyā needs knowledge of *Brahma*, and as *Brahma vidyā* needs the *karmas* connected with the *udgītha-vidyā*, it is directly connected with the subject of the *śārīraka mīmāṃsā*. That *udgītha-vidyā* needs a knowledge of the nature of *karma* is admitted by all, however opinions may differ as to its connection with this enquiry.

To proceed to the principal topic of the subsection, viz., enquiry into *Brahma*.

Pūrva pakṣa. This is urged by *Prābhākara*. The enquiry under consideration cannot be made. One obtains his first knowledge of the meaning of a word, when he hears that word in a command to do something and he sees that thing done. Thus, when the words "Bring a cow" are uttered, and the cow is brought, one who stands by understands their meaning as a whole. Next, if he hears the words "Bring the horse," and the horse is brought, he compares the two sets of words, and arrives at the meaning of each word. If on the other hand he hears the words "The jar is," as they are not followed by any action, he does not know what they denote. Nor will he form an idea, if at the outset, he is told "This word means this". Thus, he learns the connection between words and things which they denote first in connection with things to be done. If afterwards he is told that a particular word means a particular thing, he understands the connection between that word and that thing subject to the impression that he has already formed that words denote something to be done. The conclusion is that all words

denote *kārya*—something to be attained by *kṛiti* (mental effort) (1). As the *Veda* consists of words, the conclusion reached is extended to it. In the *Vedānta*, however, which deals with matters, which have not to be done, but which are settled, the connection between the words and their meanings cannot be understood, and the enquiry proposed is not therefore possible.

2. The following objections were raised: (a) The words "A son has been born to you" spoken to the father are understood by him, as may be seen from the expression of gladness appearing on his face. (b) When a person, going on a road, stops suddenly, mistaking a rope for a snake, and a bye-stander says "It is not a snake, it is a rope," his fear disappears and he resumes his journey. (c) A person hears a lark sing in the sky, and not knowing what the bird is, he asks "What is it that sings," and receives the reply, "the lark sings." He already knew the meaning of the word "sings," and with its help, he learns the meaning of the word 'lark' also. (d) A person hears the words "He cooks food in a vessel with fuel". He knows the meaning of the word 'cooks' and of the termination of

(1) Both the person, who gives the command, and the person, who carries it out, know the meanings of words. The former thinks of the work to be done, when he gives the command; and the latter, when he receives it, understands that he has to do that work. The bye-stander, who desires to know the meaning of words, perceives these facts, and watches. He receives the impression that the words he hears are related to some thing to be done.

the third case, which is translated here by the word 'with'. With this help, he understands the meaning of the word 'fuel'. Thus words which do not contain a command to do a thing, and which are not followed by action, are easily understood. (e) Words cannot be said to denote only *kārya* (action to be done); for they denote *kāraṅgas* also, i.e., the object of the work, the means with which it is done, the place in which it takes place and so on. Next they cannot be said to denote their meanings as connected with *kārya*; for the termination containing command does not do so; it denotes *kārya* as connected with *kāraṅgas*, not with *kārya*. Lastly, they cannot be said to denote their meanings as connected with *kāraṅgas*; for words denoting *kāraṅgas* do not do so; they denote *kāraṅgas* as connected with *kārya*. Hence, it must be concluded that words denote their meanings as connected with other things. They will then denote matters which are settled. To say that words denote only *kārya* is unsound.

3. *Prābhākara* replies to them. In the first case there may be many causes past, present and future, which may make one glad, such as the auspicious nature of the moment of confinement, easy delivery and the like; and it cannot be ascertained for certain that the cause was the fact mentioned to him, or that he understood the words. A similar remark applies to the second case; the traveller may have noticed that what he took for a snake did not move, or that it had no poison, or that it was an inanimate

thing, and so on. In the third and fourth cases, the person, knowing that words indicate a *kārya*, will conclude that the words that he now hears also refer to a *kārya*, or something connected with it. The criticism in the last case is not sound. When words 'Bring a cow' are uttered, action takes place. They must therefore denote a *kārya*, which prompts the action; for action is preceded by the understanding that it should be done. Hence all words have *kārya* in view, and denote only *kārya* as connected with its adjuncts. Here a question is put. Does not the understanding, that a thing is the means to a desirable end, prompt action? *Reply*--Not directly; it moves one to action by the resolve that it must be done. No person will move, even though he has this understanding, if he knows that the means to his desirable end will be adopted by another. Until one feels 'The end will not be attained without my effort; I must therefore adopt the necessary means,' he will not act. Hence my contention is sound.

4. Further, you say that the proposed enquiry should be made: (i) because the fruits of *karmas* are petty and perishable; and (ii) because the *Upanishads* state the fruit of knowing *Brahma* to be unlimited and enduring. You rely on the *mantras* and *arthavādas* of the *Upanishads*; but there are similar *arthavādas* in the earlier part also. Here is one *arthavāda*. 'The good deed of one doing the *chātur-māsyā* is imperishable; this is well-known.' Hence your first reason for the enquiry fails, and the enquiry is unnecessary.

Final decision. The foregoing view suppresses the well-known (1) mode, by which the connection between words and what they mean is ascertained, and maintains that all words denote one particular *kārya*, not pertaining to this world.

(i) Who does not know how parents (2) instruct their children by drawing their attention to various things with their finger and pronouncing the words by which those things are denoted? When this has been done a number of times (3), the connection between words and the things which they denote little by little becomes well-established in their minds. They perceive that words are used to denote things, as they have the power to do so; for they see no other connection (4) between them, nor are they aware of any person, who has

(1) *Well-known.* The original has 'known by all the worlds'. The implication is that the opponent himself learnt the meaning of words in this manner.

(2) *Parents.* Parents send their children to proper teachers at an age, when they are able themselves to learn the meanings of words. Will they fail to teach them, when they are unable to do so?

(3) *A number of times.* Until they are able to use the proper words to denote things, to think of the words, when they see the things, and to think of the things, when they hear the words.

(4) *No other connection.* Though all *pramāṇas*—sense perception, inference and testimony—make things known, there is a difference. The first makes a thing known by the mere existence of the thing; inference by the knowledge that what is seen (smoke) is generated by the thing inferred (fire); and testimony by the mere connection between the words and the things.

fixed that such and such words shall denote such and such things.

(ii) Among the words, which are thus taught, words such as father, mother, uncle, etc., showing the relation of the children to those round about them, come first, and they must be taught by the relatives themselves; for others may not use the words with reference to these relations. These cannot be learnt on the method advocated by the opponent; nor will they be learnt first, as they are at present. Further, the mode referred to in the first view is casual, and all words cannot be learnt in this manner.

(iii) When a sufficient number of words has been learnt, elders use them to convey the meaning of other words, saying 'This is the meaning of this word.' Thus, children learn the meanings of all words; and to show to others that they do so, they use them in sentences, which convey those meanings.

(iv) The meanings of words may be learnt in another way. A person sends a messenger to *Devadatta* to give this message 'Your father is doing well,' and gives it by signs. The messenger delivers the message in words. A by-stander, who desires to know the meanings of words, and who knows like a mute person the meaning of signs, knows that a message is being conveyed, goes with him and hears the words. He concludes 'these words convey that meaning'. For these reasons it is unnecessary to hold that the method stated by the opponent is the only one by which the meanings of words can be learnt.

2. The replies given to the objectors are not convincing. In the first case, the cause of the gladness appearing on the person's face should be sought in what is present at that moment ; and that is the confinement of his wife ; and he would therefore take the words to refer to the birth of a son. If on hearing the words he bathes and performs the ceremony usual on such occasions, it will be evident that the words have been understood. It may be urged that the person cannot be sure that the birth of the son only is communicated to him ; the words may refer to other matters also, as that the confinement was easy, that the moment of birth was auspicious and the like. We reply. Similar doubts may arise in regard to the injunction "Bring the cow". Does it refer to the cow only, or to the cow and something else ? After the order is issued, and before the cow is brought in, the person receiving the order may do many things—he may rise ; he may cover his cloth with a towel ; he may take up a stick ; he may speak to a by-stander ; and may go to fetch the cow. Does the order refer to any of these things ? The bringing in of the cow may be for aught one knows quite an accident, and unconnected with the order. In whatever way it is decided that the order refers to the bringing of the cow, the same method may be applied to the statement "A son has been born to you".

3. The question will arise how if words are taught by elders, when all persons die during cosmic rest, and a new evolution begins, the meanings of words are known. The reply is that men are not reborn with a

clean slate; that the impressions received by them during the last earth-life before the cosmic rest will survive, and that the connection between words and their meanings will remain as sub-conscious impressions, till it comes up into waking consciousness on the application of the proper stimuli, which must surely exist in abundance in the stream of existence. (*Adhi.*, verse 29.)

4. Even accepting your view, it does not follow that the enquiry regarding *Brahma* will be impossible. The *Vedānta* gives many injunctions to meditate on *Brahma* (1), and they refer to a particular kind of *kārya* as understood by you. The fruit to be yielded by the *kārya* is stated in other texts, *viz.*, to reach *Brahma*. It is necessary to know, as serving the *kārya*, the nature of *Brahma*. His attributes, the universe, which He controls, and what obstructs the attainment of the fruit, so that it may be avoided. Hence it must be admitted that the whole of the *Vedānta* does convey its meaning. This conclusion follows the precedents set by the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* itself in three cases (2), in all of which the

(1) The following are the texts: (I) *Ātmā*, dear, should be seen, be heard about, be thought about, be meditated on (*Bṛihad.*, IV-4-5); (II) "He should be sought; he should be meditated on" (*Chando.*, VII-1); (III) "Knowing, do meditation" (*Bṛihad.* VI-4-21); (IV) "The small *ākāṣa* within it, and what is within it—both should be sought, and meditated on" (*Chando.*, VIII-1-1); and (V) "The small *ākāṣa* in it free from grief, and what is within it should be meditated on" (*Taitti.*, *Nārā.*, 10-23).

(2) *In three cases.* The first is texts like the following: "One who desires *svarga* should do a *yāga*. This does not state what the *svarga* is. The information is given in

sentences contain no injunction, and there is merely a statement of facts; and yet as the injunctions given in separate texts require some information or service, the sentences are connected with the injunctions, and it is held that they convey their meanings.

5. In sentences like 'Bring the cow' words do not denote *kārya*; for the opponent will not be able to explain what *kārya* is as understood by him. Let us ask him to state what it is.

(i) *Opponent.* *Kārya* is *kriti-uddesya*, and it comes after *kriti*. (*Kriti* is mental effort in the form of willing.) We reply. *Kriti-uddesya* is the *karma* (object) aimed at by *kriti*; *karma* is what one most desires to obtain; and this again is pleasure or removal of pain, if it exists. This is not your *kārya*.

Opponent. *Kriti-karma* is not the object aimed at by *kriti*, but what moves *kriti*.

another place—'Where there is no heat, no cold; no disgust.' This text is connected with the injunction text. The second is a text prescribing a *satra yāga*; in which the *soma* offerings are made on twelve or more days. The text is merely 'Do the *satra yāga*'; and its fruit is stated in an *arthavāda*. 'Those who do this *satra yāga* are firmly established.' The two texts are connected, and being firmly established is held to be the fruit of the *yāga* (*Mīmā.*, IV-3-8). The third is the following text—'He who raises his hand with intent to kill a *brāhmaṇa* should be made to suffer torture for a hundred years; hence let not one raise his hand against a *brāhmaṇa*'. As doing what is prohibited here will obstruct the enjoyment of *svarga*, the injunction to do *yāgas* requires the service of this text. Similarly what conflicts with the means to release serves the injunction to meditate on *Brahma*. (*Mīmā.*, III-4-10.)

Reply. What moves *kriti* is pleasure or removal of pain. If one desires it, and knows that it cannot be attained without his effort, he will wish to make the effort, and will make it. Hence, *kriti-uddeṣya* is the object of desire, depending on *kriti* for its attainment. No other *kriti-uddeṣya* can anywhere be seen.

(ii) *Opponent.* *Kriti-uddeṣya* is *puruṣa-anukūla* (agreeable to man).

Reply. Pleasure alone is agreeable to man.

Opponent. The removal of pain also is agreeable to man.

Reply. No ; what is agreeable in itself is pleasure. Pain is the reverse ; this is how they differ. The removal of pain is desired, as pain is disagreeable ; but not because its removal is agreeable. The removal of pain brings about a state in which there is neither pleasure nor pain.

Opponent. The means to pleasure is agreeable to man.

Reply. No. Nothing other than pleasure is agreeable, whether it be action, mental effort or anything else. For, their nature is to be disagreeable. In order to procure pleasure one desires to resort to them.

(iii) *Opponent.* *Kriti-uddeṣya* is the *śeṣhi* of *kriti*. We ask—What is *śeṣhi*.

Opponent. A *śeṣha* is what is fit to co-exist with *kriti* working for the sake of another ; this another is *śeṣhi*.

Reply. Then *kriti* is not a *śeṣha* ; the other cannot be *śeṣhi* ; for, the relation of *śeṣha* and *śeṣhi* depends upon one of them being a *śeṣha*.

Opponent. I will amend the definition. A *śesha* is what is fit to work for another ; and that another is *śeshi*.

Reply. In defining *uddesya* you used the word *śesha* ; and in the definition of *śesha* you use the word *uddesya*. (See the definition in sanskrit.) This is moving in a circle. Further, what do you mean by 'being fit to work for another' ?

Opponent. Working for another is found only in a *śesha*.

Reply. No. A master, who is a *śeshi*, works for his servant, who is a *śesha*.

Opponent. The master maintains the servant for his own sake.

Reply. The servant too for his own sake serves the master. Hence working for another is not found in him, and your definition fails.

Opponent. The relation of *śesha* and *śeshi* is what subsists between *kriti* and *kārya*.

Reply. As you have not explained what *kārya* is, this definition of *śesha* and *śeshi* is useless.

(iv) *Opponent.* *Kriti-uddesya* is the *prayojana* or end of *kriti*.

Reply. *Kriti*, being unintelligent, cannot seek an end. It must therefore be the end of one, who has the *kriti* ; and this is what he desires to obtain—pleasure.

Thus, however you define the word *uddesya*, you arrive at the object of desire ; you have not been able to show that it is anything else. Hence the definition of *kārya* given at the outset fails ; and our statement that you cannot explain it is borne out.

6. The opponent and his school define *kārya* as *kriti-uddeṣya*, *Ishta* and *kriti-sādhya*. We have examined the first definition in connection with commands issued in the worldlike 'Bring the cow'. Let us now examine the second definition in connection with commands given in the *veda*. We ask the opponent what *kārya* is. Is it an end sought for its own sake, or a means to an end?

Opponent. It is an end in itself; for it is to be attained by *kriti*.

Questioner. What is attained by *kriti* is *yāga*, and this is not an end in itself, but is a means to *svarga*. This appears from the sentence *Svarga-kāmo yajeta* (one desiring *svarga* should do a *yāga*), which shows *svarga* to be the end; and *yāga* to be the means; and this means is the *kārya* that is denoted by the termination. How can you say that *kārya* is an end?

Opponent. As the *yāga* disappears in a moment, we require a means to *svarga*, that is other than *yāga*, and that will endure. This is *apūrva* and it is *kārya*.

Questioner. Then *apūrva* is other than the object directly desired, and sought, *viz.*, *svarga*. It should be desired and sought only as the means to it. Hence you distinguish *apūrva* from *yāga*. Your first view was that *apūrva* was an end in itself; and in order to make out that it is so, you have to admit that it is a means to an end. Your first view was not carefully formed. Even at the outset the termination does not show an end; for, the word *yajeta* should be taken with the first word in the sentence. Further, one will think only of the end,

pleasure or removal of pain, and its means ; and *apūrva*, not being one of these, there is no reason for his thinking of it as a thing to be attained by *kriti*.

7. Next, let us ask what the nature of *apūrva* is, if it be an end.

Opponent. It is agreeable to man, as pleasure is.

We ask again. Is it pleasure? That alone is agreeable.

Opponent. It is like pleasure, but of a different kind.

Again we ask. What is the authority for regarding it as such?

Opponent. My own experience.

Question again. When you enjoy an object that appeals to the senses, you perceive the pleasure, which it gives. When you experience *apūrva*, do you perceive pleasure in the same way? You will be unable to say that you do.

Opponent. *Śāstra* states it to be an end, that men will seek. When this is known, it will be enjoyed like pleasure.

Question. *Śāstra* is a command. What is the command that states *apūrva* to be an end? It cannot be commands issued in the world ; for they refer to actions, which are in themselves disagreeable. They show them to be only means to pleasure, or removal of pain, and to be capable of being attained by *kriti*. They do nothing more. It cannot be the injunctions contained in the *veda*; for they too merely show *kārya* to be the means to the attainment of *svarga*. It cannot be texts of the

veda that prescribe *yāgas* to be done throughout life (*nitya*), or on the occurrence of a contingency (*naimittika*); for in your view, that all *yāgas* bring about *apūrva*, the conclusion cannot be avoided that they too state them to be the means of attaining *svarga*. Certain actions like the taking of food, if unobstructed, yield fruits quickly in this world, and they are enjoyed, as good health is. If *apūrva* were a fruit like pleasure, it should be enjoyed in the same manner, and be perceived to be different from these worldly fruits; but it is not so enjoyed. Hence, we see no *śāstra* accepting the view that *apūrva* is a kind of pleasure. Nor do *arthavādas* describe the nature of pleasure in the shape of *apūrva*, as they describe the pleasure of *svarga*. We have not seen this, nor have you.

8. The last definition of *kārya*, that it is brought about by *kṛiti* is, like the other two definitions, untenable. In injunction texts, the termination denoting the injunction shows that the meaning of the root (i.e., *yāga* in the word *yajeta*) can be done by *kṛiti*. And this is supported by the *sūtras* of *Pāṇini*, the grammarian.

Opponent. If *kārya* be not *apūrva*, who gives the fruits?

Reply. *Brahma* as the inner Ruler of *agni* and other *devatās*. That *yāgas* are His worship, and that pleased with the worship, He gives the fruits will be explained in Chapter 2, Section 2, *Sūtra* 37.

9. At the end of para 4 of the *first view* it was stated that the fruit of *chāturmāsya* is imperishable. This happens only, when it is done as the worship of

Brahma. Otherwise, it is stated to be perishable; and the term *akshayya* (imperishable) used in the text should therefore be taken to mean relatively permanent, as in the text 'Air and ether—they are free from destruction' (*Bṛihad.*, IV-3-3).

10. The result of this discussion is that the *Upanishads* can give information about *Brahma*, even though He is a settled fact, and that therefore the proposed enquiry may be made (1).

SUB-SECTION 2

Who is this *Brahma*, regarding whom an enquiry is to be made?

२. जन्माद्यस्य यतः ।

From Whom the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of this (universe) take place, He is *Brahma*.

Meaning of sūtra. (2) The term this (*asya*) denotes the universe as seen. Attention is intended to be drawn to

(1) There are five parts in a sub-section: (i) The subject to be considered; (ii) the doubt regarding it; (iii) discussion; (iv) decision; and (v) its use. Here the subject is enquiry into *Brahma*; the doubt is whether it may be commenced; the discussion is that words convey no meaning regarding settled facts; the decision is that they do; and the use of the decision is that the commencement of the enquiry may be made.

(2) The first word in the *sūtra*, meaning that of which *janma* (evolution) is the beginning, is a compound known as *bahuvrīhi* to the grammarian. There are two kinds of this compound. In one that which

the diversity which characterises it. It consists of the two elements—*Jivas* and matter existing together. There is diversity in the former element by the division into *devas*, men, beasts and vegetables; and by their limitations; for each is limited to a place, to a period of time and to the enjoyment of particular fruits. The other element also shows diversity by division into the primary products, and the formation of numberless objects out of the compounded primary products. By drawing attention to this diversity the intention is to indicate the greatness of *Brahma* in evolving and sustaining this wonderful universe (1).

is denoted by the first word is a part of what the whole word denotes; in the other it is not. The compound word here comes under the first kind, known as *tad-guṇa-sam-vijnāna*. It denotes a group consisting of evolution, sustenance and dissolution; and of this evolution is a part. This explanation is needed to refute the objection that evolution not being included in the word, *Brahma* is not its cause.

(1) The vedic text, which is considered in this subsection, uses the words *yataḥ* (from whom), *yena* (by whom) and *yad* (whom); and they indicate that the text repeats what is stated by other texts. These indicate certain attributes of *Brahma*, which are needed in a creator, and in one who should be sought. These attributes, as being intended by the author of the *sūtras*, are enumerated in the *Bhāṣya*. They are—(i) He is the ruler of all; (ii) He is an enemy of every imperfection; (iii) His will is unfailing; (iv) He possesses numberless good qualities like *jñānam* (shining) and *ānanda* (bliss); (v) He is all-knowing; (vi) He has the capacity to do anything; (vii) He is most merciful; and (viii) He is the highest *puruṣa* (person).

The meaning of these clauses is as follows: The second clause differentiates Him from matter, the substance

Subject. The text for consideration is :

From Whom these beings are born, by whom (as supporter from within) they live when born, and returning to whom they enter becoming one, know Him, He is *Brahma* (*Taitti.-Brigu.*, Section 1). See Vedic Texts.

of which continually changes, and from *jīvas*, who are subject to *karma* and suffer misery in various ways. By the term 'enemy' it is meant that no imperfection can ever touch Him. The freed *jīva* has no imperfection of any kind; but before release he was subject to *karma*. The third clause shows that He can at His will subject *jīvas* to bondage, or release them, if they appeal to Him. This attribute accounts for freedom from imperfections, and is needed for creation and for being sought. The fourth attribute is needed for the latter purpose. He is bliss in the sense that He is agreeable, that is, to be with Him is bliss. The fifth and sixth attributes are needed in creation—being all-knowing for being the operative cause, and being almighty for being the material cause. This indicates that matter and *jīvas* form His bodies, and as clothed in them He evolves from the subtle condition to the gross condition as the universe. The two attributes are also needed for releasing bound *jīvas*; He must know what is in their way to reach Him, and must be able to remove it. The seventh is needed for both purposes. Seeing that *jīvas* in the state of rest are unconscious and sleep like matter, He is moved by mercy and creates the universe again. It is because He is merciful, that He is approached. The last attribute shows that He, who releases a bound *jīva*, is the Being to be reached by him; it is not one that releases and another that is reached.

The termination in the term *yataḥ* (from whom) denotes cause, and the cause here is both material and operative causes. On this point there is some misconception, which must be removed :

(i) *Opponent.* The termination shows only the material cause; for *Pāṇini's sūtra* (I-4-30) gives the name *apādānam* to that from which a thing is born; and another *sūtra*

The question is whether from this text a conception of *Brahma* can be formed. The doubt arises from the

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(II-3-28) requires the ending of the fifth case to be added to the word, which expresses *apūdānam*. Here the ending is of the fifth case. The term *yataḥ* therefore refers to the material cause; and as the word *yad* refers to *Brahma*, He is only the material cause; and the operative cause is different, and He is the being known as *Īṣvara*.

Reply. Here the fifth-case-ending denotes cause in general; for the cause is common to evolution, sustenance and dissolution. It does not denote *apūdānam*; for *Pāṇini* does not give the name to the cause of sustenance and to the place of dissolution. It covers both the material and operative causes. Your conclusion is unsound.

(ii) *Opponent.* In the vedic text, which is repeated by the *sūtra*, three words occur *yataḥ* in the fifth case, *yena* (by whom) in the third case, and *yad* (whom) in the second case; and each occurs in a separate clause. The word *yataḥ* is not common to all the operations. It relates only to evolution. The termination therefore denotes *apūdānam*, and this agrees with the word *jāyante* (are born). Further, taking the termination to denote cause in general, it must be restricted to the cause of evolution, i.e., material cause; for the *sūtra* and the *vedic* text should state the same thing, and the word *yataḥ* in the *sūtra* should agree with the same word in the vedic text.

Reply. It is true that the word *yataḥ* in the vedic text is not common to the three operations; but it repeats what has been stated in other texts; and must not conflict with what they teach. One of them is 'It was one only; without a second'; It willed 'I will become many . . . It created fire' (*Chāndo.*, VI-2-2 and 3). This shows *Brahma* to be the material cause, and denies an operative cause other than He. The expression 'I will become' means 'I myself will evolve as the universe, that is characterised by diversity'; and the text states that He became as He willed. *Brahma* being thus both the causes, the term *yataḥ* in the text, which repeats the *vedic* texts, should indicate both the causes; and so should the word *yataḥ* in the *sūtra* also.

mention of more than one epithet (1), from the singular number of the word *Brahma* and from its non-repetition.

First View : 1. A conception cannot be formed. For there are three epithets—the cause of evolution, the cause of sustenance and the cause of dissolution ; and they must point to three *brahmas*, not to one.

2. Here an objection is raised. In the sentence “ *Devadatta* is black, young, red-eyed, and of uniform dimensions,” though the epithets are many, we perceive that *Devadatta* is one only. Similarly, here too *Brahma* is one only. The opponent replies: In this case *Devadatta* is actually seen to be one by other means, and all the epithets are taken as referring to one only. If he were not known to be one by other means, the same impression would be created with regard to him also. In the case under consideration, *Brahma* is to be known only from this definition ; and is therefore not known (2) to be one by other means ; the epithets being many, *Brahma* must be many.

3. *Objection Again*. The term *Brahma* is used in the text but once. It has not been repeated ; nor do

(1) *Epithet*. The sanskrit word for this is *viśeṣaṇa*. It is a word, which connotes an attribute, and through it separates an object, which has the attribute, from other objects. The object separated is known as *viśeṣhya*.

(2) *Not known to be one by other means*. The opponent's view is this—It is useless to refer to the text—One only ; without a second (*Chūnd.*, VI-2-3) ; for that also has more than one epithet, and *sat* should be many. The term one (*eka*) may be explained as in the sentence ‘ This paddy is one ’.

these words "These *Brahmas*" occur. Hence *Brahma* is one. *The opponent replies.* From the sentence "broken-horned, hornless and full-horned is the ox" one will conclude, in spite of the singular word 'go' (ox) being used but once, that there are more than one animal; as the epithets are many.

4. *Further objection.* The word 'go' being in the singular number, and being used but once, denotes of itself that the animal is one. In the example given this impression is shown by sense perception to be erroneous. *Reply.* Even if one has not seen oxen, he will conclude from the number of the epithets that the animals are many. For the same reason these three epithets cannot together form a definition.

5. In the next place, the text under consideration cannot be regarded as indicating *Brahma* by marks, which are only accidental. In this case He must have been known in one aspect already, and another aspect of His should be indicated by the accidental marks. For, in the example generally given on this point "The field, on which that bird sits, is A's field," the field is already known, and the further information that it belongs to A is now given. Here as *Brahma* has not been known in one aspect already, the text cannot be so understood.

6. The objector again appears and observes—*Brahma* has been known already from the text 'Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*' (*Anan.*, 1-1); and being the cause of evolution, etc., shows Him in another aspect. The opponent replies: In this

text also there are many epithets, and the objection stated in para 1 holds. If reference be made to accidental marks, I ask what is the aspect already known. If you refer to a third text, I will repeat the question, and you must refer to a fourth text, and so on *ad infinitum*. You cannot refer to this second text, as it will be manifestly absurd. You must therefore refer to the text under consideration in this sub-section. Then, this text will depend on the second text, and that will depend on this text. This will be arguing in a circle.

Final decision. Neither objection¹ is valid. The number of epithets does not conflict with the unity of an object, unless they connote attributes, which are inconsistent with one another. In the instance of the ox, the epithets do connote inconsistent attributes, and plurality of oxen is inferred. In the other instance, the epithet 'black' separates *Devadatta* from persons, who are white, red, or brown; but it does not deny the existence of other aspects not inconsistent with the black colour. There being no conflict, all the epithets apply to the same person. In the same manner as evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe take place at different times, the epithets do not connote inconsistent attributes, and the same Being may be the cause of them all. In cases like this the rules to be followed are these: (i) When attributes are invariably found in different individuals, epithets connoting them

¹ The original considers the second objection first, as it is in the author's mind. Here the order of the objections is followed.

imply plurality of objects; (ii) but when attributes are not so found, plurality of epithets connoting them is not inconsistent with the unity of an object.

2. In the *first view* it was stated that the three epithets together cannot form a definition. The reason for this remark has been disproved. One epithet only will suffice to form a definition; for it will separate *Brahma*, from every other thing; but the other epithets serve the purpose of showing that the same Being, who is concerned with evolution, deals also with the other operations.

3. The second objection also is invalid. It is not true that *Brahma* is unknown in any aspect to a student of the *Upanishads*. In the sixth chapter of the *chāndogya*, Section 2, it is stated that at the time of cosmic rest all the manifested world was *Sat* only; that He alone existed and without a second; that He willed to become many; and that He evolved successively as fire, water and earth. This evolution implies that *Sat* was all-knowing and all-powerful. This aspect of *Brahma* is referred to as a well-known fact in the text under consideration by the words 'from whom,' 'by whom' and 'to whom,' and the additional information is given that He is *Brahma*, i.e., that He is immeasurably great in His substance and in His attributes, and that He makes others great.

4. In para 6 of the *first view* reference was made to the text 'unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*'. When He is known from the definition

considered here, this text will differentiate (1) Him from everything else, and show Him to be a unique Being. There is therefore no arguing in a circle.

5. The result is that a conception of *Brahma* may be formed from the definition.

6. The first two *sūtras* do not fit in with the view of others (2) that *Brahma* is *nir-viśeṣa*; for the term *Brahma* means a Being who is immeasurably great, and

(1) *Will differentiate*: (i) See note (3) on the text in Vedic texts. When it is said that *Brahma* evolves as the universe, one might presume that He is in Himself subject to changes, and is therefore subject to imperfections. This text removes the impression. It is known as the purifying (*śodhaka*) text.

The author of the *sūtras* has not given this text as the definition of *Brahma*; for it defines Him in Himself and apart from the universe. He has to be meditated on as clothed in the universe, and it is in this form that He is reached. He should therefore be known in this form, and the other definition has therefore been considered. But He should be known to be free from imperfections; and it was therefore the author's intention that reference should be made here to the purifying text also. The original in closing the discussion uses the epithet *niravadya* in the reference to *Brahma*. There is no *sūtra*, in which the purifying text is considered; and the references made to it in *sūtras* (II-3-29) and III-2-15 and 24 serve only as illustrations.

(2) *The view of others*. This is that *Brahma* alone exists; nothing else; and that He has no attribute whatever. As there is nothing from which He can differ, He is said to be *nir-viśeṣa* (without differences). If any other thing exists, or if He has any attribute, he will differ from them; and then He is said to be *sa viśeṣa* (with differences).

who makes others great; and this Being is stated here to be the cause of the world's evolution, etc. The *sūtras* also, which follow, and the *vedic* texts examined therein do not lend any support to that view; for they refer to attributes like willing. Nor can it be proved by inference; for to show that there is fire on a hill, it must be shown that smoke, which co-exists with fire, is seen on it. Similarly, to show that *Brahma* is *nir-viśeṣha* it is necessary to admit that there is an attribute in *Brahma*; and this will make Him *saviśeṣha*. Even the interpretation of the *sūtra*, based on their authority, will prove the same thing. This interpretation is—He, who has the misconception that the world evolves, is sustained and dissolves, is *Brahma*. Misconception comes from *avidyā* (ignorance); and *avidyā* is, as they admit, seen by Him. This is possible, as He is mere *chit* (light) and *chit* is differentiated from dark things (*jada*), as it shows itself or other things, and makes them fit to be spoken about. *Brahma* therefore has this attribute, and this will make Him *saviśeṣha*. If He has not this attribute, He is non-existent; for being *chit* is stated to be the proof of His existence.

SUB-SECTION 3

The enquiry regarding *Brahma* having been shown to be possible, after considering first the *vedānta* as a whole, and next a particular text, which serves as a definition,

it is next examined whether the enquiry is necessary. With this point the third *sūtra* deals :

३. ज्ञान्योनित्वात् ।

Because *Brahma* can be known only from the *veda*.

Meaning—The *sūtra* has the term *śāstra yoni tva*. The first member of the compound is the *veda* ; and the second member means cause, not a cause that becomes a product, but a cause by which some thing is known ; and *Brahma* is known from the *veda*. The term ‘only’ is also implied, as in the statement ‘He lives on water’ ; the meaning evidently is that he lives on water only. So here also.

Subject—The text for consideration is the same as in the preceding sub-section. The doubt is the same as in the other case, but in a different form. If *Brahma* can be known by other means, then the *veda* is no authority ; for it is authority only, when a thing cannot be known by any other means.

First View. I dispute the statement that *Brahma* can be known only from the *veda* ; for He can be known from other sources. The *veda* serves a purpose, only when it shows what cannot be so known. Here an objector comes forward and asks—What is the source ? It cannot be sense perception (*pratyaksha*) ; for the senses make known those objects only, that are present and are capable of being contacted by them. They are powerless to show a maker of the world, who sees everything and who is capable of making it. It

cannot be perception by the mind ; for it shows only pleasure and pain and the like, and is powerless to act in regard to objects in the outer world independently of the outer senses. It cannot be perception in *yoga* (meditation); for however vivid it may be, it is merely thought on something previously experienced, which by much practice has become vivid like sense perception. It possesses no authority ; how can it be considered to be sense perception ? It cannot show anything else ; if it does, it is misconception. Nor can the source be inference ; for the *hetu* (1), on which you rely, cannot be one that is seen in the Being under consideration ; for Being beyond the senses, its existence in Him cannot be perceived. The *hetu* cannot be one common to Him and others ; for its co-existence with the power to see all things and to make them has nowhere been seen. Here one, who holds the same view as the *vaiṣeṣhika*, comes forward and urges the following inferences :

(i) The universe is a product ; for it is made up of parts ;

(ii) The universe has for its maker one, who knew of what material it should be made, what were the instruments needed, who were to profit by it and how the product was to be utilised ; for it is a product like an earthen jar.

(1) *Hetu*. The following is the type of a valid inference :
 “ There is smoke on the hill ; therefore there is fire on it ; for smoke and fire co-exist. ” Here smoke is known as the *hetu* ; and fire as the *sādhya*.

(iii) The universe depends upon a single intelligent being ; for it has been made out of non-intelligent material, like the healthy body of a person.

2. A *mīmāṃsaka*, who holds the same view as the *vedāntin* in regard to the helplessness of inference on this point, criticises the inference thus: First,¹ the second inference is faulty in three respects. (i) In the example given the work is within the normal knowledge and capacity of the maker, and only such works are known to be made by intelligent persons ; but it is not so in the case under consideration ; for the earth, the hills and the great oceans are beyond normal knowledge and capacity. The condition that the work should be of this character is present in the example, but is absent from the subject under consideration. The inference is faulty (1). (ii) Next, it is a simpler hypothesis to accept *jivas* as the makers ; for their existence is admitted by both the parties. They perceive the material of which the universe is made, *viz.*, the earth

(1) It is not sufficient to state that a thing is a product ; it should be shown also that normal knowledge and capacity will suffice for making it. In the case under consideration this cannot be shown. *Example*: There is fire on the hill ; therefore there is also smoke on it. Here the *hetu* alone is not sufficient ; it must be shown also that undried fuel has been placed on the fire. If a condition, that must co-operate with the *hetu* in producing the effect, is present in the example, but is absent from the subject under consideration, it is known as *upādhi*, and an inference tainted by *upādhi* is invalid.

¹ The original considers the second inference first ; here the order of the inferences is followed.

and the other elements, and they also perceive the *yāgas* which produce the *adrishtams* and serve as the instruments. As they perceive them now, it may be presumed that they perceived them at the time of creation. It is not necessary that they should also perceive the *adrishtams*—i.e., capacity generated in themselves by the *yāgas*; it is sufficient to know that the *yāgas* generate this capacity, and this knowledge is obtainable from the *veda*. In the case of the jar the potter knows that the rod and wheel possess the capacity to make the jar; but he does not see the capacity. The conclusion on this point is that the opponent attempts to prove what is accepted by the other party. (iii) Next, the jar is made by one subject to *karma*, of limited knowledge and capacity, operating in a body, and with instruments, and not in possession of every object of desire. The *hetu*—being a product—being found to co-exist with these particulars, it will follow that the maker of the universe is also subject to *karma*, that he is of limited knowledge and capacity, that he lives in a body, that he works with instruments and that he is not in possession of all objects of desire. In other words the inference proves the reverse of what is intended. If the subject of the inference can be known from some other source, it may be possible to eliminate these particulars; but the maker of the universe is not known by any other means. The inference is faulty.

3. The third inference—the universe depends upon a single intelligent being, like one's healthy body, is also untenable. What is meant by this dependence?

It cannot be dependence for coming into existence or for its continuance ; for this is absent from the example, the person's body having been born, and continuing to exist for the sake of his wife (1) and others, who profit by him. Existence in the sense of the parts of the body remaining together as a whole does not need an intelligent person. Nor can it be existence in the sense of breathing ; for this is absent from the earth, hills and oceans, which are included in the universe. What is needed is the same form of dependence, which is found in both the example and the subject under consideration ; and this does not exist here. Lastly, it cannot be dependence for action ; for the *hetu*—being made—is found in cases like the making of cars, where many persons co-operate to produce a work. Hence the inference is faulty ; for the *hetu* and *sādhya* do not co-exist. Unless they do, the inference cannot be valid. If you omit the word 'single' from the *sādhya*, you will then try to prove what needs no proof.

4. The *Vaiṣeṣhika* himself comes forward to reply to the criticism and deals with the objections stated in para 2, first putting forward three inferences to prove

(1) *For the sake of his wife.* Every deed produces a capacity in the person, who does it, to yield its fruit. This is known as *adrishṭa* or *apūrva*. The *adrishṭas* of the wife, children and others bring the person's body into existence, and keep it going, so that they may all obtain the fruits due to them. Hence the body depends upon the *adrishṭas* of many, and not upon a single intelligent being. For a valid inference both the *hetu* and *sādhya* should co-exist ; they do not do so in the example.

that the universe is a product: (i) The earth and hills are products; for they consist of parts, like a jar; (ii) The earth, oceans, and hills are products; for they are of such size as can be perceived and have motion, like a jar; and (iii) The human body and earth are products; for they are of such size as can be perceived but of limited dimensions, like a jar. Among objects consisting of parts, there is nothing, other than this character, which determines their becoming products. The condition that a work should be within normal knowledge and capacity (1) is unnecessary. In a thing known to be made, an opinion of the knowledge and capacity of the maker is formed from the workmanship. When a large palace of a king is seen, considering its parts and the way in which they have been put together, it is concluded that it was made, and at the same time the knowledge and capacity of the maker is noted to be of a high order. Similarly, as the universe consists of parts, it is presumed that it was made, and that its maker was omniscient and omnipotent, and that the work was not beyond his knowledge and capacity. The first criticism therefore fails.

5. Further, all men experience pleasure or pain as the result of good or bad deeds; but the deeds

(1) *Within normal knowledge and capacity.* The meaning is—What is normal should be determined in each case from the work itself. It is different for different works; so that the Maker of the universe has such knowledge and capacity as is needed for His work, and that is normal knowledge and capacity for the work. There is therefore no *upādhi*, and the inference is not invalid.

themselves, not being intelligent, cannot yield their fruits without guidance from an intelligent Being. It is therefore necessary to assume that a Being exists, who can give every fruit in accordance with the past *karma* of all persons. A carpenter's tools, though the set is complete, and though all the conditions exist, except guidance by an intelligent person, cannot make a box, unless they are handled by him. That a tree grows from a seed, and that pleasure which one feels makes his hair stand on end do not disprove the point; for both these cases are included in the subject under consideration.

6. The next criticism also fails. The *jivas* are unable to see things which are minute, which are at a distance, or which are separated from them by intervening objects. This is known as a fact; and in constructing a theory one should be guided by what one actually sees. In the case of the maker of the universe it is not known that he labours under the same incapacity, and it is not illegitimate to infer his existence as *omniscient* and *omnipotent*.

7. The last criticism that the inference proves the reverse of what is intended merely reveals ignorance. In the making of a product what is needed is knowledge of the material and the capacity to make it into the product, but not ignorance or incapacity in regard to other objects. To find out whether a thing is connected with the effect as cause, it should be examined whether the effect will follow, if that thing be absent. Tested by this method ignorance and incapacity in regard to other

matters will be found unconnected with the effect (1); and the assumption that the attributes found in the potter will be found in the maker of the universe is not therefore legitimate. As to the possession of a body, let me point out that by the mere exercise of will one is seen able to dislodge the poison, which has entered the body of another; that for the exercise of the will, a body is not needed; that what is required is the mind; that it exists in the maker of the universe; that it is eternal and survives death; and that in the inference of the existence of a maker the possession of the mind is included along with knowledge and capacity. Hence, the text in question is no authority, and the proposed enquiry is unnecessary.

Final decision. That the universe has been made is conceded; but what is the authority for holding that it was made by one person and at one and the same time? A jar, for instance, is made of one material, and

(1) *Will be found unconnected with the effect.* The opponent asks: You say that the potter is a man of limited knowledge and capacity, that is, he is ignorant and incapable in regard to many matters. Do the ignorance and incapacity relate to all matters, other than the making of earthen vessels, or only to some matters? The former alternative is not correct; for the potter does possess them in some matters. Nor will the second alternative do? What is this matter? Is it the making of gold ornaments? If so, ignorance and incapacity in regard to gold ornaments are not found in the goldsmith; and yet he makes them. Hence ignorance and incapacity in any matter other than the making of a particular product is not necessary for making it.

is of limited size, so that it may be made by one person at the same time. The whole of the universe is not one product, like the jar, capable of being made of one material by one person at the same time. If it were so, one maker might be presumed to have made it without effort. But it consists of different products; and those which differ from one another are seen to be made by different persons and at different times; but not always made by one person and at the same time.

2. You urged (*first view*, para 6) that the *jivas* have not the capacity (1) to make the universe; but we see that particular individuals by accumulating merit by numberless good deeds acquire peculiar capacities; and it is possible that some *jiva*, by making the *jyotishtoma* offering numberless times, acquires the capacity to create the earth, and other objects. It is not therefore legitimate to ignore the *jiva*, who is already known, and assume the existence as a maker of a person wholly unknown. The rule to be followed in adopting a new theory is that it is more legitimate to assume a new attribute as existing in a known individual, than to assume the existence of a new individual. *Question*: At the dissolution of the

(1) *Have not capacity*. The opponent's contention was this. The products are some of them of very large size, and some are very minute; and these being beyond the capacity of *jivas*, one other than a *jiva* should be assumed, and in doing so, it is simpler to assume one such being than many. In the reply it is pointed out that it is needless to assume one other than a *jiva*; and this being so, there is no room for the simplicity rule.

universe *jivas* are devoid of bodies ; and they can do nothing without them. How can a *jiva* create the universe ? A maker, who can work without a body, and who is therefore other than a *jiva* is needed. *Reply* : Why do you assume that all things come into existence or go out of existence at the same time. For such a thing has not been seen ; on the other hand, they appear and disappear only one after another. *Question again* : This is so ; but should not simultaneous creation at the end of cosmic rest be assumed ? *Reply* : The assumptions must be based on what is seen ; and from doing so no undesirable result will follow.

3. The criticism stated in the two preceding paras may be put in logical form thus : You say—the universe has been made by *one* intelligent person ; for it is a product. If reference be made to an intelligent person in general terms, the *hetu* is found among things which are made by many persons. The inference is faulty. If reference be made to an omniscient and omnipotent person, such a person is unknown, and the *sādhya* will be absent from the example (1). When it is wished to infer that there is fire on a hill, fire is already known, and it is concluded that it exists on the hill. Here the thing predicated is unknown. If the word ‘one’ be omitted from the *sādhya*, it will prove what requires no proof.

(1) *Will be absent from the example.* For a valid inference the *hetu* and *sādhya* must co-exist ; and an example is given to show that this condition exists. If therefore the *sādhya* be absent from it, there is nothing to show the co-existence.

Again is the *hetu*—being a product—found in all objects coming into existence at the same time or in all objects appearing successively? In the former alternative such a *hetu* does not exist. In the latter alternative, the inference will prove that the objects are made by many persons; a conclusion the reverse of what is intended. If you assert that they are made by a single individual, it will be opposed to sense perception, inference and the *veda*. We hear the statements—‘The maker of the jar is born’; ‘The maker of the car is born’. Thus, the jar and car are made by different persons.

4. In para 7 of the *first view* you rejected the argument that like the potter, the maker of the universe should be of limited knowledge and capacity and the like; you urged that these points were not connected with the effect. This view is not correct; when something is done, the doer not only possesses the knowledge and capacity that is needed for the work, but is also under bondage to *karma*. For, he is invested with a body, which as shown by the effects produced—pleasure, pain, or delusion—is influenced by the three *guṇas*; and his knowledge and capacity are limited by them. Even the desire, which prompts the action, springs from the action of the *guṇas*. And the bondage to the *guṇas* depends upon his past *karma*. Hence, the maker of the universe should be bound by *karma*, like the potter; and the inference will prove the reverse of what you intended.

5. From what has been stated in the preceding paras, it will be evident, that the scope of inference as a

source of knowledge is limited. It can only prove that the universe was made by an intelligent person ; and it will overstep its bounds, if it states that the maker is omniscient also on the strength of the magnitude of the product. For, omniscience is not found in the potter, though he is the maker of the jar. The attempt to prove omniscience by inference will be like the attempt to perceive smell by the ear. (*Adhi.*, verse 42.)

6. Do you rely in the last resort on a negative example and put forward the following inference: The universe has been made by an omniscient maker; for it is a product. What is not made by an omniscient maker is not a product, like the *jiva*. We reply. We accept the *hetu*, but reject the conclusion. If the argument were valid, you should be able to point to an unwelcome result as flowing from the rejection, but you cannot; for there are lots of things that are not made by an omniscient maker, and yet they are products like the potter's jar. If on the other hand, you say "The universe has been made by a maker; for it is a product", we cannot accept the *hetu* and reject the conclusion; for we should then assert that a thing is a product, though not made by any one, which is absurd. Your argument must be such that no conclusion other than the one stated by you should be possible; here it is not so. Your epithet 'omniscient' therefore serves no purpose. We reject arguments based on a negative example only; for there is no evidence of the co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*." (*Adhi.*, verse 43.)

7. In passing, let us add that inference is powerless to prove that *Brahma* is both the material and operative causes of the universe ; for in the example of the potter, the causes are found to be distinct. You may say—accept my inference to prove the existence of *Brahma* as an operative cause ; and then your *vedānta* may show that He is also the material cause. This view is untenable ; for, if the *vedānta* should rely on your inference, it must accept its testimony as it determines the fact ; and it will determine *Brahma* as the operative cause only, and as distinct from the material cause.

8. Here are some counter-arguments : (i) The body and the earth were made by a bound *jīva* ; for they have been made, like an earthen jar. (ii) *Brahma* was not the maker of the universe ; for He had no object to gain, like the freed *jīva*. (iii) *Brahma* was not the maker of the universe ; for He had no body, like the freed *jīva* again ; and (iv) At the time under consideration (1)—the universe was not non-existent ; for that time had the characteristic of time, like the present time. The result will be that if *Brahma* be accepted as the maker on the authority of inference, He would be bound by *karma*. He would have some object to gain ; and He would be embodied. Here the opponent

(1) *Time under consideration.* The time stated to be the beginning of evolution. The intention is to show that the universe as it exists now, existed then ; and that therefore there is no need to prove that it had a maker.

speaks. The *jiva* does not need a body, when his first connection with a body begins, or when he moves his own body to action. Reply. In the first case, he does remain in a subtle body, when he enters a gross body. His subtle and gross bodies follow one another like the seed and tree. *Illustration.* The entry of a *jiva* in a child body into a young man's body. In the second case the very body that he moves to action helps him in this effort. *Illustration.* A jar by its very existence causes perception of itself, and then becomes the object of the perception.

9. Let us put some questions to the opponent: In making the universe did *Īṣvara* work in a body or without a body?

Opponent: Without a body.

Questioner: He could not have done so; for we have not seen any one without a body doing anything. Can you give an instance?

Opponent: An operation of the mind takes place without the help of a body. It only requires the possession of the mind. Mind being eternal, *Īṣvara* can therefore make the universe by mere willing.

Questioner: Even mental operations are observed only in those invested with bodies. Though the mind is a permanent entity (which by the way we do not accept), the freed *jiva*, being devoid of a body, does not give any indication of its operation.

Opponent: *Īṣvara* worked in a body.

Questioner: Was that body permanent or perishable?

Opponent: It was permanent.

Questioner : If so, a body, though made up of parts, need not be a product. The universe, though made up of parts, might likewise be permanent, and the need for inferring the existence of a maker would not arise.

Opponent : The body was a perishable one.

Questioner : It must have been made ; but the body by the exertion of which this body should be made was not then available.

Opponent : *Īṣvara* was himself the cause.

Questioner : This cannot be in one without a body.

Opponent : He had a body other than that made on the completion of evolution.

Questioner : We will ask—how was that body made? This would lead to the assumption of a third body ; then of a fourth body and so on *ad infinitum*.

10. Another question. In making the world, did *Īṣvara* operate or not.

Opponent : He operated.

Questioner : Having no body, this could not be.

Opponent : He did not operate.

Questioner : Like the freed *jīva* he could make nothing.

Opponent : The universe might be made by mere willing without manual operation.

Questioner : Making a thing by mere willing without the use of the hand is unknown, and an example would be wanting ; for the potter does not make a jar by mere willing.

11. The conclusion is that *Brahma* can be known only from the *veda*. The *opponent* puts some questions:

(i) You reject my inference on the ground that it assumes many things which are unknown and improbable ; does not the *veda* do the same ?

Reply. The *veda*, not having been made, and being therefore perfect, its testimony is implicitly accepted, like the statements of a friend returning from a distance. Where any of these statements conflicts with what is known from other sources, they are rejected. Similarly, if the *veda* makes a statement conflicting with sense perception, it is understood in a secondary sense as mere praise. (*adhi*, verse 44.)

(ii) Do not those who rely on the *veda* say "From products which are beyond our capacity, we should infer a superior maker?" Does not the text under consideration in this sub-section refer to what is already known from another source, and is not that source inference?"

Reply. These are not cases of proof of *Brahma* by inference. The testimony of the *veda* on this point is unhesitatingly accepted ; and the truth is brought home to students by pointing out its appropriateness. In the text under consideration the reference is not to the *vaiśeṣika*'s inference, but to other texts. (*adhi*, verse 45.)

SUB-SECTION 4

Introduction. The enquiry regarding *Brahma* has thus been shown to be both possible and necessary. The next *sūtra* points out that (1) it is highly desirable.

4. तत्तु समन्वयात् ।

It—viz.—that *Brahma* should be known from the *veda*—surely results from the fact that *vedic* texts describe Him as the highest among the ends desired by man.

Subject. The word 'surely' gives the meaning of the particle *tu*, which occurs in the original. This is the description given (2). The world-cause, referred to in general terms as *Sat*, *Brahma* and *Ātmā*, is *Nārāyaṇa*, He is free from every imperfection ; He is the seat of every good quality ; and He is limitless bliss (3).

(1) A person will desire to know a thing, (i) when he does not know it already ; and (ii) when it will lead to a desirable end. In the preceding sub-section it was shown that *Brahma* cannot be known from any source other than the *veda*. In the present sub-section it will be shown that He is the highest among desirable ends.

(2) The texts which give the description are: (1) From whom these beings are born (*bhṛigu.*, *anu* 1) ; (2) Before creation, my dear, this was *sat* only ; one only ; without a second ; It willed " I will become many ; I will evolve ; He became fire " (*chāndo.*, VI-2-2 and 3) ; (3) Before creation, this was *Brahma* ; one only (*bṛihad.*, III-4-11) ; (4) Before creation this was *Ātmā* ; one only (*aita.*, 1-1-1) ; (5) " From this *Ātmā* ether came forth " (*āna.*, *anu* 1) ; (6) *Nārāyaṇa* alone was (*maho.*, 1-1) ; (7) Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma* (*āna.*, *anu* 1) ; (8) *Brahma* is bliss (*bhṛigu.*, *anu* 6).

(3) *Limitless bliss.* As He is bliss. He is an end that man may seek ; as the bliss is limitless, it is the highest

The *vedic* texts, which give this description, as a whole, is the subject for consideration ; and the doubt is whether they are authority for the statements made by them.

2. *An objector* states—The texts do not mean what they state ; for they do not enjoin action or abstention from action.

Reply. Explain your meaning.

3. *Objector.* When a sentence means what it states, action or abstention from action is invariably enjoined. When therefore it does not do so, it does not mean what it states.

Reply. The invariable co-existence that you allege is not a fact. Every source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) gives information in matters to which it relates. When this has been done, its business ends ; it does not go further, and enjoin action or abstention from action.

4. *Objector.* When sentences mean what they state, a purpose (*prayojana*) exists ; and when a purpose exists, action or abstention from action is enjoined. When therefore neither is enjoined, no purpose exists ; and in its absence, sentences do not mean what they state.

Reply. Neither statement is correct. The real intention of a speaker does not depend upon a purpose ; on the other hand, the purpose depends upon the meaning

end. One may be disagreeable in himself ; but being the means to some pleasure, he may be sought by others. *Brahma* is not of this character ; He is extremely agreeable in Himself, and is also the means to limitless bliss.

which it is intended to convey. Also it is not true that a purpose does not exist, when action or abstention from action is not enjoined; for a desirable end appears. In the world also sentences, which merely state facts like 'A son has been born to you,' or 'This is not a snake,' do show a desirable end; for they give pleasure or remove fear.

The first view is put forward by the *Prābhakara*, the *mīmāṃsaka*. The *veda* is authority in so far as it refers to a pleasure to be attained or to a pain to be removed; and it serves a useful purpose of this kind, in so far as it enjoins the doing of a thing or abstention from another. The earlier portion is full authority, as it refers to *svarga* and enjoins the performance of *yāgas* as the means for attaining it. But the later portion contains no such injunctions, and merely states that *Brahma* is such and such. It is not therefore any authority in the sense of stimulating one's effort to procure a good (1).

2. *Objection.* The business of a source of knowledge is, as already stated, to convey information in matters with which it deals:

Reply. This is true of sense perception only. The *veda*, however, should point to a good; for no statement is made in the world or in the *veda*, which does not do so; nor will one make or hear a

(1) The opponent contended that the sentences in the *upaniṣads* convey no meaning. This was refuted in the first sub-section. He now contends that their meaning is not what appears on the surface, but something different.

statement, without aiming at something desirable (1). This something is seen to be either the attainment of pleasure, or the avoidance of pain by abstention from action. Here are some instances—"One, who desires to get a valuable object, should go to the palace; one, who has a weak stomach, should not drink too much water; one, who desires *svarga*, should do *yāga*; one should not eat an intoxicating article of food."

3. Here the question is put to him. Has it not been stated that sentences, which merely state facts, give pleasure or remove fear?

Reply. We must consider what it is that gives pleasure or removes fear—Is it the fact stated or the impression created on the hearer's mind by the sentence? It cannot be the fact; for though it exists, if it be not known, it will not produce the effect stated. Hence, it must be the impression created on the hearer's mind by the sentence. This being so, even though the fact stated does not exist, from the mere impression created the desirable end will result. The sentences are therefore no authority for the facts, which they state. It follows from this that every sentence aims at some action to be done or to be abstained from, or at creating an impression on the hearer's mind; and

(1) *Something desirable.* For himself or for others; whether little or great. When a person speaks, some effort is needed; and it will not be made, unless there is something good to be attained. As statements are of this character, repetition of a statement is considered to be a fault.

in either way it serves a purpose. But in regard to a settled matter no sentence can convey any information.

4. Here an *illusionist* (1) comes forward and observes—Even the texts of the *upanishads* aim at a *kārya* (something to be done); and from the very fact that they do so, they are authority for the existence of *Brahma*.

Opponent. How can it be?

Illusionist. This is what they state—*Brahma*, who is without a universe, who has no second, and who is merely *jnānam* (perception) (2), under the influence of beginningless *avidyā* perceives Himself as connected with the universe; make Him disconnected with the universe. Though *Brahma* already exists, He may become the subject of an injunction through the destruction of the universe.

Opponent. What is the injunction, which directs that by destroying the universe, consisting of knowers and the known, *Brahma* should be made mere *jnānam*.

(1) *An illusionist* is one, who maintains that *Brahma* alone exists; but that under the influence of *avidyā* (ignorance) He imagines that there is a universe other than Himself, and that this is illusion.

(2) *Mere jnānam.* In every perception there is a person who perceives, and a thing that is perceived, in addition to the perception. The universe is made up of numberless persons who perceive, and numberless things that are perceived. In the opinion of the illusionist this universe does not really exist.

Illusionist. Here is one.

Do not perceive a knower other than knowing; do not think that a thinker exists other than thinking. (*brihad.*, V-4-2.)

And there are others. This text means—‘Make *Brahma* devoid of differences in the form of knowers and the known, and make Him ‘mere *jnānam*’ (1). *Brahma*’s existence of Himself is not incompatible with his being a *kārya* in the aspect of being disconnected with the universe.

5. The opponent criticises the illusionist. The view put forward is untenable. You state that the text aims at the creation of a *kārya*, *apūrva* or *niyoga* (for, they are all synonymous). You should then point out the following things—*niyoga*, the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is given, the action that creates it (2), what helps this action and the person who does the action. Of them the qualification of the person is either a contingency, on the occurrence of which an action should be done (*nimitta*), or a fruit to be attained

(1) *Make Him mere jnānam.* The meaning is that even the *avidyā*, that is the cause of the misperception, should go.

(2) *The action that creates it.* This is denoted by two words in the original—*vishaya*, and *karaṇa*. The same *yāga* is *vishaya* (subject), when it particularises an *apūrva*, and is *karaṇa* (instrument), when it creates it. *Apūrvas* are all similar, being mere capacities generated in the persons who do *yāgas*. To distinguish one *apūrva* from another, it must be connected with the *kṛiti*, which generates it through a *yāga*. In this aspect of distinguishing an *apūrva*, *yāga* is *vishaya*.

by the action. In either case, it cannot be enjoined. What is it here?

Illusionist. It is the perception by *Brahma* of Himself as He really is.

Opponent. Then it cannot be *nimitta*; for the perception of the true nature does not now exist; but has to be brought about. In the case of *agnihotra* offerings (1) the *nimitta* is to be alive at sunrise or sunset; and this already exists, when the offerings are made. Assuming it to be *nimitta*, it will ever exist, when once it is attained; and like the *agnihotra* offerings the action enjoined will have to be done ever afterwards, even though *avidyā* has been destroyed.

Illusionist. The undesirable result which you state will not happen; for though the *nimitta* may exist, a body and senses, which are needed for action, will not be available.

Opponent. *Brahma* now perceives Himself to be connected with the universe; and this is not perception of His true nature. It must come only after release from the influence of *avidyā*. As this is the *nimitta*, the action enjoined should be done after release. Seeing that He will have then no body and no senses, will He be able to do the action enjoined? If He be able, he can do the action ever afterwards. If he be

(1) *agnihotra offerings.* These are made under the injunction 'One should make the *agnihotra* offerings, so long as he lives'. Here being alive at the time for making the offerings is the *nimitta*; and it occurs at sunrise and sunset every day.

unable, the injunction should not have been issued. The qualification of the person cannot thus be *nimitta*. Nor can it be the fruit ; for the fruit will be yielded by *niyoga*, and will therefore be perishable. *Svarga* is yielded by *niyoga*, and is known to be perishable.

6. *Opponent*. Next, what is the *vishaya* of *niyoga*, i.e., what is it that distinguishes the *niyoga* under consideration from other *niyogas* ?

Illusionist. *Brahma* Himself.

Opponent. The *vishaya*, like *yāga*, must be such as is made. A fruit is also created ; but *vishaya* must also be an action like *yāga* again. Here *Brahma*, being eternal, can neither be made, nor is He action. Hence, He cannot be *vishaya*.

Illusionist. *Brahma* devoid of the universe may be made.

Opponent. Even if He is to be made, He will be only a fruit, and cannot be *vishaya* ; for *vishaya* is different from the fruit ; as *yāga* is different from *svarga*. As He is not action, He cannot be subject to an injunction. *Brahma*, devoid of the universe is thus not *vishaya* ; nor can *Brahma* or the withdrawal of the universe by itself be the *vishaya*. It cannot be the former ; for He already exists ; and if He is to be made, He will be liable to destruction, as whatever is made is seen to perish. It cannot be the latter ; for the withdrawal of the universe will be the thing to be made, not *Brahma*.

Illusionist. The withdrawal of the universe is the subject of the injunction.

Opponent. It is a fruit and cannot be the subject of the injunction; for the withdrawal of the universe is itself release, (*moksha*); and release is a fruit. Further, if withdrawal of the universe be the *vishaya*, it creates *niyoga*, as *yāga* creates it; and *niyoga* will bring about withdrawal of the universe, as it brings about *svarga*. This is arguing in a circle.

7. Is the universe to be removed real or unreal?

Illusionist. It is unreal.

Opponent. It must be removed by right understanding and not by *niyoga*; which will serve no purpose.

Illusionist. *Niyoga* yields the right understanding, and through it removes the universe.

Opponent. The right understanding comes from the *vedic* text itself; why should *niyoga* intervene? From the mere understanding of the text, every thing other than *Brahma*, being unreal, is destroyed; hence *niyoga* and its adjuncts no longer exist.

8. If the universe is to be removed, what is the *niyoga*, which removes it? Is it *Brahma* Himself or something else?

Illusionist. It is *Brahma* himself.

Opponent. Then *niyoga* will be eternal; and the universe to be removed by it can have no existence whatever. And being eternal, it cannot be created by doing the action enjoined, as *niyoga* should be.

Illusionist. Something other than *Brahma* is the *niyoga*.

Opponent. This *niyoga* should be created by doing the *vishaya*, and this *vishaya* is the withdrawal of the

universe (para 6 *supra*). Hence, the person, who should do it, ceased to exist, as he is included in the universe. *Niyoga*, being a capacity subsisting in a person, and finding no one, will not be available. As by mere doing of the *vishaya* everything other than *Brahma* will disappear, there will be no fruit in the shape of release (*moksha*) to be brought about by *niyoga*.

9. You say that the withdrawal of the universe is *vishaya* of *niyoga*; it is also the instrument (*karāṇa*) that creates the *niyoga*. What is it that helps it (*iti kartavyatā*). In the absence of the helper, it cannot be a *karāṇa*. You cannot point to anything in reply. The help is of two kinds. (i) To bring the *karāṇa* into existence, and (ii) to enable it, when it has come into existence, to create the *kārya*. We see nothing, which will destroy the whole of the universe, as a hammer destroys a jar by falling upon it. Thus, help of the first kind is not available. Help of the second kind too fails; for if it exists, then the whole of the universe will not disappear, and the complete disappearance being the *karāṇa*, it will not come into existence.

Illusionist. The knowledge that *Brahma* is without a second brings the *karāṇa* into existence.

Opponent. This alone will lead to the disappearance of the universe (which disappearance is *moksha*); and there is nothing for the *karāṇa* to do. If the helper is a negation, by the very fact that it is a negation, it cannot render help of either kind. The conclusion is that there is no injunction, which contemplates *Brahma* disconnected with the universe.

10. Another *illusionist* now comes forward and speaks. Though the texts of the *upanishads* possess no authority, on the ground that they refer to *Brahma*, as already existing, yet *Brahma* is surely shown to exist.

Opponent. How?

Second Illusionist. From the strength of the injunctions to meditate. (1) So do they teach—

Meditation is the *vishaya* of *niyoga*. (See note under para 5.) And as meditation can be described only by referring to the object meditated on, *niyoga* implies that object. That is *Ātmā* referred to by the texts. The question arises—What is His nature? The reply is given by texts like these—

Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma* (*āna.*, I-1); and, 'Before creation, dear, the world was *sat* alone' (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1).

They show the nature of *Ātmā*, and thus serve the injunction texts and obtain authority. As *Brahma* enters into the meditation, the texts do mean what they state about Him.

(1) (i) *Ātmā*, dear, should be seen; . . . should be meditated on (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-5); (ii) The *Ātmā*, who is unpolluted by evil, should be sought; He should be meditated on (*chāndo.*, VIII-7-1); (iii) Meditate on Him only as *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7); (iv) Meditate on the *Ātmā* alone, who is the world (*bṛihad.*, III-4-15).

The first text enjoins meditation, and indicates that it should be as vivid as sense perception. The third text indicates meditation on oneness; and the fourth text directs meditation that the *Ātmā* and the world are one. The term used in the original is *loka*. The illusionist understands it to mean the world; but the correct meaning is fruit.

11. They also mean what they state, when they say that the universe is illusion. The following texts show that *Brahma* alone exists; and that everything else is unreal

'One only; without a second' (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1); 'That is real; He is *ātmā*; That thou art, *śvetaketu*' (*Ibid.*, VI-8-7); 'Here no difference of any kind exists' (*kāṭha.*, 4-11).

On the other hand, differences are shown by sense perception and by the portion of the *veda* dealing with *karmas*, which are based on differences. There is thus conflict between the two sets of authorities; but the perception of differences is capable of explanation as having been caused by beginningless *avidyā*. We therefore conclude that non-difference alone is the truth. Now, meditation on *Brahma* creates a *niyoga*, which in its turn leads to the realisation of *Brahma*. Then release (*moksha*) is reached; and this is the attainment of the *Brahma*-condition, in which all *avidyā*-made differences of many kinds are removed, and *Brahma* appears without a second, and as mere *jñānam* (perception). This condition cannot be reached by the mere understanding of *vedic* texts; for, it is not so perceived; and the perception of differences of many kinds continues. If the *Brahma*-condition could be reached as stated, the injunction to hear, to think and to meditate would become purposeless (1).

(1) This view of the second illusionist is not open to the objections urged in regard to the view of the first illusionist. Meditation on *Brahma* is the *vishaya* of *niyoga*; and it is also *karāṇa* (instrument) in the creation of the

12. The *opponent* replies. This view of the second illusionist also is unsound. The texts may serve injunction texts as pointed out; but the texts of the *upanishads* are no authority for the existence of the facts stated. If the texts under consideration be connected with the texts enjoining meditation, so as to form a whole, then they serve the latter texts and do not mean what they state about *Brahma*. If they be not so connected, as they do not enjoin action or abstention from action, they possess no authority.

13. *Second illusionist*. Have I not shown that meditation on *Brahma* implies a knowledge of His nature, and that this knowledge is furnished by the texts under consideration?

Opponent. This is so; but meditation is possible, even with imaginary facts, and the correctness of the facts meditated is not needed. In the injunction 'Meditate on name as *Brahma*' it is not true that name is *Brahma*; and what applies to this text may apply to all texts. The conclusion is that the texts of the *upanishads* do not enjoin action or abstention from action and do not serve any purpose. Even if they be considered as rendering service to meditation texts, they only point to the object to be meditated on, and their business ends there. 'Considering them by themselves, they create an impression on the hearers' minds,

niyoga. The control of the mind and the rest are the helpers. The removal of *avidyā* is the fruit; and to attain this *niyoga* is created and the meditator is the person, who creates it.

and by this alone, as by statements made to children and invalids to induce them to take medicines, they conduce to the attainment of desirable ends. Hence in mere statements of facts there is no guarantee as to the truth of the facts, and the *upanishads* are therefore no authority regarding *Brahma*.¹

Final decision. The argument is not valid. What pleases is not the impression created on the mind, but the belief that the statement of facts is correct. If it be known to be false, no pleasure will follow. In the case of children and invalids the pleasure is based on the belief in the reality of what is told them. With the disappearance of the belief, the pleasure also will disappear, even though the impression remains. Similarly, if one be certain that the *upanishad* texts, though asserting the existence of *Brahma*, do not mean what they state, his knowledge of the texts will not in his opinion count for anything. And there is no reason to hold that the texts do not mean what they state. For the *veda* is not a thing made by any one; and it is perfect.

2. Let us ask the opponent—Why should not your argument be turned against yourself? The statements made in the earlier portion of the *veda* do not mean what they state; and yet like children elders are duped into doing what is enjoined.

¹ Here the original brings in *Ṣaṅkara* and *Bhāṣkara*, and makes them state their views, which are criticised by the second illusionist. This portion of the *Śrī Bhāṣya* is omitted, as not quite relevant. It is, however, embodied in the "Three *Tatvas*".

Opponent. The *veda*, not being made, cannot delude like the statements of worldly men. If it did, knowing men would not teach it to their children and disciples.

Reply. This applies to the *vedānta* also.

Opponent. The *vedānta* shows that the *jīva* has an existence, independently of the body ; and this knowledge being needed by the earlier portion, the later one is subsidiary to it, and will continue to be learnt on this ground.

Reply. How do you know that the *jīva* is other than his body ? When one has reason to believe that the difference between them is delusion, will he be induced to learn the *vedānta*, as subsidiary to your injunctions.

Opponent. The difference between the *jīva* and his body is real ; it is known from the perfect *vedānta* helped by good arguments.

Reply. *Brahma* is the highest among desirable objects. This is known from the perfect *vedānta*, helped by good arguments.

Opponent. The difference between the *jīva* and his body stated by the *vedānta* is confirmed by some other source ; hence no one is deluded.

Reply. Then you do not need the *vedānta* ; and it will not be learnt as subsidiary to injunctions.

Hence, as the earlier portion of the *veda* is accepted as authority, by its teaching being found to be true in regard to present needs, and by its injunctions in regard to *svarga* being acted on by knowing persons, so the later portion also must be accepted as authority. Being free from imperfections, and not conflicting with any

other source of knowledge in matters which are within its province, the *vedānta* is authority from its very nature.

3. These questions now arise: (i) How is *Brahma* the highest among desirable objects; (ii) How are the fruits attained by following the injunctions of the earlier portion of the *veda* defective; (iii) Where has it been seen that statements of existing facts give pleasure; and if this be so, how are injunctions to meditate useful. The following are the replies. *Brahma* gives limitless bliss by His substance, by His figure, by His attributes, by the persons and objects whom He controls and by His doings; all freed *jivas* share this fully with Him; and the bound *jivas* have their full share in it (1) when they render themselves fit for it. In the fruits dealt with in the earlier portion, on the other hand, the pleasure is limited, and the efforts to attain them are great and painful. Hence, the texts of the *upanishads*,

(1) *Bound jivas have their full share.* At present bound *jivas* do not enjoy this limitless bliss; for they are under the influence of *avidyā* in the shape of beginningless *karma*. They do not therefore know the real nature of *Brahma* and of the universe, which He controls; nor are they aware of their own nature. Owing to differences in their *karmas* there are endless differences in what supports them, in what nourishes them and in their enjoyments. Above men, there are *devas*, *asuras*, *gandharvas*, *siddhas*, *vidyādhara*s, *kinna*ras, *kimpurushas*, *yakshas*, *rākshasas* and *piṣūchas*. Below men, there are beasts, birds, snakes, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and the like. In each class, there are males, females and neuters. In spite of such diversity, all of them are entitled to the enjoyment of the same degree of bliss as *Brahma* Himself.

which show *Brahma* to be in every way enjoyable, directly aim at a desirable end ; while the texts, which enjoin action or abstention from action, do not do so. They merely indicate the means to petty pleasure, which are in themselves by no means agreeable. Hence one who states that the former set of texts do not aim at a desirable end, on the ground that they do not enjoin action or abstention from action, states that a person born in a royal family has no desirable end on the ground that he is not one among a group of low men living on dogs.

4. Reply to the third question is contained in the following two examples: A person is told "There is treasure buried in your house". He is pleased with this (1), and at his leisure makes efforts to take it out (2). A young prince (3), intent on his play (4), gets out of the palace (5), loses his way and is given up as lost by the

(1) *Is pleased with this.* Even a statement of this kind is pleasing. Hence statements that *Brahma* is such and such give pleasure ; and to one, that wishes to realise Him, the injunctions to meditate indicate the means thereto, and are therefore not purposeless.

(2) The first example shows the pleasure that may be derived from a non-intelligent material possession, and the second the pleasure which the company of an intelligent person may give. Both kinds of pleasure are found in *Brahma*.

(3) *A young prince.* This indicates that *Brahma* is the ruler of all, and that *jivas* are His sons.

(4) *Intent on his play* indicates that they are engrossed in sensual enjoyment.

(5) *Gets out of the palace*—This shows that they are outside His presence, and have not attained the highest heaven ; *loses his way* that they do not know *karma yoga* and other

king. Being of too tender an age to know his parentage, he is brought up by a good *brāhmaṇa*, and is taught the *veda*. He is sixteen years old, is a fine-looking boy and is full of all estimable qualities. If some good man tells him "Your father is the lord of all the country, and is full of all estimable qualities (1), and lives in a great city, anxious to see you (2), his long-lost son," he is

means of reaching Him. By 'good *brāhmaṇa*, reference is made to a teacher (*āchārya*), who teaches the *jiva* the *veda*, and makes him qualified to receive instruction about *Brahma*. Sixteen years of age indicates that the *jiva* becomes fit to enjoy *Brahma*, and that he is also an object of enjoyment to *Brahma*. By *Is full of estimable qualities* reference is made to the qualities in the *jivas*, which are pleasing to *Brahma*.'

(1) *Full of all estimable qualities*. Here the original enumerates seven qualities as being found in the king. They are therefore found in *Brahma* also. They are (i) *gāmbhīrya*—the quality of not minding the unfitness of the person, who receives a gift, and the greatness of the gift itself; (ii) *audārya*—the quality which makes Him feel that He is a debtor, even after He gives Himself and His possessions; (iii) *vātsalya*—love, which makes Him regard even a fault as a good quality, like the love of a mother towards her child; (iv) *saṁśīlya*—the quality which makes a great man closely mingle with low persons. These four qualities of *Brahma* should encourage a *jiva* to approach Him without fear, and ask to be taken to Himself. The next three qualities show His greatness. (v) *Śaurya*—the quality of going in the midst of enemies, like going into one's own house; (vi) *virya*—absence of fatigue, however much He may have to fight; (vii) *parākrama*—the power to overcome enemies. To these should be added *dhairya*, though not stated. It is the quality of treating any trouble given by enemies as mere straw.

(2) *Anxious to see you*. This shows the longing of *Brahma* as expressed by the text—"That great man is very

extremely pleased and cries out "my father lives; he is full of every kind of wealth". The king also is equally pleased, and makes efforts to get his son back; and in due course they become re-united. Similarly, the *vedānta* teaches. How is *Brahma* to be reached? The injunctions to meditate point out the way (1).

5. It will be seen that *arthavādas* (portions of the *veda* other than injunctions and *mantrams*) are treated by the *mīmāṃsaka* as mere praise, without authority for what they state, unless they supply some information needed by the injunctions. Here the same kind of *arthavādas* are stated to mean what they state, and to possess authority independently of injunctions. How are these to be reconciled, if the two *mīmāṃsas* form one work? Thus—in the earlier one a general rule was stated, and here an exception is pointed out. (*adhi.*, verse 50.)

difficult to find" (*gita*, VII-19) 'Great city' refers to man's heart, where *Brahma* is present in a form of the size of one's thumb. It may refer also to the place known as *śrīvaikunṭham*. Good man refers to a *guru* who imparts instruction about *Brahma*.

(1) The opponent may urge that in the example of the buried treasure, the sentence should be taken to include a direction to dig and take out the treasure. This contention is untenable. The digging will be done by the hearer of his own motion without an injunction, and the mode of digging is known to all. The *veda* will serve a purpose only, when it enjoins a thing, which will not be done otherwise.

SUB-SECTION 5

Introduction. The bar to enquiry having been thus removed, the enquiry is begun in this sub-section (1) with the help of the definition considered in sub-section 2. It will be shown, first, that neither matter nor *jivas* are fit to be contemplated by the texts which describe the maker of the universe. The first text is taken from the *chāndogya*, chapter VI.

The text is "Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only; one only; without a second. It willed "I will become many; and to that end I will evolve: it created fire". *Vide* 'Vedic Texts'. Here the doubt is whether what is indicated by the term *Sat* is *prakriti* (matter).

5. ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ।

What may be known from inference, *i.e.*, *prakriti*, is not referred to in creation-texts; for the term "willed" occurs in the text.

The *sūtra* has the term *aṣabda*, which means that in regard to which the *veda* alone is not authority. *Prakriti* or matter may be known by inference.

The *first view* is that reference is made to *prakriti* or matter. The term "this" in the vedic text refers to the diverse material products of the universe as

(1) The correctness of the conclusion reached in the preceding sub-section may be impugned on the plea that creation texts refer to matter or *jivas* as the world-cause. It has therefore to be shown that the world-cause is neither the one nor the other, and that He is a unique Being.

distinguished from *jivas* (1) with whom they are blended. It properly applies to what are capable only of sense perception, which the *jivas* are not. The *jivas* do not change in substance, and go from one condition to another; they are present in bodies only as enjoyers. The material products on the other hand continually change and are characterised by the attributes—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the effects of which in the form of pleasure, pain and delusion are everywhere perceptible. The text under consideration states the causal condition of these products; for an object, by abandoning one condition and assuming another, becomes a product. Hence, whatever object possesses a particular nature in the changed condition, that same object possessing the same nature was in the causal condition. The universe in the condition as products exhibits the three attributes mentioned in an unbalanced state; the same in the condition in which they were balanced was the cause (2); and what is known as *pradhāna* or *prakṛiti* is that cause

(1) *As distinguished from jivas.* To show that *prakṛiti* is the world-cause it is necessary to exclude the *jivas*, who are blended with material products. Three reasons are assigned for their exclusion. (i) the term this (*idam*) cannot be applied to them; (ii) they do not change in their substance; and (iii) they are without the three *gunas*—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

(2) *Prakṛiti is that cause.* The opponent's meaning is that *Brahma* cannot be the cause; for He must have the three *gunas* or the universe must be without them. In the first alternative *prakṛiti* would be accepted as the cause under another name; the second would be opposed to the experience of all.

and the only cause. Because it was then devoid of any name or form, it is denoted by the term 'sat' (1). Hence the cause and product do not differ ; it is only then that the announcement made—*viz.*, that by knowing one thing everything is known—will be appropriate. If an intelligent being were the cause, then the illustration of the lump of earth and its products would not fit in. The conclusion is that *prakṛiti* is stated by the text as the world-cause, as taught by the great sage *Kapila*. This is evident also from the form of the texts, which like a syllogism state the point to be proved and the example.

Final decision. The term "willing" states a particular mental operation of *Sat*, which is followed by the creation of fire. A mental operation of this kind cannot take place even in a *jīva*, though from the possession of the attribute *jñānam* he is capable of willing ; much less can it be found in the unintelligent *prakṛiti*. Hence, one who is capable of this, and who must therefore be omniscient and omnipotent, *viz.*, the highest *puruṣa*, is denoted by the term *Sat*. In all other creation texts also creation preceded by willing is seen (*vide aitareya*, I-1-2 ; and *praśna*, VI-3-4). Hence, the attempt to understand the term "willing" in a secondary sense, which will be referred to immediately, will overlook the natural meaning of these texts.

(1) *It is denoted by the term sat.* The term 'one only' in the *vedic* text shows that names and forms did not then exist ; and the term 'without a second' that the three *guṇas* were not unbalanced. This is the interpretation of the opponent.

2. The *first view* relied on similarity of the cause to its products; and this point is accepted; but not the conclusion arrived at (1). For, the highest *Purusha* clothed in His inseparable elements (2)—*jivas* and matter in a subtle condition—is the cause, and He is also the universe in the gross condition; the cause and products are therefore similar. These elements are His bodies; but their possession does not pollute Him with any imperfection as in the case of *jivas*. This will be explained later on the chapter II, section I, *sūtras* 6 to 9.

3. The second reason is untenable. For, though the point to be proved and an example are stated, the *hetu* (reason), the principal element, is absent from the text. It cannot be contended that the *hetu* should be added, as implied in the other two elements of the syllogism. This may be accepted only, when the other

(1) *But not the conclusion.* If *prakriti* were the world-cause, the cause and the products would not be similar; for it cannot be the cause of the *jiva*-element, which is a part of the products.

(2) *Inseparable elements.* Because *Brahma* is clothed in these elements, He is fit to be the world-cause. He is besides all-knowing and omnipotent. As the latter quality is in no way limited, He is *satya-samkalpa*, i.e., His will never fails. The following texts describe Him as being of this character:

His capacity (*śakti*) is heard to be superior, to be of many kinds and to pertain to His nature; also His capacity to know, to support and to create and destroy (*sveta*, 6-8); Who knows everything and every attribute of everything, whose *tapas* is thought (*munda.*, 1-10); “whose body matter *avyakta* is; whose body *akshara* is; whose body subtle matter *mrityu* is; He is the inner Ruler of all beings.”

two elements do not serve any other purpose ; but they are common to inference and all other sources of knowledge. In the present case the example serves to show that the statement made by the father was not impossible, as imagined by the son. The reasons assigned in this *sutra* and those which are to follow show that even as an alternative the second reason is untenable.

6. गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ।

If it be contended "the term 'willed' is used in a secondary sense," the reply is "no; for the term *ātmā* is applied to *Sat*".

The opponent contends—Willing in its primary sense, which is consistent with intelligence, is not stated here; but only such an operation as is found in an unintelligent thing is referred to. For further on in the same section it is said "The fire willed," "The water willed," and the terms in these cases should be understood in a secondary sense. By the side of these sentences (1), the willing by *Sat* must be understood in the same way to mean coming into a state immediately

(1) *By the side of these sentences.* Here reference is made to the following rule deduced in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. In connection with milking for making the *agnihotra* offerings, it is enjoined 'one should touch the calf'. The original of the text has the term *ālabheta*, which may mean either to touch or to kill for offering to a *devatā*. It is decided that the term means to touch only, as this is mentioned along with several other operations intended to give a fitness (chapter II, section 3, sub-section 6).

This rule is to be followed in cases of doubt. Here the question may be put—"How can you follow the rule,

preceding creation. It is usual to speak of unintelligent things as possessing the attributes of intelligent beings—"The rice-crops look forward to rain". "The seed was pleased with the rain."

2. The author of the *sūtras* states the contention and replies. It is said of *Sat* further on "All this is pervaded by that (*Sat*); this is true. *Sat* is *ātmā*". (*chānd.*, VI-8-7.) By the term "all this" the universe consisting of the intelligent *jīvas* and the non-intelligent *prakṛiti* is referred to; and this *prakṛiti* cannot be the *ātmā* (inner Ruler) of them all. Accepting the view that the term "willing" was used in a secondary sense in the case of fire and water, a reply has been given; but even there the term has the ordinary meaning. For the words 'fire' and 'water' indicate the highest *Purusha*, who is within them and controls them. This point will be explained later on in *sūtra* II-3-14. It will be sufficient here to refer to the text. "I will enter these three *devatās* as the ruler of this *jīva* and make diverse names and forms" (*chāndo.*, VI-3-2). It is by the entry of the highest *Purusha* into them, that they become objects and receive names (1).

when there is no doubt in the matter? The term 'willed' is *śruti*; its use along with the other words is the *pramāṇa* known, as *sthāna*, and this is weaker than *śruti*. Hence the term is used in its primary sense." *Reply*. Here the opponent contends on the strength of an inference that *prakṛiti* is the world-cause; the primary meaning of the term 'willed' will then be inappropriate. Hence a doubt exists, and there is room for relying on the rule.

(1) These two rules may be deduced from the two *sūtras*—(i) By the statement of the point to be proved and

7. तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ।

Because the attainment of *moksha* by one who meditates on *Sat* is taught.

One reason for the *final decision* was stated in the preceding two *sūtras*. Another reason is stated in this *sūtra*—*viz.*, the giving of *moksha*, which pertains only to the world-cause, as shown in the text “The world-cause should be meditated on”. In a text which occurs in the same *upanishad* it is stated “That thou art”. The word “that” refers to *Sat* described in the preceding sections, and the word “thou” to *Śvetaketu*, who was being taught by his father. As *Sat* is stated to be the *ātmā* of the world, He is also the *ātmā* of *Śvetaketu*; and the sentence therefore directs him to meditate on *Sat* as his own *ātmā*. In section 14 of the same *upanishad* it is said in regard to one, who follows the instruction of a teacher and meditates on the supreme Being,

There is delay only so long as he is not released from his body. He will then be united to *Brahma*.

Now if *Sat* were *prakṛiti*, meditation thereon would lead to union with it. For the law of growth is

Whatever one meditates on in this world, that will he become when he departs from hence. (*chāndo.*, III-14-1.)

of the example, the *hetu* (reason) should not be assumed as implied by them. (ii) When there are grounds justifying the understanding of a term either in its primary sense or in a secondary sense, the ground justifying the adoption of the primary sense should be followed.

And union with *prakriti* will only strengthen one's bondage to material things, from which he is already suffering. The *veda*, which loves us more than a thousand parents, cannot give this instruction. Even those, who assert *prakriti* to be the world-cause, do not admit that meditation on *prakriti* will lead to release. Hence, the teaching as to the attainment of *moksha* will not fit in with the view that *Sat* is *prakriti*. It may be stated here that the term *moksha* does not mean merely release from the body, but includes also union with *Brahma*; for both the items are mentioned in the text.

8. हेयत्वावचनाच्च ।

And because meditation on *Sat* has not been stated to be a thing to be avoided.

In the view that *Sat* is *prakriti* meditation thereon would have the undesirable result pointed out; and the teacher would have warned his disciple against it; but he did not do so. These two *sūtras* point out the same reason, one in a positive form and the other in a negative form. This is indicated by the particle 'and' (cha.) in the second *sūtra*.

9. प्रतिज्ञाविरोधात् ।

Because the view that *Sat* is *prakriti* would conflict with the announcement made (at the outset in the *upanishad*).

The announcement was made in the first section, *viz.*, that by knowing one thing—*Sat*—everything would

be known. Because the cause and the product are one—i.e., the cause by a change of condition becomes the product—by knowing *Sat*, the cause, the universe, the product, will be known. If *Sat* were *prakriti*, by knowing it, one would know all its modifications, but not the *jivas*; for they are not products of *prakriti*. This *sūtra* became necessary to remove the erroneous impression that the commencement of the *upanishad* (1), chapter VI, referred to *prakriti* as the world-cause, and that the reasons contained in later texts were therefore weak as compared with the commencement.

10. स्वाप्ययात् ।

Because *jivas* are said to be dissolved in *Sat* in deep sleep.

The preceding *sūtra* referred to the relationship of cause and effect; and this brought up the *jiva*'s condition in deep sleep based on the same relationship; and this furnishes a further reason. In explanation of the statement that the universe evolved from *Sat*, the teacher confined his attention first to the evolution of matter (sections 2 to 7), and in sections 8 to 11 he dealt with the evolution of *jivas*. In the case of matter evolution is growing from unity and uniformity to multiplicity and diversity; but in the case of the *jivas*, who do not undergo

(1) *The commencement of the upanishad.* The opponent would refer to the example of the lump of earth mentioned in section 1, verse 4. The *sūtra* refers to verse 3, which possesses greater validity than verse 4 (*Intro.*, para 24).

change of substance, evolution is expansion of consciousness, while dissolution is its contraction, till in the state of cosmic rest consciousness ceases to work. As the expansion and contraction of consciousness could not be explained with reference to the cosmic processes of evolution and dissolution, the teacher selected the processes of going to sleep and returning to wakefulness. The *upanishad* says :

When this statement—a person sleeps—is made, he is then, my dear, united to *Sat*; he is dissolved in himself (section 8, verse 1).

Section 9 states that the sleeping man does not remember what he was before, and does not know where he is then. He is then without name and form. This is his daily *pralaya* or rest. Section 10 states that when he rises from sleep, he does not know whence he goes forth, and he resumes the impressions that he had before going to sleep. He is now with name and form. This is his daily evolution or going forth. The seat, on which a person daily rests, and from which he daily goes forth, is his cause, *i.e.*, *Brahma*. Section 8 states that that cause is *Sat*, which cannot be the non-intelligent *prakriti*; because it is not fit to be the cause of the changes in the consciousness of the intelligent *jiva*.

2. The word 'himself' (*svam*) in the second sentence of the text takes the place of the word *Sat* in the first sentence; and as both the sentences convey the same idea, the word 'himself' refers to *Sat*. As every word denotes *Brahma*, the inner Ruler of what it ordinarily denotes in the world, the word 'himself'

means *Sat*, his inner Ruler. *Brahma*, denoted by the word himself (*svam*), is described merely as *Sat* during deep sleep as in the state of cosmic rest; for He is then without name and form. Hence, the text states that the sleeping *jiva* is united to *Sat*; and that he is dissolved in himself.¹ The same thing is stated in a parallel passage (1).

This *jiva*, embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, does not know what is outside; does not know what is inside (*brihad.*, VI-3-21).

The *jiva*, till he is finally released from bondage to matter, can know anything other than Himself only by

(1) *Parallel passage.* This is quoted in order to remove the doubt, which may arise, that the *jiva* abandons his gross condition and comes into a subtle condition; that this is his cause; and that his coming into this condition is his dissolution. The word *sat* would then denote a *jiva*.

¹ The expressions 'united to *Sat*' and 'dissolved in himself' require explanation. The term 'himself' does not denote only a *jiva*; for as already stated it is identical with *Sat* and in this context *Sat* is *Brahma*. Nor does it denote *Brahma* as distinguished from His inseparable elements; for in this form He cannot be the material cause, and cannot therefore be the *jiva*'s seat in deep sleep. A product is dissolved in its cause. Hence, the term means *Brahma* in the form of the *jiva*. The dissolution in question is not like the dissolution of silver in shell-silver, in cases in which the latter is first mistaken for the former, and then the mistake is discovered. The silver disappears; but the *jiva* remains. It cannot be like the dissolution in the atmosphere outside, of the air in a jar, when the jar is removed; for the *jiva*'s body remains. Nor can it be like the dissolution of a jar on the ground, when it is broken and reduced to dust; for the *jiva*-condition remains, as he is eternal, and his body also remains. If the *jiva*-condition could disappear by one's merely going to sleep, the means of release indicated in the *veda* would be purposeless. Hence 'being united' and 'being dissolved' mean that the *jiva*'s attribute *jñānam* then ceases to flow outwards. The term 'himself' means *Sat* as the inner Ruler of the *jiva* in this condition.

the possession of a name and a form. In deep sleep he abandons them, and is united to *Sat*. On waking he takes up his name and form again. This is clearly stated in another place.

When he sleeps, and sees no dream of any kind, he is then one with *Prāṇa* alone. When he awakes, from that *Ātmā* the *jīvas* go forth, each to his place; from the *jīvas* the senses; from the senses their activities (*kaushī.*, chap. III). See also *chando.*, VI-9-3.

Hence, the term *Sat* denotes *Brahma*. The author of the *vrītti* also observes 'By the union and separation stated in the text 'He is then, my dear, united to *Sat*,' this is known for certain. It is also stated 'embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*'.

II. गतिसामान्यात् ।

The text under consideration states what other creation-texts state.

Other creation-texts describe an all-controlling Being as the world-cause, and the text of the *chāndogya* must therefore do the same. The texts cited are from *aitareya* (I-1-2); *ānandavalli* (I-1-2); and *brihad āraṇyaka* (IV-4-10).

12. श्रुतत्वाच्च ।

And because the attributes of an all-controlling Being are explicitly stated in the same *upanishad* regarding *Sat*.

These are (i) the entering into everything as its *ātmā* and making its name and form, and (ii) being

all-knowing, omnipotent and the support of everything; being free from *karma* and other defects, and the possessor of unchanging objects of desire, and of a will that never fails. (VI-3-2; VI-8-6 and 7; VIII-1-3 and 5.) (1).

Criticism of Śankara's view. The view that *Brahma* is *nirviśeṣa*¹ and mere *chit* should be known as having been rejected by the author of the *sūtras*. For, he has proved that *Brahma*, who should be known, possesses the power to will, taking the word in its primary sense, and this power is real.

(1) The same thing is stated in other *upanishads* :

Śvetāśvatara. 'No one in the world is His lord; there is none who controls Him; He has no body; He, the world-cause, is the lord of the lords of the senses (*i.e.*, *jivas*); no one is His maker or his lord' (sec. VI).

Taittirīya-āranyaka. The all-knowing Being made all form and names, and remains being denoted by the names (III-3-12). He has entered into man and rules them; He is the *ātmā* of all (*Ibid.*, 11).

Ibid., *nārāyaṇa.* The *ātmā* of all, and the highest goal; the lord of all and the controller of Himself; whatever is seen or heard about in this world, *Nārāyaṇa* pervading all that within and without, remains (*anu.*, 11).

Subāla-upanishad. He, the inner Ruler of all beings, is free from *karma*; is the dweller in the highest heaven; has a shining figure; is one (*i.e.*, without an equal or superior); and is *Nārāyaṇa*. Hence the texts, that deal with the world-cause, are not fit to refer to *pradhāna*.

¹ For the meaning of the terms *nir-viśeṣa*, *viśeṣa* and *saviśeṣa* see note (iii) on page 106.

Opponent. The *vedic* text does not refer to the possession of an attribute. It states *Brahma* to be a witness merely. Being a witness, He is other than *prakriti*.

Reply. In your view even to be a witness is unreal. If he is not a knower, He cannot be a witness. The announcement was made at the outset that *Brahma* taught by the *upanishads* was to be known; and it has been shown that He is an intelligent Being by *sūtras* 5 to 12. An intelligent person is one, who has the attribute *jñānam*; what is without the attribute of willing is merely like *prakriti*.

(ii) The opponent holds the view that *Brahma* is mere light. Now light is a substance that makes itself or other things fit to be spoken about. A *nirviśeṣa* thing does not possess either character, and is therefore a thing like a jar and is not light.

Opponent. Even though it does not possess either character, it has the capacity therefor.

Reply. Capacity is an attribute; if you admit its possession, you abandon your view of a *nirviśeṣa* substance.

Opponent. On the authority of the *veda* this one *viśeṣa* is accepted.

Reply. Then on the very same authority accept all other attributes like omniscience, omnipotence, being the controller of all those that rule over others, being the seat of all estimable qualities, and being an enemy to imperfections of every kind. For the moment we accepted your statement that your

Brahma has the capacity ; we now repudiate that statement ; for having a capacity should conduce to the doing of an action ; and it can be explained only with reference to a particular action. If there be no authority for that action, *i.e.*, if it does not show itself or other things, and make them fit to be spoken about, there is no authority for holding that it has the capacity.

(iii) There is no authority for holding what is *nirviśeṣha* to be a thing at all ; sense perception, inference, testimony, and one's own experience—all refer to *saviśeṣha* things.

The conclusion is that the Being to be known is one, who is competent to will 'I will become many in the form of the universe consisting of endless varieties of *jivas* and material products', and that He is *Purushotama*, the highest *Purusha*.

SUB-SECTION 6

In beginning the enquiry the mind first turned to matter, which is seen everywhere ; it was turned away from it in the preceding sub-section by the reasons adduced. It next turns to the *jivas*, who though not so well-known as matter, are yet better known than *Brahma*, and are perceived by the cognition 'I am' ; and in this sub-section the mind is turned away from them also.

13. आनन्दमयोऽम्बानात् ।

Ānandamaya is the highest *Ātmā*; because He is the seat of infinite bliss.

The text for consideration is

There is a being known as *Ānandamaya*, who is other than this *viññānamaya*, and who is within it. He is the *ātmā* (*ūna.*, V-2).

The doubt here is whether *ānandamaya* is a *jīva* in the condition of bondage or a *jīva*, who has become free, or whether he is the highest *Ātmā*. It arises from the statements that He is full of bliss, and that He has a body.

First view. *Ānandamaya* is a *jīva*; for the text

Who is the *ātmā* of the previous one, the very same is the *ātmā* (in the body) of this also (section VI-2) states that He has a body, and one who has a body is a *jīva*.

2. *This objection is raised:* The *upanishad* described creation in these terms.

From that *Ātmā* came forth ether; air from ether; fire from air; water from fire; earth from water; plants from earth; food from plants; *purusha* (body) from food (I-2).

By the term "that *Ātmā*" reference was made to *Brahma*; and to show who He is in a manner, which the student might understand easily, the *upanishad* stated that the *purusha* was *annarasamaya*, i.e., a modification of food and water (1-3); next, that within it was *prāṇamaya*; that it was *ātmā* (II-2); and that whatever was the *ātmā* of *annarasamaya* was the *ātmā*

of this also (III-1). The impression first created that *prāṇamaya* was the *ātmā* of *annarasamaya* was thus removed ; and it was stated that another was the *ātmā* of both. In this manner the *upanishad* passed over *manomaya* and *vijnānamaya*, and reached *ānandamaya*. It therefore teaches that the same world-cause is *ānandamaya* ; and the world-cause, as shown in subsection 5, is the all-knowing Ruler of all. To this objection the *sāṅkhya*, who put forward the *first view*, replies. True ; but the world-cause is no other than a *jiva* ; for it is stated in the *chāndogya* itself, to which reference is made, “ Entering with this *jiva* with myself ” and “ That thou art *Śvetaketu* ”. Here the expression “ With myself ” and the word “ That ” refer to *Sat* mentioned as the world-cause ; and this *Sat* is put in apposition with the *jiva*, and with *Śvetaketu*, who also was a *jiva*. Words in apposition—i.e. words in the same case, placed side by side and intended to denote the same object—always refer to oneness. And the *jiva* is competent to will and then create ; for he is an intelligent person.

3. A further *objection* is raised: The *upanishad* begins with this injunction—“ One who meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest,” and then gives this definition “ Unchanging, shining, and without limitations is *Brahma* ”. This shows *Brahma* to be the object of meditation and of attainment ; for one attains what he meditates on. If the *jiva* were *Brahma*, there is nothing to be attained by him ; for he is a *jiva* already. Being known, the definition would be

purposeless. Lastly, he is not unchanging ; for his attribute *jñānam* contracts and expands ; and he is not without limitations. Hence *Brahma* is not a *jīva*. The opponent replies : By the term *Brahma* is meant the aspect of the *jīva* divorced from the body ; and it is this that is to be attained ; and the definition states what this aspect is. The attainment of this aspect is indeed *moksha* ; for it is stated

From one, who is in a body, welcome and unwelcome things do not depart ; and one who is without a body, welcome and unwelcome things do not touch (*chando*., VIII-12-1).

Hence, this aspect of the *jīva* is stated to be *ānandamaya*.

4. The opponent explains his conclusion further : The *upanishad* goes on to indicate what the *Ātmā* is, following the method adopted in the world to indicate a star to a person. His attention is first drawn to the branch of a tree ; and when his eye is turned to it, he is asked to look in the same direction ; and it is stated that the star which he sees is what has to be known. Following this method, the student's attention is first drawn to his body with the words " This *purusha* is *annarasamaya* ; then it is directed to *prāṇa* with its five-fold activity, which is within the body, and supports it ; next to the mind, which is within the last one ; next to *buddhi*, which is within the last ; and it is finally fixed on the *jīva*, as the *ātmā* of them all. The natural aspect of the *jīva* is *Brahma* ; and the same is stated to be *ānandamaya*.

5. *Brahma—the tail.* Here an *illusionist* raises an objection. The *upanishad* states :

He has the form of man ; imitating the human form of *vijnānamaya* he has a human form. Pleasure (*priya*) is his head ; *moda* is his right wing ; *pramoda* is his left wing ; *ānanda* is his trunk ; *Brahma* is his tail, that supports. (V-2 and 3).

Brahma is therefore other than *ānandamaya* (1).

Opponent. It is not so. *Brahma* is described as having the form of man by His attribute, and is stated Himself to be head, wings and tail. This is clear from the description in similar terms in section 1, verse 3 of the body nourished by food. The parts of the body—head, wings and tail—do not differ from the body. . In the same way *Brahma*, who is *ānandamaya*, is described by *priya*, *moda* and the rest, which are not other than Himself (2). As *Brahma*, who is wholly *ānanda* (bliss), is the seat of *priya*, *moda*, *pramoda* and *ānanda*, described as parts of Himself, He is stated to be the tail that supports them. If *Brahma* were other than *ānandamaya*, the *upanishad* would have stated (3) ‘ other

(1) *Brahma is therefore other than.* In the words ‘His tail’ the termination of the sixth case shows relationship ; and this implies two things, the tail being one, and he who has it being the other. Hence *Brahma*, the tail, is other than *ānandamaya*, who owns the tail.

(2) *Which are not other than Himself.* The reply to the objection raised on the strength of the sixth case is that it denotes here the relationship of the whole and a part of it.

(3) *The upanishad would have stated.* In this context each thing is shown to be other than the preceding one, as

than *ānandamaya* and within it is *Brahma* ; He is *ātmā* ; but this is not stated. The *upanishad* began by enjoining meditation on *Brahma*. It next gave a definition, by which He is differentiated from everything else. Reference was then made to Him as *Ātmā* in the text 'From that *Ātmā*'. In order to show that He is the inner *ātmā* of all, the *upanishad* mentioned *prāṇamaya* as the inner *ātmā* of *annarasamaya*, and then passing over it, stated *manomaya* as the inner *ātmā* of both. In this manner it passed over *manomaya* and *viññānamaya*, and ended with the statement that *ānandamaya* is the *ātmā* of all. Hence the word *ātmā* shows *Brahma* Himself, with whom the *upanishad* began, to be *ānandamaya*.

6. *Illusionist*. After stating ' *Brahma* is his tail ' the *upanishad* gives a verse (*āna.*, VI-1) which means that one, who has knowledge of *Brahma*, exists, and that one, who has not the knowledge, does not exist. This does not refer to the knowledge of *ānandamaya*, and its absence (1). *Ānandamaya* is known to all the world in the form of *priya*, *moda* and the rest ; and reference to its knowledge and its absence would not be fitting. Hence,

being its *ātmā* ; hence *Brahma* would have been stated to be the *ātmā* of *ānandamaya*, and therefore as different from it.

(1) Does not refer to the knowledge of *ānandamaya*. Verses similar to this verse are found in the *upanishad* in regard to *annarasūmaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *viññānamaya* ; and in all of them the terms *anna*, *prāṇa*, *manas* and *viññānam* are found. If *ānandamaya* were the principal thing, the word *ānanda* would be found in the verse ; but it is not.

this verse has not been stated with reference to *ānandamaya* ; and *Brahma* is other than *ānandamaya*.

Opponent. You say that the verse under consideration refers to what is stated to be the tail ; but in the four verses preceding it reference is made not to the tail, but to *annarasamaya* and the rest. Similarly, here also reference is made by the verse to *ānandamaya*, and not to the tail or anything else.

Illusionist. Then *ānandamaya* Himself is *Brahma*. The objection that I stated holds, as *Brahma* would be known to all,

Opponent. True ; but it is not known that *ānanda* is unlimited. Your *Brahma*—the tail—is known already ; you must therefore say—not as unlimited *ānanda*. This answer applies to us too.

7. *Illusionist.* *Brahma* is not a whole made up of head and the rest. Hence *ānandamaya* is not *Brahma*.

Opponent. *Brahma* is neither the tail, nor the support ; He cannot therefore be said to be the tail.

Illusionist. *Brahma* is said to be the tail and support, as He is the seat, on which the illusion created by *avidyā* rests.

Opponent. *Brahma* may be described as *priya*, *moda* and the rest to show that He is *ānanda*, and other than pain. Thus, as by the definition ‘unchanging, etc.’ He is differentiated from things, that undergo changes, from things that do not shine, and from things that are subject to limitations, so He is differentiated from what is not bliss by the statement ‘He is *ānandamaya*’. Hence, in

the term *ānandamaya*, the termination *maya* (*mayat*) as in the word *prāṇamaya* has not separate meaning. The conclusion is that the natural condition of the *jīva*, who now appears under the influence of *avidyā* to be divided in endless ways as *devas*, men, etc., is described as *ānandamaya*. It is every part of it bliss and only bliss. *Ānandamaya* is therefore a *jīva*.

Final decision. *Ānandamaya* is the highest *Ātmā*. This expression is what is implied by the words *na* and *aśabda* (1) drawn down from the first *sūtra* in the preceding sub-section. What is the reason? He is the seat of infinite bliss. Section 8 of the *upanishad* gives a description of bliss, taking as the unit the happiness of one who is young, healthy and strong and who commands every influence on earth, and showing that the happiness of various classes of beings and of various personages is one hundred times the happiness of the next lower class or personage. The bliss of *Ānandamaya* is one hundred times the happiness of the last, i.e., the four-faced being; and to show that this description is intended merely to indicate that this bliss exceeds the happiness of every one and that it has no limit, it is stated that speech and mind set out to find out its higher limit, and that they return baffled. Bliss of this kind can never be found in a *jīva*; for he enjoys a drop

(1) By the words *na* and *aśabda*. The latter term means that in regard to the existence of which testimony (*śabda*) alone is not authority; as the *jīva* shows himself, and as he is also known from inference, he may be denoted by the term *aśabda*.

of limited happiness mixed with endless misery. The freed *jiva* enjoys the same kind of infinite bliss no doubt; but it is bestowed on him by *Brahma*, after releasing him from his bondage. The bliss of *Brahma*, on the other hand, pertains to Him by nature; and there is nothing to show that it has had a commencement. It is not left to settle this point by argument only. There is express statement:

There is a Being known as *Ānandamaya*, who is other than this *viññānamaya*, and who is within it (V-2).

And *viññānamaya* is a *jiva*; for the term means one having *viññānam* or *buddhi* in abundance; and he who has it is a *jiva*.

2. *Viññānamaya* is *jiva*. In para 4 of the *first view* reference was made to *buddhi* as immediately preceding *Ānandamaya*; and this is the translation of *viññānam*, the opponent regarding the termination *maya* in *viññānamaya* as having no meaning. But this is not legitimate. In the case of the word *prāṇamaya*, the termination has no meaning, and this has to be accepted; but here as one who has *viññānam* is available, the termination should not be so dealt with. *Viññānam* is a natural attribute of a *jiva*, whatever be his condition.

3. Here an objection is raised. The verse, which follows the texts regarding *viññānamaya*, states “*viññānam* does *yajna* (offering), and does (worldly) actions” (V-1). How is the use of the word *viññānam* without the termination explained? (*N.B.*: The meaning is that both the words are synonymous, and that therefore the termination has no meaning.)

Reply: The term *viijnānam* in the verse refers to a *jīva*; for like his attribute, he is also self-revealed, and the term has this meaning. Next, *viijnānam* is his chief attribute; and he is defined only as possessing it; and it is usual to use a word connoting such an attribute to denote an individual as possessing the attribute. The word 'go' connotes the characteristic attribute of cows; and by itself it denotes also an individual possessing this attribute. Lastly, the term denotes a knower (*jñātā*), the termination being that known as *lyuṭ* or *lyu* to the grammarian. In the former case on the authority of *Pāṇini's sūtra*, III-3-13, the termination is assumed to denote the doer; and in the latter the root is included in the group of words referred to in *Ibid.*, III-1-134. This being so, the term *viijnānam* is used in the following cases to denote a *jīva*:

(i) In the verse quoted he is stated to do *yajna* (offering) and (worldly) actions; an unintelligent thing like *buddhi* or *viijnānam* cannot do these things. The word 'does' should not be understood in a secondary sense, following the precedent in regard to the body—the *jīva's* instrument—where it is stated "It eats beings" (II-2). In regard to *prāṇa* and mind—also instruments of the *jīva*—the preceding sections contain no such mention of the doing of action peculiar to a knower. And as both *prāṇa* and mind intervene between the body and *viijnānam* under consideration, the precedent is broken. It should not be forgotten that recourse to a secondary meaning is itself a flaw, unless with the primary sense the meaning cannot be made out.

(ii) In section 6 of the same *upanishad jivas* and material products are considered separately with reference to the attributes peculiar to each class ; and it is stated “ He (*Ānandamaya*) became *viññānam* and what is other than *viññānam* ” (verse 3).

(iii) In *bṛihad āraṇyaka* (v-7) many things are enumerated within which *Brahma* is present, and one of these is *viññānam*. The reading of the *mādhyamikas* is exactly similar, except that the term *ātma* is used in the place of *viññānam* ; and this shows on the place authority (*sthānam*) that *viññānam* is *ātma*—i.e., a *jiva*. The neuter gender of the word may conflict with its denoting a *jiva* ; but he is regarded in the light merely of something that exists. Assuming that the term *viññānam* in the verse denotes *buddhi* merely, the term *viññānamaya* is certainly a *jiva*. There is a precedent in the same context. In the verse, which follows the text regarding *annarasamaya*, though reference is made to *anna* (food), *annarasamaya* is not *anna*, but is a modification of *anna*. Hence, the conclusion that *Ānandamaya* is other than a *jiva* stands.

4. *Words in apposition. Interpretation of the illusionist.* In para 2 of the *first view* it was stated that two words, which denoted *Brahma* and a *jiva*, being in apposition, *Brahma* was *jiva*, and that the latter was competent to create the universe. This latter point is untenable. In the state of cosmic rest, the bound *jiva* is without a body and instruments ; and his attribute *jñānam* is in a state of extreme contraction. How can he create by mere will ? The freed *jiva* is equally

powerless, as will be shown in chapter IV, section 4. The former point is equally untenable. The term denoting *Brahma* connotes that He is without any imperfection; that He is the seat of numberless, immeasurably high, auspicious attributes; and that He is all-knowing, omnipotent, with an unfrustrated will; and the term denoting the *jīva* connotes that he is the seat of endless sufferings of various kinds, and that every thought and every motion of his down to the opening and closing of the eye-lids depend upon his *karma*. How can the two sets of attributes co-exist in the same?

The *opponent* replies. Either set should be regarded as non-existing. This is the second set (1); *Brahma* under the influence of *avidyā* imagines that He suffers; but this thought is a misconception.

Reply. On this theory to be under the influence of *avidyā* (2) and the misconception engendered thereby—these alone (3) constitute imperfections; and the seat

(1) *This is the second set.* Of the three alternatives stated here, the third alone is put forward by the opponent; but as the other two are possible, they are considered here.

(2) *Under the influence of avidyā.* A cloth, which is pure in itself, becomes dirty by contact with a polluting substance. A crystal, which in itself is pure, appears red by the side of a rose. Similarly, *Brahma* is free from imperfection and the seat of every good thing, and is yet connected with *avidyā*. If both were natural and real, there would be conflict, but *avidyā* is unreal. This is the opponent's meaning.

(3) *These alone.* It is not suffering alone that is undesirable; but its cause, *avidyā*, and the thought that there is suffering also are undesirable.

of them cannot at the same time be also free from all imperfections.

Opponent. These imperfections being unreal, there is no harm.

Reply. Even the unreal imperfections are undesirable; and to remove them all *upanishads* do their work, as you say.

Opponent. This theory is needed to explain the words in apposition.

Reply. A theory, that is built up, should be unopposed to vedic texts and be capable of standing examination.

Opponent. The first set of attributes does not exist.

Reply. Then the *veda* would cease to be a guide, by pointing out that the condition of suffering is natural, and that the condition of unalloyed bliss is a myth.

Opponent. Both the sets are non-existent; *Brahma* alone exists without a difference.

Reply. This is an exploded theory. See "Three tatvas". It is sufficient to note here that this explanation does not consider the commencement of chapter VI of the *chāndogya*, in which by the knowledge of one thing the knowledge of every thing is predicated.

5. *Opponent.* The commencement has been duly considered. Nothing other than *Brahma* exists; hence by knowing Him, other things are known as not existing.

Reply. If all things were unreal, there would be nothing to be known. The fact stated would not happen. If as the knowledge of one thing relates to a

real thing, the knowledge of all things also relate in the very same way to real things, and if all these things are contained in that one thing, then it is possible to state that by knowing that thing all these things are known. By knowing real shell-silver, unreal silver, for which it is mistaken, is not known.

Opponent. The meaning of the text is—The *nir-viśeṣa* thing alone is real; the rest is unreal.

Reply. Then the text should not be worded, as it is; for it means—by knowing one thing what is not known also is known. Your interpretation is open to the following objections: (i) You must say 'all things are known as unreal; the words 'as unreal' should then be brought in; and it will not be legitimate to do so, when the sentence can be understood without them. (ii) As we understand the sentence, all things being included in the one thing, the knowledge of them is of the same kind; and this is what naturally appears. In your interpretation as the real thing differs from the unreal universe, the two pieces of knowledge would be dissimilar. (iii) The term 'know' needs a knower, a thing known, and knowing; as they do not exist, it must be taken to mean 'to withdraw' thus—'by knowing one thing, all things withdraw'. This will be resort to a secondary meaning. Further, the example given would not fit in with your view; for it states that by knowing a lump of earth, the cause, its products are known.

Opponent. Even here what is intended is that the change from the lump of earth to the products is unreal.

Reply. To show that what was stated was possible, a well-known fact should be stated ; but the hearer did not know that the products were unreal, as the snake, for which the rope is mistaken, is unreal ; hence in your view the example will not fit in.

Opponent. That the products are unreal may have been known from inference or some other authority.

Reply. This can be known only from the text 'That thou art,' which occurs much later in the *upanishad*. We are not aware of any other source, whether supported or unsupported by arguments.

6. Thus, our statement that the commencement of the *upanishad* was not duly considered is borne out. Similarly you have not considered the verses that follow. They state the following : The universe was *Sat* ; before the time of creation it was without name and form ; in the creation *Brahma* referred to as *Sat*, did not need an operative cause other than Himself. At the time of creation He willed 'I will myself become many in the form of endless moveable and immoveable things—a willing not found elsewhere ; He created as He willed endless things of many kinds in an order that was unique. He caused *jivas* controlled by Himself to enter all unintelligent objects and made for Himself endless names and forms. He is the root from which everything else proceeded ; He alone supports them, moves them to action and gives them existence ; and they will be dissolved in Him alone in the end. These points can be known only from the *veda*. Other *upanishads* point out regarding Him attributes by thousands, such as freedom

from *karma*; freedom from every imperfection; omniscience; being the ruler of all; the possession of unchanging objects of desire and of an unfailing will; giving bliss to all, and being Himself infinite bliss. To say that the term 'that,' which refers to *Brahma* described in the *upanishads* as clothed in endless *viśeṣhas* to be known from no other source, denotes only a *nirviśeṣha* thing merely is inappropriate and resembles the ravings of a mad man. The term 'thou' too denotes a *jīva* in *samsāra* (cycle of births and deaths); and to state that it denotes only a *nirviśeṣha* thing is to abandon its own meaning. To state that a *nirviśeṣha* shining thing is prevented by *avidyā* from appearing is to assert its destruction. Thus by abandoning the primary meanings of both words—that and thou—you resort to secondary meanings.

7. *Mīmāṃsaka's interpretation.* The *mīmāṃsaka* now comes forward with his explanation. When two words in the same case are in apposition, as red rose, is their meaning considered at the same time, or is the meaning of one word first considered, and it is then connected with the meaning of the other word? In the former case, as the two words in apposition should denote one thing only, the object possessing the red colour should be identical with the object belonging to the species rose. This would mean that as the objects are one, so the red colour and the peculiar feature of the species rose (which we shall denote by the term *jāti* for convenience), are also one, which is absurd. In the latter case, the object possessing the red colour should first be taken,

and then connected with the object belonging to the species rose as qualifying it. This would mean that the red colour qualifies the *jāti* rose, which is equally absurd. Hence the objects possessing the red colour and the *jāti* rose are taken; the attributes are ignored; and the objects stripped of their attributes are treated as one. The absurdity pointed out will appear in a stronger light in the sentence 'This *devadatta* is he'—meaning a person seen at another place and on another occasion. Here the former place and time are not identical with the present place and time. But there is no resort to a secondary sense. This would happen if something outside the ordinary sense were taken; but what is done here is to ignore a portion of the ordinary sense, and retain the more important portion. A person does not cease to be the same person, if he loses a finger.

8. The *mīmāṃsaka*'s explanation is equally untenable. When a word is used by itself, jar (singular number) for instance, the word without the case-ending shows three elements—an attribute, an object, and the connection between them, while the case-ending indicates oneness—not oneness of all the three elements, but oneness of the object merely. That this is so is known from recognised usage (1) based on sense

(1) *Known from recognised usage.* We ask the opponent. In words in apposition you ignore the attributes? What is the reason?

Opponent. Oneness indicated by the same case-endings is the reason.

Reply. Words without the case-endings connect the attributes with the object; and the meaning of words

perception. Similarly, when two words in the same case are used together, the case-endings show oneness of the objects, but not oneness of their attributes also. Hence, when both the words are considered at the same time, all the attributes connect themselves with the single object. As the two words should be considered at the same time, it is unnecessary to notice the difficulty pointed out in the second alternative. In using two words in apposition the intention is to show that an object denoted by one word as possessing one attribute may be denoted by another word as possessing another attribute, or briefly to refer to one object as possessing both the attributes. The interpretation has the support of the grammarian. Thus, in the expression

without the case-endings is of greater importance than their meaning. See Introduction, paras 22 and 34. Hence, the case-endings should not be understood as overriding the connection of the object with its attributes. They only show that the object is one.

Opponent. Usage shows that the case-endings indicate oneness.

Reply. Usage also connects the attributes with the object.

Opponent. Words denote only the object; its connection with attributes is seen by sense perception. In cases, in which this is not available, words do not indicate the connection with attributes.

Reply. Why should it not be the other way? That is, words denote the connection of an object with its attributes, and oneness is seen by sense perception. Hence words denote an object as possessing attributes.

'*devadatta* is black-coloured, young, red-eyed, not-weak-minded, not-poor and without faults,' the first three epithets show the possession of three attributes in a positive form, and the other three words the possession of three others in a negative form. As words in apposition should be understood in this manner, their sense as settled by recognised usage should be adhered to ; and words are so understood in the world. When the order is given—'bring a red rose'—an object answering to this description is brought and no other. It may be thought that the person receiving the order sees the red colour in a rose and brings it. Here is another example to remove this doubt. When a person going to the *Vindhya* mountains is told 'In the jungles of those mountains mad elephants abound, he will not ignore the epithet mad, and go unarmed.'

9. Where words in apposition connote two attributes, that cannot co-exist in the same object, even there one word (1) is taken in a secondary sense, *e.g.*,

(1) *Even there one word.* Words should be taken in the sense that is settled by usage ; this is the natural course. But if such sense be found to be unsuitable on proper authority, a secondary meaning should be resorted to. If this be not possible, another primary meaning should be assumed. The term 'go' means a cow, and also light ; here the primary meaning 'cow' cannot be extended to light ; hence another primary meaning is accepted. When recourse is had to a secondary meaning, it should be done for one word only ; for, by this alone the incompatibility is removed. All words should not be so understood ; for then the intention of the speaker cannot be found out. When a secondary meaning is adopted, the word does not denote

bāhlika is a cow. The term cow is understood as meaning like a cow. In the expression 'red rose' there is no conflict in the co-existence of the two attributes—the red colour and the *jāti* rose; hence the same object is perceived as possessing both the attributes. Here the opponent interposes. Have I not urged that an object possessing one attribute must be different from an object possessing another attribute? The words jar and cloth (*ghaṭa*, *pata*) have the same case endings, and yet they cannot denote the same object. Words in apposition do not therefore denote objects clothed with attributes. They only point out an object by their attributes; and the object so indicated is treated as one.

Reply. This may be as you say, if the connection with two attributes alone make oneness of the object impossible; but it is not so. What makes oneness of the object impossible is incompatibility in the co-existence of the two attributes in the same object. The incompatibility in the case of the jar and the piece of cloth is known from a source of knowledge other than the words themselves. In the expression 'red rose' no such incompatibility is perceived. The attributes are as compatible, as in a person having a stick and an ear-ring; and as in an object possessing color, taste and smell. It is not merely this; by the difference in their connotations the words in apposition are intended to show that one object has both the attributes. When two words

an object stripped of the connotation. The attribute connoted by the word in the secondary meaning is connected with the object.

are used to denote the same object, each must refer to some attribute in it; otherwise the use of both the words would be purposeless. Hence both the attributes are intended, and should not be ignored. Here the opponent (*Śankara*) explains. The words merely point out objects without reference to their connection (1) with the attributes, which they connote, and therefore do serve a purpose.

Reply. The purpose of pointing out the object will be served by one word only, and the other word will be superfluous. If the aspect of the object to be pointed out by each word be different, it will be an admission that the object is *saviśeṣha* (with difference) (2). The opponent referred in support of his view to the statement 'This *devadatta* is he.' Here too there is no need to resort to secondary meanings; for there

(1) *Without reference to their connotations.* When the moon is pointed out to a person by asking him first to look at the branch of a tree, and then to look in the same direction, the branch serves only the purpose of showing the moon. It is not intended to connect it with the moon. Similarly, the attribute connoted by a word serves merely to show the object; but it is not the intention to connect it with the object.

(2) *The object is saviśeṣha.* The opponent would ignore the attribute in order to support his own theory that *Brahma* is *nirviśeṣha*; but in the end he is driven to admit *viśeṣhas*; for if the two aspects are different from one another, they cannot be identical with the object, and they must differ from it. It then becomes *saviśeṣha*. It is better therefore to admit that the attributes of an object are intended by the person, who places two words in apposition.

is no incompatibility (1). The person was in one place in the past, and he is near in the present time. Because there is no difference, a thing that was seen at two different times is recognised as one object only by those who maintain that objects have not a momentary existence only. If the opponent contends that there is difference, *i.e.*, that the *devadatta* seen at a past moment is different from the *devadatta* seen at the present moment, he will maintain that every object exists only for a moment.

10. *Aruṇā-adhikaraṇam*. As words in apposition are to be interpreted as denoting one object clothed in more than one attribute, it is enjoined in the text (2).

With a red, one-year old, reddish-brown eyed (cow) the *soma* creeper should be purchased.

that the purchase should be made with the one-year old animal possessing the red colour. This is stated

(1) *For there is no incompatibility*. If *devadatta* were connected with both the places at the same time, there would be conflict; but he is not. This example was referred to by the opponent to justify the adoption of secondary meanings for both the words 'he' and 'this'; but as pointed out in the text there is no need for it. A word denotes an object as possessing a certain attribute; this is the principal element; and if it be ignored, the object cannot be denoted at all. This is the reply to the opponent's contention that in ignoring the attribute there is no resort to a secondary meaning.

(2) *It is enjoined in the text*. This implies that to strip words of their connotations, and take only objects as denoted by the words will be opposed to the rule deduced by the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (III-1-6). See Introduction, para 21.

in a *sūtra* of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. Here the *first view* (1) is thus stated. The word *aruṇayā* no doubt denotes an animal (2) possessing the red colour ; for like the common form of a species (*ākṛiti*), qualities also naturally appear only as aspects of objects. Yet the red colour cannot be connected only with the *ekahāyanī* (one-year old animal) ; for the sentence would then mean ‘ purchase with the one-year old animal, and it should be of the red colour ; but the same sentence cannot give two directions. Hence the sentence should be split up into two ; the word *aruṇayā* will then show that every article without exception enjoined in the context should be of the red colour. That the word is in the feminine gender is no objection ; for it is used merely as indicating all objects, whatever be the gender of the words that denote them. The *final decision* on the subject is as follows : The two words *aruṇayā* and *ekahāyanī* are placed in apposition. The first word shows an object possessing the red colour ; and the second word an object, that is one-year old. Being in apposition they

(1) *Here the first view.* As the *sūtra* is explained differently by the *mīmāṃsaka*, the *Srī Bhāṣya* states what the correct *first view* and *final decision* should be. This is stated in para 10.

(2) *No doubt denotes an animal.* This is based on the rule deduced in *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (I-3-10). See Introduction, para 12. The rule refers only to *ākṛiti* ; but qualities are exactly alike. Both *ākṛiti* and qualities appear only as aspects (*prakāra*) of objects ; and they have no independent existence. Hence what applies to *ākṛiti* applies to qualities also.

indicate that the object is one. The one-year old object and the red colour are connected with the one action—*viz.*, purchase, as the first word by its very form connects itself with the second as its epithet (*viśeṣhaṇa*). In this there is no incompatibility. Hence the red colour should be connected only with the means of purchase—the one-year old animal. If the connection of the red colour with the purchase should be known from the sentence like the connection of the one-year old animal, then two directions would be given by the sentence ; but it is not so. By the word *aruṇayū* itself (1) an object possessing the red colour is denoted ; as it is put in apposition with the other word, it is indicated that the object should be one-year old. This alone is indicated ; but not the connection of the red colour with the age ; for words in apposition indicate that the object as clothed in the attributes is one. This is in accordance with the definition of words in apposition given by the grammarian.

11. This being so (2), in sentences like 'the red cloth is' the object being one, the sentence is one.

(1) *By the word aruṇayū itself.* This shows what work is done by the two rules. The rule deduced in I-3-10 shows that a word not only connotes an attribute, but that it also denotes an object possessing the attribute. The rule now being considered shows that the same case-ending in many words indicates that the object denoted by them as possessing the attributes connoted by them is one.

(2) *This being so.* The *mīmāṃsaka's* view is that the word *ekahūyanī* satisfies the need of the sentence, and that the other word *aruṇayū* is not required. (See para, 12,

The business of the sentence is to connect the cloth with the action 'to be'; the connection of the object with the red colour is denoted by the word 'red' itself; and that the object connected with the red colour is the cloth—this alone is known from the words being placed in apposition. Thus, the attributes may be one, two or many (1); each word, whether it is a compound or whether it is used by itself, denotes an object clothed with the attribute that it connotes. By the words being placed in apposition, it is shown that the object clothed in all the attributes is one; and this object is then connected with the verb in the sentence. Here are some examples:

(i) *Devadatta* black-coloured (2), young, red-eyed, with a stick and ear-ring stands; (ii) make a screen with a

infra.) This is unsound. In an example, which he considers (I-2-1), *viz.*, 'red cloth is,' the words 'cloth is' will make a complete sentence; but as the word 'red' occurs in the sentence, it is assumed that one desires to know what kind of cloth it is; and this desire is satisfied by the word 'red'. Similarly, here also, as the word *aruṇayū* occurs in the sentence, we assume that a desire springs up as to the colour of the one-year old animal; and this the word satisfies. Hence it is required.

(1) *The attributes may be one, two or many.* Here three doubts may arise.—(i) In sentences like the 'red cloth is' there is only one epithet, and it may be taken to satisfy a desire as explained. But if there be many epithets, will the explanation apply? (ii) Should they not form one compound word? (iii) Here the words are in the first or nominative case. May the termination be of any other case? To remove these doubts examples are given.

(2) *Devadatta, black-coloured.* This is the author's intention. The words 'red cloth' denote an unintelligent

white cloth (1); (iii) bring a blue *utpala* (flower); (iv) bring blue-*utpala*; (v) bring the cow, white and good-eyed; (vi) take out paddy for offering an eight-*kapāla* made *puroḍāṣa* to the *devatū agni* with the epithet *pathikrit*.

Similarly, in the *vedic* text under consideration. In the sentence 'cook rice in a *sthāli* with fuel' one

object; the words 'red, one-year old' denote an animal; this difference does not affect the meaning of words in apposition. Similarly, the termination indicating the case does not affect it. It may relate to any case. Similarly also, the epithets may indicate an inseparable attribute, as colour and age, or objects that may be separated like the stick and the ear-ring. This makes no difference. The second example shows that the words in apposition may have the ending of the third or instrumental case. The third example shows that they may be in the objective case; and the fourth is an example of a compound word. The sixth example is from the *veda*, and shows that the words may be in the fourth or dative case.

(1) The second example raises a doubt. In 'with a white cloth' (*śuklena vāsasū*) the termination of the words indicates the connection of the whiteness and cloth with the verb, and its force is exhausted when this work is done; it does not therefore indicate their connection with each other. We ask the opponent—In the sentence "Do *yūga* with a *paṣu*" (four-footed animal) (*paṣunū yajeta*), the *paṣu* and the singular number are connected with the verb. Why should we not hold that they are not connected with each other, as the termination showing the case has exhausted its force, when it showed the connection?

Opponent. The termination has two aspects—as indicating the case, it shows connection with the verb; as indicating the number, it connects the number with the *paṣu*. The aspects being different, there is no objection.

Reply. The termination of the words connects whiteness and cloth with the verb; while the placing of the words in apposition connects them with each other.

action—to cook—as connected with many *kāra*kas is perceived at the same time. Similarly, each *kāra*ka, denoted by the group of words in apposition, at the

Opponent. The termination, being in the same word, shows both the connections at the same time. The two aspects being of equal strength, neither aspect is incompatible with the other. In your case the connection with each other needs reference to another word, and as this takes time, it is nullified.

Reply. Is it your view that quickness in perception by itself gives strength, while delay in perception by itself is the cause of weakness ? If so, sense perception alone would be authority ; and the others—inference and testimony—would lose their force. This view would give victory to the *chārvāka*. The *veda* alone would be authority ; but not *smṛitis*. Of the authorities *śruti*, *lingam* and the rest, the first alone would be authority ; but not the others. When words in the first case are placed in apposition, the singular number denoted by the termination in one word would be first perceived, and the effect of placing words in apposition would be nullified, as it needs reference to the similar case-ending of another word. Even in the case, which has your approval, the words connect the *pāṣu*, and the singular number with the verb ; and after this their connection with each other takes place ; but this would be impossible in your view.

Opponent. It is only when there is conflict, what is quickly perceived nullifies what is perceived with some delay.

Reply. In our case also there is no conflict. This is admitted by you in your final decision in the case.

Opponent. Absence of conflict alone will not suffice ; you should have the support of usage also.

Reply. We also have the support of usage.

Reference has been made to the *final decision* in regard to the text *paṣunū yajeta*. It is as follows :

In the word *paṣunā* the first member denotes a *paṣu* ; and the termination the *kāra*ka (object of the action) and

very time that it is perceived, appears as clothed in various attributes, and is connected at the same time with the verb in the sentence. In their doing so there is no incompatibility whatever. Here is an example.

Let a capable cook, prepare milk-boiled rice in a vessel of proper dimensions with dry *khūdīra* fuel.

12. The *first view* and *final decision* in regard to the *vedic* text under consideration given by the *mīmāṃsaka* are unsound. He considers that when a word (1) connoting an attribute, occurs in a sentence, in which an object is mentioned, it connotes merely the attribute, and that therefore the word *arūṇayā* only connotes the red colour. This conclusion is untenable; for both in the world and in the *veda* no word connoting

number. The number is connected first with the *kāraka*, which is nearest to it; as the *kāraka* is connected with the action denoted by the verb, the number through the *kāraka* is connected with the action. The action here is *yūga* shown by the word near at hand, *viz.*, *yajeta*. Thus, oneness becomes an *anga* of the *yūga*; but as it has no form and cannot therefore help in bringing the *yūga* into existence, it looks out for an object to which it may attach itself. It finds this object afterwards in the *paśu*. Thus oneness and *paśu* being connected, the *yūga* should be done with one *pāśu* only (IV-1-5).

(1) *He considers that when a word, etc.* In the expression 'black goes' (*krishṇogacchati*) he admits that the word 'black' denotes a black object. In the expression 'white of a cloth' (*paṭasya suklāḥ*) the term white denotes only the quality; and he concludes from this that in all cases, when in the same sentence another word denoting an object occurs, the word connoting the quality does not denote the object also. This conclusion is refuted here.

an attribute, when placed in apposition with a word denoting an object, has been seen to connote only the attribute. And the argument on which the conclusion is based is also unsound. In the expression *paṭaḥ suklāḥ* (cloth white) the first word denotes an object; and yet the second word denotes an object possessing the white colour and not merely the colour. In the expression *paṭasya suklāḥ* (white of the cloth) the second word no doubt does not denote a cloth possessing the white colour; but this is due to the use of different case-endings; not because the word 'white' occurs in the same sentence with the word 'cloth'. In the same expression, if the word *bhāgaḥ* be added, it and the word 'white' (*suklāḥ*) having the same case-endings, the word will denote a part possessing the white colour. Next, the statement in the *first view* is also unsound, that because the purchase is connected with the one-year old animal, the red colour is unconnected with it. The word connoting the red colour—*aruṇayā*—is in apposition with the other word, the object denoted by which does not possess an attribute incompatible with the red colour. Hence the attribute connoted by it may be found in the animal, and the word may be connected with the verb in the sentence. In this there is no incompatibility. Lastly, as the red colour may for the reason stated be connected with the animal by the words themselves, the animal and the attribute may not inappropriately be the means of purchase. The *final decision* need not, as it does, connect both the words with the verb, and by this means connect them with each other. Hence the

explanation of the *sūtra* given in para 10 is the right one.¹

13. *Application to the present case.* The interpretation of words in apposition having been thus settled, it may be applied to the present case. In the text 'That thou art' and similar texts, in which words are placed in apposition, the oneness intended should be explained without ignoring the attributes connoted by the two words. This will not be possible to one, who does not admit that there is a highest *Ātmā*, who is an enemy to all imperfections, and the one seat of limitless good qualities, and who is other than the *ātmās* that are or were under the influence of beginningless *avidyā*, and suffer or suffered (1) endless misery. Here the opponent asks—if I admit what you say, will not *Brahma*, by the words 'that' and 'thou' being in apposition, become the seat of all imperfections connoted by the word 'thou'.

Reply. No ; for the word 'thou' also denotes only *Brahma*, the inner Ruler of a *jīva*. This will be clear from the following explanation. *Brahma*, denoted by the word *sat* (2), free from the touch of every imperfection,

(1) *Or suffered.* A person, that is seen to be other than the king, when he is punished by him, does not become identical with the king, when he is rewarded by him. Similarly, the *jīva*, that was other than *Brahma*, when he was bound, does not become *Brahma*, when he is released and shares in his bliss.

(2) *Brahma* may be other than the *jīvas* ; so is a bit of straw. How is He an object, which all will seek ? The

¹ For the first view and final decision of the *mīmāṃsaka* see Introduction, para 21.

possessing an unfailing will, the seat of groups of endless infinite good qualities, and the cause of all, willed 'I will become many, and created the whole world, beginning with fire, water and earth. In this world, which consisted of various forms of *devas*, men and the like, He made the *jivas* enter bodies suited to their *karmas*, as their *ātmās*, and He himself of his own choice only entered after them as their inner ruler. For the aggregates thus produced in the forms of *devas* and the like and ending with Himself, He made names and forms. That is, aggregates of this nature alone are objects and are denoted by words. The text 'with this *jiva-ātmā*,' meaning 'with this *jiva*—myself' indicates that the *jiva* has *Brahma* for his *ātmā*, i.e., ruler. This happens as *Brahma* has entered into the *jiva* as his inner ruler. This is clear from the text.

He created all this, whatever exists, having created it, He entered into the very same; having entered into them, He became *sat* and *tyad* (*ūna.*, VI-2 and 3).

Here the term 'all this' refers to the two classes—*jivas*, who possess intelligence and material products, which are unintelligent. The text divides them into two groups by the words *sat* and *tyad* and by the words *viज्ञānam* and *aviज्ञānam*, and shows that *Brahma* entered *jivas* also. Names and forms being made in this manner, all words denote the *highest Ātmā* united to material products and *jivas*. Further, the text 'All this has that (*Sat*) for its *ātmā* (*chando.*, VI-8-7), indicates by the term

two epithets—freedom from imperfections and the possession of good qualities—are therefore stated.

'all this' the world blended with *jīvas*, and affirms that He is their *ātmā*. Thus, *Brahma* being the *ātmā* of all *jīvas* and material products, the whole world including the *jīvas* becomes His body. This is stated in other places. 'He has entered into men, and rules them ; and is the *ātmā* of all.' See also *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* (*bṛihad.*, V-7), and *subāla upanishad*.

14. Hence, even words denoting *jīvas*, denote *Brahma* alone ; for He is the *ātmā* of *jīvas* also, and they form His bodies. Words, denoting unintelligent bodies in the form of *devas*, men and the like, denote only the *jīva*, to whom they pertain. The text 'four persons by doing the *yāga* known as *pañchadaśarātra* (done in fifteen days) attain *devatvam*' means they become *devas* (1). As the body is the aspect (*prakāra*) of one who owns it, and as words denoting aspects do not stop with denoting the aspects, but go on to denote the persons or objects, whose aspects they are, it is proper that words denoting bodies should aim at denoting those who own them. By the term aspect (*prakāra*) reference is made to the element 'such' in objects, that are perceived as being such and such. This element needs the object, and the object needs the aspect in order that it may be known ; it is but right therefore that the aspect should end in denoting the object. Words, which denote the aspects, should also end in denoting the objects. For this reason words like cow, horse and man, that connote the common

(1) *They become devas*. The text is quoted to show that the word *deva* denotes a *jīva* in a *deva* body ; and not merely that body ; for then the word would be *devam gacchanti*.

feature of the species (*ākṛitī*), (which feature is the aspect in which they appear), end in denoting the bodies that exhibit this aspect. The bodies too appear as the aspects of *jivas*, from the fact that they serve as their bodies; and the *jivas* too, who own the bodies, appear as the aspects of *Brahma*. The words, that denote the bodies, therefore end in denoting *Brahma* alone. Hence as all words denote *Brahma* alone, when they are put in apposition with words denoting *Brahma*, they are used only in their primary meanings.

15. The opponent comes forward with an objection. In the expression 'The cow is broken-horned,' and 'the broken—horned is white' only words denoting *ākṛitī* (common feature of the species) and quality are put in apposition with words denoting objects. If one object appears as the aspect (*prakāra*) of another object, we see that the termination denoting possession is added; e.g., *dandī* (one having a stick); *kundalī* (one having an ear-ring).

Reply. What determines the placing of words in apposition is not invariably any one of these—*ākṛitī*, quality or object; for if it were one of these, words denoting others should not be put in apposition; but they are. If a thing has existence only as an aspect (*prakāra*) of another thing, it cannot remain without the other thing, and cannot be perceived without it. Words denoting such a thing denote the other thing as appearing in the aspect, which they denote. They may therefore be properly put in apposition with words, that denote the same object, as clothed in other

aspects. But where a thing has an existence by itself, and can stand independently, and is made to appear sometimes as the aspect of another object, there the termination showing possession is added. The objection therefore fails.

16. As even the *jiva* in the material vehicle is the body of *Brahma*, and is the aspect in which He appears, words 'I' and 'thou' and the like, though intended to denote *jivas*, denote *Brahma* alone. This being so, the *upanishad* after stating 'All this has that (*Sat*) for its *ātmā*' closes with the words 'That thou art'. It does not, however, follow that the attributes of the *jiva* touch *Brahma*; for the *jiva* is connected with *Brahma* as His body. The properties of his body like childhood and youth do not touch the *jiva*; similarly here. The word 'that' denotes *Brahma*, the world-cause, the possessor of an unfrustrated will, the seat of all good qualities, and the enemy of all imperfections. The word 'thou' (1) shows the same Being as the *ātmā* of the *jiva* and of his body. Thus both the words are used in their primary meanings. By understanding the words in this manner, we avoid conflict with the context, and with all the *upanishads*. We are saved from the need to attribute

(1) *That thou art*. This means that *Sat* denoted by the word 'that,' and *Brahma*, the *ātmā* of *śvetaketu*, denoted by the word 'thou' are one. Here no affirmation is made; for this was made already in the preceding sentence 'all this, etc..' and the result is stated here by the words in apposition, the object being that the student should meditate on *Brahma* as possessing the attributes stated in the context and as being his *ātmā*.

avidyā to *Brahma*, free from imperfections and the seat of all good qualities. The very statement that *Brahma* and the *jīva* are one, as thus understood, shows Him to be different from the *jīva*, who is His aspect. The conclusion is that *Brahma*, *ānandamaya*, is other than the *jīva*, *viññānamaya*.

17. *Brahma* is *śārīra*. In para 1 of the *first view* *Ānandamaya* was stated to be a *jīva*, as He is referred to as *śārīra*, i.e., one having a body. This *view* is unsound. The text "From that *Ātmā* came forth ether, etc." (I-2), shows that the creation of *annarasamaya*—i.e., the *jīva*'s body—came after the creation of ether and the other elements, and that the *jīva* being therefore incapable of creation at the time, the creator of ether and the other elements must be another—i.e., *Brahma*; and He is referred to as *ātmā*. The term *ātmā* being correlated to body, ether and the other elements down to *annarasamaya* inclusive are His bodies. Regarding *prāṇamaya* it is stated—

Who is the *ātmā* of the previous one, the very same is the *ātmā* (in the body) of this also (III-1).

The previous one is *annarasamaya*, and its *ātmā* is *Brahma*, and He is therefore the *ātmā* of *prāṇamaya*, and that becomes His body. These remarks apply to *manomaya* and *viññānamaya* also; and they also are His bodies. Regarding *Ānandamaya* it is stated—

Who is the *ātmā* of the previous one, the very same is the *ātmā* (in the body) of this also (VI-2).

The previous one is *viññānamaya*, and its *ātmā* is *Ānandamaya*. He is therefore His own *ātmā*—i.e., no

other is His *ātmā*, and this is as it should be, as He is the seat of infinite bliss, and as no other is fit to be His *ātmā* and control Him. The conclusion is that *Brahma* has everything as His body, and that a being, who has the whole world as His body cannot be a *jīva*. Because *Brahma* is *śārīra*, this work, which deals with Him, is stated by great men to be *śārīraka*.

14. विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात् ।

If it be said 'No; for the ending indicative of modification is used,' the reply is—'No; for it indicates abundance.'

The opponent's argument stated more fully is as follows :

(i) The ending *mayā* occurs in the following words: *annarasamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, *viññānamaya* and *ānandamaya*. In the first word it admittedly means modification (1), *annarasamaya* i.e., the body. being a modification of food and drink. As the beginning is more important, and governs all the rest, the ending should have the same meaning in the term *ānandamaya* also. (ii) The ending is largely used in this sense (2) both ordinarily and in the *veda*, and this

(1) *It admittedly means modifications.* *Pāṇini*, the grammarian, states in a *sūtra* (IV-3-143) that the termination *mayā* (*mayat*) may be added optionally in two meanings—modification, and part of one's body. The next *sūtra* directs that it should invariably be added after words, that have a long vowel at the beginning. The word *ānanda* is such a word.

(2) *Largely used in this sense.* Here are some examples—*mriṣṇmaya*, *hiraṇmaya*, *dūrumaya* (modification

sense is thought of first. (iii) Further, to understand the ending to mean abundance (1) will not serve the purpose. Much of bliss implies a little of misery, and the existence of misery even in a small degree will make its seat a *jīva*. (iv) Lastly, a *jīva* is certainly a modification of bliss. Though blissful in his real nature, he has only a modicum of bliss in the state of bondage. The *sūtra* repeats the opponent's objection, and replies.

Reply, taking the four points in order :

(i) In para 1 of the *final decision* under the first *sūtra* (*sūtra* 13) it was stated that *Ānandamaya*'s bliss exceeds the happiness of various grades of beings and various personages, and that it has no higher limit. This being impossible in a *jīva*, the seat of this bliss must be *Brahma* ; this being so, as *Brahma* is not subject to modification, and as the termination *maya* indicates also abundance, it cannot be taken in the sense of modification (2). The opponent relies on what is known as

of earth, of gold and of wood); *parṇamayī juhūḥ* (*juhū* a modification of *parṇa* wood); *śamīmayūḥ srucaḥ* (*sruks*, modifications of *śamī* wood); *darbhamayī raśanū* (cord, a modification of *darbha* grass). The first three examples are from worldly usage, and the next three from the *veda*.

(1) *To mean abundance*. It was suggested to the opponent, that the termination is used in the sense of abundance also ; and reference was made to *Pāṇini's sūtra*, V-4-21, and to the following examples—'*annamayo yajnaḥ*' (offering in which food was abundantly given).

(2) *It cannot be taken in the sense of modification*. The opponent's view that the termination in *ānandamaya* is added under *Pāṇini's sūtra*, V-3-144, is not sound ; for it refers to words in worldly usage, as the term *bhūṣhūyām*

the majority rule (*vide* note under *sūtra* 6, page 147); but it has no place here, as the word *ānandamaya* has the capacity to single out its seat from all *jivas*; and capacity, known as *lingam*, is stronger than the context, on which that rule is based. The rule is not applicable for another reason. In the word *prāṇamaya*, which immediately follows *annarasamaya*, the meaning modification is dropped as unsuitable. Here also the termination indicates abundance; of its five-fold activities the *prāṇa* or breathing activity is mostly in evidence.

(ii) Secondly, the termination *maya* is also largely used to denote abundance. Even if the other meaning were more common, it must be rejected, when it is unsuitable, as the well-known meaning of the term *gangā* (Ganges) is given up in this sentence, 'Shepherd huts on the Ganges.'

(iii) Thirdly, the argument that much of bliss implies a little of suffering is not sound. The expression 'one has bliss in abundance' does not imply the existence of any suffering at all. It only means that its degree is not low. The existence or otherwise of suffering has to be ascertained by other means. Here the absence of suffering is known from other *vedic* texts. A comparison is certainly intended; a high degree implies a low degree; and the question is—is reference made to the same attribute as found in the subject under consideration

occurring in the preceding *sūtra* is drawn down to this *sūtra*. As regards *vedic* words, the *sūtra* is 150; and this contemplates words of two syllables only. The word *ānanda* has three syllables.

and in other individuals, or to an attribute, which is the reverse of that under consideration, as found in the same individual? The opponent adopts the latter alternative; but as already stated, it is negatived by express denial of imperfection of every kind in *Brahma*. And in favour of the former alternative there is also express affirmation in the description of *ānanda* in *anu* 8 of the *upanishad*; and it is the more natural of the two. When it is said 'A. B. is stronger', comparison is made with the strength of other individuals, and not with another attribute of the same individual, such as intelligence.

(iv) Lastly, the remark that the *jīva* is a modification of bliss is untenable; he is not subject to a modification of substance, as a lump of earth is modified as a jar; and the termination indicative of modification implies a change of this kind. He is naturally *jñānam* (a knower) and bliss; during the condition of bondage, the capacity to know and bliss are limited by his *karma*. This is all (1).

15. तद्वैतव्यपदेशाच्च ।

And because *Ānandamaya* is stated to be the cause of bliss in others.

(1) From this discussion the following rule may be deduced: When two primary meanings of a word are available, one well-known, and the other not so well-known, if the former is unsuitable, and the latter is suitable, the reason which supports the former should be rejected, and the reason which supports the latter should be followed.

This statement is made in the following text :

Who will attain worldly pleasure, who will attain the bliss of release, if this limitless (*ākāṣa*) bliss does not exist? He alone makes one blissful (VII-1).

He who gives bliss must be different from him who receives it. *Ānandamaya* Himself is referred to here as *ānanda*.

16. मान्त्रवर्णिकमेव च गीयते ।

And the same Being that is defined in the *mantra* is referred to as *Ānandamaya*.

The *mantra* is "Unchanging, shining, and without limitations is *Brahma* (I-1)". And He is other than a *jīva*. For He is to be reached by the *jīva* by meditation, and what is reached must be other than he who reaches Him. Hence, *Ānandamaya* is not a *jīva*. It is hardly necessary to add that the *mantra* merely explains (1) the *brāhmaṇa* "one who meditates on *Brahma* reaches the highest (2)".

Here the argument already stated in para 4 of the *first view* is refuted :

(1) This is clear from the verse, which is between the *brāhmaṇa* and the *mantra*. It means 'Referring to that, i.e., *Brahma*, this verse has been stated, and the verse is the *mantra*. The same meaning of the *brāhmaṇa* is explained by the *brāhmaṇas* and *mantras* that follow.

(2) The word 'and' in this and in the preceding *sūtra* indicates that the reasons stated in them are in addition to that stated in the first *sūtra*. It is absent from the second *sūtra*; because it is not independent; it merely confirms the reason adduced in the first *sūtra*.

17. नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

The other is not referred to in the *mantra* ; because of inappropriateness.

The other is—other than the highest *Ātmā*—he who is called *jīva*, even though he has become free. For to *Brahma* referred to in the *mantra* the epithet *vipaśchit* (1) is applied, and this is unconditioned (2). It means one who possesses *jñānam* capable of seeing diverse things. This is referred to further on thus, “He wished, I will become many, and to that end I will evolve.” This is therefore the perception preliminary to the evolution of the universe. Similar omniscience is inappropriate to a *jīva*. It appertains to the freed *ātmā* no doubt; but it has had a beginning; for during the state of bondage it was absent. Unconditioned *vipaśchitvam* cannot pertain to him.

To one, who regards the freed *ātmā* as being mere intelligence without any attribute, the unfitness to see the many becomes still more evident. It has been already explained that there is no authority to show that a substance exists that is *nir-viśeṣha*—i.e., devoid of differences. The opponent refers to the

(1) *The epithet vipaśchit*—*vipaśchit*=*vi*+*paśyat*+*chit*—This means one who sees various things. In the second member the letters *yat* have been dropped. This is included in a group of words, beginning with *prishodara*, which are similarly formed. (*Pāṇini*, VI-3-109).

(2) *This is unconditioned*. This means that it does not depend on any particular action, on the senses and the like. If it did, it would have been stated; as it does not exist, it has not been stated.

text 'From whom speech returns with the mind without reaching ' (*āna*, *anu*-9), and observes that *Brahma* cannot be spoken about or thought of. Assume that this is the meaning; yet we cannot see from this that a thing is *nir-viśeṣa*. It only shows that speech and mind are no authority in regard to *Brahma*. He would then become only a non-entity. The *upanishad* begins with the direction that *Brahma* should be meditated on, and states that He is *vipaścīt*, i.e., all-knowing; that He is the world-cause; that He is the one seat for *jñānam* and bliss; that He gives bliss to others; that by mere willing He created the whole world consisting of *jīvas* and material products; that He entered the created objects and has become their *ātmā*; that He causes fear and removes it; that He controls the wind, the sun and the rest; that He is the seat of infinite bliss; and many other things. If after all this, it be stated that there is no authority for *Brahma*, on the plea that speech and mind do not reach Him, it would be speaking like an insane person (1). The term 'whom' in the text refers to *ānanda*; for it is correlated to the term *ānanda* in the remainder of the text 'One who knows the *ānanda* of *Brahma*'. It is connected with *Brahma* by the words *ānanda* of *Brahma*, and reference is made to one who

(1) *Speaking like an insane person.* If *Brahma* were beyond speech, nothing should be said about Him; but as the *upanishad* states many things about Him, He cannot be said to be beyond speech; to say that He is would be conflicting. As the *upanishad* refers to the knowledge of the bliss of *Brahma*, He cannot be said to be beyond thought; to say that He is would be conflicting.

knows it. If the meaning be that *Brahma* is beyond speech and mind, the sentence would make conflicting statements. Hence the correct meaning of the text is as follows: Speech began to explore the higher limit of the bliss of *Brahma*; and as it has no limit, and for this reason alone, withdrew from the attempt along with the mind. It is added that one, who knows that the bliss of *Brahma* is limitless, does not fear anything (1).

18. भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ।

Because His difference (from the other) is expressly stated.

The texts, which beginning with the words "From that *Ātmā* came forth ether," go on to indicate who is referred to in the *mantra*, distinguish Him from *jivas*, as they distinguish Him from body, *prāṇa* and mind, thus:

There is a being known as *Ānandamaya*, who is other than this *viññānamaya*, and who is within it; He is the *ātmā*.

Here attention is called to the *jiva* in the state of bondage, and *Ānandamaya* is stated to be other than he, and to be his *ātmā*. This statement would not be

(1) In this and the preceding *sūtra* the reason found at the commencement of the *upaniṣad* was stated. The next *sūtra* states another reason found in the middle, which is clearer, and the *sūtra* next to it a reason found towards the close. *Sūtra* 17 is subsidiary to *sūtra* 16, as it confirms the reason assigned in that *sūtra*. Hence, the conjunction 'and' is absent from it.

correct, if the same *jīva*, when freed, became *Brahma*. Hence the *Ānandamaya* referred to in the *mantra* is other than the *jīva*.

19. कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा ।

And because He brings about the evolution of the world by a mere wish, and has no need of matter.

An *ātmā* in bondage can create only, when he is embodied; he will therefore need matter in the form of a body and senses and motor organs. This is seen in the four-faced *Brahmā*. But the Being under consideration brought about the evolution by a mere wish, even though He was without this matter.

He desired, 'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve.' 'He considered; considering, He created all this, whatever exists.'

A freed *ātmā* is also omnipotent; but his power does not extend to the evolution of the world.

20. अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति ।

And because it is taught that the *jīva* attains bliss in Him.

This means that the bliss consists in the enjoyment of *Ānandamaya*. The text is—

He is bliss; for on reaching this bliss one becomes blissful (VII-1).

That, by the enjoyment of whom one becomes blissful, cannot be that one. Hence *Ānandamaya* is other than a *jīva*. This last *sūtra* removes the doubt that may arise that the freed *jīva* might create, without a body, as he has merely to will; and it is stated in *vedic*

texts that he attains this power on reaching *Brahma* in the highest heaven.

Ānandamaya (1) being thus decided to be *Brahma*, the reference to *ānanda* in the texts

'If this limitless *ānanda* did not exist' (VII-1);
'*Vijnānam ānandam Brahma (brihad., V-9-28)*;

is to *ānandamaya* alone, as by the term *vijnāna* reference is made to *vijnānamaya*. For the same reason the following statements are made:

'One who knows the *ānanda* of *Brahma*' (*āna.*, IX-1);
and 'He reaches the *ātmā*, who is *ānandamaya*' (VIII-6).

In the *bhṛiguvalli*, which follows, reference is made to the things enumerated in the *ānandavalli*, thus—

'He learnt that *anna* was *Brahma*.' 'He learnt that *prāṇa* was *Brahma*.' 'He learnt that the mind was *Brahma*';
and 'He learnt that *vijnāna* was *Brahma*'.

Hence in the expression 'He learnt that *ānanda* was *Brahma*, reference is made to *ānandamaya* alone'. For the same reason the conclusion in that place is thus stated—'Reaching the *ātmā* who is *ānandamaya*'.

(1) The objection may be raised that one becomes blissful on reaching *ānanda* (bliss); but not by reaching *ānandamaya*. To refute this objection, the text states that the two words are synonymous. The reasons for this statement are the same as for *vijnāna* and *vijnānamaya*. (See *final decision*, para 3.) As *Brahma* is extremely agreeable, He is *ānanda*; and even though the word denotes the attribute bliss, it cannot stop there, but must denote also one who possesses it, *i.e.*, *Brahma*. Where it is intended to refer to the attribute alone, the word *ānanda* and *Brahma* will not be in apposition; the word *Brahma* will have the termination of the possessive case, as in the expression quoted in the text:

SUB-SECTION 7

In the preceding sub-section *Ānandamaya* was shown to be other than a *jīva*. In the *upanishad*, which dealt with it, the following text occurs :

He who is within man, and he who is within the sun, He is one. (*āna.*, VIII-5.)

The former being *Ānandamaya*, it follows that *Ānandamaya* is he who is seen within the sun. In the *chāndogya* reference is made to the *purusha*, who is seen within the sun, and He is described as having a body with eyes, hair and nails. The opponent attempts to show that this *purusha* is a *jīva*, and thinks that if he succeeds, he can contend that *Ānandamaya* also is a *jīva* ; and the conclusion reached in that sub-section will then be nullified. Hence this sub-section is subsidiary to the other.

It may be asked—Has it not been proved that the possession of a body does not make its owner a *jīva* ?

Reply. True ; but the bodies therein referred to were not shown to be bodies with hands and feet. The relationship of *Ānandamaya* to those bodies was that of controller and controlled, or of owner and owned. Here reference is made to a body with eyes, hair and nails ; a body of this kind is well-known to be made by *karma* ; and the relationship in regard to it is that of a person to an instrument. Though *annarasamaya* is a body with hands and feet, yet *prāṇa*, mind and *jīva* are not of this description. Hence a doubt may properly arise.

The text for consideration is (1):

“Now that golden *Purusha*, who is seen within the sun, with golden beard, with golden hair, and golden in every part of the body up to the tip of His nails. His eyes are like the lotus flower newly opened to the sun’s rays.” And “Now, that *Purusha* who is seen within the eye”. See Vedic Texts.

Here the doubt is—Who is this *Purusha*—is he a *jiva*, known by the words sun and the like (2), who has attained this greatness as the result of numberless good deeds, or is he the highest *Ātmā*. It arises from the mention of the possession of a body and further on of freedom from every imperfection.

First view. The *Purusha* is a *jiva* with accumulated merit. For mention is made of the possession of a body; and connection with a body is found only in a *jiva*; and its purpose is to enable him to experience the fruits of *karma*—pleasure and pain. Hence the attainment of release, in which connection with a body ceases, is described as being without a body—

One who is in a body is caught by welcome and unwelcome things; from one in a body welcome and unwelcome fruits do not depart; and one who is without a body they do not touch (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-1).

(1) *The text for consideration.* The text begins with the words *ya eshaḥ*; and though they indicate *anuvāda* (repetition), they should not be so treated; for what is stated here has not been stated anywhere else.

(2) *The sun and the like.* The intention in using the word *ādi* in the original is that for the reasons stated in this sub-section every text, which refers to a body and senses, and in regard to which the doubt may arise whether they indicate a *jiva*, refers only to *Brahma*.

2. The possession of extraordinary knowledge and capacity is possible with exceedingly great merit. Hence the attributes mentioned in the *upanishad* may be found in the *jīva* also—viz., control of worlds and of enjoyments; being the subject of meditation; and bestowal of fruits; and by the removal of sin, he may be the means of others' attaining release. Examples of such persons are seen among men; then there are *siddhas*, *gandharvas*, *devas*, *Indra* and others in order of merit (See *Vedic Texts—āna.*, section 8). Though the four-faced *Brahmā*'s life is limited, there may be a succession of *Brahmās*, each exercising authority and creating the universe in a world-age. Hence, there is no highest *Ātmā* other than a *jīva*. This being so, the texts, that describe *Brahma* as being neither gross nor subtle, should be taken to refer to the *jīva*'s nature; and the texts relating to release should be understood as teaching its nature, and the means to its attainment.

Final decision. It is thus stated in the *sūtra* :

21. अन्तस्तदमोपदेशात् .

The *Purusha* who is seen within (the sun and in the eye) is other than a *jīva*; He is the highest *Ātmā*; because His attributes are stated.

The words 'other than a *jīva*' have been added to convey the meaning of the word *anya* inserted from the succeeding *sūtra*. The sentence 'He is the highest *Ātmā*' is what the first sentence implies. One attribute is mentioned thus: "He has risen from all evil." Now what is meant by the term 'evil'? When one thing out

of many connected things is mentioned and denied, the existence of the other things may be inferred. Good *karma*, and evil *karma* are spoken of together ; and when evil *karma* is denied of the *Puruṣha* in the sun and in the eye, the existence of good *karma* follows ; and it may be thought that one, that has good *karma* to his credit, is a *jīva*. But this is a point to be settled by texts ; which include good deeds also in the term evil (*pāpa*).

Him night and day do not touch ; no old age ; no death ; no grief ; no good deeds ; no evil deeds. All evil depart from Him. (*chāndo.*, VIII-4-1.)

That this is so, wherever the highest *Ātmā* is mentioned, is well-known. Next, the expression “ risen from all evil ” cannot be understood in its primary sense. Being omnipresent, to think of His rising from a place connected with evil is absurd. It must therefore be understood to mean ‘ untouched by all evil ’ as stated in the text quoted. This means that though He does actions, which in others may be regarded as good or evil, their fruits do not touch Him. As no mention is made of any means by which He reached this condition, and as there is no authority that His attributes were ever obscured, it may be concluded that this attribute pertains to His nature, and that it has never suffered change. Now, the fact that the highest *Ātmā* has no evil distinguishes Him from *jīvas*, who are bound ; and His being untouched by them singles Him out from the freed *jīvas* also. This attribute cannot therefore be found in *jīvas* and pertains only to Him.

2. Along with this attribute—complete exemption from all evil—other attributes are mentioned in the *upanishad*—(a) He is the inner ruler of all ; for it is stated that *rik* and *sāman* are His songs. As these praise *agni*, *vāyu* and other *devatās*, He is the inner ruler of all these *devatās*, and similarly of all others also. Next (b) He controls the worlds above the sun, and the worlds below earth—in other words He rules all the worlds. (c) He controls the enjoyments of the *devas* and the enjoyments of men. (d) Whoever meditates on Him, as having risen from all evil, himself becomes free. These attributes are enumerated in the *upanishad* along with exemption from evil ; and as that has been shown to pertain to His nature, these also pertain to His nature (1).

3. The statement that the *Purusha* in the sun is exempt from all evil brings up the Being described in the *ānandavalli*, *chāndogya* (chapter VIII) and *subāla upanishads* as having the same attribute. Hence all other attributes of *Brahma* mentioned in them along with this attribute pertain to the *Purusha* under consideration. These, being His natural attributes, can never be found in a *jīva*.

4. The argument urged in para 1 of the *first view* is not sound—*viz.*, that connection with a body implies

(1) From this the following rule may be deduced. When it is possible to regard things as arising from the same source, of which one is well-known, and the others not so well-known, the mention of the well-known thing as springing from that source indicates that the others also have had the same origin.

bondage to *karma*. The former point does not prove the latter (1); for it is found in those who are not subject to bondage, and who possess the attribute of carrying out their will unfrustrated; for they assume bodies of their own will. The *opponent* observes—The possession of a body is first stated in the *upanishad*, and this makes out its owner a *jiva*; while exemption from all evil, which is referred to as the mark of *Brahma*, comes further on. The statement at the beginning prevails. *Reply*. Here the statement at the beginning is capable of another explanation, and has therefore become weak.

5. The *opponent asks*—Why does the *Purusha* in the sun assume a body even of his own motion? It is an aggregate of the elements, which are the products of matter, and exhibits the three qualities—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*; and in itself it is an undesirable object.

Reply. The body of the *Purusha* in the sun is not one of this kind. It is made of a shining substance (2) other

(1) *The former point does not prove*. The meaning is that in a matter, that can be known only from the *veda*, an argument based on co-existence observed in the world will not prove the point. The possession of a body is capable of another explanation, *viz.*, that a body is taken up of one's own choice.

(2) *Brahma* is an unique being. As He has groups of good qualities, that are numberless, that belong to Him by nature, and to the excellence of which there is no limit, He has a body that belongs to Him by nature. It is to His liking and suitable to Him; it is ever the same and cannot be regarded as being like other bodies; it is a

than ordinary matter; with *satva* alone as its quality; it is eternal, and shines in the place known as the highest heaven; and the dwellers in that world ever see it. For the benefit of those that meditate on Him, He out of His infinite mercy takes up a portion of this body and puts it into the form in which they wish to see Him. It is a form of this kind that is seen in the sun. Here is the authority for these statements:

(i) "He is not born; yet He is born in many forms" (*purusha sūkta*); (ii) "I meditate on that great *Purusha*, who shines like the sun, and who is far removed from *tamas*" (*Ibid.*); (iii) "All moments came forth from the *Purusha* with the brilliance of lightning." (*nūrūyanam*, I-8.)

The following explanation is needed. The first clause in the first text denies connection with a body made for the experiencing of the fruits of *karma*. The second sentence states that bodies made of the shining substance are assumed for the protection of the universe. In the second text the term *tamas* means matter in the subtlest condition. The text clearly shows the possession of a body, other than a body made of *tamas*; if this were not the meaning, and the intention was merely to state that *Brahma* was other than *tamas*, the expression would be—*tamasah paraḥ*; whereas the expression used is *tamasah parastāt*; and the termination *astāt* would be purposeless. The third text confirms this interpretation.

wonderful one, and is ever free from imperfections. Its brilliance, its beauty, its smell and its softness are par excellence. It is ever young, i.e., it never becomes old. It is the seat of these and endless groups of similar qualities.

6. The following *smṛiti* texts state the same thing: *Bhagavad-gītā*—Remaining unborn, incapable of change, and ruler of all beings, and being in My own *prakṛiti* (1), I come down of My own will (IV—6); To protect the good, to destroy the wicked, and establish *dharma*, I appear from age to age (*Ibid.*, 8).

Vishṇupurāṇa. That, in which all these *śaktis* firmly abide, that figure of *Hari* is other than the body formed of the world; it is made of a different substance and is of large size. (VI-7-70.)

That figure, the seat of all *śaktis*, He makes for his own amusement into bodies bearing the names of *deva*, man and beast, and acting like them. This is done for helping the worlds; it is not brought about by *karma*. (*Ibid.*, 71 and 72.)

Mahābhārata. The body of the highest *Ātmā* is not an aggregate of the elements (*udyaoga parva*).

7. The following texts confirm the conclusion stated, and show that the highest *Ātmā* is free from

(1) In the first verse the term *prakṛiti* means what belongs to one alone; and denotes here the figure which appears in the highest heaven, as opposed to the figures of bound *jīvas*. The term 'will' is the rendering of the term *māyā* in the original. The term is stated to be synonymous with *jñānam* by vedic lexicographers. The 'good' are those who meditate on Him; to protect them alone is the purpose of *avatāra*; the destruction of the wicked is incidental; for it may be brought about by mere willing. The term *śakti* in the third verse means what is an inseparable element of a thing, and denotes here matter, *jīvas* and time. They appear in the body of the highest *Ātmā* in the forms of ornaments and weapons.

bondage to *karma*, free from connection with a body made of matter with the three *guṇas* and free from connection with undesirable qualities pertaining to it:

Taittirīya ānandavallī. Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma* (I—1);

Bṛihad āraṇyaka. *Jñānam* and bliss is *Brahma* (V-9-28);

Ātmopaniṣad. He is without *guṇas* (i.e., *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*);

Chāndogya. He is free from *karma*, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst; He has unchanging objects of desire and an unfailing will (VIII-1-5);

Śvetāśvatara. (VI) He is without attachment (19); He has no body, no senses; no one is seen to be his equal or superior; His capacity is heard to be superior, to be of many kinds, and to pertain to His nature; so also His power to know, to support and to create and destroy (8); Him, the greatest ruler among rulers, and the highest *devatā*, among *devatās* (7); He, the world-cause, is the lord of the lords of the senses (*jīvas*); and no maker or lord of Him exists (9).

Taittirīya, nārāyaṇam. The all-knower made all forms and names, and remains being denoted by the names.

22. भेदव्यपदेशान्नान्यः ।

The *Purusha* in the sun's orb is other than a *jīva*; because his difference from the *jīva* energising the orb is expressly stated.

This statement is made in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text :

Who stands in the sun, who is within the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun from within, this inner ruler is your immortal *ātmā*. (V-7-13.)

The *upanishad* separates the *inner ruler* similarly from all others. There are similar verses relating to all *devas*, and *ātmās*. The former distinguishes Him not only from the *devatā*—sun, but also from all other *devatās*, and the latter from the *ātmās*, divorced from their bodies. Hence, even in the condition of release, the *jīvas* are controlled by *Brahma*.

By these three sub-sections, which form one group, this point has been settled, *viz.*, that the cause, which brings about the evolution of this universe, is other than matter and other than *jīvas*, whether they are bound or have been freed. The *upanishads*, that were examined, use *general* terms, as *Sat*, *Brahma* and *Ātmā* ; and with reference to the indications, which they contain, the decision was arrived at. It will be open to an opponent to contend that there are other *upanishads*, which refer to the world-cause in terms which unmistakably denote particular individuals, and that express mention, known as *śruti*, should prevail over arguments based on indications, known as *lingam*. The next four sub-sections (1),

(1) In the first sub-section the *first view* is based on a term, which is known to denote a particular element ; and the *final decision* relies on the unsuitability of the attributes mentioned to that element. In the second the absence of similar unsuitability is urged ; the *final decision* points out its existence. In the third the *first view* refers to the

which form another group, proceed to examine these *upanishads*, and to confirm the conclusion already reached.

SUB-SECTION 8

The text for consideration is :

What is it that this world should attain? *Ākāśa* replied he; all these beings come forth from *ākāśa* alone; they disappear in *ākāśa*; for *ākāśa* alone is greater than all these; *ākāśa* is the highest goal. (*chāndo.*, I-9-1.)

Here the doubt is—whether *ākāśa* refers to the well-known element ether, or the highest *Ātmā*. It arises from the fact that the element ether is well-known by the term *ākāśa*, and from the statement that it is the highest goal.

First view. *Ākāśa* is the element ether. In a matter to be known (1) only from testimony, whatever

absence of any difficulty of the same kind, and points to an indication in its support; and this is over-ruled by drawing attention to the commencement of the context. In the last sub-section the *first view* relies on this argument, and it is set aside by showing that the *upanishad* as a whole supports the *final view*.

(1) *In a matter to be known.* In the expression 'The sun is *yūpa*' (the post to which the goat to be offered in a *yūga* is tied) the *yūpa* being actually seen, it is not identified with the sun; and the word 'sun' (*āditya*) is taken to mean 'shining like the sun'. In a matter, that cannot be known in this manner, the established meaning of words should not be similarly abandoned. (*mīmā.*, I-4-15.)

is denoted by a word by well-recognised usage, that alone should be adopted. The element ether is denoted by the term *ākāṣa* ; and it is the cause from which all objects—moveable and immoveable—come forth.

2. Here an objection is raised—Has it not been shown that *Brahma* is other than unintelligent matter and other than *jivas* on the ground among others that they cannot create by mere will ?

Reply. Yes ; but the conclusion is not sound. *Brahma* was defined as the world-cause ; this led to the question from whom the universe came forth ; and the text under consideration furnishes a reply. It is then decided that the world-cause is *ākāṣa*, and that the general terms *Sat* and *Brahma* used in other creation-texts refer to this particular object—on the rule stated in note (1) on page 51.

3. *Second objection.* Is not *ātmā* also mentioned in another creation-text ?

Reply. True ; but the term is not confined to intelligent objects only. Example : “ The jar is *mridātmake*, i.e., has *mr̥it*—earth—for its *ātmā* or substance.” As the term has more than one meaning, and it is uncertain which should be adopted, they should all be rejected, and the meaning by its etymology should be taken. The term *ātmā* will then mean what pervades something, and will apply to *ākāṣa*, which pervades all space.

4. *Third objection.* Does not *ākāṣa* appear to be a product from the text, “ From that *Ātmā* came forth ether ? ” (*āna.*, I-1-2.)

Reply. Ether and the other elements exist in two conditions, one subtle, known as *tanmātra*, and the other gross, known as element. The subtle condition of ether is the cause, and the gross condition is the product. The text therefore means that ether in the gross condition came forth of itself from its subtle condition. The conclusion therefore is that the element ether is the world-cause. Hence *Brahma* being no other than *ākāṣa*, the following statements are made in the *upanishads* ;

“If this *ākāṣa*, bliss—did not exist” (*āna.*, vii-1);
 “*Ākāṣa* is indeed the maker of names and forms” (*chūndō.*, VIII-14).

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

23. आकाशस्त्विह्मात् ।

Ākāṣa is *Brahma*, other than the well-known element ether; He is the highest *Ātmā*; because certain marks appear in the text, which belong only to Him.

Of these the first mark is being the world-cause. The expression ‘All these beings’ in the text denotes the whole of the universe made up of matter and *jīvas* blended together. The term ‘being’ (*bhūta*) does not refer to the elements, unless the word great or five is placed before it, thus—great beings or five beings, or unless one of them is mentioned, thus—earth and other *bhūtas*. When it stands by itself, its meaning is what has been stated. The word ‘alone’ in the text shows that *Ākāṣa* is not merely the material cause, but is also

the operative cause. Now, ether being a product of unintelligent matter, cannot be the world-cause ; for it cannot be the cause of the intelligent element in the universe. The next mark is being the highest goal—the goal of *jivas* ; but ether in the form of material products obstructs the attainment of every desirable object, and is held up as a thing to be rejected. The last mark is being greater than everything ; and this means excelling every one by being the seat of all auspicious qualities as a part of one's nature and in the highest degree. Such a mark cannot be found in the element ether. The term *ākāṣa* therefore refers to the highest *Ātmā*.

2. The argument in para 2 of the *first view* is untenable. The text under consideration has the expression *havā*, which indicates that what is stated is well-known ; and a statement of this kind, being a mere repetition of what is found elsewhere, has no independent authority. It should not therefore conflict with other texts, which by themselves are authority for what they state. Two such texts were examined in sub-sections 5 and 6 ; and the world-cause was determined to be the highest *Ātmā*. The text under consideration refers to Him, and affirms certain attributes to prove that He is *ananta*—imperishable, which was the question to be established, as will be seen from the context.

3. The *first view* relied on the meaning of the term *ākāṣa* established by usage ; but when it is found to be unsuitable, it must be rejected, and the etymological meaning should be adopted. The term *ākāṣa*

means what shows all objects to others, and is suitable to the highest *Ātmā*. He also shines to Himself, and causes others to shine similarly for His own benefit.

4. It is true that the term *ākāṣa* mentions a particular object, unlike *Sat* and *Brahma*, which only describe objects in general terms; but the text under consideration labours under the defect pointed out in para 2, which is confirmed by the unsuitability of the term in the present case. The other texts on the other hand are capable, by the sentences which follow them, of indicating a Being as omnipresent and as possessing an unfrustrated will—which are points not previously known; and these texts are many and speak with one mind. To plead that they should be set aside in preference to a single text, which has the defect pointed out, is not acceptable.

5. It may be objected that *śruti*, express mention, should not be superseded by *lingam*—i.e., mere indications, and that the *mīmāṃsā* does not contain a precedent on the point. Here are some precedents: (i) In connection with taking a portion of a prepared substance for offering it is stated,

He takes with the hand; He takes with *sruvam*;
He takes with a knife.

Here three instruments are mentioned without specifying the substance to which each instrument should apply; but each can apply to one kind of substance only—the hand for solids as rice, or cakes; the *sruvam* for liquids like ghee; the knife for the flesh of animals. Hence by the capacity of the instruments—

which is *lingam*—the signification of the word *avadyati* (takes)—which is *śruti*—is narrowed, though it is repeated thrice. (ii) “Cook *krishṇala*.” Here the term denotes grains made of gold to resemble grains of rice; it is obviously impossible to cook them in the ordinary sense. The meaning of the word ‘cook’—which is *śruti*—is narrowed to mean ‘heat,’ by the capacity of the grains to be merely heated. Precedents are available also in ordinary writings—Thus (iii) “Fire learns”. The reference is to a student as pure as fire. Here the primary meaning of the *śruti agni* (fire) is superseded by the capacity indicated by the word ‘learns’ (*bhāva*, p. 218); (iv) ‘Shepherd huts on the ganges.’ Here, the primary meaning of the *śruti-gangā* (ganges) is superseded by the capacity of the word ‘huts’. Hence, *śruti* prevails over *lingam*, only when the primary sense of the *śruti* is not found to be unsuitable. See also the precedent stated in Introduction, para 20.

6. The last point to be noticed in the *first view* is that the term *ātmā* has several meanings, and that therefore its etymological meaning should be adopted. It is true that the term is occasionally used with reference to objects possessing no intelligence; but what is well-recognised is its correlation to a body; and in the texts “Before creation this was only *Ātmā*; there was only one,” and “From that *Ātmā* ether came forth,” it denotes an intelligent Being. The term ‘go’ has many meanings; but by established usage it calls up the animal cow, as soon as the word is mentioned; and its use in other occasional meanings should be determined

by the context. Similarly here. The meaning which first suggests itself is confirmed by the sentences which follow.

7. The conclusion is that the term *ākāṣa* denotes the highest *Ātmā*.

SUB-SECTION 9

24. अत एव प्राणः ।

For the very same reason *Prāṇa* is the highest *Ātmā*.

The text for consideration is :

Prāṇa, said he. All these beings are dissolved in *Prāṇa* ; they come forth from *Prāṇa*. (*chāndo.*, I-11-5.)

Here the term *prāṇa*, like the term *ākāṣa*, denotes something other than the well-known *prāṇa*—*i.e.*, the highest *Ātmā* ; for the entry of all beings into, and their going forth from, a certain being is mentioned ; and this is His mark. As the expression *havā* occurs here also, the same conclusion follows. Why is a new sub-section necessary ? Reply. As all beings are seen to depend upon *prāṇa* for continued existence and for their movements, a doubt arises whether it may not be the world-cause. This is removed by drawing attention to the fact that dependence upon *prāṇa* is not seen in stones, timber, and the like, or in the *jivas* considered apart from their bodies. As in the previous sub-section the etymological meaning of the word *prāṇa* is taken—*viz.*, what makes beings exist ; and this is applicable to the highest *Ātmā* only.

SUB-SECTION 10

In the following sub-sections it will be shown that the terms *jyotis*, *indra* and the like denote *Brahma* alone, though by established usage they denote other things; and this will be done, because the texts state some very superior quality, that co-exists with the capacity to evolve the world.

The text for consideration in this sub-section is

Now, that fire (*jyotis*) which shines beyond this heaven, above this universe, in worlds without a superior world. He is the fire within man (*chūndo.*, III-13-7.)

See *Vedic Texts*. Here the doubt is whether this indescribably brilliant fire is one of the well-known shining objects, as the sun, or whether it is the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. The fire here is surely one of the well-known shining objects. For, though the text refers to a well-known fact, as is evident from the use of the pronoun 'that' (*yad* in the original), there is no indication here, as in the texts relating to *ākāṣa* and *prāṇa*, that reference is made to the highest *Ātmā*. He is not therefore recognised here. On the other hand, the fire is stated to be the fire within the stomach. Both are of the same kind, being products of the element fire, and they are therefore said to be one. Also, the term 'shines' refers to the light which belongs to an object possessing colour. The term 'fire' therefore denotes a well-known shining object; and as this indescribable

brilliance (1) is found in the same object along with the capacity to evolve the universe, this shining object is the world-cause.

* *Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

25. ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ।

The fire (appearing in heaven) is the highest *Ātmā* ; because (all beings) are described as His foot.

The fire referred to as connected with heaven, and as indescribably brilliant, is the highest *Ātmā*, and no other. It is true that in the text itself under consideration there is no mark which belongs exclusively to Him. Yet in a previous sentence in the same context reference is made to Him as connected with heaven ; and the fire similarly connected here is recognised as that Being. The pronoun 'that' (*yad* in the original) shows that the sentence repeats what has been stated previously. In examining what this previous statement is, we come to the verse, which speaks of a Being connected with heaven, whose one foot are all beings. From this connection with heaven, we recognise that the fire under consideration is that Being. And as all beings are one

(1) *This indescribable brilliance.* In the *mundaka upanishad* it is said "The sun does not shine there (*i.e.*, by the side of the *Akshara*) ; the moon and the stars ; nor yet the lightning ; how can this fire shine ? When He shines, everything shines after him. With His light all these shine" (chap. 2, section 2, verse 11). In the same place it is stated that the world comes from the *Akshara*. Thus the object that has this brilliance is said to be the world-cause.

of His feet, we see that he is *Brahma*. This verse is quoted from the *purusha sūktā*, which beyond all doubt refers to the highest *Ātmā*, known as *Nārāyaṇa*. The brilliant fire is therefore the highest *Ātmā*. (*bhāva*, page 221.)

2. The *opponent* contends—The term *jyotis* (fire) is a *śruti*; the connection with heaven in this text, which recalls the preceding text to one's mind, is a *lingam*; the two texts occur in the same portion of the *upanishad*, which is a *prakaraṇa*; but both *lingam* and *prakaraṇa* are weaker than *śruti*. Hence, the word 'fire' does indicate a well-known shining object.

Reply. The pronoun *that* indicates that the text repeats a fact stated previously; and by its connection with it, the term 'fire' (*jyotis*) has become weak. The occurrence of the term *yad* in the beginning of the sentence (and it is also a *śruti*), and the connection with heaven, which is a *lingam*, both prevail.

3. The *opponent* contends again—Of the two *śrutis*—*yad* and *jyotis*—the former should be taken as referring not to what has been previously stated, but to the well-known fire brought up before one's mind by the term *jyotis*; by this means the primary meaning of that term will not be interfered with.

Reply. It is the peculiar feature of pronouns (1) to refer to what has gone before, even at the expense of the

(1) See the text discussed in Introduction, para 15 (v). It has been decided that the pronoun *it* (*sa* in the original) refers to milk, previously mentioned, and that both milk and *āmikshū* are the same substance. The dropping in of the

primary sense of a word, with which it is placed in apposition. Hence, the term *jyotis* should be understood in accordance with this feature of *yad*.

4. In the preceding paragraphs it was assumed that the term *jyotis* applied exclusively to the shining objects well-known in the world; but it is not so. For the term means what lights up other things; and the highest *Ātmā* possesses this attribute in the highest degree—"Nārāyaṇa is the highest fire." (*taitt.-nārāyaṇam, anu., 11.*)

5. It only remains to explain why this fire is said to be the fire in the stomach. The object is that the latter should be meditated on as being controlled by this fire beyond heaven, in order that certain fruits may be attained. That *Brahma* is the *ātmā* of the fire in the stomach is stated in *Bhagavad-gītā*, chap. 15, verse 14.

6. The text under consideration does contain an indication that reference is made to the highest *Ātmā*—viz., the shining of the fire in "in worlds without a superior world"; for this expression applies to the highest heaven beyond the world of matter; and the fire which dwells therein cannot be any other. As this does not appeal to the opponent, who thinks of a mark similar to what was found in the texts relating to *ākāṣa* and *prāṇa*, the author answers him on his own ground. (*adhi., 73.*)

curd was merely to make it hard and give it a peculiar taste. As *ūmikshū* is not a new substance, it determines the dropping in of curd, but *vūjīnam* does not. It is merely a bye-product. (*mīmā., IV-1-9.*)

26. छन्दोभिधानान्नेति चेन्न तथाचेतोर्पणनिगमात् तथाहि-
दर्शनम् ।

If it be contended—"This is not so, because the preceding text mentions a metre." The reply is "No; because meditation as *gāyātrī* is taught. Similar teachings are observed".

Here an objection is raised. The preceding section of the *upanishad* begins with this statement—" *Gāyātrī* is all these"; and after mentioning the metre in illustration of this, a verse from the *purusha sūkta* is quoted.

All beings form one of His feet; His remaining three feet, which are immortal, are in heaven.

This verse also should refer to the metre, and does not apply to the highest *Ātmā* as presumed. This objection is stated in the first part of the *sūtra*. The second part contains a reply. By the word *gāyātrī* reference is not made to mere metre; for as will be shown in the next *sūtra*, it cannot have the four feet described in the text. What is taught is that in *Brahma* similarity to the metre should be meditated on. The similarity consists in each having four feet. The verse of the *purusha sūkta* describes Him as having four feet, and *gāyātrī* metre of four feet is occasionally found. The word *gāyātrī* therefore stands here for *Brahma*. The last part of the *sūtra* refers to a precedent for denoting a thing by a word, which ordinarily denotes a metre on the ground of similarity. In the *samvarga vidyā* it is stated "Those five forming one group, and these five forming another group—make up ten," and

it is then added "This is *virāt*". And *virāt* is the name of a metre. (*chāndo.*, IV-3-8.)

27. भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम् ।

And it must be so; because only then will the statement be appropriate that all beings and the other things are feet.

'All beings' are the *jīvas* in the embodied condition; and the other things are earth, which serves them as the place of enjoyment, their bodies, which are instruments of enjoyment, and the hearts, wherein they abide. After mentioning these the *upanishad* adds "This is the four-footed being." This statement will be appropriate, only if the term *gāyatrī* denotes *Brahma*.

28. उपदेशभेदान्नैति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् ।

If it be contended again "No; because the statements (of connection with heaven) are different"; the reply is "No; In both the statements there is no conflict".

The first part of the *sūtra* states an objection. In one of the two texts referred to under the first *sūtra* the statement is "In heaven"; and in the other it is "Beyond heaven". The statements being thus different, one cannot recall the being stated in the former text, when he considers the latter. The conclusion based on this recognition therefore fails. The second part of the *sūtra* replies: Both the statements convey the same meaning. The expression 'In heaven' is a general statement, the preposition 'in' meaning either inside

or outside and below or above. The preposition in 'Beyond heaven' means only above. While the latter text repeats the former text, it limits the meaning of the preposition; and both the expressions therefore mean above heaven. There is therefore no difficulty in recognition. Compare the statements—'The hawk is on the top of the tree; the hawk is beyond the top of the tree.'

The conclusion is that the fire beyond heaven with surpassing brilliance is the highest *Ātmā*; and from the *purusha sūkta*, from which a verse is quoted here, it is clear that reference is made to His shining body.

I meditate on this great *Purusha*, who shines like the sun, and who is far removed from *tamas* (matter).

This view refutes certain minor objections that have been urged :

(i) The reference to brilliance implies the existence of a material object possessing colour; but *Brahma* has no colour; (ii) The expression 'beyond heaven' implies limitation in place, and cannot apply to one who is omnipresent; and (iii) The expression 'In worlds' implies that He needs many worlds as support; but He needs no support.

SUB-SECTION 11

In this sub-section it is determined that the being, who is denoted by the words *indra* and *prāṇa*, is the highest *Ātmā*, on the ground that He is stated to

be the object of meditation as the means to immortality; and this feature is found only in Him, who is the world-cause.

The text for consideration occurs in the *kaushitaki brāhmaṇa*, and is as follows: Being requested by one *Pratardana* to teach him what was most beneficial to man, *Indra* said.

I, a knower-*ātman*, am *prāṇa*; meditate on me thus described as life, as immortality. (verse 14.)

See *Vedic Texts*. The doubt is—who is this, denoted by the words '*indra*, and *prāṇa*' and described as the object of meditation most beneficial to man? Is he a particular *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*? (1).

First view. The text refers to a *jīva* only; for the term *indra* denotes a particular *jīva* by well-established usage; and the term *prāṇa* also, being in apposition

(1) The alternatives are only two—a particular *jīva*, and the highest *Ātmā*, and not four as thought by some—*viz.*, *prāṇa*, *jīva*, the *devatā*, *Indra* and the highest *Ātmā*. In the expression 'I am *prāṇa*,' the term 'I' and *prāṇa* being in apposition, *prāṇa* is a property of the 'I'; and as it occupies a subordinate place, it cannot be one of the alternatives. The author of the *sūtras* does mention *prāṇa* in the *sūtra* for consideration; but his intention is to indicate that the *final decision* will be based on the mention of the term *prāṇa* in the closing text, which mentions certain marks of the highest *Ātmā*. The marks of a *jīva* are certainly mentioned; but as they are found from the context to refer to an individual *jīva*, he is made one of the alternatives on the general and particular rule. See note (1) on page 51. Even *Indra* as a *devatā* is not a subject for consideration; for the question was considered and settled in sub-section 7. He comes in indirectly as the seat of the *jīva*'s marks mentioned in the context.

with it, refers to the same individual. And he enjoined a meditation on himself as the most beneficial to man; and what is most beneficial to man is the means to immortality. Meditation on the world-cause being such means, *Indra*, well-known as a *jiva*, is alone the world-cause.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

29. प्राणस्तथाऽनुगमात् ।

Prāṇa is: the highest *Ātmā*; for only thus will the closing verse of the *upanishad* be connected with what is mentioned in the text.

What is denoted by the terms *indra* and *prāṇa* is not merely a *jiva*; but some other Being—i.e., the highest *Ātmā*. For, towards the close the following verse occurs :

This *Prāṇa* is all-knowing; He is bliss, untouched by old age or death.

This refers to the *prāṇa* mentioned at the commencement, and states certain attributes, which are found only in the highest *Ātmā*. Hence this text will be connected with the *prāṇa* mentioned at the beginning, only if the term denotes the highest *Ātmā*.

30. न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसम्बन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन् ।

If it be contended "No; because the speaker enjoined (meditation) on himself"; the reply is "there is here an abundance of connection with the *ātmā*".

The first part of the *sūtra* raises an objection: The speaker is *Indra*; and he enumerates his previous deeds

—the slaying of the three-headed *Trashtā* ; the banding over to dogs of men, who had renounced the world, but who were not reciting the *veda*, the slaying of certain *asuras* in spite of his undertaking many times not to do so. It is clear therefore that the speaker was a *jiva*, and he enjoined a meditation on himself. Knowing that the commencement of the *upanishad* refers to a *jiva*, one should understand the ending so as to agree with it ; but not the other way ; for it is an admitted rule of interpretation that when there is a conflict between the beginning and the ending, the former should prevail. (*Intro.*, para 24.)

The second part of the *sūtra* gives a reply. Immediately preceding the verse quoted—*viz* :

This *Prāṇa* is all-knowing ; He is bliss, untouched by old age or death,

there is another verse which states

As on the spokes of a wheel the felly rests, and the spokes on the nave, so the organs (*bhūtas*) rest on the *jivas*, and the *jivas* on *Prāṇa*.

The term *bhūtas* refers to all material objects ; they are supported by *jivas*, who are again supported by *Prāṇa* under consideration ; and this *Prāṇa* is described as all-knowing, etc. This support of all material objects and of all *jivas* is possible only by a Being other than a *jiva*, *viz.*, the highest *Ātmā*.

The second part of the *sūtra* may be construed in another way, which brings out the meaning more clearly. Many are the attributes, which can be connected only with *Brahma*, that are enumerated in this

context. First, *Pratardana* requested *Indra* to choose for him a boon that was most beneficial to man ; and he enjoined a meditation on himself, saying that he was *prāṇa*. Now to be the object of meditation leading to release is the peculiar feature of the highest *Ātmā*. This occurs at the very commencement. Towards the close, it is said of *Prāṇa*.

It is He alone that makes one do a good deed, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds. It is He alone that makes one do an evil deed, whom He wishes to lead downwards.

To be the prompter of all actions is an attribute of the highest *Ātmā*. Reference has already been made to His being the support of all ; and to his being all-knowing, full of bliss and untouched by old age or death. Lastly,

He is the protector of all the worlds ; He is the lord of all the worlds ; He is the controller of all.

These attributes are found only in the highest *Ātmā*. Hence owing to the abundance of His attributes, that are found here, *Prāṇa* is the highest *Ātmā*.

The opponent relied on the greater validity of the commencement of a context. We give him the following reply. The commencement and end are parts of sentences ; and when they conflict with each other, the commencement prevails. But it cannot have this strength, when the conflict is between it and the whole. Here many sentences, when carefully examined, are found to form a connected whole ; and the commencement, which is only a part, becomes weak. In the sentence 'On the

ganges shepherd habitations are situated,' the expressions 'shepherd habitations' and 'are situated' convey a certain impression, which is not nullified by the expression 'on the ganges, which occurs at the commencement'. On the other hand, it gives up its primary meaning, and adopts a suitable secondary meaning.

31. शान्द्रष्टयात्पदेशोवाग्देवत् ।

The injunction was given from a knowledge of himself from the *veda*; like *Vāmadeva* and others.

The opponent has been silenced; but two doubts remain to be cleared up. The first is—why did *Indra* refer to himself as the object of meditation? The term *indra* no doubt from its etymology means one who is the highest ruler; but to understand it in this sense will not do here, as it will not fit in with the killing of *Trashtā* and the rest. The particle *tu* in the original indicates this doubt.

Reply. *Indra* spoke from a knowledge of himself as gathered from the *veda*. The *veda* teaches that all *jivas* are the bodies of *Brahma*; and that every word including 'I and you,' though ordinarily understood as referring to a *jiva*, ends in denoting Him. When he said with this knowledge 'meditate on me,' he meant 'meditate on the highest *Ātmā* as ruling me from within'. The second part of the *sūtra* points to a precedent for this mode of expression. The seer *Vāmadeva*, knowing these facts, said :

I was *manu*, and the sun, I am now the seer *Kakshivān*.

By the term 'I' he meant *Brahma* within himself. (Sub-section 6, final decision, paras 13 to 15, pages 186 to 190.) Compare also with what *Prahlāda* said :

As *Ananta* (*Brahma*) is everywhere, I am He alone ; all things proceed from me ; I am all things ; all things are in me, the eternal.

The second doubt is stated in the next *sūtra* and then replied to :

32. जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गानेति चेन्नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह-
तद्योगात् ।

If it be said "No ; because of the mention of the marks of a *jiva* and of *prāṇa*." The reply is—No ; the intention is to enjoin meditation of three kinds ; they are taught in other places ; they are suitable here.

The existence of the *jiva*'s marks has already been stated ; and the marks of *prāṇa* are :

How long *prāṇa* is within this body, so long is life. *Prāṇa* takes hold of the body directed by the knower, and raises it.

Reply. There was an object in referring to *Brahma* by these words ; meditation is of three kinds : (i) meditation on *Brahma* in His own nature ; (ii) meditation on Him as the inner ruler of *jivas* ; and (iii) meditation on Him appearing as material objects. Examples of the three kinds are found in other places. In the *ānandavallī*, which formed the subject of sub-section 6, meditation of the first kind is taught in these words, "Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*" ; "*Brahma* is bliss" ; and the other two kinds in the words "Entering into it, He became *sat* and

tyad". Here also the three kinds are suitable. By the words 'Full of bliss, untouched by old age or death' meditation in³⁷ His own nature is taught; by the words 'I am *prāṇa*' meditation on Him appearing as *prāṇa*; and by the words 'Meditate on me,' meditation on Him as the inner ruler of *Indra*.

... The rules deduced here are not confined to the particular portion of the *upanishad* considered, but are of universal application. They are :

(i) Wherever an attribute found only in *Brahma* is applied to a *jīva*, or to a material product, *Brahma* is to be meditated on appearing as that *jīva* or as that product; (ii) Wherever words ordinarily denoting a *jīva* or a material product are placed in apposition with a word admittedly denoting *Brahma*, then also the meditation should be as stated above.

The first section has now been completed. In answering the opponent's objections, and establishing the highest *Ātmā* as the world-cause, sub-sections 5 to 11 have brought out the following facts about *Brahma*. He evolves as the universe by mere willing; He is bliss beyond thought; He has a form, which is pure, not made by *karma*, and which is eternal. His nature is ever to shine and make others shine; It is by Him that everything has a continued existence, whether it has *prāṇa* or is without it. He is a surpassingly brilliant fire, and He controls *prāṇa*, *Indra* and everything else from within. (*adhi.* verse 78.)

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः !

CHAPTER I

SECTION 2

INTRODUCTION

THE second section is now taken up. In doing so, what has been achieved so far may be briefly reviewed (1). The contention that the evolution of the universe is

(1) In the first section the following points were dealt with: (i) one, who had learnt the *veda*, and who by reading the *pūrvā mīmāṃsā* knew the true nature of *karmas*, will perceive that *karmas* not performed as the worship of *Brahma* will yield only petty and short-lived fruits. By learning the *upanishads* he would have seen, though superficially, that *Brahma* is limitless and enduring bliss; and he will desire to attain release by meditation, which is the means thereto. He will decide that words can convey their meanings even in matters, that are settled; and that the *upanishads* are therefore authority in regard to *Brahma*. He will then begin an enquiry into *Brahma*. This was stated in order to remove the bar to the commencement of the work; (ii) The definition 'From whom these beings are born,' etc., will enable us to know *Brahma*, who is the only cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of all the worlds and the only means to limitless bliss. By the term 'worlds' we should understand that which consists

unconnected with *Brahma* as its cause was refuted. In sub-sections, 5, 8, 9 and 10 it was sought to prove that the world-cause was matter in the subtle condition, or

of endless, diverse objects, moveable and immoveable, and which consists of those that enjoy, and of objects, means and places of enjoyment; (iii) *Brahma*, the only world-cause cannot be known by any means other than the *veda*, and that therefore He should be known only from it; (iv) This becomes desirable, as *Brahma* is the highest goal of man by His very nature; and though there be no injunctions to do or not to do, the texts of the *upanishads* may be accepted as meaning what they state; (v) *Brahma* to be known from the *upanishads* as being the only cause of all the worlds, is other than *pradhāna*, that is known from inference, and He is an intelligent Being, as reference is made to His willing; (vi) He is also other than the *jīva*; as He possesses the following attributes—limitless bliss pertaining to Him by nature; omniscience; being the cause of fear to all *jīvas* and the means to its removal; unfailing will; being the inner ruler of all *jīvas* and material products and the like; (vii) He has a superior body not made of matter, not brought about by *karma*, and belonging to Himself; (viii) The world-cause, referred to as a well-known fact by words denoting particular material products as *ākūṣa* and *prūṇa*, is that unique Being, other than everything else; (ix) The fire that is recognized as connected with heaven is He alone, as its brilliance is unlimited and is found only in the highest Being. The highest *Purusha* alone, the means to the attainment of immortality, which pertains to the world-cause, is denoted by the terms *Indra* and the like. Reference to Him by these terms was made from a knowledge of *vedic* teaching.

Thus, *Brahma*, known also as *Purushottama*, and *Nārāyaṇa*, is to be known from the *upanishads*. He cannot be known from any source other than the *veda*, and stands apart from everything else, as being the seat of excellent qualities like omniscience and the possession of an unfailing will.

was one of its modifications—ether, air (for *prāṇa* is only a product of air) or fire. In sub-sections 6 and 11 *jīvas* in general, and an individual in particular in the form of *Indra* were put forward. All these attempts have failed. In the remaining sections of this chapter it will be shown that nothing else is connected with the evolution of the universe; and this will establish *Brahma* as the only cause. In the first section the opponent objected altogether to the enquiry into *Brahma*; in the next three sections he assumes a new rôle, and merely contends that this or that text of the *upanishad* does not refer to *Brahma*. If he should succeed, he would plead that all other texts should be construed so as to agree with his conclusion. In the first section the marks on which he relied were indistinct, that is, they did not exist, and flowed from his own imagination. In the second section the marks will be found to exist; but they are general; and the opponent will endeavour to limit them to something other than *Brahma*.

SUB-SECTION 1

In this sub-section the following text is for consideration.

All this indeed is *Brahma*; for it has come forth from Him; it will be dissolved in Him; it lives by Him. With a serene mind meditate (on *Brahma*). Now, this *purusha* is full of meditations. What he meditates on in

this world, that he becomes, when he departs from hence. Let a person do meditation (*chūndo.*, III-14-1). *Manomaya, prāṇa śarīra, bhūrūpa.* (*Ibid.*, verse 2.)

This text is considered in two ways. In the first the fifth sentence only is taken up; *viz.*, 'Let a person do meditation'. Two meditations are enjoined—one meditation in the second sentence for the purpose of attaining serenity of mind, and another in the fifth sentence for attaining release. The third sentence will then show that there is no impropriety in one's undertaking many meditations; while the fourth sentence will indicate that the second meditation aims at a fruit of its own, and that it does not serve the first meditation; for unless a fruit is mentioned or is implied, an operation will be regarded as serving another operation, in regard to which a fruit is stated. Here the object of meditation is not stated in the sentence conveying the injunction; it is therefore supplied from the sentence which follows, and which describes one connected with mind and *prāṇa*. The doubt is whether this person so connected is a *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. He is a *jīva*; for mind and *prāṇa* are the *jīva*'s instruments; while their connection with the highest *Ātmā* is denied in the text—"He is indeed without *prāṇa* and without mind." (*munda.*, II-1-2.)

The following objections are raised:

(i) The term *Brahma* in the first sentence of the text may be added here as the object of meditation.

Reply. The term serves another purpose; for the first sentence shows how serenity of mind, which is

needed as a condition of meditation, may be attained ; and it points out for this purpose that everything is *Brahma*.

(ii) But an object of meditation being needed, though the term is found in another sentence, it may nevertheless be added.

Reply. By supplying the terms *manomaya* and the rest found in the same sentence, the need is satisfied.

(*N.B.*—By the expression the same sentence is meant a sentence connected with it so as to form a whole. The first sentence is not so connected, as three sentences intervene.)

(iii) But the sentence which contains these terms is *arthavāda*, i.e., its object is merely to praise ; and the terms are in the first case, while what is needed is words in the second or objective case.

Reply. When an injunction-text has a need, it may be supplied from *arthavāda*. (*mīmāṃsā.*, IV-3-8.) And the case endings may be changed, and by this means both the needs will be satisfied.

Hence, it may be decided that one connected with mind and *prāṇa* is a *jīva* ; and then the term *Brahma*, which occurs towards the close of the context in the sentence “He is *Brahma*,” should denote a *jīva*, speaking of him in respectful terms.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ।

Because what is well-known in all (the *upanishads*) is stated here. . .

The person connected with mind and *prāṇa* is the highest *Ātmā*; for in all the *upanishads* the connection of the terms mind and *prāṇa* with Him alone is well known. Here is the authority:

(i) *Manomaya*, the leader of *prāṇa* and body. (*munda.*, II-2-8.); (ii) This ether within the heart; in it is this *Purusha*, *manomaya*; He is immortal, and has a shining body. (*taitti.-śikshāvalli*, VI-1.); (iii) With love and perseverance He may be perceived with the mind; those who meditate on Him become immortal (*nūrūyanam*, 1-10.); (iv) He is not perceived with the eye; nor with speech; but with a pure mind (*munda.*, III-1-8.); (v) He is the *prāṇa* of *prāṇa*! i.e., He is the support of *prāṇas*; (vi) Next, *Prāṇa* alone directed by the knower takes hold of this body and raises it (*kaushitaki*, II-26.); (vii) All these beings are dissolved in *prāṇa*; they come forth from *prāṇa* (*chando.*, I-11-5).

The first term in the first text means 'one who can be perceived with (a pure) mind only'. The third sentence in the second text is added to show that reference is made to the highest *Ātmā*. These two texts merely mention connection with mind in general; the third text shows the nature of the connection. The fourth text shows the condition of the mind needed for perception. The last three texts show connection with *prāṇa*. The sixth text refers to *Brahma* as the inner ruler of *prāṇā*. The term *prāṇa* in the last text was previously explained from its etymology as denoting *Brahma*; it may denote Him also as the ruler of *prāṇa* on the rule of interpretation to be explained in subsection 6 of this section.

N.B.—It may be noted here that both the *jīva* and *Brahma* are connected with mind and *prāṇa*, the former

using them as his instruments, and the latter as being perceived by one and as supporting and controlling the other. Hence from mere connection in general no inference can be drawn in favour of the *jiva*.

2. Taking this view the following statements, which occur in the context; "This *Ātmā* is present within my heart"; and 'He is *Brahma*,' may be explained without resort to a secondary meaning. The text quoted in favour of the *first view* denies of *Brahma* the following, that His knowing depends on the mind; and that His existence depends upon *prāṇa*.

Second Explanation. The foregoing is one mode of understanding the text; but it is open to the following objections: First, the whole of the *sūtra* stated the reason; and there was no word to indicate the subject under consideration, and it was supplied. Secondly, the word *Brahma* occurs at the beginning and end of the context. The first view took it to denote *Brahma* at the beginning, and a *jiva* at the end. But, as it is natural to presume that it denotes the same being in both places, the sub-section would be unnecessary. Thirdly, serenity of mind being attained by learning the meaning of the *veda* and dwelling on it constantly, it is unnecessary to enjoin a meditation for this purpose. Lastly, the term *śānta* in the original had to be understood as meaning desiring serenity of mind, while its natural meaning is having a serene mind. The text under consideration will therefore be explained differently.

Only one meditation is enjoined, and that in the second sentence; and the injunction is repeated (1) in the fifth sentence in order to enjoin certain particulars to be included in the meditation. The particulars are 'He can be perceived with a pure mind' and the rest stated in verse 2. Hence, the meaning is 'Meditate on *Brahma*,' the *ātmā* of all, as possessing these particulars. The doubt is whether the term *Brahma* denotes a *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. It denotes a *jīva*; for the term *Brahma* is put in apposition with the term 'all'; and it will be appropriate only in the view that reference is made to a *jīva*. The term 'all' denotes all the *jīvas* in the universe, beginning with the four-faced *Brahmā* and ending with the minutest germ; and they have attained their present conditions as the result of *karma*, of which the root is beginningless *avidyā* (2). In the case of the highest *Ātmā*, on the other hand, this cannot be the case. For, being all-knowing, He knows that these conditions are very undesirable; being omnipotent, He is capable of avoiding them; His knowledge and

(1) *The injunction is repeated.* The text 'Do the *agnihotra homa*' gives the injunction, but does not state the material for offering. This is stated in another text 'make the *homa* with curd'. This merely indicates the material, and the words 'make the *homa*' is a repetition of the first text. Similarly here.

(2) *Of which the root is beginningless avidyā.* The meaning intended to be conveyed is that *avidyā* and *karma* follow one another like the seed and tree; and that this succession has had no beginning.

power have never been limited; for He has no *karma*. Hence He cannot be all this.

2. The question is asked—Why is the term *brahma* used, if the *jīva* be intended?

Reply. The term is occasionally applied to the *jīva* also; for like the term *ātmā* it is common to both the *jīva* and *Brahma*. Hence, it is that the highest *Ātmā* is referred to with the epithet highest as in the expressions ‘The highest *Ātmā*,’ ‘the highest *Brahma*’.

3. A further question is put. The term *ātmā* has the same connotation and is therefore common to both. Is this so in regard to the term *brahma*.

Reply. The *jīva* also is great in regard to his attribute *jñānam*; and this emerges, when his *karma* goes. Here is the authority. “He becomes unlimited.” (*śvetā.*, V-9.)

4. Still another question. Being the cause of the evolution and dissolution of the universe is adduced as a reason; and what is previously well-known is so stated here; and it is *Brahma*, that is well-known as the cause; not the *jīva*.

Reply. Evolution and dissolution take place, as the *jīvas* have to be rewarded or punished according to their deserts. In their own nature they are without limitation in regard to their attribute *jñānam*, and are *brahma*; but owing to *karma* they appear in various forms—*devas*, men, beasts or vegetables.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

1. He Who is identified with all this, *i.e.*, the universe—is the highest *Ātmā*; because a well-known fact is adduced (as the reason).

Here the first word *sarvatra* in the original, meaning 'in all this,' refers not to the *upanishads* as in the first explanation, but to the universe. The term *aṣabdam, na·itara* (not the other), or *anya* (another) is brought down from the first section, and its meaning is stated. The reason assigned is that *Brahma* is the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe, and it is only what is previously known, that is stated to be the cause. If the texts be examined, it will be seen that the cause is the highest *Ātmā*, not the *jiva*. The *taittiriya bhriguvalli* begins with the sentence

"From whom these beings are born, by whom (as supporter from within) they live, when born, and returning to whom, they enter, becoming one, know Him; He is *Brahma*," and ends with these words "He learned that *Ānanda* was *Brahma*; for all these beings are born from *Ānanda* alone".

They recall the all-knowing, *ānandamaya* described in the *ānandavalli* (*vide* sub-section 6). Here is another text.

He, the world-cause, is the lord of the *jivas*; none is His maker; no one is His lord. (*śvetū.*, VI-9.)

The original has the word *karaṇādhīpa*, which means the lord of instruments—*i.e.*, *prāṇa*, mind, the five senses and the five motor organs, and such an one is clearly a *jiva*. The lord of the *jivas* is the world-cause. This may be seen in other places also. Hence the *Brahma* is the highest *Ātmā*.

2. How is the identification of *Brahma* with 'all this' to be explained?

Reply. As fully described in paras 13 to 15 of the *final decision* under *sūtra* 13 of chapter I, section 1, (pages 186 to 190), *Brahma* is the *ātmā* of 'all this,' as the *jīva* is the *ātmā* of his body. Hence the objections urged in para 1 of the *first view* fail. Nor can the explanation offered in the same para be accepted. The *jīva* in each body is different from the *jīva* in another ; how can they be identical with one another ? In regard to the freed *jīvas* too, their identity with the universe, and being the cause of the evolution of the world are impossible, as will be shown in chapter IV, section 4. Lastly, the *jīva's karma* merely accounts for the diversity observed in the world ; but it cannot be either the material or operative cause. In the term *tad-jāla-an*, which occurs in the original, and which means 'what has come forth from, what is dissolved in and what lives by it,' the term it (*tad*) refers to the term '*Brahma*,' and not to *karma*. Hence, the last explanation also fails.

This second explanation alone meets with the approval of great men. The author of the *vritti* observes *Brahma*, the *ātmā* of all, stated in the text 'All this indeed is *Brahma*,' is the all-controller.

2. विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च ।

And because the attributes mentioned in the next verse will be appropriate only in the highest *Ātmā*.

See verse 2 in *Vedic Texts*, and the notes thereunder.

The first attribute—being capable of perception with a pure mind only—shows that He is free from all

imperfections ; for only a pure being (1) can be perceived with a pure mind. Impure beings only can be perceived with impure minds. The purity of the mind should be attained by meditation on the highest *Ātmā* helped by the seven *angas*, beginning with discrimination in regard to food (the capacity to separate pure food from what is impure). The next term *prāṇa śarīra* should not be limited to one *prāṇa* ; it indicates one who supports and controls the *prāṇas* of all. Similarly all the other epithets will be found applicable to Him only. See explanation of the other terms in Vedic Texts.

3. अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शरीरः ।

The seat of the attributes cannot be an embodied being ; because they are not appropriate in him.

The *jīva* is like a glowworm ; and he is fit to experience untold suffering from the possession of a body made by past *karma*. Whether he is bound (2) or has become free, not a grain of these attributes will ever be found in him.

The first *sūtra* assigned a reason found in the text under consideration ; the second *sūtra* another reason

(1) A freed *jīva* may also be perceived by a pure mind ; but he will be perceived as controlled by, and as existing only for, *Brahma*. If he be perceived otherwise, the mind will not be pure.

(2) *Whether he is bound*. The bound *jīva* is mentioned in illustration. As the *jīva*, that is bound as punishment, cannot be identical with the Being that punishes him, so the *jīva*, that is rewarded, cannot be identical with Him, who rewards.

found in the second verse; and this was put into a negative form in the third *sūtra*. A third reason, which occurs in the last verse, is brought forward in the next *sūtra*.

4. कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च ।

And because *Brahma* and *jiva* are described as object and subject respectively.

The description is as follows :

Departing from here I shall reach Him. (verse 4.)

Here *Brahma* is the object; and the meditator is the subject; and the object reached is what is meditated on (1); hence, *Brahma* is different from the *jiva* who reaches.

5. शब्दविशेषात् ।

Because there is difference in the words used to indicate them.

In the text "This *ātmā* is present within my heart" (verse 3) the word 'my' (*me*) which indicates the *jiva* is in the possessive case, and the word *Ātmā*, which denotes *Brahma* is in the nominative case. The same difference is seen in a parallel passage from the *bṛihad-āranyaka*.

As is a grain of rice, a grain of *yava*, a *śyāmāka* seed (a kind of grain) or the same without the husk, so within

(1) *The object meditated on.* One may ask—The commencement referred to the meditator and that meditated on; and the difference between them should be stated. Of what use is the distinction drawn between the person who reaches and Him who is reached. These clauses reply.

the *ātmā* is this *Purusha* having a golden form, and resembling a fire without smoke.

Here the *jīva* is denoted by the word *ātman* in the seventh case, and *Brahma* by the word *purusha* in the nominative case.

The preceding *sūtra* and the text which it considered raise a doubt. The difference pointed out between object and subject may be explained with reference to two different conditions. To remove this doubt, this *sūtra* cites a text which refers to one and the same condition, and indicates difference between *Brahma* and the *jīva*.

6. स्मृतेश्च ।

And because *smṛiti* lends its support.

The *bhagavad-gītā* in several places similarly indicates *Brahma* and the *jīva* by words which have different case-endings. See chapter XV, verses 15 and 19, and chapter XVIII, verse 61.

Here the mention of the highest *Ātmā*'s presence within the heart of man leads to two objections, which are replied to in the next two *sūtras*.

7. अमेकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च ।

“If it be said—No, because *Brahma* is stated to dwell in a very small place and to be of very small size”—The reply is “No—because He has to be so meditated on; in Himself He is like the ether”.

The statement is made in verse 3: ‘This *ātmā* is present within my heart in a form smaller than a grain

of rice, etc.' The heart is a very small place ; and His form is smaller than a grain of rice. This description applies to a *jiva*, who is stated to be of the size of a ten-thousandth part of the tip of a hair ; but not to the highest *Ātmā*, who has no limitation in place. To this objection the second part of the *sūtra* replies. He has to be meditated on as being within the heart and as appearing in this form. His natural form is further on in the same verse stated to be larger than the earth, etc. That meditation is enjoined will be evident from a consideration of the *upanishad*. It begins with the injunction to meditate on *Brahma*, who is the *ātmā* of all objects, and who is the cause of the evolution and dissolution of all objects, and of their continued existence by entry into them as their *ātmā*. It next states that the fruit to be reached will be in accordance with the mode of meditation. It then repeats the injunction in order to enjoin certain particulars, and describes Him as the ruler of the worlds, and enumerates His attributes (verse 2). The next verse states that He is present in a small form in the meditator's heart, in order that he may meditate on Him as his *ātmā* ; and then describes the form of *Brahma* to be reached by him. The last verse directs that the meditator should meditate '*Brahma*, who is all this, out of His infinite mercy is present in my heart, in order that I may have immortal life' ; and also ' I will surely reach my goal in accordance with my meditation '. The *upanishad* closes with the assurance that there need be no doubt as to the result in the case of one who has this belief.

Hence being in a small place and being of small size is for the purpose of meditation (1).

8. संभोगप्राप्तिगति चेन्न वेदोप्यात् ।

If it be said “(By dwelling within the heart) the experiencing of pleasure and pain must result,” the reply is “no—Because there is a difference”.

The *jīva*, who dwells within the heart, suffers pleasure and pain. If it be admitted that *Brahma* also abides within it, He must suffer like the *jīva*. The second part of the *sūtra* replies. Mere dwelling within a body does not bring about this result; the true cause is bondage to *karma*; and this does not exist in *Brahma*. Here is the authority: “Of them the other does not eat (the fruit) but shines. (*munda.*, III-1-1.)

SUB-SECTION 2

9. अन्ता चराचरग्रहणात् ।

The eater (of *brāhmaṇa* and *kṣhattriya*) is the highest *Ātmā*; because these words denote (the universe consisting of) the moveable and the immoveable.

The text for consideration is:

To whom *brāhmaṇa* and *kṣhattriya* both become food, and to whom Death is a condiment, who can know how He is.

(1) From this the following rule may be deduced: When an object or being is known to be of large size, and a limiting object is stated, and a size is mentioned, the limitation is accidental; and the size without the limiting object is the natural one.

The words 'to whom' in the text indicate a connection between the Being referred to and food ; and the words 'food' and 'condiment' show that this connection is the relationship of the eater and the eaten. Hence the term 'eater' in the *sūtra*. The term used in the original is *upasechanam*; and this means what is eaten along with food, facilitating the eating by imparting a relish to the food ; and it is translated here by the word 'condiment'.

The doubt here is—Who is the eater—a *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view—He is a *jīva*. Because the mention of food and condiment calls up an eater ; and as the word 'food' cannot be taken in its primary sense here, it must mean an object of enjoyment ; one to whom an object of enjoyment appeals (1) should be a *jīva* ; and his enjoyment is the effect of past *karma*. He is subject to the bondage of *karma* and experiences its fruits, while the highest *Ātmā* is untouched by it.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*. The eater is the highest *Ātmā* ; for by the words *brāhmaṇa* and *kshattriya* reference is made to the whole of the universe ; and by the word 'food' an object of destruction

(1) *Object of enjoyment appeals*. The words *brāhmaṇa* and *kshattriya* denote *jīvas* in the embodied condition. As persons of one sex are objects of enjoyment to the other sex, they are objects of enjoyment to the Being under consideration. If the word 'food' (*odana*) be taken to mean objects of enjoyment, death must be taken to be a helper in the enjoyment.

is meant; and He who destroys the universe cannot be other than the highest *Ātmā*.

2. Here an objection is raised. The word 'food' cannot be an article of consumption in its ordinary sense; but in adopting a secondary meaning an attribute of food should be taken, which is peculiar to it (1). Being an object of destruction is common to it and to other objects.

Reply. Here reference is made not to enjoyment yielded by *karma*, but to destruction by *Vishṇu*, i.e., *Brahma*, the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe. This is evident from the mention of death as *upasechana*. As the condiment is utilized to facilitate the eating, and is itself ultimately eaten up, so death is used as an instrument in the destruction of the world of diversity, and is himself ultimately destroyed. Hence destruction of the whole

(1) *Which is peculiar to it.* Here reference is made to the rule deduced in the *pūrvā mīmāṃsā* (III-5-8). When the juices in *chamasas* have been offered in a *soma yūga*, the *adhvaryu* directs that four of them should be taken to the *sadas*, where the juice that remains is drunk. To one of the *chamasas* he refers as follows—*prodgātṛinām* (of the *udgātās*). Here the term *udgātū* denotes only one person—he who sings the second part of a *sāma mantra*; but it has a plural ending. Hence, the meaning of the term established by usage is given up, and a secondary meaning is adopted. This may be done in two ways—(i) it may be taken to denote all the helpers in the *yūga* (*ritvik*), or (ii) only the three who sing *sāma mantras*. In the former reference will be made to a feature common to the singers and others; and in the latter only to the singers; it has therefore been decided that the term should be restricted to the three singers only.

world is intended. The Being who destroys is referred to as *Vishṇu* in the same *upanishad* (*valli* 3, verse 9), and He is the highest *Ātmā*.

3. It is objected again. The second clause, being heard later than the first, is weaker, and should not alter the meaning which is adopted for the term 'food' independently. *Reply*. Here the words 'food' and 'condiment' being connected, one cannot be understood independently of the other. (*bhāva*, page 240.)

4. The opponent accepts these replies, but asks why the terms *brāhmaṇa* and *kshattriya* also should be understood in a secondary sense. The following is the reply. It is true that with the primary sense the meaning of the sentence can be made out; but there is no reason to presume that destruction is confined to these classes only. In cases where meditation is enjoined, the highest *Ātmā* may be regarded as connected with only a portion of the universe as in the texts considered in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 7; but here no meditation is enjoined, and the text merely states an existing fact. Further, the word 'whom' in the text refers to something stated elsewhere; and this will be found to be the *chāndogya* text "All these beings, my dear, have their root in *Sat*; they rest in *Sat*; they dissolve in *Sat*". (VI-8-7.)

10. प्रकरणाच्च ।

And because the context refers to *Brahma*.

The verse under consideration points out the difficulty in knowing how the highest *Ātmā* is, unless one

secures His grace ; and recalls the following verses where the same difficulty was mentioned :

“ The *Deva*, who is difficult to see, concealed from man by his *avidyā* ; who has entered into all beings ; who is present in the cavity of the heart, and stands in the *jīva* ; and who has had no beginning ” (verse 12). “ This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation, by mere hearing many times ” (verse 23).

Here the opponent comes forward and seeks to turn this argument in his own favour. Immediately after the text under consideration comes the following verse :

By those who meditate on *Brahma* and serve the five fires or recite a particular portion of the *veda*, two persons are said to be drinking *ritam* (the fruit of *karma*), remaining in this world reached by good deeds, entering the cavity of the heart, and dwelling in the excellent ether within it. They are also said to be shade and light.

This verse clearly refers to a *jīva*, as will be explained presently. As it is nearest to the text under consideration, and as the verses quoted under the preceding *sūtra* are removed from it, the continuity of the context may be taken to have been broken ; and this verse and the text form one context. Now the verse refers to the drinking of *ritam*, the fruit of *karma*, and a *jīva* is clearly indicated. But who is the other that drinks with him ? The following statements are made. The two—the *jīva* and the other—are in the heart ; they are in this world reached by good deeds. They cannot naturally apply to the highest *Ātmā*, who is omnipresent and who is not touched by *karma*. The terms *shade* and *light* will appropriately indicate the

unintelligent mind and a *jiva*. Hence the second must be either the mind or *prāṇa*. It is true that they do not drink *ritam*; but as they are the *jiva*'s instruments, they may somehow be connected with the drinking. There is an additional reason for this conclusion. The verse gives prominence to the *jiva*, which will be preserved, if the other be one of the two mentioned. This will not happen, if the other be the highest *Ātmā*. Hence, the *jiva* being the subject of this verse, along with either the mind or *prāṇa*, and the context being one, the text under consideration refers to a *jiva*; and the conclusion reached in the two preceding *sūtras* is not sound.

This view is refuted in the *sūtra*:

11. गुह्यं प्रविष्टा वात्मानो हितद्वर्शनात् ।

Those, that have entered the cavity of the heart, are surely *ātmās*; for this is so stated.

The *ātmās* are *jiva* and the highest *Ātmā*. The term 'surely' (hi) draws attention to a well-known fact. Here are some texts:

"The *Ātmā* is located in the cavity of the heart"; "Who meditates on Him as located in the heart"; "all *jivas* are cities to Him who lies in the cavity of the heart."

Presence in the heart cannot therefore pertain either to the mind or to *prāṇa*. On the other hand the context itself shows that only the *jiva* and the highest *Ātmā* are in the heart. First, as regards the *jiva*:

Who has been born with the five elements, has entered the cavity of the heart, and remains therein, and

who lives with *prāṇa*, depends upon the senses for enjoyment and eats the fruits of *karma*; of him He is the inner ruler (*kaṭha*, IV-7).

As regards the highest *Ātmā* see verse 12 quoted under the second *sūtra*. The arguments of the opponent may be answered thus: The expression 'drinking *ritam*' may be explained as in the statement 'Those that carry umbrellas go'. This does not mean that every one carries an umbrella; it means that a group of persons goes, and that the group is marked by the carrying of umbrellas. This is, however, resorting to a secondary sense. Another explanation is to regard the highest *Ātmā* as prompting the *jīva* to drink; and both will then be connected with the drinking—the *jīva* directly as drinker, and the other indirectly as prompter. It must be admitted that though the latter explanation is better than the former, as avoiding resort to a secondary meaning, there is still a departure from the natural meaning of the expression. In the case of the mind or *prāṇa*, however, the departure is much greater; for they are connected with the drinking only as instruments. When it is said 'Two have entered the house,' one thinks of two persons, and not of one person and of his walking stick. Again, mention is made of two as drinking *ritam*, and it is known that one of them is a *jīva*. In the search for the second the mind naturally turns to another of the same class; and the highest *Ātmā* belonging to the class of intelligent beings, it thinks of Him only. Here the class being known, an individual has to be found belonging to that

class, while in turning to the mind or *prāṇa* another class and another individual have to be brought up; and this requires a greater effort (1). Hence, the other is the highest *Ātmā*; the verse refers to Him; and the continuity of the context is preserved.

12. विशेषणाच्च ।

Because also (the two) are distinguished.

The *jīva* and *Brahma* alone are mentioned throughout the context thus distinguished. The one meditates and reaches the goal; the other is meditated on and is the goal reached. Three verses are quoted below:

“He, who knows *Deva*, worthy of all praise, as the inner ruler of the *jīva* and meditates on Him, will reach the final end of *samsāra*” (I-17). “We are able to meditate on Him, who gives the fruits of *yūgas*, who is the unchanging highest *Brahma*, who is the firm shore to those that wish to cross the ocean of *samsāra*, and who is reached by the worship of the *nāchiketa* fire” (III-2). “Know the *ātmā* as the owner and ruler of the chariot; the body as the chariot.” This is as to the *jīva*. “But the man who has control over *buddhi* (conviction), the charioteer, who firmly holds the mind, the reins, reaches that well-known end of the road—viz., *Vishṇu*, the highest goal” (III-3 and 9).

This is as to the highest *Ātmā*. In the very verse quoted by the opponent the *jīva* and *Brahma* are

(1) From this discussion two rules may be deduced:

- (i) When resort to a secondary sense cannot be avoided, and two ways of doing so present themselves, that should be adopted, which is suitable to the context.
- (ii) When two things are mentioned by the dual number of a word, they must be of the same class.

distinguished as shade and light. The former is shade, being ignorant; and the latter is light, being all-knowing¹ (1), (2).

SUB-SECTION 3

The text for consideration is from the *chāndogya*, and is as follows :

"This *Purusha*, who is seen in the eye, He is *ātmā*"; said he, "He is *amritam*; He is freedom from grief; He *Brahma*."

(1) Here the original raises an objection and answers it. In *valli* 1, verse 20 of the *upanishad* (see *Vedic Texts*, Introduction and the note under this verse), *Nachiketas* requested Death to teach him in regard to the destiny of a *jiva*, when he quits his body. This verse relates to the *jiva*; and hence the whole of the *upanishad* relates to him, and not to *Brahma*. The reply is that the questioner referred to the ultimate destiny of the *jiva*, as there were several opinions in the matter. The reply had therefore to describe the nature of release (*moksha*) and its means; and this necessarily included the nature of *Brahma*, and of the *jiva*, meditation on *Brahma*, and the reaching of the highest heaven. The objection therefore fails.

(2) The four *sūtras* of this sub-section are thus connected. The first mentions a reason that is found in the text under consideration. The second gives a reason available in a previous verse in the same context. The third removes a doubt raised by the verse immediately following the text. The particle 'and' is therefore not added. The last *sūtra* confirms the conclusion of the third *sūtra*.

¹ The original here describes how death came to teach *Nachiketas*; it explains the meaning of verse 20 and states the various opinions held regarding the destiny of the *jiva*. As all this is embodied in the 'Vedic Texts,' it is omitted here.

(See notes on this text in Vedic Texts.) The doubt is whether this *Purusha* is a reflection, the being controlling the organ of sight, a *jiva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. The *purusha* is a reflection; for the statement is like the statement of a well-known fact; and by the words 'is seen,' reference is made to what is actually perceived. Or he may be a *jiva*; for his presence in the body is ascertained by looking at his eye; and this also is well-known. Lastly, the *purusha* may be the *devatā* controlling the sense of sight; for this is known from the text—"He is established in this through his rays." (*bṛihad.*, vii-5-1.) The *purusha* in the eye must be one of these, as the mention as of a well-known fact applies to them appropriately. What follows—being *amritam* and the rest—must be understood in accordance with the beginning, and to be mere praise. The particle *iti* (which serves the purpose of inverted commas) recalls injunctions like the following "meditate on mind as *Brahma*," the original being *mano brahma iti upasita* (1).

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

13. अन्तर उपपत्तेः ।

The *Purusha* within (the eye) is the highest *Ātmā*; because the attributes enumerated are appropriate only in Him.

(1) *The first view* is based on the statement made in the preceding sub-section, that it is difficult to know the highest *Ātmā*. If this be so, the opponent argues, the *purusha* referred to here, as well-known, and as being actually seen, cannot be He.

Three attributes are stated in the text. Three others are described in the verses which follow: *viz.*, all good qualities come together in Him; He leads all good qualities to those that come to Him; He shines in all the worlds (verses 2 to 4). A single indication at the commencement, when opposed to many attributes stated further on, becomes weak. Hence, they cannot be treated as mere praise.

14. स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च ।

And because standing and the rest are stated.

The word *sthāna* in the original means standing, and not place, as will appear from a comparison with the wording of the last *sūtra* in this sub-section. By the word 'rest' control is meant. The statement is made in *bṛihad āraṇyaka* :

Who stands in the eye, who is within the eye, whom the eye does not know, whose body the eye is, and who rules the eye from within, this inner ruler is your immortal *Ātmā* (V-7-13).

This standing and control are the attributes of the highest *Ātmā*: and by the text under consideration He is thought of. The reference as of a well-known fact applies to Him, and He is seen by *yogis* (those who meditate on Him). Hence the statements in the text are appropriate.

15. सुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेवच ।

And for this reason alone, *viz.*, that a Being who is bliss is stated.

See the narrative in *Vedic Texts*.

At the outset in this context it was taught "Bliss is *Brahma* ; ether (*kham*) is *Brahma*". Reference is made in the text under consideration to this *Brahma*, who is infinite bliss ; and further instruction is imparted regarding the place, wherein He should be located, and the qualities, with which He should be meditated on. The word 'alone' (*eva*) shows that this reason is sufficient of itself to establish the conclusion.

Here the following objection is raised : The text under consideration is not connected with the beginning, as the teaching of *agni-vidyā* (i.e., meditation on the three fires) intervenes. This *agni-vidyā* cannot be regarded as subsidiary to *brahma-vidyā* (meditation on *Brahma*) ; for certain fruits are mentioned as flowing from the *agni-vidyā*, which cannot be included in the fruits of *brahma-vidyā*, and which on the other hand conflict with them.

Reply. Before and after the teaching of the *agni-vidyā* mention is made of *Brahma* thus : (i) "*Prāṇa* is *Brahma*" ; (ii) "He is *amritam* ; He is freedom from grief ; He is *Brahma*." Next the fires said "Thus have been taught you *our vidyā* and *ātma-vidyā* ; your teacher will teach you the path" (section 14-1). It is clear that until the very end, where the *deva*-path is taught, the teaching is incomplete (1). The intervening

(1) *The teaching is incomplete.* This needs some explanation. The fires said 'your teacher will speak to you about the path.' It should not be thought that this referred

agni-vidyā is therefore subsidiary to *brahma-vidyā*. The *upanishad* has the word (*enam*) in the sentence 'Then the *gārhapatya* fire taught him (*enam*)'; and it is used when reference is made to one already mentioned. Here *brahma-vidyā* was first taught; and then the *agni-vidyā* and to the same student, the intention clearly being that the latter *vidyā* should help the former. And it is taught only to one who has become fit for the latter. If any confirmation were needed, there is the express statement of the fires, "Thus have been taught you our *vidyā* and *ātma-vidyā*," i.e., *brahma-vidyā*. The student was very unhappy and yearned to know the means to release; the teaching of *brahma-vidyā* to him was appropriate; but why was *agni-vidyā* also taught him, unless it was to help the other? Thus it is evident that *agni-vidyā* was subsidiary to *brahma-vidyā*; oneness of teaching on a subject is not destroyed by the intervention of something subsidiary to it. Then as to the fruits that were said to flow from the *agni-vidyā*. They must be regarded as mere praise

only to the path, and that the teaching by them was otherwise complete. Their intention was this. The teacher having gone abroad without giving instruction, the student was inconsolate; and to comfort him, the fires, pleased with the service that he rendered to them, taught him only the nature of *Brahma*, and the *agni vidyā* that was to serve *brahma vidyā*. They were of opinion that only instruction by a teacher would be most serviceable, and expected that he would teach the student the attributes of *Brahma*, the place where He should be located and the path. Hence, the mention of the path by the fires should be taken to include the rest. The teacher understood them in this sense.

(*arthavāda*) (1). And they do not conflict with the goal sought. See sections 11, 12 and 13 of the *upanishad* in *Vedic Texts* and the notes thereunder. Hence the beginning of this portion of the *upanishad* is connected with the text, and the reason assigned in the *sūtra* holds.

At this stage the opponent asks "How is it known that in the sentence 'Bliss is *Brahma*; ether is *Brahma*' the highest *Ātmā* is meant?" The form of expression suggests the well-known element ether, and worldly happiness; and these, one may presume, were to be meditated on as *Brahma*. For, the form of the sentence is similar to the sentences—name is *Brahma*; mind is *Brahma*. In both, the principal object to be meditated on is first stated, and then the attribute with which it should be invested. This is confirmed by the words with which the fires close their teaching: "They told him about *prāṇa* and that ether." There is no reference here to *Brahma*. To this objection the next *sūtra* furnishes a reply :

16. अत एव च स ब्रह्म ।

And for that very reason (2) He is *Brahma*.

(1) *Mere praise* (*arthavāda*). This is based on the following rule deduced in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (IV-3-1). In the text "Whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* wood, he does not hear disagreeable statement," the fruit stated is decided to be mere praise; what has to serve a *yāga* does not need any fruit other than helping the making of the *yāga*; and a *juhū* serves *yāgas*, being the instrument with which offerings are made.

(2) The expression 'for that very reason (*ataḥ*)' refers to the words 'because a Being who is bliss is stated'

The meaning of the *sūtra* is—Because in the text ‘What is bliss, that is ether’ the term ‘bliss’ qualifies the term ‘ether,’ He who is denoted by the term ‘ether’ is the highest *Ātmā*.

Now, how is this a reply to the objection raised?

Reply. The student was disgusted with the round of births and deaths, known as *samsāra* (see the narrative in *Vedic Texts*), and was burning for release from it; and as his teacher went abroad without teaching him, the fires, full of mercy, taught him. It is clear that they did not mean that he should meditate upon *prāṇa*, worldly happiness or ether as *Brahma*. The student understood it in this way; for he replied to the fires in these words—“I know the meaning of the statement that *prāṇa* is *Brahma*; but I do not understand (what you mean by) bliss and ether.” If the view of the opponent were correct, as all the three sentences, ‘*prāṇa* is *Brahma*; bliss is *Brahma*; ether is *Brahma*’ are

occurring in the preceding *sūtra*; and the meaning is that the same words give the reason in this *sūtra* also. In the preceding *sūtra* the text was ‘Bliss is *Brahma*,’ and it was urged as the reason; and in this *sūtra* the text is ‘What is bliss, that is ether,’ and this is the reason adduced here. In both cases the reason is the same, though it is expressed differently. For an analogous case see chapter II, section 3, *sūtras* 18 and 19. In the former the words ‘from the *veda*’ express the reason; and in the latter reference is made to the same words, by the word *ataḥ*, and they give the reason; but the texts are different. The term he (*saḥ*) in the *sūtra* refers to ether (*ākāśa*); and its gender is determined by the gender of the term *ākāśa* (ether) in the closing text ‘They taught him about *prāṇa* and that ether’ (verse 5 of section 10).

exactly alike, he would not have said that he understood one sentence and not the others. What passed in his mind must be something like the following: The fires teach me that *Brahma* alone is to be meditated on; for I have heard that one who desires release should do so. I know also that the words man and *deva* denote a *jīva* dwelling in bodies connoted by them, and that similarly the term *prāṇa* may denote one who is within *prāṇa* and controls it, as the *jīva* is within a human or *deva* body and controls it. The first sentence therefore means—the controller of *prāṇa* is *Brahma*. If the other sentences were construed similarly, that is, that the controller of worldly happiness and of the element ether is *Brahma*, then no information as to what *Brahma* is would have been conveyed. On the other hand, if the terms bliss and ether should qualify one another, then the meaning would be that *Brahma*, who is bliss, is ether—*i.e.*, as unlimited as ether; and this epithet would apply to both *Brahma* and the attribute bliss. Thus the nature of *Brahma*, would be known to be indescribable bliss. His question was therefore meant to ascertain which of these alternatives was intended. The fires replied, accepting the latter alternative; and in their closing words they said that He who is *prāṇa*, as controlling it, is also indescribable bliss. Hence, the text “Bliss is *Brahma*; ether is *Brahma*” refers to *Brahma*, who is indescribable bliss; and this being the subject under consideration, the same is referred to as standing in the eye. It will be observed that the nature of the reply given by the fires negatives the presumption that the

text 'bliss is *Brahma*' means meditation on bliss as *Brahma*. For the question was what was meant by the statement 'bliss is *Brahma*'. To reply that 'bliss is ether' would not be appropriate; for this would merely be equivalent to another injunction that bliss should be meditated on as ether. This also receives confirmation from a later statement of the fires—'Thus have been taught you our *vidyā* and *ātma-vidyā*' (14-1); for this refers to what is under consideration and describes it as meditation on *Ātmā*, which meditation on bliss or ether will not be.

17. श्रुतोपनिषत्कगत्यभिधानाच्च ।

And because the path is taught, that should be meditated on by one that has heard the *upanishad*.

This is done in the last two verses of section 15 of the *upanishad*. This is described in other *upanishads* as leading to *Brahma*, and is here taught to the student, who has heard the *upanishad* and knows the nature of *Brahma*, so that he may meditate on this also. Hence, the *Purusha* in the eye is *Brahma*.

18. अनवस्थि तेरसम्भवाच्च नेतरः ।

And (the *Purusha* within the eye) is not one of the others; because it does not ever remain within the eye; and because also the qualities enumerated cannot be found in it.

First, the reflection depends upon the presence of another person before the eye; and when he departs, the reflection disappears. Next, the *jīva* remains in the

heart, from which he can control all the senses and all the organs of action ; and he does not therefore remain in the eye. Lastly, the being controlling the sense of sight may remain elsewhere and control the sense ; and he is said to do so with his rays. In none of these will the attributes mentioned, which are unconditioned, be appropriate (1).

SUB-SECTION 4

In the second *sūtra* of the preceding sub-section reference was made to another *upanishad* in support of the view that the *Purusha* within the eye is the highest *Ātmā*. That *upanishad* is now taken up for examination.

The text for consideration is section 7 of *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, chapter V. See *Vedic Texts*. One of the verses is as follows :

Who stands in earth, who is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, and who rules the earth from within, this inner ruler is your immortal *Ātmā* (verse 7).

(1) The six *sūtras* in this sub-section are thus connected : The first *sūtra* mentions a reason available in the text under consideration. The second *sūtra* removes a doubt that arises in regard to it by citing another *upanishad*. The third *sūtra* adduces another reason found in a previous text in the same context. The fourth *sūtra* decides that this text refers only to *Brahma*. The fifth *sūtra* brings up a third reason, which a later text furnishes ; and the last *sūtra* confirms the first two *sūtras* in a negative form.

There are many similar verses. Here the doubt is who is this inner ruler—is he a *jīva* or is he the highest *Ātmā*?¹

First view. He is a *jīva*; for in the closing verses this inner ruler is stated to see and to hear; seeing and hearing mean perception through the senses; and one who has to use the senses to see and hear must be a *jīva*. Even control of others depends upon the possession of the mind; for it is so observed in the world.

2. Here an objection is raised. Reference is made to a Being who is the inner ruler of all *jīvas* and of all material objects. How can he be a *jīva*? *Reply.* For the reason stated, the inner ruler being a *jīva*, and not the highest *Ātmā*, the reference to immortality, the standing in *jīvas*, and control of them should not be taken literally. It is not true that there is but one inner ruler. When it is said 'He who stands is your son; he who cooks is your son,' one understands that there are two sons. Similarly when the pronoun 'who' (*yah*) is repeated in each verse, and the being described is said to be the inner ruler, one should conclude that there are many such (*bhāva*, p. 252).

3. Another objection: Why should not seeing mean merely the perception of colour? *Reply.* The text 'There is no seer other than this,' which occurs towards the close, makes a denial, which would be inappropriate, if seeing meant merely the perception of colour in general terms; for this is found in the *jīva*.

¹ Here the original compares the *kānva* and *mādhyandina* readings. This being embodied in the 'Vedic Texts' is omitted here.

The denial should therefore be understood as referring to perception without the help of the senses. As therefore perception is through the senses only, the conclusion stated stands.

Final decision. The inner ruler is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*.

19. अन्तर्यामिधिदैवाधिलोकादिषु तद्रम्यपदेशात् ।

The *antaryāmi* (inner ruler) in the sentences containing the words *adhidaivam* and *adhilokam* is the highest *Ātmā*; because His peculiar attributes are specified.

The text under consideration occurs in the *upaniṣad* of both the *kānvas* and the *mādhyandinas*. The text as read by the former contains the word *adhidaivatam*; and the text of the latter has additional verses relating to all *lokas* (worlds), all *vedas* and all *yajnas*. By the words *adhidaivam* and *adhilokam* the *sūtra* refers to the texts as read by both (1), and affirms that the inner ruler in both the texts is one—*viz.*, the highest *Ātmā*.

That the inner ruler is one is evident from the narrative with which the text commences. See *Vedic*

(1) How can this be—when the texts differ in some respects? *Reply.* The term *adhidaivatam* occurs in the eighteenth verse preceded by the particle *iti* (equivalent to inverted commas), and covers all the verses beginning with the seventh. All these occurring in the *mādhyandina* reading also, it is concluded that both the sets of texts treat of the same Being; and the additional verses in one are supplied in the other on the rule that what is not stated in one place may be taken from another place, where it is stated.

Texts. In the question put to *Yājñavalkya* only one inner ruler is referred to: "Do you know that inner ruler, who rules from within this world, the other world and all beings," and *Yājñavalkya*'s reply is the text under consideration.

2. The *sūtra* refers to the peculiar attributes of the highest *Ātmā*. One of these is the entry by one only into all worlds, all beings, all *devas*, all *vedās* and all *yajnas*, and controlling them in every way. Another is having every object as His body, and being its *ātmā* (1). These are not possible in one other than *Brahma*, who is omnipresent and who has an unfailing will. A third attribute is being immortal; and this is as a part of His nature. When a doubt arises whether an attribute mentioned is natural or accidental, and there is no epithet to limit its application, it should be presumed

(1) This is stated in the following texts: 'He has entered into men and controls them; He is the *ātmā* of all.' 'Having created it, He entered into the very same; having entered into it, He became *sat* and *tyad*' (*āna.*, VI). *Subūla* upanishad begins with these words 'Here there was nothing whatever before. These beings are born without a root and without support. *Nūrūyaṇa* is a dweller in the highest heaven, has a shining body and is one, *i.e.*, has no equal or superior. The eye and what is to be seen are *Nūrūyaṇa*; the ear and what is to be heard are *Nūrūyaṇa*'. It then goes on thus—'He remains within (man's) body in the heart; He is unborn; one, *i.e.*, without an equal or superior; eternal. He whose body earth is, who moves about in earth. whom earth does not know; whose body water is; . . . whose body *mrityu* (subtle matter) is, who moves about in *mrityu*, whom *mrityu* does not know, He, the inner ruler of all beings, is free from *karma*; dwells in the highest heaven; has a shining body; has no equal or superior; He is *Nūrūyaṇa*.'

to be natural. If it be accidental, the cause that induced it should be known first, and while this is being looked for, the view that it is natural occurs to the mind and is at once accepted. (*bhāva*, p. 253.)

3. The arguments in the *first view* are not sound. First, the perception of the highest *Ātmā* does not depend upon the use of sense organs. It pertains to His nature; for He is all-knowing, and has an unfailing will. Here is a text, which denies that His perception is like that of the *jīva*.

Do not look upon Him as the doer of (ordinary) seeing (*bṛihad.*, V-4-2). And here is another "He sees, but has no eye; He hears, but has no ear; He goes and he takes, but has no hands or feet". (*ṣvetā.*, III-19.)

Question. The primary meaning of the words seeing and hearing is to see or hear through one or the other organ. Is it not so? *Reply.* This will not apply to the case of the highest *Ātmā*. In determining the meaning of words reference should be made to all the cases, in which they are used; and that meaning should be adopted, as the primary meaning, which applies to all the cases. Hence seeing means merely perception of colour and size. *Question again:* Wherever there is perception, there is dependence upon the senses. Is not this what we see? *Reply.* Your argument will be like this. The perception of the highest *Ātmā* depends upon the senses; for it is perception, like the perception of the *jīva*. This is, however, faulty. There is a third thing—*viz.*, bondage to *karma*, which co-exists with dependence upon the

senses in the example given, and limits perception to perceptions through the senses only ; but it is absent from *Brahma*. Hence His perception is not so limited.

4. The other argument urged in para 3 of the *first view* is also unsound. In the denial of a seer the words used are “no other than this” ; the term ‘this’ refers to the inner ruler described in the preceding verses as controlling others without being seen by them ; and the term ‘other’ (*anya*) to one who is in every way similar to Him ; and the existence of a seer of this kind is denied. It has been decided in the case of *itara* (other) that it refers to something similar to what was previously stated (*vide* Introduction, para 31-i). The term *anya* has the same meaning, and the same rule applies to it also. The usage is similar in the world also. When it is said ‘In this village *devadatta* alone is man ; no other is.’ What is denied is not that there are no men ; for this would be opposed to facts. The meaning is that there is no other similar to him in intelligence and the like. The statement ‘He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *ātmā*’ refers to the *jīva* by the term ‘your,’ and to the inner ruler as his *ātmā*. The latter is not therefore fit to be a *jīva*.

20. न च स्मातेतद्वर्माभिलाषाच्छरीरश्च ।

Neither any form of matter nor the *jīva* can be *antaryāmi* ; because attributes that can never be found in either are mentioned.

They are those stated in the first *sūtra*. The object in mentioning the material products is to show

that it is as impossible for the *jiva* to be the inner ruler, as it is for matter.

In these two *sūtras* the conclusion was established with reference to certain attributes. The next *sūtra* adduces a reason, which is by itself sufficient.

21. उभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते ।

Both (the *kānva* and the *mādhyandina*) describe Him (the inner ruler) as different from the *jiva*.

For he is controlled as much as his instruments are—*prāṇa*, the senses and the mind. The inner ruler, who controls, is other than the *jiva* that is controlled.

SUB-SECTION 5

Subject. The following texts from the *mundaka* are for consideration (1):

Next, the higher (*vidyā*), is that by which that *Akshara* (the indestructible) is vividly perceived (verse 5). That well-known Being, who cannot be seen, nor seized; who has no name and no colour; who has no eyes and ears, nor hands and feet; and who is eternal, omnipresent, and all-pervading, because of His highly subtle nature. He is

(1) The author of the *sūtras* clearly meant that both the texts should be considered together. The first word in the first *sūtra* of this sub-section means one of whom invisibility and the rest are attributes; and this is the *akshara* mentioned in the first text. The masculine gender of the word indicates the superior in the second text.

without imperfections, and the wise perceive Him to be the material cause of all that exists (verse 6).

Aksharūt parataḥ paraḥ (superior) (1) (II-1-2).

The doubt is who is the *akshara*, described as invisible in the first text, and who is the superior mentioned in the second text. Are they matter and *jīva* respectively or are they the highest *Ātmā* in both the texts?

First view. The *akshara* in the first text is matter in the subtle condition; and the superior in the second text is *jīva*. In the preceding sub-section it was decided that He who sees without being seen was the highest *Ātmā*. Here no reference is found to seeing, the peculiar attribute of an intelligent being; and the expression "Who cannot be seen" may therefore refer to matter in the subtle condition. Again, to be the object of seeing and seizing is denied of this *akshara*; and these are attributes of matter in the gross condition which we see. By these matter in the subtle condition is brought up; for it is of the same nature as the other—matter in the gross condition. The expression 'he is not *brāhmaṇa*' refers to one in a caste similar to the *brāhmaṇa*, viz., to a *kshattriya*, *vaiśya* or *sūdra*, but not to an outcaste

(1) *Aksharūt parataḥ paraḥ*. This is interpreted in two ways—(i) superior to that, which is superior to *akshara*. In this the *akshara* is matter; that which is superior to it is the *jīva*; and he who is superior to him is *Brahma*. This interpretation is that adopted in the final decision. (ii) Superior to *akshara*, which is superior. In this also, *akshara* is matter, but in the subtle condition; and it is superior to its products. The superior to *akshara* is the *jīva*. This interpretation is that adopted in the first view.

or to a beast. The expressions 'he is not a boy,' and 'he is not lean,' bring up the same individual in conditions similar to the conditions denied, but not another individual. Similarly, here certain attributes are denied of *akshara*, and we wish to know what it is; we see the attributes in matter; and this is present before the mind. The denial may therefore appropriately refer to the same matter in the subtle condition; and we conclude that *akshara* is subtle matter. To go in search of another object will need greater effort on the part of the mind, and is therefore out of the question.

Here an objection is raised. The denial of visibility carries with it the denial of the absence of intelligence; for what is without intelligence is visible. *Reply*. What is not visible is not necessarily intelligent; for the mind is invisible, and is without intelligence. Hence *akshara* is matter in the subtle condition known as *pradhānam*.

2. In the second text reference is made to the *jiva*. For the verse, of which the text is a part (II-1-2), has the term without a body; and as a body is found in a bound *jiva*, the denial of body brings up the same individual in his freed condition. And he is superior to *akshara*. The terms *aksharāt* and *parataḥ* are in the same case and are in apposition; and the meaning is that *akshara* is superior to its products. Hence the meaning of the text is superior to *akshara*, which is superior to all its products; and such a one is a *jiva*.

3. *Akshara* controlled by the *jiva* evolves as *mahat*, *aḥamkāra* and the five elements; and this is shown by the following examples.

As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread ; as plants appear on earth ; as from man, who remains a man, hair comes forth, so from *Akshara* the universe comes forth here. (I-1-8.)

The spider illustrates evolution of matter as controlled by a *jiva* ; the appearance of plants shows that it is possible for matter to evolve even without control ; and the last example proves that the mere presence of the *jiva* will suffice.

4. Hence the texts under consideration refer to subtle matter and the *jiva*.

Final decision. Both the texts refer to the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

22. अदृश्यत्वादिगुणक्रोधमोक्षैः ।

He, of whom invisibility and the rest are attributes, and the Superior is the highest *Ātmā* ; because His peculiar attributes are stated.

One of the attributes mentioned is omniscience, and this is predicated of *Akshara*. (See *Vedic Texts*.) After mentioning *akshara* in verse 6, reference is made in verse 8 to the evolution of the universe from *akshara*. This recalls the *akshara* first mentioned. This *akshara* is therefore the same. Verse 10 repeats the fact of evolution, and predicates omniscience of its cause. It must be the same *akshara*. *Akshara*, being all-knowing, cannot be *pradhānam*. No reference was made to it here ; and it is not present before the mind.

2. Here an objection is raised. In connecting *akshara* in the first text with omniscience, reliance is

placed on the mention that it is the cause of evolution, and on this being recalled by verse 10 predicating omniscience. This is the authority known as *lingam*; and by it the first text is connected with verse 10; and the *akshara* in the first text is concluded to be the highest *Ātmā*; and to differ from the *akshara* in the second text, which is *pradhānam*. Instead of doing this, both the texts should be regarded as referring to the same object on the strength of the word *akshara* occurring in both. This is the authority known as *śruti*; and *śruti* is stronger than *lingam*. In the second text *akshara* is *pradhānam* as admitted by both the sides. The *akshara* in the first text also is *pradhānam*, and to predicate omniscience of it is not appropriate. *Reply*. You rely on *śruti* alone; but on my side there is *śruti* also in addition to *lingam*. For in verse 13 of section 2 the terms *akshara* and *purusha* are placed in apposition; and this verse and the first text are connected as relating to the same object; and the *lingam* lends its support to the *śruti*.

3. *Further objection*—While the first text refers to the material cause, the verse predicating omniscience relates to the operative cause; the two causes being different, the statement that *lingam* lends support is not correct. Leaving this aside, there is *śruti* on each side; but my view is supported by the illustration of the spider. *Reply*. The illustration is as appropriate to the highest *Ātmā* invested with matter, as it is to *pradhānam*, and this must be ignored. Then each side has to rely only on *śruti*; but the *śruti* for me occurs before

your *śruti* ; for it is found in the last verse of the second section, while your *śruti* occurs in the second verse of the third section. It therefore prevails on the beginning rule (Intro., para 24). *Akshara* in the first text and *akshara*, which is put in apposition with *purusha*, being identical, and *purusha* being an intelligent person, it is appropriate that *akshara* in both places should be all-knowing. He is therefore the highest *Ātmā*.

4. The view of the opponent that the material and operative causes of evolution are different is not correct. Because they are one, it is stated at the very commencement of the context that by knowing one thing everything will be known. In the view taken here the term *akshara* and that in the fifth or ablative case in verses 8 and 10 will refer to the same cause of evolution.

5. In the second text also reference is made to the all-knowing *Akshara* by the term superior (*paraḥ*). This will be evident on a comparison of the verse in which this text occurs with the first text and the verse which immediately follows it. The term 'without body' recalls the clause 'who has no hands and feet'; the words 'inner ruler of everything without and within' recall the word 'all-pervading,' and the word *purusha* occurs in both the places. Hence the verse and the first text are connected and refer to the same object. But the all-knowing *Akshara* in the first text cannot be the *akshara* in the second ; for there is another greater than this *akshara*, which description cannot apply to the all-knowing *Akshara*. For in the verse following the

first text referring to Him it is stated "There is no other superior to Him."

6. The remark in para 2 of the *first view* that in the second text the words *akshara* and *para* are in apposition is not correct. For, a comparison being made, we should know the thing with which it is made, and a word is needed to denote that thing; and this is supplied by the term *akshara*. The *para* or greater than *akshara* is the *jiva*, and greater than he is the all-knowing *Akshara*. Hence in both the places reference is made to the highest *Ātmā* (1).

23. विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ ।

And the *akshara* cannot be the other two (matter and *jiva*); because He is distinguished from them, and His difference from them is stated.

This distinction is made by the *prakaraṇa* or context. (i) At the very commencement reference is

(1) The term *akshara* means etymologically that which pervades; and applies fully to the highest *Ātmā*. It is used with reference to *pradhānam* also on the ground that it surrounds its products on all sides. It comes from another root and means what does not change. This description is fully true of the highest *Ātmā*; and as *pradhānam* has not changed and assumed new names like its products *mahat* and *ahamkāra*, the term is loosely used with reference to it also. For the use of the same term to denote two different things, there is a precedent in the same context. The term *brahma* denotes *pradhānam*, the *veda* and the highest *Ātmā*. Though the word *akshara* applies to *pradhānam* and the highest *Ātmā*, its application is determined with reference to the attributes mentioned. In the first text the attributes of the highest *Ātmā* being found, *akshara* there is the highest *Ātmā*. It is not so in the second text, and *akshara* is therefore *pradhānam*.

made to *brahma-vidyā*, knowledge of *Brahma*, as the basis of all knowledge; for by knowing *Brahma* everything is known. This is stated. *Ṣaunaka* applied to *Angiras* for instruction on *Brahma-vidyā*, and asked "By knowing what is all this known." This question means that he desired information regarding *Brahma*. (ii) The teacher replied "Two *vidyās* should be obtained—the lower and the higher." The *upanishad* goes on to state that the lower is knowing *Brahma* from the *veda* and its adjuncts, and that the higher is loving meditation on Him (1). (iii) In the first text under consideration the nature of *Brahma*, who is the subject of both the *vidyās*, is described, referring to Him by the term *akshara*. (iv) In the verse giving the illustrations the evolution from Him of the whole universe, including the

(1) The latter is the means of reaching *Brahma*; That it is loving meditation is stated in the text 'He can be reached only by him, whom He chooses' (*munda.*, III-2-3). The means to this again is the knowledge obtained from the *veda*, helped by discrimination and six others. This is stated in a text 'Him *brāhmaṇas* wish to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yūgas*, by making gifts, by *tapas* in the form of fasting (*brihad.*, VI-4-22). This is also stated in a *smṛiti*. 'The means of reaching Him is said to be *jñānam* and *karma*; of them *jñānam* is said to be of two kinds—that coming from the *veda*, and that coming from discrimination and the rest (i.e., *yoga*)' (*vishṇu*, VI-5-60). In the *mundaka* reference is made to the lower *vidyā* in verse 5 beginning with the words 'of them the lower is *rik veda*, and ending with the word *dharma śāstra*. For the *veda* helped by its *angas*, by *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*, by *dharma śāstras* and by *mīmāṃsās* creates knowledge of *Brahma*. The higher *vidyā* is referred to in the remainder of the verse and in verse 6.

jivas, is mentioned ; for the terms *viśvam* does not refer to matter only. (v) In the next two verses the mode of evolution is described ; and omniscience and the possession of an unfrustrated will, needed for the evolution, are predicated of Him.¹ (vi) The second section of the *upanishad* begins with the statement ' That *akshara* is *satyam* '. This means that it is His nature to remain unchanged ; and this statement is made to show that He does not suffer in any way by the evolution. (vii) The direction is then given that one should do the *karmas* prescribed in the *veda* without an eye on their fruits, and from a desire to reach the all-knowing, omnipotent, unchanging *Purusha* ; the futility of *karmas* done from a desire for fruits is fully pointed out ; and those who regard such *karma* as the only thing to be striven for are condemned. (viii) In the closing verses of this section the student, who on enquiry is dissatisfied with fruit-yielding *karma*, is directed to go to a teacher, who has learned the *veda* and does meditation on *Brahma*. (ix) In the third section the evolution of the universe is explained in detail ; and certain attributes of *Brahma* not previously stated are enumerated, including His being the inner ruler of all beings, and His appearing in every form. (x) In the remaining three sections of the *upānishad* He is stated to have come down from the highest heaven to dwell in the hearts of men ; the mode of meditation on Him is explained ; and the fruit of such

¹ Here the original explains the meaning of verse 9. This, being embodied in ' Vedic Texts,' is omitted here.

meditation is shown to be release from *karma* and the enjoyment of *Brahma* in full.

By this description *Akshara* is distinguished from both matter and the *jīva*. He is also expressly stated to be different from them by the second text under consideration.

24. रूपोऽन्यानृद्धिः ।

And because a form is described of the *Akshara*.

This description is as follows :

His head is heaven ; His eyes are the sun and the moon ; His ears are the quarters ; His speech is the *vedas* ; His *prāṇa* is the air ; His heart is the universe ; His feet are the earth ; He is the inner ruler of all beings (II-1-4).

A form of this kind can belong only to the highest *Ātmā*, who is the inner ruler of all.

SUB-SECTION 6

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *chāndogya*—

Though *Ātmā vaiṣvānara* surrounds every thing and is really without limitation, yet one, who meditates on Him as thus limited by places, etc.

The doubt is whether it is possible to decide that this *ātmā vaiṣvānara* is the highest *Ātmā*, or not (1).

(1) *Question*. How can there be any doubt ? At the commencement the sentence "Who is our *Ātmā* ; what is *Brahma* " occurs. (See *Vedic Texts*.) Every term in the

First view. It is not possible to decide that the term *vaiṣvānara* means the highest *Ātmā*; for the term is used in four senses. First, it denotes the fire in man's stomach.

"This is fire *vaiṣvānara*, by which this food is cooked—the food which is eaten. This is its sound, which one closing his ear hears. When one departs from the body, this sound is not heard" (*bṛihad.*, VII-9-1). Next, it denotes the element fire—"For the benefit of the whole world, the

closing portion of the *upanishad* should be understood in accordance with the beginning. *Reply.* In the *agnirahasya*, which deals with the same subject, the term *vaiṣvānara* is put in apposition with the term *agni*, which means fire, the element fire and a *deva*. Hence the doubt.

The form of the question for consideration is unusual. In the preceding sub-sections the form was—which out of two or more things mentioned a term denoted. *Reply.* The variation is because the first *sūtra* in this sub-section uses a word which is a common term, that is a term used to denote several things.

Question. In the preceding sub-section the term *akshara* was a common word in this sense; and yet the question considered there was whether the term denoted matter or the highest *Ātmā*. Why should the alternatives for examination be stated differently here? *Reply.* In that sub-section apart from the common usage there were marks which led the opponent to think that *pradhānam* was indicated; and he put forward the *first view* accordingly. Here, however, the *first view* will be based only upon the common usage of the term *vaiṣvānara*; for in the opinion of the opponent there are no marks by which elimination may be made. *Question* again—This will mean that the word is ambiguous. Will not the *first view* thus impugn the authority of the *veda*? For it was stated in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* that it does not use ambiguous words? And this conclusion has been accepted in this

devas made the fire *vaiṣvānara* the sun, so that the day may be indicated." Next it denotes a *devatā*—"May we be in the good graces of *vaiṣvānara*; he is the king of the worlds, and is surrounded with wealth" (*yajur*, 1-5-11). Lastly, it denotes the highest *Ātmā*. "He made the offering to *agni vaiṣvānara*, who is within the body itself in the heart" (*aṣṭaka* III, *pra.* 11, *anu.* 8). "This *vaiṣvānara*, who appears in all forms, who is *prāṇa*, who is *agni*, rises" (*praṣṇa*, I-7). The marks which are found in the context may be applied to any one of them.

Final decision. *Vaiṣvānara* is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

25. वैश्वानरस्साधारणशब्दविशेषात् ।

Vaiṣvānara is the highest *Ātmā*; because the common term is particularised by attributes belonging only to Him.

See *Vedic Texts* for the narrative. Six seers discussed the question "Who is our *ātmā*? What is *Brahma*?", and being unable to arrive at a decision, they went to one *Aṣvapati*, who knew *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara* and applied for instruction. They wished to know *Brahma*, who is the inner ruler of *jīvas*; they searched for one who knew Him; and finding one who knew *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, they asked for instruction. *Vaiṣvānara* is therefore the highest *Ātmā*. The context begins with the words *ātmā* and *Brahma*; but after this the words used are *ātmā vaiṣvānara* throughout. The term

enquiry into *Brahma*. *Reply.* Though it is not possible to decide which of four things is intended, it is certain that the *veda* means some one of them, and this general assurance remains. The *pūrva mīmāṃsā* itself permits an opponent who puts forward the *first view* to express it in this form.

vaiṣvānara being used in the place of *Brahma*, it may be concluded that *vaiṣvānara* is *Brahma*. Further, the fruits of meditation on *Vaiṣvānara* are thus stated.

He who meditates on Him as thus limited by heaven and earth, eats the food that is in all worlds, in all beings, in all *ātmās* (section 18-1); and All his (meditator's) sins will be burnt up, as the cotton of the *ishika* plant thrown into the fire is burnt up (section 24-3).

These two fruits can be reaped only, if *vaiṣvānara* is *Brahma*.

26. स्मयमाणमनुमानं स्यादिति ।

This description of *Vaiṣvānara* recalls similar descriptions in other places ; and serves as a mark (to identify Him as *Brahma*).

The description referred to is this: 'Heaven is His head ; the sun is His eye ; air is His *prāṇa* ; ether is His waist ; water is His bladder ; and earth is His feet.' (See Vedic Texts, sections 12 to 17.) In *muṇḍaka* (II-1-4) a similar description is given (1), and it is well-known

(1) The *muṇḍaka* text is 'Heaven is His head ; the sun and the moon are His eyes ; the quarters are His ears ; the *vedas* are the activities of His speech ; *vāyu* is His *prāṇa* ; all the world is His heart ; the earth is His feet ; He is indeed the inner *ātmā* of all beings ' ; The *smritis* also state this—' *Brāhmaṇas* state heaven to be His head ; intermediate world to be His navel ; the sun and the moon to be His eyes ; the quarters to be His ears ; and the earth to be His feet ; know this Being, whose nature cannot be conceived, to be leader of all beings and of *prāṇa* ' ; 'Prostration before the Being, who appears in the form of the world thus—Fire is His mouth ; heaven is His head ; intermediate world is His navel ; the earth is His feet ; the sun is His eye ; and the quarters are His ears (*bhārata*).

that it applies only to the highest *Ātmā*. It may be concluded that *vaiṣvānara* is the highest *Ātmā*.

These reasons should set the matter at rest; but certain passages in the *agnirahasya*, and certain remarks in the latter portion of the *chāndogya* itself, raise a doubt, which the opponent takes hold of. He states as follows :

In the *agnirahasya* these words occur " This fire *vaiṣvānara* " (IV-25); and they are in apposition. Again, in the *chāndogya* itself *vaiṣvānara* is stated to be in the heart, mind and mouth of the meditator and to be the three fires of one who does *yāgas* (section 18-2). In the next verse he is described to be the place, on which five offerings are made with the words *prāṇa*, *vyāṇa*, and the like. Lastly, in the *agnirahasya* reference is made to the location of *vaiṣvānara* within man " Whoever thus meditates on this fire *vaiṣvānara* with a human form and placed within man " (IV-26). From these it appears that *vaiṣvānara* may also be the fire in the stomach, and it cannot be concluded that he is the highest *Ātmā* alone. The first part of the next *sūtra* states this objection :

27. शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानाच्च नेति चेन्न तथा दृष्ट्युपदेशाद-
संभवात् पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते ।

If it be contended ' No; because there are texts against this conclusion, and because *vaiṣvānara* is placed within (man) '. *Reply*. ' No. Because meditation in that form is taught; because the

attributes mentioned cannot be found (in the fire in the stomach); and because some texts describe *vaiṣvānara* as a *Purusha*.'

Vaiṣvānara, previously described as connected with the three worlds as His body, is to be meditated on as controlling the fire in the stomach; The term *agni* (fire) does not denote only the fire in the stomach; it denotes the highest *Ātmā* as controlling it from within. How is this known? *Reply*. Thus, the terms *agni* and *vaiṣvānara* are in apposition; and should indicate the same object. The latter denotes the highest *Ātmā* described as having the three worlds as His body; and the former is known to be the fire in the stomach. The term *agni* cannot therefore fit with the other word. It must therefore denote the highest *Ātmā* as controlling the fire in the stomach (1). This is confirmed by the *agnirahasya*. "This fire *vaiṣvānara*, who is a *Purusha*" (IV-25). The fire in the stomach is not a *Purusha* in itself. The term without limitation applies to the highest *Ātmā*, as shown in the *purusha sūkta* (2).

28. अतएव न देवता भूतं च ।

And for the very same reasons *vaiṣvānara* cannot be either the *devatā* or the element fire.

(1) See also *Bhagavadgītā*. Becoming *vaiṣvānara* I am in the bodies of living beings, and with *prāṇa* and *āpāna* (outward and inward breaths) digest their food of four kinds (XV-14).

(2) See the following texts—*Purusha* is a being with a thousand heads; '*Purusha* alone is all this.'

The reasons are the use of the words *ātmā*, *brahma* and *purusha*, and the mention of fruit in no way limited, and of the burning up of all sins. The reason for adding a new *sūtra* is that like the fire in the stomach the *devatā* and the element are not limited, and that to possess the three worlds as a body may be regarded as not impossible in their case. The former controls the three worlds, and the latter, being compounded with the other elements, has evolved into those worlds.

In the preceding *sūtra* but one, the expression *agni vaiṣvānara* was explained, taking the word *agni* (fire) to denote the inner ruler of fire. This mode of denotation is indirect; but *Jaimini* considers that another explanation is available by taking the word *agni* (fire) to denote the highest *Ātmā* directly. This is stated in the next *sūtra* :

29. साक्षादप्यविरोधं जैमिनिः ।

Jaimini considers that the conflict may be obviated also by understanding the term *agni* (fire) directly.

The term *vaiṣvānara* means etymologically one who leads all men; and in this sense it denotes only the highest *Ātmā*. Though it is used to denote other things also, it is restricted to Him by the attributes mentioned in the context. Similarly in regard to the term *agni*

also. The term *agni* (1) (fire) means from its etymology that which leads upwards ; and it denotes fire, because it possesses this quality. The same quality occurs fully in the highest *Ātmā*. The term being thus common, the attributes mentioned in this context will limit it to the highest *Ātmā* only.

The question arises why the highest *Ātmā*, who is unlimited, is to be meditated upon in a limited form. The next *sūtra* furnishes a reply :

30. अभिव्यक्तेरित्याश्मरथ्यः ।

For the purpose of (the meditator's) forming a vivid image. This is the view of *Āṣmarathya*.

It must be difficult for one to meditate on an unlimited Being. At the outset a mental image should be formed for meditation ; and it is for this purpose that the *upanishad* mentions the limitations.

Next, a human form made of matter with head, eyes and the rest is stated here ; but he has no such body. Why is it stated ?

(1) If the term *agni* be understood in both the ways, as denoting the inner ruler of fire, and as leading the *jivas* upwards, how is meditation to be done ? *Reply*. Meditation should be on *Vaiṣvānara* as the inner ruler of the fire in the stomach ; for this was so stated in *sūtra* 27. *Jaimini's* meaning is—where the attributes mentioned unmistakably point to the highest *Ātmā*, and when words denoting other objects by established usage have to be understood as denoting Him, their etymological meaning should be adopted. This rule is of general application ; and having to be stated somewhere, this opportunity was availed of.

31. अनुसृतेर्वादिति ।

For the purpose of meditation in this manner. So does *Būdari* think.

The text is "who meditates on this unlimited *Ātmā vaiṣvānara* thus". The term 'thus' means in the manner described and the description is of a human form. The text adds,

He (the meditator) eats the food that is in all worlds, in all beings, in all *ātmas*.

The term 'food' (*annam*) means object of enjoyment; and that which exists in all places, and which of itself is infinite bliss is *Brahma*. The object enjoyed by each bound *jīva* to the exclusion of others has to be rejected by those that desire release. Reference is not therefore made to it here.

Why again is the breast of the meditator described as the *vedi* (the place between two of the fires whereon the materials for offerings are placed), and the like?

32. सम्पत्तेरिति जैमिनिः तथाहि दर्शयति ।

For the purpose of converting the offerings to *prāṇa* into worship of *Vaiṣvānara*. So does *Jaimini* think; and this is shown by the *upanishad*.

Every *brāhmaṇa*, when he takes his meal, puts into his mouth five handfuls of cooked rice with ghee, and offers them to *prāṇa* in its five-fold activity, mentioning the names connoting each such activity. The *upanishad* directs that he should regard them as offered to *Vaiṣvānara* in the same way, as offerings are made in what is

known as *agnihotram*. In this there are three fires; the space between two of them is somewhat lower than the surrounding floor, and is known as the *vedi*. It is covered with *darbha* grass, known as *barhis*, and on this the offerings are placed as a preliminary to the offering. To make the conversion stated the meditator should regard his own breast as the *vedi*, the hair on it as the *barhis*, and his heart, mind and mouth as the three fires.

The texts referred to are as follows:

If without knowing this, one makes offerings to *prāṇa*, it would be as if one should remove the live coal from the fire and make the offering on ashes (section 24-1). Next if he thus knows it, and makes offerings, his offering will be made to all worlds, all beings, all *ātmas*. (*Ibid.*, 2.) When one thus knows it and makes offerings, all his sins are burnt up, as the cotton of the *ishika* plant thrown into the fire is burnt up. (*Ibid.*, 3.)

This is the fruit appropriate to meditation on the highest *Ātmā*; and this converts the offerings to *prāṇa* into *agni-hotram*.

33. आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन् ।

And the *upanishad* mentions *Vaiṣvānara* as described as being in the meditator's body.

This is the description: The head of this *ātma* (the meditator) is the head of *Vaiṣvānara* named *sutejas* (heaven); his eyes are *viṣvarūpa* (sun); his *prāṇa* is *prithakvartma* (air); his waist is *bahula* (ether); his bladder is *rayi* (water); and his feet are the earth. (section 18-2.) The meditator has to regard himself as *Vaiṣvānara*, the parts of his own body being the parts of

Vaiṣvānara. The offerings will then be made to *Vaiṣvānara*. This additional meditation is subsidiary to the principal meditation (1).

The second section has thus been completed. In the first three sub-sections the highest *Ātmā* is to be meditated on as being in a very small place—the cavity of the heart and the eye. In the next three sub-sections the meditation should be on *Brahma* as possessing very large dimensions. In all the six sub-sections the words *brahma*, *ātmā* and *purusha* are limited by the context to the world-cause as distinguished from matter and *jīvas*. In thus establishing the highest *Ātmā* as the world-cause, the following attributes are brought out: The coming of everything into existence, its continuance and its movements depend upon Him. He is therefore said to be everything. He is the cause of the dissolution of the universe. He is ever in the eye; and appears in every form. The world as a whole forms His body, and He is therefore called *vaiṣvānara*. (*adhi.*, 96 and 98.)

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

(1) At first meditation on *Vaiṣvānara* as having the three worlds as His body was prescribed; then the fruit in the form of reaching *Brahma* was stated; and then this meditation as *agnihotram* is enjoined. It is therefore its *anga* (subsidiary part).

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER I

SECTION 3

THE third section, consisting of ten sub-sections. is now taken up; and it will be shown that the texts, which contain distinct marks of the *jīva* or matter, refer only to the highest *Ātmā*. This will be done in seven sub-sections. The remaining three, interposed between the sixth and tenth sub-sections, incidentally discuss the fitness of the *devas* and of the *sūdra* among men for meditation on *Brahma*. Such discussion is not without its use. The contention of the athiestical *mīmāṃsakas*, that *devas* do not exist, will be refuted, and the greatness of the highest *Ātmā* will be established. In the seven sub-sections the main teaching is that the highest *Ātmā*, who supports all, requires no support for Himself; and to confirm this reference will be made to His ruling the world and to other attributes. The last sub-section is connected with the sixth, and supports the instruction conveyed therein that the highest *Ātmā* is the ruler of all.

SUB-SECTION 1

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *munḍaka* :

In whom (*Akshara*) heaven, earth and the intermediate world are woven, also the mind with all the senses (*prāṇas*), know Him alone as *Ātmā* (inner ruler of all). Leave off words relating to other things. He is the bridge to immortality (11-2-5).

Here the doubt is whether that, on which heaven, earth and other things rest, is a *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. He is a *jīva*. For in the next verse reference is made by the term *yatra* (in which) to him, who was mentioned in the text under consideration ; and he is stated to be the support of blood vessels, and to be born in many ways. Connection with blood-vessels and being born in many ways—*i.e.*, as *devas*, men, etc., are the attributes of the *jīva* alone. Even in the text under consideration he is said to be the support of the mind and of the five senses, and this is certainly an attribute of the *jīva*. When it is decided with reference to these marks that he is a *jīva*, being the support of heaven and earth and other marks should be somehow explained.

¹ 2. Here the following question is put. Was it not shown in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 7 that the highest *Ātmā* takes up bodies made of a superior substance, of His own choice, and without the compulsion of *karma*, and in section 2, sub-section 1 that He is connected with *prāṇa* and mind? *Reply.*

It was not shown in the former sub-section that the expression 'beng born in many ways' does not mean to be born as *devas*, men and the like. As regards the connection with the mind and the senses, the first impression is that they are connected as instruments; and there is nothing here to negative it.

3. Another question. The text under consideration contains three marks of the highest *Ātmā*; Why are they not taken into account? *Reply*. The text contains marks of the *jīva* and of the highest *Ātmā*; and owing to this conflict one or the other set should be explained away. This being so, reference is made for help to the verse immediately following the text; and it mentions two other marks of the *jīva*; the question should therefore be decided with reference to them.

Final decision. The support of heaven and earth is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. दृग्भावाद्यतनं स्वशब्दात् ।

The support of heaven, earth and other things is the highest *Ātmā*; because words which apply only to Him are used.

The expressions referred to are the following :

(i) *Ātmā*. This term means one who pervades; and by well-established usage it denotes one who pervades and controls. The term is not applied to ether, which pervades all space; And, there are no words to

limit its application. It therefore indicates *Brahma*, who pervades everything and controls it. (ii) *Bridge to immortality*. The word used in the original is *setu*, which means a bund placed across a stream. This is not applicable here. A secondary meaning is adopted—*viz.*, like the bund, which serves as a bridge to reach the other bank, the highest *Ātmā* carries one across the ocean of *samsāra* to immortality, which is the farther shore; or the etymological meaning may be taken, which is—one who helps another to attain a thing. In all the *vedānta* the highest *Ātmā* is stated to be the means by which immortality is reached. (*puru*). (iii). “Knowing everything and every attribute of everything.” This is stated in verse 7. All these expressions relate only to the highest *Ātmā*.

2. What are stated to be the marks of the *jīva* may be thus explained. First, to be the support of blood vessels applies to the highest *Ātmā* also through the heart. The eleventh section of *nārūyaṇam* begins with this statement “like a lotus bud slightly opened the heart hangs connected with blood-vessels,” and ends with the words “In the middle of the flame the highest *Ātmā* abides.” “Next, the *purusha sūkta* states “He is not born; yet, He is born in many forms.” (See also *Bhagavad-gītā*, quoted on page 209.) In order that *jīvas* may come to Him, He takes up bodies similar to those in which they appear, and acts as they do. Lastly, it is appropriate that one, that supports everything, should also support the mind and other instruments of the *jīva*.

The next *sūtra* adduces another reason :

2. मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशाच्च । .

And because it is stated that He is to be reached by the freed *ātman*.

The statement is made in the following verses :

When the meditator sees the brilliant maker and ruler, who is *Purusha* pre-eminently, and the world-cause, he shakes off good and evil deeds, and free from all touch of matter, attains the highest likeness to Him (III-1-3). As rivers flowing into the sea, abandon name and form and lose their individual existence, so the meditator, released from name and form, reaches the *Purusha*, greater than the great and the dweller in the highest heaven (III-2-8).

Here three things are mentioned—shaking off good and evil deeds, dissociation with matter and the abandonment of name and form. As the last item occurs during cosmic rest also, reference is made to the other two items also ; and both the verses have been quoted. As *samsāra* is association with matter and the assumption of name and form, dissociation with matter and becoming devoid of name and form constitute release. *Purusha*, the support of heaven and earth, and the goal of the freed *jīva* is the highest *Ātmā*.

Having thus proved with reference to expressions, which apply only to the highest *Ātmā*, that the text under consideration pertains to Him, the next *sūtra* establishes the same conclusion from the absence of expressions relating to the *jīva* alone :

3. नानुमानमतच्छब्दात् प्राणमृच्च ।

It is not matter, because of the absence of expressions relating to it ; nor he is who supports *prāṇa*.

There is here no question whether matter is the support of heaven and earth. The intention in making reference to it should therefore be that it should serve as an illustration. As owing to the absence of expressions relative to it, matter is not dealt with in this *upanishad*, so the *jīva* is not considered here and for the same reason.

The next *sūtra* also shows that the support of heaven and earth is not the *jīva* :

4. भेदव्यपदेशात् ।

Because He is described as different from the *jīva*.

The description occurs in this verse :

On the same tree man, immersed, grieves, bewildered with the attraction of worldly things. When he sees the other, the ruler of all, pleased with his actions and sees His greatness to be such and such, his grief passes away. (III-1-2.)

The text under consideration referred to the support of heaven and earth in these words " Know Him alone, the inner ruler of all ". By the expression 'Ruler of all' this verse recalls that Being, and referring to Him by the word 'other,' it differentiates Him from the *jīva*.

5. प्रकरणात् ।

Because the context relates only to the highest *Ātmā*.

This conclusion was reached in section 2, sub-section 5 ; but from the marks of the *jiva* stated in the *first view*, a doubt has been raised that the continuity was broken, and that a different subject is dealt with in the latter half of the *upanishad*. The object of this sub-section is merely to remove this doubt. This might have been done in the former sub-section ; but the marks of the *jiva* examined here being distinct, this is the proper place (1).

This *sūtra* does not state what it proposes to prove ; it may therefore be taken to deal with both the points—that the text contemplates the highest *Ātmā*, and not the *jiva*. This is also the purpose served by the next and last *sūtra*.

6. स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च ।

And because of dwelling and eating.

The reference is to the following verse :

“Two birds inseparable, and possessing similar qualities, cling to the same tree. Of them one eats the ripe fruit ; the other does not eat, but shines on all sides.” (III-1-1.)

The one that eats the ripe fruit is the *jiva* ; the other that does not eat, that shines on all sides, and

(1) The conclusion previously reached established the *prakaraṇa* (context) as relating to the highest *Ātmā*. The *first view* pointed out certain marks, which being *lingam*, should prevail over *prakaraṇam*. This sub-section explains the marks as applicable to the highest *Ātmā* and removes the conflict. The previous conclusion therefore stands.

merely dwells in the heart of the *jīva*, is the highest *Ātmā* (1).

SUB-SECTION 2

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *chāndogya* :

That is *bhūmā* (large), which being experienced, one does not see anything else, does not hear about anything

(1) Here a doubt may be felt. Reference being made to a *jīva* in this verse, why should he not be regarded as the subject also of the text under consideration? This verse mentions eating the ripe fruit, and that text the instruments needed therefor, *viz.*, mind and the senses. *Reply.* Though this verse mentions both the *jīva* and the highest *Ātmā*, that text refers only to the latter. For, he is Himself fit to be the support of heaven and earth; He is said to be all-knowing, the bridge to immortality, and the inner ruler of all; and His connection with the mind and senses is not inappropriate. On the other hand, the *jīva* is unfit, as he eats the fruit of *karma* and grieves, bewildered with the attraction of worldly objects. This verse, though mentioning the *jīva*, deals only with the highest *Ātmā*; its purpose being to bring out His attribute of shining on all sides and His freedom from *karma* and its effects. The mention of the *jīva*'s eating the ripe fruit serves this purpose by contrast. It is shown that the experiencing of the fruit of *karma* is the lot of the *jīva* alone, but not of the highest *Ātmā*, though He dwells within the *jīva*'s body. *Question* why should it not be the other way—*viz.*, the remark that the highest *Ātmā* does not eat is made to show that the *jīva* eats? *Reply.* It is only by what is well-known that one is helped to grasp what is not known. The highest *Ātmā* is not better known than the *jīva*; if He were, He might serve as an illustration. Nor is the knowledge of the *jīva* more useful than the knowledge of the other. Hence the verse deals with the highest *Ātmā* only.

else, does not meditate on anything else. That is a small thing (*alpa*), which being experienced, one sees another thing, hears about another thing, meditates on another thing. (VII-24-1.)

Here the term *bhūmā* is made up of the root *bahu* and the termination *iman*; and by a rule of grammar the word becomes *bhūman*, which in the nominative singular appears as *bhūmā*. It should mean a high number or largeness of size; but as it is here opposed to the word *alpam*, which connotes only size, and denotes an object, not a quality, it means a large thing. This large thing is *ātmā*; for the context begins with a request for instruction regarding *ātmā*, and closes with the words “*Ātmā* alone is all this”. Thus, *bhūmā* is a large *ātmā*. The doubt is—Who is he—a *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*?

First view. He is a *jīva*. See *Vedic Texts*. *Nārada* went to *Sanat Kumāra* and requested him to teach him about *ātmā*, so that he might end his grief arising from *samsāra*. The teacher told him that name—*i.e.*, words—was *ātmā* and asked him to meditate on it. *Nārada* was not satisfied, and enquired whether there was anything greater than name. The teacher replied that speech was greater than name, and asked him to meditate on speech. Again the question was put, and again another thing was indicated; and this colloquy went on till *prāṇa* was reached. After that there was no further question. Hence it may be concluded that the teaching came to an end here, and that *prāṇa* is the large *ātmā*.

2. Now, the term *prāṇa* denotes the *jīva* ; for he and *prāṇa*, the instrument which sustains his body, dwell in the body together and together they depart. This view is confirmed by the context. *Prāṇa* is said to be father, mother, brother, etc. ; and this shows that the word refers to an intelligent person. Next, when *prāṇa* abides in the body, even a harsh word used by a son towards his father brings on him censure as a parricide ; but when *prāṇa* leaves the body, *i.e.*, when the same person is dead, if the son throws the body into a fire and fries it well, no one blames him. Now as pain cannot be caused to the body dissociated from its *jīva*, and as the *jīva* in his own nature cannot be reached, the term *prāṇa* as used in the *upanishad* should denote a *jīva* abiding in a body, and capable of feeling pain. It does not refer here to *prāṇa*, the *jīva*'s instrument, as pain is caused to things without *prāṇa*, *i.e.*, to vegetables, when they are injured ; and those that acknowledge the authority of the *vedānta*, must admit that they too are *jīvas* in those forms.

3. This *prāṇa*, denoting the *jīva*, is the large *ātmā* ; for the question whether there was anything greater than *prāṇa*, was not put, and the reply that there was was not given. Hence, the context remains without interruption till *bhūmā*—the large *ātmā*—is reached. Hence the large *Ātmā* is a *jīva*.

4. Here the following question is put to the opponent. After referring to *prāṇa* the *upanishad* states :

As the spokes of a wheel rest on the nave, so does everything rest on this *prāṇa* (VII-15-1).

Does not this refer to the highest *Ātmā* as in other *upanishads*, and is not *prāṇa* therefore that Being?

Reply. The highest *Ātmā* is not capable of being injured; and this incapacity to be injured negatives the presumption that the highest *Ātmā* is intended by the use of the word. The illustration of the spokes and wheel applies to the *jivas* also, as they support non-intelligent material products, which serve as objects and instruments of their enjoyment. 85 64

5. Another question: The *upanishad* states that one who meditates on *prāṇa* will praise it as excelling everything; it then refers to one who meditates on *satyam*, and adds "But he praises beyond limit, who praises in regard to *satyam*." Does not this show that *satyam* is greater than *prāṇa*—i.e., the *jiva*—and is therefore the highest *Ātmā*; and that the large *ātma* is therefore that Being? *Reply.* No. The term he (*esha*) refers to the praiser of *prāṇa* and enjoins *satyam*, truth-speaking as subsidiary to his meditation on *prāṇa*. The expression is similar to "But he is the doer of *agnihotra*, who speaks truth"; and this has been decided to mean that truth-speaking is a necessary condition of *agnihotra*.

6. One more question. The *jiva*, i.e., *ātma* was said to be miserable by *Nārada* at the commencement. How can he be the large *Ātmā*, who is described by the *upanishad* (section 23) to be bliss? *Reply.* *Nārada* referred to the bound *jiva*; but the freed *jiva* is infinite bliss. There is therefore no inconsistency with the commencement.

The *upanishad* enjoins meditation on the true nature of *prāṇa* (i.e., the *jīva*), previously mentioned as receiving service from truth-speaking ; and as a means of its being attained, it refers to thinking, eagerness, the conviction that it alone should be sought and the turning away of the mind from other things. In order that it may be commenced, it points out that *prāṇa* (*jīva*), the true nature of whom should be attained, is bliss and closes with the statement that this bliss is large (i.e., unlimited). As the large *ātmā* is thus a *jīva*, the 'I' also mentioned towards the close is a *jīva* ; and he is praised in these words.

I alone am below ; I am above ; I am behind ; I am before ; I am on the right ; I am on the left ; I alone am all this (section 25-1).

Final decision. The large *ātmā* is not a *jīva*, but he is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*.

7. भूमा संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात् ।

The large (*ātmā*) is the highest *Ātmā* ; for He is stated to be greater than the *jīva*.

Satyam is said to be greater than *prāṇa* ; and *satyam* is the highest *Ātmā*. The large *ātmā*, being *satyam*, is greater than *prāṇa*, i.e., the *jīva*, and is therefore the highest *Ātmā*. Examining the context, one will see that of name, speech and the rest up to *prāṇa* each is said to be greater than the preceding one, and is therefore different from it. Similarly, *prāṇa* is mentioned

before *satyam*, and the latter is therefore greater than the former (1).

2. *Question.* How can it be decided that *satyam* is greater than *prāṇa*, when in para 5 of the *first view* it was replied that the praiser of *prāṇa* was referred to, and truth-speaking was enjoined on him as a special condition of his meditation.

Reply. In the sentence 'But he praises beyond limit, who praises in regard to *Satyam*,' the particle 'but' (tu) separates the *ativādi* (praiser beyond limit) previously mentioned from the *ativādi* of *satyam*. This is its natural import. Hence, the word 'he' does not refer to the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*. It may refer to what has been mentioned before, or to what may be stated further on; and it does not invariably point only to the former. Here it refers to the person stated in the latter half of the sentence, and is connected with the pronoun 'who'. There is a break in the context as indicated by the particle 'but'; and therefore no reference is made to the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*. There being a second *ativādi* from the context, he is greater than the first one; and as his greatness is due to the object that he meditates on, it follows that *satyam* is greater than *prāṇa*.

3. This case differs from the case of the *agnihotri* referred to in the *first view*. The *agnihotri* is like the

(1) This is stated by the author of the *vritti*: "In the expression '*bhūmā* alone' *bhūmā* is *Brahma*; for beginning with name, and going through the others, *ātmā* was reached; and after that it was taught."

ativādi; the *agnihotra* (making an offering to the *devatā agni*) is like meditation; the material offered and the *devatā* are like the object of meditation. The sentence relied on in the *first view* 'But he is *agnihotri*, who speaks truth' does not mention either the material to be offered or the *devatā*; and the word 'speaks' has not the capacity to bring them up, as the word 'offers' (*juhoti*) would do. There is therefore no second *agnihotra*, and no second *agnihotri*; and the word *agnihotra* not finding another *agnihotra*, has to refer back to the *agnihotra* already mentioned; and truth-speaking has to be regarded as an item of discipline subsidiary to it. For this reason the natural import of the particle but (*tu*) has to be ignored. It is entirely different in the case under consideration. There are two objects to be meditated on—*prāṇa* and *satyam*; two meditations, and two persons to meditate and to praise the object of meditation as excelling everything else.

4. Further objections—(i) When it is decided that the particle 'but' (*tu*) separates the meditators. the the word *satyam* will present a second object for meditation; when the word *satyam* presents a second object for meditation, the particle will separate the meditators. This is dependence upon each other. *Reply*. The word *satyam* does not depend upon the particle. It is well-known to indicate the highest *Ātmā*. " *Satyam* (unchanging), shining, and without limitations is *Brahma* " (*āna.*, I-1).

5. (ii) To be *ativādi* is peculiar to the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*, and will not suffer another *ativādi* by its side.

This is its natural import, and it may therefore neutralise the natural import of the particle 'but' (tu).

Reply. Usage has not established the praise of *prāṇa* only as the meaning of the term *ativādi*; and it is not legitimate to assume a new meaning, when the etymological meaning determined by the rules of grammar is available. See Intro., para 11. (1). The term *ativādi* connotes to praise beyond limit—i.e., to praise an object as excelling every other object. This was found in the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*, as the *jiva* denoted by the term *prāṇa* excels all those objects mentioned by the teacher to *Nārada* as objects of meditation. It is found in the fullest degree in the highest *Ātmā*, who is the highest object to be attained by man. Hence the particle 'but' (tu) and the term *ativādi* have their natural meanings as thus interpreted.

6. If *satyam* were to be meditated on, the term would be in the objective case, and not in the instrumental case. (*satyam* is in the objective case; *satyena* is here in the instrumental case). Compare the sentence in regard to the *ativādi* of *prāṇa* 'He who so thinks on *prāṇa*, so meditates on it and so realises it, becomes *ativādi*' (The term *prāṇa* is in the objective case).

Reply. The term *satyena* (instrumental case) indicates

(1) *Intro., para 11.* In the first view, it was contended that the word *prokṣhaṇī* denoted the species water. In reply it was stated that usage had not established this as the meaning of the word, and that it was not legitimate to fix a new meaning for the word, when the meaning by *yoga* was available.

how a thing is; and the meaning is 'Who is *ativādi*, being marked with *satyam* as an object of his meditation'. The case would be inappropriate only in the *first view*; and the prefix *ati* would be without meaning.

7. The refutation of the *first view* in the foregoing paragraphs is confirmed in two ways: First, when the student heard that the *ativādi* of *satyam* was *ativādi* in truth, he said "Let me, revered sir, praise beyond limit in regard to *satyam*." The teacher replied 'you must then meditate on *satyam*' (section 16). (1) Neither of them referred to *prāṇa*, which they would have done, if *prāṇa* were the *Ātmā* in quest. Secondly, at the close of the *upanishad* the sentence '*prāṇa* comes from the *Ātmā*' occurs (section 26-1), and *prāṇa* comes from *Ātmā* as all others do—name, speech and the rest. Hence, the *Ātmā*, regarding whom instruction was commenced in the first section of the *upanishad*, is other than what is denoted by the term *prāṇa*.

8. One more objection—Was not the teaching as to *ātmā* completed, when *prāṇa* was reached? For, no question was put by the student as to the existence of anything else, and no reply was given by the teacher. *Reply*. Question and answer is not the only mode of

(1) It may be attempted to explain away the teacher's reply, and to state that what he meant was—'To speak truth, *satyam* should be known.' This will be open to two objections. The words 'to speak truth' should be added in the sentence; and 'should be known' is not the natural meaning of the word used.

going from one subject to another. It will be what is called *lingam*; but here is the particle *tu*, which is *sruti*; and the origination of *prāṇa* from *Ātmā*, which is *lingam*. But why did not the student ask? Because when *prāṇa* was referred to, and one who meditates on him was praised as *ativādi*, while the same praise was not bestowed on those that were to meditate on name, speech and the rest, the student thought that here the teaching came to an end. The teacher saw his mistake and himself introduced *satyam*.

9. *Satyam* having been shown to be the highest *Ātmā*, it has to be connected with *bhūmā*, the large *ātmā*. The teacher thought that one who realised *satyam* would praise it above everything else; that realisation depended upon meditation; that the latter should be preceded by hearing and thinking; that this implied eagerness to know; that eagerness came from the conviction that *satyam* alone should be known; that this conviction should be coupled with the turning away of the mind from all other things; and that both would happen, if *satyam* was known to be bliss (sections 17 to 22). He accordingly led the student through each of these stages, and at the end stated 'What is *bhūmā*, that is bliss'. Hence *satyam* and *bhūmā* are identical.

10. The text under consideration gives a definition of *bhūmā*, the large *ātmā*.

That is *bhūmā*, which being experienced, one does not see anything else, does not hear about anything else, does not meditate on anything else.

This does not mean, as the school of *Śankara* thinks, that all other things do not exist, and that *Brahma* alone is real. The correct meaning is that all other things form a part of *Brahma*, including His attributes and the perishable and imperishable worlds which He controls. And he, who experiences *Brahma* as thus described, will find Him to be infinite bliss (1). This is stated in a verse at the end. "One who sees (*Brahma*) does not see death; nor disease; nor anything (in the world) to be disagreeable" (section 26-2).

11. How can this be? Is it not known that many things give pain, or that the pleasure derived from them is limited? *Reply*. This is so (i) to those that are under the influence of *karma*; and (ii) to those that see things as distinct from *Brahma*. The following analogies will make this clear. One suffering from bile finds milk to be bitter; when he regains health, it becomes sweet again.

(1) Two other interpretations of the text are possible. In that given above *bhūmū* is the highest *Ātmā* considered by Himself; for He is stated to be the *ātmā* of all; and the highest *Ātmā* together with the matter and *jiva* elements cannot be the *ātmā* of those elements. In this case, as these elements exist, it is not correct to say that one does not see anything else. The difficulty is got over by remembering that these elements are inseparable from Him, and that one who experiences Him necessarily experiences them also. Two other interpretations are therefore given. One does not see anything, *i.e.*, anything similar to Him; for the term *anya* (other) in the original refers to some one similar to what has been described. The other interpretation is that one who experiences Him finds him so full of bliss, that he does not see anything equal to it in this respect.

The son of a ruling prince may look upon his father's subjects in themselves with indifference or with positive distaste; but when he looks upon them as relating to his father, the feeling changes. This point is explained by what follows:

One thus seeing, thus thinking, thus meditating, finds every variety of pleasure in the *Ātmā*; and becomes his own master; the capacity to wander at will in all the worlds comes to Him. Next those that meditate differently from this are subject to another; their worlds are perishable; the capacity to wander at will in all the worlds does not come to them (25-2).

His own master—no longer subject to *karma*; subject to another—subject to *karma*. There is another verse to the same effect:

One that sees (*Brahma*) does not see death; nor disease; nor anything to be disagreeable. He sees everything; he attains everything in every way.

That *Brahma* is infinite bliss is fully dealt with in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 6. The conclusion is that *bhūmā* is *Brahma*; for *satyam* is stated to be other than *prāṇa*; and *satyam* is *Brahma*; and *prāṇa* is a *jīva*.

8. धर्मोपपत्तेश्च ।

Because also the attributes mentioned further on are appropriate only in the highest *Ātmā*.

The attributes are: (i) Immortality, which pertains to His nature and is not the gift of another (section 24); (ii) non-dependence upon anything else for support (*Ibid.*); (iii) Being the *ātmā* of everything (section 25);

and lastly, being the source from which everything beginning with the *jīva* evolves (sections 25 and 26).

What then is the meaning of the teaching "I alone am below . . . I alone am all this" (section 25). It means that in the meditation the meditator should identify himself with *Brahma*, in order that the fact that He is his inner ruler may be firmly impressed on his mind. For the term 'I' like the other terms means the inner ruler of the 'I'.

As everything is the body of the highest *Ātmā*, He is the *ātmā* of all; and He is therefore the *ātmā* of the *jīva* too. This is taught in the text beginning with the words 'next the teaching regarding meditation on (*Bhūma*) as *ātmā*,' and ending with the words 'the *Ātmā* alone is all this'. In order to explain this point, the coming forth of everything from the highest *Ātmā*, the *ātmā* of the *jīva* too, is taught—'From the *Ātmā* of him, who thus sees, who thus thinks, who thus meditates, *prāṇa* comes; from the *Ātmā* ether comes' and so on. This means that everything comes forth from the highest *Ātmā*, who abides in the meditator as his inner ruler.

SUB-SECTION 3

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, and runs as follows:

It is that well-known *akshara*, *gūrgi*, whom those knowing *Brahma* describe as neither gross nor subtle, as neither short nor long, as neither red (like fire) nor cohesive (like water), as being without shadow, etc. (V-8-7).

The doubt is whether this *akshara* is subtle matter, the *jiva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. It is subtle matter ; for in the *mundaka* text (II-1-2) the term *akshara* denotes subtle matter ; and the attributes stated in the text apply to it. Further, *Gārgi* (see *Vedic Texts*) referred to things existing at all times, and asked on what they rested. Receiving the reply that it was *ākāśa* (ether), she enquired again on what the *ākāśa* rested ; and the reply was that it was *akshara*. The element ether is the cause of all that exists at all times, and its support must be subtle matter, known as *pradhānam* or *prakṛiti*.

2. Here a question is put. In the same *mundaka* the term *akshara* occurs, and it was decided that it refers to the highest *Ātmā*. *Reply.* Subtle matter has been known from inference, while the highest *Ātmā* is known from the *veda*. Of the two authorities the former depends only on sense perception ; while the latter depends upon sense perception and upon the connection of a word with its meaning. Hence, inference brings up an object more quickly than the *veda* ; and that should be accepted. In doing so there is no conflict with anything.

Final decision. *Akshara* is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

9. अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृते : ।

Akshara is the highest *Ātmā* ; because He is said to be the support of what is the end of ether.

In the reply given to *Gārgi* the term *ākāṣa* does not mean the element ether ; for *Gārgi*'s question referred to what is above heaven, below the earth, and between them, and to what was past, what is present and what may come in the future, *i.e.*, to all products existing at all times ; and the element ether, being itself a product, could not have been meant. It must therefore refer to subtle matter, which is the end or farther limit in which evolved products will be dissolved. *Akshara* said to be the support of *ākāṣa* cannot therefore be subtle matter.

2. The view put forward in para 2 of the *first view* is not sound. The term *akshara*, being used to denote more than one object, its etymological meaning has to be taken. In understanding a word from the elements, that make it up, where is the need for sense perception ? Does it occur when the meaning of each element is ascertained, or when the meanings of all the elements being already known, their meaning as a whole is known ? In the former case, the need does exist ; but not in the latter. The word *dandi* is made up of the word *danda*, a stick, and of the termination, which means one who possesses. To know what object the word denotes, and who is its possessor sense perception may be necessary ; but when these elements of the word are known, the word conveys its meaning without any other help. An eye suffering from cataract needs a doctor to remove it ; but when this has been done, it can perceive a jar without the doctor's help. Hence testimony in general and the *veda* in particular conveys its

meaning as quickly as any other authority. If it be considered that even when the elements of a word together convey their meaning, the authority, by which the meanings of the elements were ascertained, is needed, commands like 'call the *dandi*' can never be carried out. For the person not being present, and the word *dandin* depending upon his perception to be understood, no impression will be made on the mind of the person, that receives the order. As the *veda* deals with matters not of this world, it will serve no purpose. Hence, the conclusion stated stands.

3. Again, when the etymological meaning of a word is taken, is the need for another authority felt, when the object indicated is to be known in general terms, or when a particular individual answering to the general description is to be found? In the former case the meanings of the elements suffice without extraneous help. In the latter case the marks known as *lingam*, the position by the side of other words and the context will decide who the particular individual is, and sense perception is not required.

4. Further, in cases like this, that object in which the etymological meaning is found in the highest degree is quickly brought up by a word. The term *iṣvara* means one who controls; and the exercise of control in the highest degree possible being found in the highest *Ātmā*, the word brings Him up naturally, though a number of persons exercising control in this world are found. Similarly, the word *akshara*, meaning one who does not change, brings up the highest *Ātmā*,

who does not in any way change. Subtle matter is not brought up as quickly by the word. It cannot be perceived by the senses ; it cannot be established by inference in opposition to the *veda* ; and the only authority for it is the *veda*. Hence, the statement that it is more quickly known from inference than the highest *Ātmā* from the *veda* is not made out.

Question. If *akshara* cannot be subtle matter, why should it not be the *jīva* ? The term is used to denote him also ; he can appropriately support all forms of matter, including *prakṛiti* ; and the attributes mentioned in the text apply to him. The next *sūtra* gives a reply :

10. साचप्रज्ञासनात् ।

Because this support is by command.

The *upanishad* states (verse 8) that by the command of *Akshara* the sun and the moon stand supported ; and heaven and earth ; by His command rivers flow, and time is measured as days, half-months, months, seasons and years. The term used in the original is *pra śāsana*—superior command—*i.e.*, command never frustrated and exercised over all. The power to support all things by mere command in this manner can never be found in a *jīva*.

Akshara was differentiated from subtle matter and the *jīva* in the two preceding *sūtras*. The same result

is attained in the next *sūtra* with reference to the texts at the end of the *upanishad*.

11. अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च ।

Because attributes showing that *akshara* cannot be any other thing are stated.

In the penultimate verse it is said :

Unseen He sees ; unheard He hears ; unthought of, He thinks ; unmeditated on, He meditates .

Here by the terms sees, hears and the rest *Akshara* is differentiated from unintelligent matter. The attribute of seeing everything, while He remains unseen by all others, differentiates Him from *jivas*. Hence *Akshara* is the highest *Ātmā*.

The last *sūtra* may be explained in another way also :

Because the existence of a similar being is denied.

Following the text quoted above these words occur :

There is no seer other than He ; no hearer other than He ; no thinker other than He ; no meditator other than He.

The term 'other' refers to one similar to the Being described here, *i.e.*, one who is unseen by others, who sees others and who supports all others ; and this similar being is denied. In other words as *Akshara* is unseen by others, sees others and supports all others, so there is no one, who unseen by *Akshara* sees Him and supports Him. In effect *Akshara* is differentiated from subtle matter and the *jiva*.

The *sūtra* has the particle *cha* (and), which connects the reason mentioned with other reasons stated at the same place in the *upanishad*. These reasons are (i) that all acts whether pertaining to this world or enjoined by the *veda* take place under His command ; (ii) By not knowing Him one remains in *samsāra*, and by knowing Him, he attains immortality. These are the attributes of the highest *Ātmā*, and He is therefore *Akshara*.

SUB-SECTION 4

The text for consideration in this sub-section occurs in the *praṣṇa* :

If again he meditates on the higher *Purusha* with that same syllable (known as *praṇava*), with the vowel elongated, he reaches the orb of the sun full of light. As the snake is released from its (worn-out) skin, so is he released from sins, and is carried to *Brahma-loka* with *sāma*-verses. He sees the *Purusha* who dwells in man's hearts, and who is superior to the freed *jīva*, who is again superior to the bound *jīva*.

Here the words 'meditates' and 'sees' have for their object one and the same thing ; for the seeing is the fruit of meditation ; and by the law of evolution what is meditated on is reached. In both the places the term higher *purusha* occurs and denotes the object to be one. Here the doubt is who is this *purusha* that is seen ? Is

he the four-faced creative agent (1) or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. He is the four-faced one. For three meditations with the syllable known as *praṇava* are described here: if with one *mātra*, *i.e.*, with the vowel short, the world of men is reached; if with two *mātras*, *i.e.*, with the vowel long, the intermediate world is attained; and if with three *mātras*, *i.e.*, with the vowel elongated, *brahma-loka* is reached as the fruit. This *loka* or world, coming after the intermediate world, must be the world of *Brahmā*, the four-faced one. The *puruṣa*, seen by one who goes thither, must be the lord of that world.

2. Here a question is put. The *puruṣa* is said to be superior to one who is superior to this *jīva ghaṇa*, *i.e.*, the *jīva*, who has a *karma-made* body. How can he be the four-faced one? *Reply.* The terms *jīva ghaṇāt* and *parāt* are in apposition and refer to the same person, *i.e.*, the *jīva*; and he is superior to his body and instruments. The four-faced one is superior to this *jīva*.

3. Hence, the marks of the highest *Ātmā* mentioned in the *upanishad* should be somehow explained away.

(1) The original adds the epithet *jīva samasṭi-rūpa* to the word denoting the four-faced creative agent. It means in the form of *samasṭi jīva*. At the time of creation all the *jīvas*, that were to be embodied in the evolving universe, were made to enter his body. The *jīvas* were then *samasṭi*—without name and form, as opposed to *vyasṭi jīvas*, which they subsequently became by assuming names and forms (*nyūya siddhānjanam*).

Final decision. The *purusha* is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

12. ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः ।

The object of seeing is He (1); for it is so stated.

In the second verse recited by the *upanishad* in illustration of what precedes, he who is to be reached by the meditator is described as free from the six evils, free from old age, free from death, and free from fear and as superior (verse 7). This description applies only to the highest *Ātmā*, as will be seen from a comparison with other *upanishads*.

2. The explanation in para 2 of the *first view* is not correct. Even the four-faced one is included under the term *jiva-ghana* (bound *jiva*); for he lives in a body; he was made; and the *veda* was taught to him. This implies that his attribute *jñānam* was not fully expanded. Here is the authority :

Who created *Brahmā* (in the lotus of His navel) and gave him the *veda* (with the capacity to create the world) (*ṣveta.*, VI-18).

Hence, the words *jiva ghanāt* and *parāt* are not in apposition; and the meaning is as in the translation of the text.

(1) The term 'he' in the *sūtra* indicates that in all the *sūtras* of this section this term should be added to show what is predicated. This purpose was served in the first section by the word *anya* (other) in *sūtra* 22; and in the second section by the word *brahma* in *sūtra* 16. In the fourth section the word *prājña* in *sūtra* 5 will do the same work.

3. Nor is the argument in para 1 of the *first view* tenable. When it is decided, for the reason stated in para 1 above, that the meditator sees the highest *Ātmā*, *brahma-loka* cannot be the perishable world of the four-faced one. This is confirmed by two facts: (i) the meditator is released from all sins, and travels to *brahma-loka* on the way leading through the sun. (ii) In the verse recited the place reached by him is said to be seen by the seers; they are dwellers in the highest heaven; and what is seen by them is the world of *Vishṇu* as taught in other *upanishads* "The dwellers in the highest heaven ever see that highest place of *Vishṇu*".

4. It is not true that the world of the four-faced one is next to the intermediate world; for between them there is the world of *Indra* and many others. Hence, even on the *first view*, the natural order of the worlds was departed from; and this flaw is not peculiar to the *final decision*.

5. Why then is reference made to the intermediate world? *Reply*. The fruits to be earned by the three meditators were divided into two groups; the lower group consisted of *aihikam*—fruits to be enjoyed on earth; and of *āmushmikam*—fruits to be enjoined in the intermediate and other worlds, including the world of the four-faced one. The higher group is to be enjoyed in the world of the highest *Ātmā*. Thus the term *antariksha* includes all perishable worlds other than earth.

SUB-SECTION 5

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *chāndogya*.

There is in this city of *Brahma* a dwelling place in the form of a small lotus ; The small ether within it, and what is within it—both should be sought and be meditated on (section 1. verse 1).

The doubt is whether this small ether is the element ether, a *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. It is the element ether ; for the term *ākāṣa* (ether) denotes it by well-recognised usage ; and it appears as the support of what has to be sought.

Final decision. The small ether is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

13. दहर उत्तरेभ्यः :

The small ether is the highest *Ātmā* ; for the reasons stated in the succeeding verses.

These reasons are: (i) “He is *Ātmā* ; He is free from *karma*, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst ; He has unchanging objects of desire ; His will is never frustrated.” These attributes refer to the small ether (verse 5) ; and show it to be the highest *Ātmā* ; (ii) one who meditates on the small ether is said to attain an unfrustrated will (verse 6). (iii) In verse 3 the small ether is compared with the element ether, and is said to be as large as that element is. This comparison would be inappropriate, if they were identical.

2. Here the following objections are raised : (i) The ether within the heart is compared with the same ether outside. *Reply.* The ether within the heart cannot then be the support of heaven and earth and of all other things as stated in that verse (See *Vedic Texts*). (ii) If the small ether were the highest *Ātmā*, how can an unlimited Being be compared with ether which is limited? *Reply.* The intention is merely to remove the erroneous impression, that may be left on one's mind by the statement that the highest *Ātmā* is within the heart, *viz.*, He is a minute Being. Similarly, to show that the sun does not move slowly, it is usual to say that he goes like an arrow. Nor can it be thought that the sentence means that there can be no comparison with anything else, and that the small ether is unique, as in the sentence 'the fight between *Rāma* and *Rāvaṇa* was like the fight between *Rāma* and *Rāvaṇa*'. The term 'as large as' would then be inappropriate.

3. Another objection—The first of the three reasons adduced does not hold. For the text quoted from verse 5 refers not to the small ether, but to what is within it. The small ether is the element ether, and what is within it is *ātmā*. At the commencement prominence is given to this *ātmā* by its being placed before the students as an object to be sought. In other *upanishads* it is the *ātmā*, that one is enjoined to seek ; hence what is within the small ether is *ātmā*, and it is so stated here. Another objector observes—The expression 'what is within the small ether' refers to

certain attributes of the small ether ; this small ether should be meditated on, in which case the attributes also will be included in the meditation ; but the reverse will not happen, if the attributes be meditated on, omitting the seat of the attributes. Hence the injunction is to seek the small ether only. *Reply*. Neither view is correct. Both the small ether, and what is within it should be sought and be meditated on. The meditator's body is the city of the highest *Ātmā* ; his heart is His palace ; He is the small ether ; for, the all-knowing, and omnipotent highest *Ātmā* out of love towards those that come to Him and for the purpose of helping them is present in this palace ; and He should be meditated on as being of small size ; and what is within the small ether is His noble qualities. Both He and His noble qualities are to be meditated on. To bring out this meaning clearly, the pronoun *yaḥ* (which) and the conjunction *cha* (and) should be added in the sentence, which will then be like this “ which (*yaḥ*) small ether is within it (the lotus—like dwelling place), and which (*yad*) is within it (*i.e.*, the small ether) that (*tad*) should be sought and be meditated on ”. The masculine *yaḥ* and the neuter *yad* will then correspond to the term *tad* ; this being made up of the masculine *saḥ* and the neuter *tad*. By a rule of grammar one of them will be dropped and what remains will assume the form of the neuter singular. Or, the whole is treated as one sentence, and the term *yad* stands for both the things mentioned, the small ether and what is within it.

4. How is this known—that the small ether is the highest *Ātmā*, that what is within it is His noble qualities, and that reference is made to both and meditation is enjoined? *Reply*. This will be evident from a careful examination of the first section of the *upanishad* (See *Vedic Texts*). In the third verse the small ether is said to be exceedingly large; it is referred to by the words ‘within it,’ and is said to be the support of everything. Again, referring to it by the words ‘within it,’ it is stated that the meditator will find in it every kind of enjoyment. Verse 5 states that though the small ether is within a part of the body, *viz.* the heart, it is not affected by the old age or death of the body, being as the ultimate cause of the universe extremely subtle, and that it is *satyam*—*i.e.*, unchanging. It is said to be an unchanging city, *Brahma* being the dwelling place of all the worlds. Again referring to it by the words ‘in Him’ all noble qualities are said to be contained in it. The original has the term *kāmān* (plural); but it means noble qualities; for the meditator will no longer hanker after any worldly object. The sentence under consideration then states that the small ether is *Ātmā*, and enumerates His noble qualities. The closing verse, stating the fruit of meditation, expressly mentions both the small ether and the eight qualities enumerated as included in the meditation. Hence the small ether is the highest *Ātmā*.

5. Objection again. From what has been stated it appears that the commencement of the context is

changed to suit the close ; but this is not correct ; it should be the other way. *Reply.* The commencement refers to seeking what is within the small ether ; and this is left untouched. The close refers to the small ether also ; and this is taken to have been intended at the commencement ; and this is all that is done.

6. The question is again asked—Why is so much trouble taken to explain the opening verse ? The beginning enjoins search for only what is within the small ether ; and the close enjoins search for the small ether. Why should they not be understood in this way ? *Reply.* The close mentions the fruit, repeating what has been stated already ; and as it mentions search for both, the beginning should refer to both. If the search for the small ether be not mentioned at the beginning, its repetition at the close will not be appropriate. The close cannot give an injunction as to the search for both ; for one of them has been enjoined already by the opening verse. Nor can it be regarded as repeating this injunction and as giving a new injunction for the other ; for it repeats both searches and mentions the fruit. Hence the explanation already given stands.

7. This has the support of the author of the *vākya*.

14. गतिशब्दाभ्यां तथाहि दृष्टं लिङ्गं च ।

For this reason also—the mention of going and of the word *brahma* ; for so is it seen (in other places) ; and they are (by themselves) a sufficient reason.

The mention is made thus :

As people, not knowing the gold treasure buried below, constantly go over the place and do not get at it, in the same way all these people every day go to that *brahma-loka* and do not reach Him (section 3, verse 2).

The word 'that' refers to the 'small ether'; and the daily going is in deep sleep as stated in *chāndogya* (VI-8-1), which clearly refers to the highest *Ātmā*. Similarly, it is said, "He is *Brahma-loka*, oh king" (*brihad.*, VI-4-23). It is not necessary to seek support from parallel passages. Here the reference to treasure in the illustration, and the daily going of all people to it in deep sleep as during cosmic rest to enjoy temporary respite from misery, show that the small ether must be the highest *Ātmā*. Similarly the term *brahma-loka* means *Brahma*, who is a *loka* or world; because He supports everything. See *Intro.*, para 29 (ii).

The daily going may also be taken to mean the daily going of the *jivas* over the highest *Ātmā*, who is ever present as the inner ruler. They go over Him, but do not know Him and do not reach Him. This is stated in the texts quoted in chapter I, section 2, sub-section 4. Taking this daily going with the illustration of the treasure, this reason will suffice to show the small ether to be the highest *Ātmā* (1).

(1) In this second explanation going over applies to both the illustration and to the case under consideration, which was not the case in the first; but it referred to the small ether directly; here it has to be taken that the small ether and the inner ruler are one. See also note on this text in *Vedic Texts*.

15. धृतेश्व महिम्नोऽस्यास्मिन्नुपलब्धेः ।

Because the greatness of the highest *Ātmā* consisting in the support of the worlds is seen in the 'small ether'.

The text, which shows this is :

This *Ātmā* is a protective bund, to prevent these worlds from being confounded. (section 4, verse 1.)

The reference is to the small ether ; and this is stated to be the work of the highest *Ātmā* in *bṛihad āraṇyaka* thus :

'He is the ruler of all ; He is the lord of all beings ; He is the protector of beings ; He is the protective bund, to keep these worlds from being confounded' (VI-4-22). Again, 'By the unobstructed command of *Akshara*, *Gārgi*, the sun and the moon stand supported' (*Ibid.*, V-8-8).

The small ether is therefore other than the element ether.

16. प्रसिद्धेश्व ।

And because of its being well-known to (indicate the highest *Ātmā*).

The use of the term *ākāśa* (ether) to indicate the highest *Ātmā* is well-known ; and by the side of the attributes referred to under *sūtra* 13, it must prevail over the ordinarily accepted signification to denote the element ether.

Having thus shown that the small ether cannot be the element ether, the second point is taken up, *viz.*, that the small ether is not a *jīva*.

17. इतरपरामर्शात्सइति चेन्नासम्भवात् ।

If it be contended "It is a *jiva* ; because reference is made to one other than the highest *Ātmā*," the reply is "no ; because (the attributes mentioned) are impossible in Him".

The reference is made in the following verse :

"This *jiva* rises from this body (1), reaches the highest Light, and appears in his natural form." (section 3, verse 4.)

It is argued that the verse relates to the *jiva* alone. Though the small ether was decided not to be the element ether, owing to the inapplicability of the comparison with it, and for other reasons, yet on the authority of this text, it may be taken to be the *jiva*. The term *ākāśa* (ether) may denote him, taking the etymological meaning. The first part of the *sūtra* thus states the objection, and the second part gives a reply. The reply is no. Because freedom from *karma* and the other attributes mentioned as existing in the 'small ether' cannot be found in the *jiva*.

18. उत्तराच्चेदाविभूतस्वरूपस्तु ।

If it be urged again " (They are found), because it is so taught in the later portions of the same chapter," the reply is "Reference is made to one in whom they have recently emerged".

(1) *This jiva rises*. The word 'this' refers to what has gone before ; hence in previous sentences also the *jiva* was referred to. In this text he is referred to by a word that denotes him, but not by a mark relating to him. The reference is therefore unmistakable.

In sections 7 to 12 of the same chapter of the *upanishad* the attributes referred to are taught as belonging to the *jīva* also. The conclusion in the preceding *sūtra* is therefore unsound.

These sections of the *upanishad* deal with the *jīva* alone. *Indra* had heard the following statement as having been made by *Prajāpati* (the four-faced being):

The *ātmā*, who is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst, who has unchanging objects of desire, and whose will is never frustrated, should be sought and should be meditated on. He who knows him and meditates on him, attains all the worlds and all objects of desire (section 7, verse 1).

He approached *Prajāpati* in order to know the nature of the *ātmā*, who has to be sought. *Prajāpati* wished to examine whether the applicant was fit to receive instruction, and successively described an embodied *jīva* in the condition of waking, of dream, and of deep sleep. *Indra* saw nothing to give him enjoyment in these conditions, and approached *Prajāpati* again and again. Having thus tested him and found him qualified to be taught the nature of a pure *jīva*, *Prajāpati* taught him as follows:

The body alone is perishable; it is surrounded by death. It is supported by this *ātmā*, who does not die, and who has no body. One, who is in a body, is caught by welcome and unwelcome things; from one in a body welcome and unwelcome things do not depart; and one who is without a body they do not touch (section 12, verse 1).

The teacher thus showed that the body is supported, and the *ātmā* supports; that when the *ātmā* is divorced from the body and remains in his own nature, he is

immortal ; that when he is connected with a *karma*-made body, his lot is to experience pleasure and pain in accordance with his *karma* ; and that when he is released from it, he is without this undesirable result. He then taught him the nature of the *jiva*, as separated from the body in these words :

In the very same way, this *jiva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light, and appears in his natural form (*Ibid.*, verse 2).

He next observed that the highest Light to be reached is the best of *purushas* ; that the *jiva*, the obscuration of whose nature has come to an end, and who has reached the highest Light, has such enjoyment as he desires in the world of *Brahma* ; and that he no longer thinks of the *karma*-made body, that was inseparable from pleasure and pain and such undesirable things ; that as a horse is yoked to a carriage, the *jiva* of this very nature is yoked in the state of bondage to a *karma*-made body (verse 3) ; that the eye and other senses are his instruments for perception ; forms and the like are the objects perceived ; and the *jiva* is a perceiver ; that he is therefore other than the body and the senses ; and that when he shakes off the body and senses brought about by *karma*, he has every enjoyment with the help of *jñānam*, his natural attribute (verses 4 and 5). He closed with the remark that wise men know the *jiva* to be of this nature ; and that one, who meditates on the *ātmā* of this nature, attains all worlds and all enjoyments—i.e., enjoyment of *Brahma* (verse 6). Hence he, who was stated to be known as possessing the eight

qualities beginning with freedom from *karma*, is a *jiva* alone. This being so, these qualities may be found in him; and as he is referred to in the remainder of the *upanishad*, the small ether is he alone.

The second portion of the *sūtra* replies to this objection. These attributes in the condition of bondage are prevented by *karma* from appearing; when this bondage of *karma* is broken, and the body is cast aside and the highest Light is reached, they emerge. Such a person is referred to in the teaching of *Prajāpat*. Here, however, reference is made to a Being, in whom they never at any time ceased to appear. Further, there are other attributes of the 'small ether,' which a *jiva* can never possess, even when his nature emerges. These are (i) protecting the worlds like a bund, and (ii) the controlling of *jivas* and matter. This latter point follows from the etymological explanation of the term *satya* (VIII-3-5).

Why then is the *jiva* referred to in this context?

19. अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः ।

And the mention is for another purpose.

This purpose is to add to the attributes of the 'small ether' already taught here one more, *viz.*, to enable the freed *jiva* to attain his true nature on reaching Him. The true nature of the *jiva* is explained further on in sections 7 to 12 of the chapter. He has to meditate that he will enjoy the highest *Ātmā*, the seat of endless noble qualities, being himself the seat of noble

qualities. He should therefore know his true nature, and the latter half of the chapter gives this information. Hence it is subsidiary to the former half, and the fruits stated in it are a repetition of the fruits of the former half.

In these three *sūtras* a reason found towards the close of the context was urged by the opponent. In the next *sūtra* he puts forward a reason found at the commencement.

20. अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् ।

If it be contended "a place of small dimension is mentioned," the reply is "this (objection) was met already".

The 'ether' under consideration is expressly stated to be of small dimension; and residence in it is appropriate to the *jīva* alone, who is of minute size (1), but not to the infinite highest *Ātmā*. The latter half of the *sūtra* states that this objection was raised in the first sub-section of section 2 of this chapter, and that the reply was given that 'the highest *Ātmā* has to be so meditated on' (2).

(1) *Who is of minute size.* This is what is meant by the term in the original *ūrāgropamitasya*—which means 'who is compared to the pointed end of an *ūrū* or goad'.

(2) The reason for raising this question again is that there is a further doubt. In the other place the mention of a place of small dimension was not at the beginning of the context; while being the inner *ruler* of all was stated in the opening verse, and being of large size at the close. In accordance with these the mention of small size was

Sūtras 21 and 22 are treated by some as forming a separate sub-section, and as proving that the shining object described in the *munḍaka* text (II-2-11) is the highest *Ātmā*. This is unsound. It has been shown in section 2, sub-section 5 and section 3, sub-section 1, that the whole of that *upanishad* deals with Him. The *first view* put forward by them does not arise, as *Brahma* has been shown to be limitless fire in section 1, sub-section 10. Further, the interpretation of the *sūtras* is opposed to their wording.

SUB-SECTION 6

The texts for consideration in this sub-section are from the *kāṭhavalī* :

Purusha, the controller of the past and the future dwells in the middle of the meditator's body, in a form of the size of the thumb. Hence He does not shrink (from the faults of the body) (IV-12.). The *Purusha*, the controller of the past and the future, and of the size of the thumb, is like a fire without smoke. He alone is what exists to-day; He alone is what will exist to-morrow (IV-13.). The *Purusha*, the inner ruler of men, is ever seated in the heart in a form of the size of the thumb. Separate Him in thought from His body (the *jīva*) like an *ishika* from a bush. Do this with perfected knowledge. Know him to be bright and immortal (VI-17.).

convey the intention. The *smṛiti* is cited to make this clear. The verse is 'Resting on this wisdom, they have reached My likeness. They do not become the objects of either creation or destruction'. (*Bhagavad-gītā*, XIV-2.)

Here the doubt is who is this *purusha* of the size of the thumb? Is he a *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*? It arises from the inapplicability of the expression 'of the size of the thumb' to the highest *Ātmā*, and of the expression 'controller of the past and the future' to the *jīva*.

First view. He is a *jīva*; for in another place reference is made to the same size as regards him.

The lord of *prāṇa*, goes about bound by the strings of *karma*, he who is of the size of the thumb, bright as the sun, full of resolutions and of the notion that he is the body (*śvetā.*, V-8).

As regards the highest *Ātmā* there is no similar mention anywhere even for the purpose of meditation (1). Hence, it should be decided that the text refers to the *jīva*; and the control mentioned in it should be limited to his body and its instruments, and to objects and instruments of his enjoyment.

Final decision. The texts refer to the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

23. शब्दादेव प्रमितः ।

The *purusha* of the size of the thumb is the highest *Ātmā*; from the mere mention of the word.

The word is controller. The control of what was and of what will be, *i.e.*, control of all, is not possible to a *jīva* bound by *karma*.

(1) The statement made above is not correct. In the *taittirīya* and *śvetāśvatara* the highest *Ātmā* is described as of the size of the thumb; but the statement made is accepted, and the question is discussed.

2. The following objection may be raised. The reference to the size is what is known as *lingam* ; and the expression 'controller of the past and the future' is also *lingam* ; but it occurs later on and cannot prevail over the other *lingam*, which is first heard. *Reply*. The size is capable of being explained with reference to the place where the *jiva* abides ; but the other expression cannot be so explained. Hence, it is stronger and prevails.

Why is the highest *Ātmā* said to be of the size of the thumb ?

24. हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ।

Because He is present in the heart ; and the mention of the size is with reference thereto. He remains in men's heart ; because men are competent to meditate on Him.

He dwells in the heart of man, in order that he may meditate on Him ; and man's heart is of the size of the thumb. Hence the form of the highest *Ātmā* is of the same size. The opponent must admit that for the same reason the *jiva* also is of this size ; for by nature he is *anu*, an atom. In regard to the inapplicability of the size both the *jiva* and the highest *Ātmā* are in the same boat ; but the control is full in the case of the latter, but not of the former.

SUB-SECTION 7

Here the question whether man alone is competent to meditate on the highest *Ātmā*, and whether *devas* are

excluded is taken up and discussed. The discussion on sub-section 6 will be continued after the ninth sub-section.

25. तदुपयेपि वादरायणस्सम्मवात् ।

That (meditation) is possible also (to beings) above man. So does *Bādarāyaṇa* think ; Because they are both capable and likely to desire release.

The *first view* is put forward by the *mīmāṃsaka*. *Devas* are not competent ; they have no bodies, and there is no authority for holding that they have. It cannot be contended that the *vedānta* proves this fact ; for testimony possesses authority, only as it directs the doing of what is desirable, or as it prohibits the doing of what is undesirable ; and the earlier portion of the *veda* possesses authority of this kind. In sub-section 4 of chapter I, section 1, it was decided after much discussion that the *vedānta* is authority in regard to the highest *Ātmā*, as being the highest among what man desires. The possession of bodies by *devas* does not come under either description ; and neither the earlier nor the later portion of the *veda* can be cited in evidence.

2. The earlier portion consists of *mantras*, *arthavādas* and injunctions ; but the two former serve the last, one pointing out how the *karma* enjoined should be done, and the other praising the *karma*, so that one may take it up with zest. The efficacy of both is thus expended.

3. *Question*. Are not injunctions the authority needed ? for they state the *devatās* and the materials to be offered to them. As the *karma* disappears as it is done, one

must look to the *devatās* to yield the fruits of *karma*. It must therefore be presumed that they possess bodies, that they receive the offerings, that they eat them, that they are satisfied and that they are pleased with their worshipper. *Reply*. This presumption is, however, erroneous. When a person makes gifts or undergoes severe discipline (*tapas*), there is no *devatā* to be pleased ; and what is known as *apūrva* must be assumed to be originated, and to subsist till the fruits aimed at by the gifts or discipline are yielded. This being so, similar *apūrva* may be presumed in the case of other *karmas* also. The injunctions need only the name of the *devatā*, to whom offerings should be made, and they mention them ; but state nothing other than this.

4. This view is strengthened by the fact that the *devatās* are themselves products of evolution ; that it may not be possible for them to reward their worshippers within this world-age for all their *karmas* ; that they may not reappear at the beginning of the next world-age ; and that some *karmas* may fail to yield fruits.

5. Here the *vedāntin* observes—It is the highest *Ātmā*, appearing in the form of the *devatās*, that is worshipped by *karma* and yields fruits, and that He endures, as also His power to reward. *Reply*. Do you know what is known as the *pratimā-pratimeya* rule. When one worships an image and makes offerings to it, a *devatā* is pleased. Similarly, when *devatās* are worshipped and offerings are made to them, the highest *Ātmā* is pleased. Hence, in doing the *karma* enjoined one should know only who the *devatā* is in each case, as

one. Turning to the portions of the *vedānta* dealing with meditation, one will observe in the latter half of chapter VIII of the *chāndogya* that *Indra* among the *devas* and *Virochana* among the *asuras* went to *Prajāpati* with fuel in their hands; and lived by his side a life of discipline for thirty-two years, and that then *Prajāpati* spoke to them.

2. In the earlier portion of the *veda* also there is ample evidence. The following statements are made: “*Purandara* has *vajra* in his hand”; ‘with this *Indra* raised the *vajra*’; and they do not conflict with any authority, and should be accepted as correct statements of facts. It is not possible to explain them away on the plea that the texts, being subsidiary to injunctions, have merely to praise or to show what has to be done, and that therefore it was not the intention to state what appears on the surface. For the statements are needed for praise. Without making similar statements there can be no praise; for praise is a recitation of one’s qualities of body or mind; and if there be no qualities, there will be no praise. *Opponent*. One may be induced to act by stating a quality, which does not exist. *Reply*. The same argument applies also to injunctions; one may be made to do a *karma*, though it does not lead to any desirable result. *Opponent*. Injunction—texts, not having been made by any one, are perfect, and they are authority for what they state. *Reply*. We give the same answer. The *arthavāda* texts were not made by anyone, and they do not describe any *deva* as what he is not.

some future time, and he should therefore think of the *devatā* to help him.

6. *Objection*—When one tills a field for raising crops, the plants intervene between the tilling and the reaping of the crops; similarly *karma* may yield its fruit through an intermediary in the form of a non-intelligent *apūrva*, which comes into existence, when the *karma* is done, and subsists till the fruit is attained. *Reply*. This assumption is unnecessary. For here is a text.

Vāyu is indeed a quickly-acting *devatā*; he (the worshipper) approaches *vāyu* alone with his own offering; *Vāyu* causes wealth to come to him.

This shows that a *devatā*, worshipped with an offering, bestows a fruit; his power suitable for this purpose, which appears in the *arthavāda*, is required; and it fits in with the injunction text, with which the *arthavāda* is connected. To abandon what is stated and to assume what is not stated, like the *apūrva*, is not legitimate. By considering the whole of a text, all that is required by the injunction is known from the text itself. Hence there is no need to assume an *apūrva* as some persons do. It is not known when the meanings of words are ascertained; and it need not therefore be taken as others do to be denoted by the termination conveying the injunction.

7. Where it does not appear from a sentence following an injunction-text that a *devatā* is pleased, it may be presumed, from the word formed from the root *yaj*, that the worship of a *devatā* is the principal part of the

karma; for *Pāṇini*, the grammarian, states the meaning of the root to be to worship a *devatā*. As the root supplies what is needed by the injunction, his statement may be accepted as authority, and as being based on a previously existing *mantra* or *arthaśāda*.

8. The possession of bodies and senses by *devas* is proved also by *smṛitis*, *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*, which are based on *vedic* texts scattered throughout the *veda*. They describe very clearly their natures, the places where they live, their occupations and their enjoyments.

9. The need for assuming *apūrva* even in some cases stated in para 3 of the *first view* is denied. In the case of gifts and of leading a life of discipline there is the highest *Ātmā* to be pleased by them; and there are also *devatās*, who are pleased as stated in this text.

He gives cloth; the *devatā* concerned with the gift of cloth is all *devatās*; for all *devatās* are satisfied.

10. If the highest *Ātmā* is to be satisfied with all *karmas*, the satisfaction of *devatās* will not become superfluous. The *miṃāmsaka*'s precedent to assume a principal *apūrva* and subordinate *apūrvas* to serve it is followed. A principal *karma* is helped by many subordinate *karmas*, some done before, and the others after, the principal one; and as they cannot be done at the same time, it is assumed that each subordinate *karma* produces its own *apūrva* and that all these *apūrvas* bring about the *apūrva*, which yields the fruit. Similarly, each *karma* satisfies a *devatā*, and all the *devatās* so satisfied satisfy the highest *Ātmā* and make him well disposed towards the worshipper.

11. Hence, as *devas* have bodies, they have the capacity to meditate.

26. विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन्नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात् ।

If it be said "this view will conflict with *karma*," the reply is—"No, because it is seen that many (bodies) may be taken up."

If it be admitted that *devas* have bodies, it must also be conceded on the strength of the *arthavādas* that the *devatās* are invited to come and attend the performance of *karma*, and that they do come, and receive their offerings. Now, when many men perform *karma* at the same time, how can the same *devatā*, *Indra* for instance, go to them all? To this objection the reply is that they may take up as many bodies as may be needed; and that such a thing is possible has been seen in the case of *Saubhari*, who took up at one and the same time as many bodies as he had wives.

27. शब्द इति चेन्नातःप्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।

If it be said "this will conflict with words," the reply is—"No; because from them (beings) proceed as stated in the *veda* and *smritis*."

The reply given leads to a further difficulty. For if *devatās* had bodies, as they are made of parts, they must be perishable. Hence, as in the case of particular individuals like *devadatta*, there was no *Indra* before he was born and there will be no *Indra* after he dies. The word *indra* occurring in the *veda* will either have no meaning owing to the non-existence of an object connected with it, or it must cease to be pronounced. In

the performance of *karma Indra* will have to be invoked, and owing to his disappearance, the word will cease to have a meaning, or it will have to be dropped as being useless. In either case the *veda* being thus subject to change, its claim to be eternal and authoritative must be denied. To this objection the second part of the *sūtra* replies. The term *indra* used in the *veda* does not denote a particular individual like *devadatta*. It is a common name like the word *go*, and indicates one of a class, possessing specified attributes and performing certain definite functions. When one *indra* disappears, the four-faced *Brahmā* considers what the word *indra* meant, and creates another *indra* possessing the same attributes to exercise the same functions. This is analogous to what a potter does. He considers what the word 'jar' denoted, and makes another jar of the same form and size. That such is the case may be seen from the *veda* and *smṛitis*.

With the *veda Prajūpati* made diverse forms—intelligent and non-intelligent.

Similarly, "He uttered the word *bhūh*; he created the earth; he uttered the word *bhuvah*; he created the intermediate world"; and so on. This means that he uttered the word, that denoted an object; he thought of its form, and created the object in that form. The same thing is stated by *smṛitis* also—"At the beginning *svayambhū* (one that exists of himself) gave this noble word forming the *veda*, which has no beginning or end, and from which all creation proceeded (*manu*, I—21); "In the beginning he made from the words of

the *veda* alone the names of all, their actions, and their forms, each having his own name, action and form." "At the beginning he made the names and forms of beings beginning with the *devas*, and determined what work each class should do; this was done with *vedic* texts alone" (*vishṇu*, I-5-63).

28. अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ।

And for the very same reason the eternity (of the *veda*).

Vasishta and other seers are said to have made this or that text of the *veda*. How can this statement be reconciled with the other statement that the *veda* was not made, and that it is eternal? The *sūtra* states that taking the same view they may be reconciled. Thus *Vasishta* is an officer in the economy of nature, his business being to go into meditation and to perceive the texts of the *veda*, as they were known before, *i.e.*, what were the sounds that made up a text, their order and the accents with which they were pronounced. On this work the four-faced *Brahmā* employed other seers also, endowing them with the necessary capacity. Because the texts were only reproduced, the *veda* is said to be eternal; and because they were seen by this or that seer, they are said to have been made by them. There is thus no real inconsistency.

Here arises a further question. The explanation given was that the four-faced *Brahmā* created *indras* and *vasishtas* with the help of the *veda*. There is a period of cosmic rest, in which ether a product of

ahankāra, disappears along with words, and in which the four-faced one who creates also disappears. How can there be creation by *Brahmā* with the help of the *veda* after the close of the cosmic rest ; and how can the *veda*, which has ceased to exist, be said to be eternal? Hence one, who holds the view that the *veda* is eternal, should admit that the universe is beginningless like a stream, *i.e.*, that there is a succession of universes, one following another without a beginning. The next *sūtra* replies :

29. नमाननामरूपत्वाच्चवृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात् स्मृतेश्च ।

Because the names and forms of the preceding evolution are reproduced, there is no difficulty, even when evolution is repeated. And this is known from the *veda* and *smṛitis*.

The highest *Ātmā* recalls to His mind the universe as it existed before ; He wills to become many, and causes the evolution to proceed down to the appearance of the four-faced *Brahmā*. He makes him learn the *veda* exactly as it was recited in the previous evolution, and directs him to create the world as it was before. He himself remains as his inner ruler and helps him to carry out the order. The impression left on one's mind by the recitation of the *veda* in the previous world-age enables him with the help of *tapas* (life of discipline) and meditation to recall the *veda* exactly as it was known by him. This is the eternity of the *veda*. This is what men do ; but the highest *Ātmā* does not depend upon the impression.

The *vedic* text is "Who formerly made *Brahmā*, and who gave him the *vedas* (*ṣveta.*, VI-18). The *smṛiti* texts are: 'This was in the condition of *tamas* (subtle matter). . . . He considered; and in order to create diverse products from His own body, He created first the materials for making the egg-shaped universe, and gave them the capacity for its formation. They became a golden egg, with the brilliance of the sun; in this *Brahmā*, the grand-father of all the worlds, came forth of himself (*manu*, I-5, 8 and 9). The following verses are from the *purāṇas*: 'In the *navel* of the *Deva*, who slept in it, a lotus appeared; in that lotus *Brahmā*, the great being, who knew the *veda* and its *angas* thoroughly, was born; To him the *Deva* said 'Create beings, Oh, wise one'; '*Nārāyaṇa* is a great *deva*; from Him was born the four-faced being'; Stating 'I will describe the first creation,' a *purāṇa* states 'I created water, which is *nāra* (made by *nara*, the imperishable), and remained within it; hence My name has become *Nārāyaṇa*. In every *kalpa* (world-age) I sleep in it; in the *navel* of myself, who thus sleeps, a lotus again appeared as before; Oh *Devi*! in the lotus, which appeared in My navel, the four-faced one was born; I told him 'create the beings, wise one'.

SUB-SECTION 8

In the preceding sub-section it was decided that *devas* in general are fit for *brahma-vidyā* in general. In this sub-section the fitness of particular *devas* for

particular *vidyās* is considered. The *vidyā* known as *madhu-vidyā* is taken from the *chāndogya*, chapter III, sections 1 to 11; but from the expression 'in *vidyās* beginning with *madhu*' used in *sūtra* 30 it appears that the conclusion should apply to other similar *vidyās* also.

See *Vedic Texts*. The sun is to be meditated on as honey: it is made from the *karmas* enjoined in the four *vedas* and secret doctrines; it is carried by the sun's rays and is lodged in cells on the four sides and on the top of his orb: the honey-comb is the intermediate world hanging from the cross-beam of heaven. The group of *devas* known as *vasus* lives on the honey on the east, and four other groups live on the honey lodged on the other sides and on the top. By this meditation a person gets into one of these groups, enjoys its honey and has supremacy in the group, and his will is never frustrated (sec. 6-3 and 4). Here, in addition to meditation on the sun and on the five-fold honey, one has to meditate also on the *vasus* as enjoying the honey; for he has to become a *vasu* himself, and the rule is—what one meditates on, that he becomes. The doubt is whether it is competent to a *deva*, who is already one of the *vasus*, to take up this form of *vidyā*.

First view. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

30. मध्वादिष्वनम्भवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः ।

In *madhu* and other similar *vidyās*, there is no competency; this is *Jaimini's* view; owing to non-existence (of desire and capacity).

One, that is already a *vasu*, will not desire to become a *vasu*; and there is no *vasu*, other than himself.

on whom he may meditate. Nor will he be capable of meditating on himself. *Question.* Why? Will it not be easy to do so? *Reply.* The meditation in question is not merely to dwell with the mind on an object; for to think continuously of a jar should then be called *vidyā* or meditation. *Vidyā* is to dwell continuously on an object superior to the meditator; and this is not possible to the *vasu*, as he is not superior to himself. Again, one unable to attain a fruit, that he desires, pleases a *devatā* with his meditation and receives the fruit from him. It is absurd that the *vasu* should please himself with meditation on himself. The conclusion is that a *vasu* is not competent for this *vidyā*.

The next *sūtra* gives an additional reason :

31. ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ।

And because of meditation on the fire.

A *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text states “*Devas* meditate on that fire of fires, who is life and who is immortality” (VI-4-16).

Reference is here made to the highest *Ātmā*. The text may mean one of two things—*devas* alone meditate, or *devas* meditate on the highest *Ātmā* only. Now, *brahma-vidyā* being common to both the *devas* and men, the first alternative will not do. The text therefore means that *devas* meditate only on the highest *Ātmā*. They are therefore excluded from the rest, inclusive of *madhu-vidyā*.

Final decision. This is stated in the next *sūtra* :

32. भावंतु बादरायणोऽस्ति हि ।

In the view of *Bādarāyaṇa* qualification exists. It is so.

Vasus are qualified for the meditation referred to. First, they have to meditate not on themselves, but on the highest *Ātmā* as the inner ruler of themselves and of the *devatā* sun in their present condition. This is taught in sections 6-10 of the *upanishad*. In section 11 meditation on Him as the inner ruler of the *devatā* sun in his unevolved condition is taught. Thus, in both the places the meditation is on the highest *Ātmā* ; and this is indicated by the verse.

When one thus meditates on this *brahma-vidyā*, i.e., practises *brahma-viśṭyā*, for him the sun does not rise or set ; for him there is day, once and for all.

The whole of the *madhu-vidyā* is therefore concerned with the highest *Ātmā* ; and its fruit is to reach Him, but after being one of the five *deva* groups. Next, the existing groups of *devas* may desire to reach the same condition in the next *kalpa* (world-age), and then to reach the highest *Ātmā*. The objection raised does not therefore hold (1).

Objections. (1) Why is this sub-section necessary ? It has been decided that a *vasu* should meditate not on himself or on the sun, but on the inner ruler of both ; and this rule was laid down in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 11. *Reply.* In that place the fitness for the meditation under reference was not considered. A new sub-section is therefore necessary. Also, there the conflict was between the marks of a

As *Brahma* alone is to be meditated on in this *vidyā*, the text quoted in *sūtra* 31 raises no difficulty. The author of the *vr̥itti* states the same thing—'There is qualification in *madhu* and other *vidyās*; for *Brahma* alone is the object of meditation in all places.'

What is the purpose served by these two sections as regards men, who practise *brahma-vidyā*? *Reply*. They will know that the highest *Ātmā* is the object of meditation even to the *devas* in general and of particular groups among them, and that he gives them what fruits they desire; and they will meditate on Him as possessing this high attribute.

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jīva at the beginning and of the many marks of the highest *Ātmā* in the context as a whole. Here, however, there is apparent conflict between the beginning and the end; and the conclusion in the former will not do.

(2) How is the *first view* admitted and replied to; for there is no difficulty as far as one can see. The meditation is on the *devatū* sun, and a *vasu* comes in only as living on the honey in that *devatū*. In meditations on the highest *Ātmā* as ruling the perishable and imperishable worlds the meditator is himself included. Similarly, the *vasu* may meditate on the *devatū* sun, though he will come in as living on the honey or as being included in the five *deva* groups. *Reply*. From the text considered in the second *sūtra* the *vasu* and all others in the five groups would be excluded from the *madhu-vidyā*.

(3) How is the *final decision* sound, if there be conflict between the commencement and end of the context. *Reply*. The conflict is only apparent, and not real.

SUB-SECTION 9

It has now to be considered whether among men the *śūdra* is qualified for meditation on *Brahma*. In the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* it has been settled that he is not qualified for the *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* (VI-1-7). These are the reasons. First, there are the following injunctions :

In *vasanta* let the *upanayana* of a *brāhmaṇa* be done ; in *grīshma* the *upanayana* of a *kshatriya* ; in *śaraḍ* the *upanayana* of a *vaiśya*.

There is another injunction :

Let one learn the text of his own *veda* ;

and this has a need—who is to carry this out ?

Those that have gone through the *upanayana* ceremony have also a need—*viz.*, for what purpose have we been made to approach a teacher in that ceremony ? The injunction to learn the *veda* therefore attaches itself to them. Hence the rule is deduced that one should first pass through the *upanayana* ceremony, and then learn the text of the *veda*. Next, there are injunctions to do *karmas* of various kinds—the term *karma* meaning making an offering to a *devatā*. They have a need—who is to perform the *karmas*, so that they may serve their purpose ? And the performance presupposes the possession of the requisite knowledge and the adoption of the means for the acquisition of the knowledge, *viz.*, leading a life of discipline as a student and learning from the teacher. On

the other side the knowledge has been acquired at great personal inconvenience ; it was not intended for any other purpose ; and it needs something in which it may be utilized. The injunctions in regard to *karmas*, finding this knowledge available in the three higher castes, attach themselves to those castes. A second rule is laid down that only those, that have learnt the *veda*, and thus possess the requisite knowledge, should make the offerings. It follows that the *śūdra*, not being directed to pass through the *upanayana* ceremony, is not qualified to learn the *veda* or to perform the *karmas* enjoined in the earlier portion thereof. The same reasoning applies also in regard to *brahma-vidyās* enjoined in its later portion, and the *śūdra* is equally disqualified for them. But certain doubts have been felt on the subject ; and it is therefore necessary to examine them and arrive at a conclusion. Hence, the need for the sub-section.

First view. The *śūdra* is qualified for *brahma-vidyā* ; for he has a desire to practise it and is also capable ; and these two elements constitute the qualification. Two conditions are regarded as necessary for *vidyā*, viz., the doing of the duties of one's caste and stage of life, as a help to *vidyā*, and a knowledge of the highest *Ātmā*, and of the mode of meditation. Now, the first condition is satisfied by the *śūdra*'s doing his own duties—viz., the service of the three higher castes. As to the knowledge needed, it may be acquired from hearing *itihāsas* and *purāṇas* read ; and permission to hear them has been given.

Let one make the four castes hear (them), placing the *brāhmaṇa* in the front.

Hearing implies critical examination ; and knowledge not tainted with doubt or misconception is available to the *śūdra*, and he is therefore qualified.

2. Here the following objections are raised : (1) If the argument urged were valid, it would follow that the *śūdra* might learn the mode of doing *karmas* also from hearing *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*. *Reply*. Though they are described in general terms in those works, detailed information needed for performance not being available, the *śūdra*'s exclusion from them remains unaffected. (2) The permission to hear *itihāsas* and *purāṇas* does not extend to understanding their meaning. *Reply*. In the *mahābhārata* reference is made to the hearing of the chapter on the thousand names of *Vishṇu*, and it is added 'the *śūdra* will attain happiness'. Hence he may hear and recite them himself. (3) There is a text in the *yajur veda* which states—'Hence the *śūdra* is unfit for *yajna*'. This is a repetition of the conclusion of the *mīmāṃsā* ; and as the reasons apply to the case of *brahma-vidyā* also, the text must be understood as excluding the *śūdra* from *vidyā* also. *Reply*. The text refers only to *yajna* and similar *karmas* needing a knowledge of the *veda* and the maintenance of the sacred fire ; while *vidyā* does not need either condition. The text quoted by the objector strengthens the *first view*. By denying a qualification for *yajna*, qualification for *vidyā* is conceded.

3. Here are some further reasons. *Itihāsas* and *purāṇas* mention *vidura* and other *śūdras* as having meditated on *Brahma*. The *chāndogya* (IV-1 and 2) shows that instruction on *brahma-vidyā* was imparted to a *śūdra*. *Raikva* addressed *Jānaśruti* in these words:

You have brought me these things, O *śūdra*! and with this means you will make me speak (section 2, verse 5).

And in the next section he is said to have taught him. Hence the *śūdra* is qualified.

Final decision. The *śūdra* is not qualified; for he is not capable. *Brahma-vidyā* needs a knowledge of the highest *Ātmā*, His nature and the mode of meditating on Him; and as a help to it daily recitation of the *veda* and performance of *yajna*. The *śūdra* does not possess this knowledge and is not qualified for the *yajnas*. Hence, he has not the capacity to do *brahma-vidyā*; and desire without capacity does not constitute qualification. The incapacity comes from the fact that he has not learnt the *veda*. As the injunctions in regard to *karmas* seek those that possess a knowledge of the *veda*, the injunctions as to *brahma-vidyā* seek the same persons. They have found them in the three castes, and the *śūdra* is excluded. *Question.* Why should it not be assumed that he is qualified? *Reply.* An assumption is made only, when injunctions cannot otherwise serve their purpose. There is an injunction, 'Let *ratha-kāra* establish the fires'. *Ratha-kāra* is a member of a mixed caste. This direction is not carried out by looking to one among the three castes: for a *ratha-kāra* is not included among

them ; and it is assumed that he is qualified for establishing the fires and for learning the requisite *mantrams*. There is no similar direction in regard to the *śūdra*. *Question* again—Is not the *śūdra* mentioned in the *chāndogya* text quoted in para 3 of the *first view* ? *Reply*. It is not an injunction, and it is what is known as *arthavāda*. *Question*. Has it not been recognised that *arthavādas* also are authority for what they state ? *Reply*. It is only when they are not nullified by the context. Here the sense of the word established by usage is unsuitable, as will be shown presently, and does not therefore support the *first view*.

2. As to obtaining the requisite knowledge from *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* it should be known that they are authority only as elucidating the *veda*, and not independently. They are commentaries on the *veda*, and one cannot obtain the full knowledge needed for *vidyā* from them alone. Also, as persons who have learnt the *veda* are advised to read *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* in order clearly to understand it, one who is disqualified for the original should not take the commentaries as independent authority. Hence, any knowledge obtained from this source will not serve its purpose, like knowledge derived from reading books.

3. This being so, the permission given to the *śūdra* to hear *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* must be understood as limited to knowing the narratives of good men, so that by this means his sin may be diminished. As to *vidura* and other *śūdras* referred to in the *first view*, it must be presumed for the reason given that the commencement

of *brahma-vidyā* by them was in previous births, in which they were qualified; that owing to previous *karma* they were born as *śūdras*; but that they retained the knowledge acquired undiminished.

4. The reasons adduced in the foregoing paragraphs are those that are acceptable to the author of the *sūtras*. The last point in the *first view* is dealt with in the *sūtra* itself.

33. शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात्तदाद्रवणात्सूच्यतेहि ।

(By the term *śūdra*) the grief of (*Jānaśruti*) is indicated by his over-hearing the disrespectful speech (of the swan) regarding himself and by his running at once (to *Raikva*).

See the narrative in *Vedic Texts*. *Jānaśruti* gave with a free hand and fed as many people as went to his places of shelter. One day a swan, which flew over his house at night time, spoke disrespectfully of him as compared with one *Raikva*, who was a meditator on *Brahma*. Overhearing this speech he at once took steps to find out the whereabouts of *Raikva* and going to him with presents, he applied for instruction. The teacher knew what had taken place; and by the word *śūdra* he indicated that *Jānaśruti* was in grief at his own ignorance, and was therefore fit for receiving instruction. The term means by its etymology one who grieves (1).

(1) The term *śūdra* is formed from the root *śuch* to grieve by adding the termination *ra*. The vowel of the root is lengthened, and the letter *ch* is changed to *d*. It therefore means one that grieves.

In this *sūtra* a reason for adopting the etymological meaning has been stated. In the next *sūtra* a reason is assigned, which shows that the meaning by established usage will not do.

34. क्षत्रियत्वगतेश्च ।

And because *Jānaśruti*'s being a *kshattriya* is seen.

This is seen from the following facts—He gave large presents, and fed large crowds of people. He had for the guard at the door of his residence a *kshattā*, one born of a *vaiśya* father and a *brāhmaṇa* mother. A person of this birth was employed as guards by kings. He gave away many villages, which shows that he was the ruler of a country. *Jānaśruti* was therefore a *kshattriya*, and not a *śūdra* by caste. The address as *śūdra* should therefore be explained as in *sūtra* 33.

The indications that *Jānaśruti* was a *kshattriya* found in the narrative at the beginning of the context have been stated; and the next *sūtra* shows similar indications at the close.

35. उत्तरत्र चैत्रार्थेन लिङ्गात् ।

From the mark, viz., reference to *choitraratha*, further on.

In section 3 of the same chapter of the *upanishad* reference is made to three persons as connected with *samvarga vidyā*—the same as that taught to *Jānaśruti* (see Vedic Texts). Of them two were *brāhmaṇas* and

the third was *abhipratārin*. One of the *brāhmaṇas* was *kāpeya*, whose family is seen from other *vedic* texts to have been connected as priests with the family of *chaitraratha*, a *kshattriya*. It may be presumed that *abhipratārin* belonged to the family of *chaitraratha* and was a *kshattriya*. It thus appears that in addition to *brāhmaṇas kshattriyas* alone among the other castes were qualified for the *samvarga vidyā*. *Jānaṣruti* was therefore a *kshattriya* and not a member of the fourth caste.

By the three *sūtras* it has been established that there are no indications anywhere in regard to the qualification of the *śūdra* for *brahma-vidyā*. It will next be shown that his disqualification is supported by *vedic* and *smṛiti* texts.

36. संस्कारपरामर्शात्तदभावाभिलाषाच्च ।

Because of the reference to *upanayana*, and because of the declaration of (the *śūdra*'s) unfitness for it.

Wherever meditation on *Brahma* is taught, reference is made to the ceremony known as *upanayana*, which gives a qualification. Thus, in the *chāndogya*, chapter IV, section 4, a teacher, applied to for instruction, stated.

One who is a *non-brāhmaṇa* is not fit to say this. Go and fetch fuel, dear, and I will do *upanayana* for you.

And the teacher initiated him. As to the *śūdra* there is express teaching that he is not fit

for the *samskāra*, i.e., the *upanayana*. 'There is no sin in the *śūdra*; and he is not fit for *samskāra*' (*manu*, X, 126); "The fourth caste forms one class; and it is not fit for *samskāra*" (*gautama*, X-9).

37. तदभावनिर्धारणे च प्रवृत्तेः ।

And because one sets about giving instruction on ascertaining that the student is not a *śūdra*.

This will be seen from the quotation made under the preceding *sūtra*. *Jābāla* applied to a teacher for instruction, who asked him of what family he was. *Jābāla* replied that he did not know. He was born, when his mother was young, and was wholly engrossed in the service of his father's parents; and she did not know to what family his father belonged. The teacher was pleased and observed that only a *brāhmaṇa* could speak out the truth as he did. He then offered to do the *upanayana* ceremony and to teach him.

38. श्रवणोद्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात् ।

Because to hear the *veda*, to learn it, and to act on its teaching are prohibited (for a *śūdra*).

Hence near him (the *śūdra*) one should not learn the *veda*. Hence the *śūdra* is like a beast, and is unfit for *yajna*.

Hearing the *veda* being thus prohibited, it follows that the *śūdra* cannot learn it, cannot know its meaning and cannot act on it. These also should be taken as prohibited.

39. स्मृतेश्च ।

Because the *smṛiti* does the same.

Here is a text.

‘Do not teach him *dharma* (the means to a desirable end), and do not direct him to follow any discipline’ (*manu*, IV-80).

Criticism. The illusionist will be unable to maintain that the *śūdra* is disqualified for the knowledge of *Brahma*. This is his view “*Brahma* is *nir-viśeṣa*, and mere *chit*; He alone is real; everything else is unreal. Bondage is not real; and it is to be removed by the mere knowledge of His true nature to be generated by a sentence; and its removal alone is release.” This being his view, even one, who has not gone through the *upanayana* ceremony, has not learnt the *veda*, and has not been taught the *upanishads*, may know from any sentence whatever the true nature of things as taught by the illusionist; and from this knowledge alone bondage may disappear.

Illusionist. The knowledge needed should come from the text “That thou art” and similar texts, but not from any other sentence.

Reply. You cannot limit the knowledge to these texts only; for it does not depend on one’s choice; when the proper conditions exist, knowledge will be generated, even though one does not desire it.

Illusionist. Bondage will disappear on the acquisition of knowledge only from *vedic* texts.

Illusionist. Only when the tendency to perceive differences is removed by meditation, the text generates such knowledge, as will remove illusion.

Reply. The same service may be rendered in the same manner to a *śūdra* even by a statement made by any one. We see no difference between the two cases. Meditation means for the mind to dwell on the meaning, which a sentence is capable of conveying. This alone removes the evil tendency. Thus you state an effect to come from meditation, which can be seen. When the *śūdra* has acquired a desire to know, he may meditate on a statement made by any one; and when by this his evil tendency is removed, knowledge will come to him from the statement. By this alone the unreal bondage will be ended.

To put the matter in another way. The *śūdra* may arrive at the true nature of things from sense perception helped by argument and from inference; by dwelling on *Brahma* in His true nature, he may get rid of his evil tendency, realise Him and be released. No help whatever can be rendered to one by statements in the *vedānta*, which are based on unreal things, such as the powers of various beings, the creation of diverse products and endless similar differences. Hence the *śūdra* alone is qualified for meditation on *Brahma*. This appears to be a very proper view. As the very same argument may be applied to the *brāhmaṇa* also, the *upanishad* will become a dead letter.

Illusionist. When one is deluded by worldly statements, that are natural to him, if some one states

“worldly statements are delusive; the truth is such and such,” then alone he will desire to know what sense perception and inference can teach. Hence the *vedic* text too, that gives this information, should be accepted.

Reply. No. To one who is afraid of *samsāra* the *sāṅkhya* explains the true nature of things with the help of sense perception and inference. He creates a desire to know what these sources of knowledge can do. When this desire comes, their capacity having been ascertained, with their help alone he may easily know the true nature of *Brahma* as you describe Him. In a thing, which shines without any help, what is the particular to be learnt from the *veda*? In your view its purpose is merely to remove an unreal aspect, which is imposed upon Him.

Illusionist. To know that the *Ātmā* is bliss, the *upanishad* is needed.

Reply. No. He is *jnāna*, and is separated from all other things, that are not *jnāna*, and He is Himself bliss. The view that the *śūdra* is disqualified for *brahma-vidyā* can be held only by one that believes that the knowledge taught by the texts of the *vedānta* as the means to release is in the form of meditation; that it pleases the highest *Brahma*, the highest *Purusha*; that it can be attained only from the *veda*; that the portion of the *veda* dealing with meditation teaches that the knowledge acquired by one that has passed through the *upanayana* ceremony, and has learnt his *veda*, as to how he should meditate, this alone is the

means, and that it should receive help from the seven qualifications beginning with discrimination in the matter of food and desirelessness; that pleased with such meditation the highest *Purusha* imparts to the meditator knowledge of His true nature, destroys the ignorance engendered by *karma*, and releases him from bondage.

Continuation of sub-section 6

The questions, which arose incidentally, having been considered, sub-section 6 is taken up, where it was left, and two further reasons are stated to confirm the conclusion that the *purusha* of the size of the thumb is the highest *Ātmā*.

40. कम्पनात् ।

Because of the shaking (from fear).

Between the texts quoted under *sūtra* 23 the following two verses are found :

Whatever stands in and comes forth from *prāṇa* (*Brahma*), i.e., all this world, shakes from great fear of Him as from the raised *vajra*. Those that meditate on this become immortal. The fire heats from fear of Him; the sun heats from fear; from fear *Indra* and *Vāyu* (do their duties); and Death, the fifth, runs (on his errand). (*kaṭha*, VI, 2 and 3.)

Thus the whole world, and the fire, the sun and the rest stand in fear as to what will happen, if His command be disobeyed in any particular, and attend to their respective duties carefully. Such control can

be found only in the highest *Ātmā*. Compare with *bṛihad.*, V-8-8, and *āne.*, 8-1.

41. ज्योतिर्दर्शनात् ।

Because the light (peculiar only to the highest *Ātmā*) is seen.

This is seen in the following verse :

“ There (i.e., by His side) the sun does not shine ; nor the moon and the stars ; nor these lightnings. How can this fire shine ? When He shines, everything shines after Him ; by His light all this shines ” (*kaṭha*, V-15).

It will be seen that the light of the *Purusha* of the size of the thumb makes all other lights pale by its side ; that it is the (operative) cause of all other lights ; and that it helps them to do their work. This supreme light is everywhere in the *veda* described as pertaining only to the highest *Ātmā*. Compare with *chāndo.*, VIII-12-2 ; *bṛihad.*, VI-4-16 ; and *chāndo.*, III-13-7 ; and this very verse occurs in the *mūṇḍaka* as referring to the highest *Ātmā*. The *Purusha* of the size of the thumb is therefore He.

SUB-SECTION 10

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *chāndogya* (VIII-14-1).

Ākāṣa known as the maker of name and form, as being between them, is *Brahma* ; He is unlimited bliss ; He is *ātmā*.

The doubt is whether this *ākāṣa* is a freed *jīva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. He is a freed *jīva*; for the text occurs immediately after a verse which refers to a freed *jīva*, and the text therefore refers to him. The verse runs as follows :

Shaking off *karma*, as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released from the mouth of *rāhu* (in an eclipse), throwing off the body, I will reach the eternal *Brahma-world*, the purpose of my life having been attained. (VIII-13-1.)

The expression 'being between them,' *i.e.*, being untouched by name and form, refers to his release from them; and the first half of the text describes his previous condition, when he had a form and bore a name, the term *nirvahitā* in the original being understood in its etymological sense. The condition which he has reached is described by the terms *brahma* and unlimited bliss. The term *ākāṣa* may denote the freed *jīva*, as his attribute *jñāna* has fully expanded.

2. Here an objection is raised. The text under consideration is connected with the beginning of the chapter, which relates to the small *ether* (*ākāṣa*). For, by the term *ākāṣa* here the small *ether* (*ākāṣa*) is recalled, and the two are recognised as one. And that has been decided in subsection 5 of this section to be the highest *Ātmā*. *Reply.* Between the portion relating to the small *ether* (*ākāṣa*) and this text the teaching of *Prajāpati* intervenes; and in this the nature of the *jīva*, till he attains freedom, is described; and reference is

made to this freedom by the words "shaking off sin". Hence the conclusion urged stands.

Final decision. *Ākāṣa* here is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *śūtra* :

42. आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् ।

Ākāṣa is the highest *Ātmā*; because an attribute is stated, which differentiates him from others; and for other reasons.

This attribute is stated in the first half of the text. The term *nirvahitā* in the original should not be understood in its etymological sense; for the meaning by recognised usage, being suggested first, and being for that reason stronger, prevails over the other. And this meaning is a maker; and the highest *Ātmā* is known from other *vedic* texts as the maker of names and forms.

I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jīva* and make diverse names and forms (*chūndo*., VI-3-2): He knows everything and knows every attribute of everything; His *tapas* is thought; from him came forth this *brahma*, name, form and *annam* (*muṇḍa*., I-1-10).

See also the *puruṣa sūkta*. This attribute cannot be found in a *jīva*; for in the bound condition he has a form and bears a name imposed on him by *karma*, and is powerless to make them for others; and the freed *jīva* cannot evolve the universe, with which this is connected. The attribute under consideration therefore separates *ākāṣa* from a *jīva* and shows him to be the highest *Ātmā*.

2. The opponent asks.—If this be so, why is the freed *jīva* next mentioned by the words 'as being between them'. *Reply*. Reference is not made to a freed *jīva*; but the previous remark is justified. Because this *ākāṣa* is between name and form, *i.e.*, untouched by them, and is therefore a unique Being. He makes names and forms for others. And He is competent to do so. Being untouched by name and form implies that he is free from *karma*, and His will is therefore unfrustrated. The words 'for other reasons' in the *sūtra* refer to the terms *brahma*, *ātmā*, and bliss mentioned at the close of the text. Used without limiting words, they apply only to the highest *Ātmā*.

3. The main argument on which the *first view* is based is untenable. Reference is made to two persons in the preceding verse—to the *jīva*, that is freed, and to the highest *Ātmā*, that is to be reached. The former may appear to be the more important of the two, as being denoted by a word in the nominative case, and the latter coming in only as the object to be reached by Him. But as it is the more important, *ākāṣa* is the highest *Ātmā* for the reason stated, and the text should be connected with the expression *brahma-loka*. This means not the world of *Brahma*, but *Brahma* the world—*i.e.*, *Brahma* who supports everything. When a compound word has to be broken up, the more appropriate way is so to do it as to give prominence to each member of the compound, and this has been recognised as correct in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. (Intro., 29-ii.)

4. Further, this chapter of the *upanishad* began with the mention of the "small ether" in the heart as the subject to be meditated on; then the nature of the meditator was described in *Prajāpati's* teaching; and lastly in the text under consideration the subject is brought to a close, stating that the same small ether is reached. He is recalled by the term *ākāṣa* in the text, and is identified with what it denotes. *Prajāpati's* teaching, which formed the subject of sections 7 to 12, is a portion of the context subordinate to the whole, and not distinct from it. (1)

5. Lastly, the term *ākāṣa* has nowhere been used to denote a *jīva*.

The opponent shifts his ground, denies the existence of the highest *Ātmā* and asserts that it is the freed *jīva* that is called the supreme *Ātmā*, the supreme *Brahma* and the supreme ruler. This is his argument: The word *brahma-loka* recalls the same word used by *Yājñavalkya*

(1) If the verse regarding the shaking off of *karma* be connected with *Prajāpati's* teaching, and the freed *jīva* is primarily dealt with in it, then following the reason assigned in *sūtra* 19 of this section (see under sub-section 5), the highest *Ātmā* is mentioned in order to indicate what the *jīva* has to reach. *Prajāpati's* teaching having been brought to a close in section 12, if the verse, which is in the 13th section, be connected with sections 1 to 6, the mention of the freed *jīva* is to draw attention to the greatness of the highest *Ātmā* in freeing *jīvas* and taking them to Himself. Viewed either way, *ākāṣa* in the text is connected with *brahma-loka* in the verse, and denotes the highest *Ātmā*.

at the close of his teaching to king *Janaka*. "He is *brāhma-loka*, great king" (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-23), and it is decided that they denote the same person. In the same place, a few verses before this, the following statements are made :

In this (*Brahma*) there is no separateness whatever ; one that suspects even a small separateness in Him attains *samsāra* after *samsāra* (verse 19) ; This unlimited, unchanging *Brahma* (the *ātmā* of all beings) should be meditated on as one (verse 20).

There is thus express mention of oneness and express denial of separateness. There is therefore no highest *Ātmā* other than the *jīva*. The conclusion stated in the preceding *sūtra* does not hold (1).

The next two *sūtras* give the reply to the opponent.

43. सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन ।

Because in deep sleep and in getting out of the body in death He is stated to be different from the *jīva*.

Hence, the highest *Ātmā*, other than the *jīva*, does exist. In the same place of the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* these texts are found :

This person, embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, does not know what is outside, does not know what is

(1) *Question*. Should not this matter have been settled in the first section ? *Reply*. True ; it was shown that there is a Being other than matter or the *jīva* ; but the decision was based on *vedic* texts, that prove His existence. But until texts, that seem to point to a different conclusion, are examined and shown to bear a different interpretation, it does not rest on a firm basis. Hence, the author of the

inside (VI-3-21). This refers to deep sleep. As a cart fully laden (with the things needed for a journey) leaves (the place where it was) and goes on, in the very same manner, this embodied *jīva*, the all-knowing *Ātmā* having mounted on him (like a driver), abandons (the body) and goes on (VI-3-35).

This refers to death. In both the cases the *jīva* is in contact with another, who is referred to as 'all-knowing,' while he himself is without any knowledge in deep sleep, and depends upon the other to help him out of the body. This other person cannot therefore be himself. Nor can it be another *jīva*; for he cannot be all-knowing, if bound; and if free, the epithets to be referred to in the next *sūtra* will not apply to him.

44. पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः ।

Because He is described by the term *pati* (lord) and other terms.

This Being, who embraces the sleeping or outgoing *jīva*, is thus described further on in the same *upanishad* (VI-4-22).

He has every one in His grip; He controls every one; He is the lord of everyone. He does not become great by a good deed; He never becomes small by a bad deed. He is the ruler of all: He is the lord of beings; He is the protector of beings; He is the protective bund, that keeps these worlds from being confounded.

This description cannot apply by any means even to a freed *jīva*. Hence, the existence of a Being other

sūtras takes this occasion at the end of this section to draw attention to the texts in question and to settle the matter.

than the *jīva* is established, and the *ākāṣa*, who makes names and forms, is other than the freed *jīva* (1).

These two *sūtras* thus confirm the conclusion reached in the first section of this chapter—that the highest *Ātmā* is other than matter, and the *jīva*. The mention of oneness and the denial of difference should be explained so as not to conflict with this. To point this out is the work of this sub-section. This is the explanation. The mention of oneness is due to all objects, intelligent or non-intelligent, being products of evolution from the highest *Ātmā*, and to being on this account identical with Him. This was stated in explaining the first *sūtra* in chapter I-2-1. The denial of difference follows from the same. In other words, the oneness affirmed is based on the fact that a cause and its product are one; but this is not due to the *jīva*'s being one with *Īṣvara*. The denial of difference is subsidiary to the affirmation of oneness, and deals with the erroneous view, based on

(1) It will be observed that the term lord (*pati*) occurs in two sentences; but not at the beginning of the text quoted. The intention of the author of the *sūtras* in using the term *pati* (lord) in the *sūtra* is that the passage between the two sentences, which affirms freedom from *karma*, should also be cited as authority here. This freedom from *karma* shows that the other attributes mentioned pertain to His nature, and that they were not acquired as in the case of the freed *jīva* at any subsequent time. Again, the original has the term *adhipati* in both the places; but only the portion *pati* finds a place in the *sūtra*, the object being to refer also to the *nārāyaṇa* text, which uses the word *pati* only—The Lord of all (*pati*) and the controller of Himself (section 11). And this text shows that the lord of all is the Being known as *Nārāyaṇa*.

unsound arguments, that a product is different from its material cause. This will be refuted in chapter II-1-6. This denial includes also a refutation of the impression that any object is independent of the highest *Ātmā*, and not an inseparate element in an aggregate. This point is dealt with in chapter II-3-7 and III-2-6.

This brings this section to a close. The highest *Ātmā* has been proved to be the world-cause in all the texts considered ; and the following attributes regarding Him have been learnt. He is the *Ātmā* of all. His greatness is unlimited ; He supports the world by His command ; He is the object of enjoyment to freed *jivas*. Everything rests on Him, though he is the small ether in the heart of man. Though of the size of the heart, He controls all. He is fit to be meditated upon by the *devas* ; *vasus* and other groups of *devas* may meditate on Him as their *Ātmā* ; but he cannot be meditated on by the *śūdra*. And He alone makes names and forms (*adhi*, 129).

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER I

SECTION 4

THE fourth section is now taken up, and the texts of the *upanishads*, that appear to repeat the teaching of other schools of thought, are examined, and shown to indicate only the highset *Ātmā*. The first six sub-sections remove the doubt raised by the *sāṅkhya* school, and the seventh sub-section performs the same work with regard to the *yoga* school. Taking the sub-sections individually, it will be seen that the first and second sub-sections refute the view that matter in the subtle condition is the world-cause. By the third, even accepting the counting of the *tatvas* relied on by the same school, their position is held to be untenable. In the fourth the term *avyākṛita* is shown to indicate the highest *Ātmā*, on the principle that every word indicates Him fully and directly. In the next two sub-sections the *jīva*, both bound and freed, is shown not to be the world-cause. And the seventh sub-section establishes the incorrectness of the view that the highest *Ātmā* is only the operative cause.

SUB-SECTION 1

The following verses occur in *kāṭhavallī* (III-10 and 11).

The objects are more powerful than the senses ; the mind is more powerful than the objects ; more powerful than the mind is *buddhi* ; and more powerful than *buddhi* is the great *ātmā*. More powerful than the great (*ātmā*) is *avyakta* ; more powerful than *avyakta* is *puruṣa*. There is nothing more powerful than *puruṣa*. He is the last ; He is the highest goal.

The opponent regards the last four clauses here as mentioning *mahat*, *avyakta* and *puruṣa* of his school ; taking the term *para* in the original to mean greater than instead of more powerful as translated. And *avyakta* is greater than *mahat*, being its cause ; *puruṣa* is greater than *avyakta*, being self-proved, while the other is not. The statement that *puruṣa* is the last is taken to deny the existence of the highest *Ātmā*, controlling both *avyakta* and *puruṣa* (in *matter* and *jīva*). He concludes that *avyakta* is the world-cause.

This argument is stated in the first part of the *sūtra* :

आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्श-
यति च ।

If it be said "In the portions of the *veda* of some schools even *pradhāna* is stated to be the world-cause," the reply is "No ; because reference is made to the body, likened to a chariot. And this is shown."

The second part of the *sūtra* gives a reply. The context deals with the control of the mind and the

senses, so that meditation on the highest *Ātmā* may be steady. For this purpose a metaphor is employed to bring the points clearly before the student. The human body is a chariot; *buddhi* or conviction is the charioteer; the mind is the reins; the senses are the horses; and the objects to which they are drawn are the roads. The *jīva* is the owner seated in the chariot and enjoying the pleasure which the objects yield. (*Ibid.*, verses 3 and 4). The *upanishad* goes on to point out (see *Vedic Texts*) that one, that has a good resolve, and controls the mind and the senses, will reach the end of the road, *viz.*, *Vishṇu*, the highest goal (verse 9). Then follow the two verses under consideration, which show which of the things mentioned it is easy to control and which are more difficult. In the order of difficulty they are arranged as follows: the senses, sense-objects, the mind, conviction, the *jīva*, the body and the highest *Ātmā*. The sense-objects are more powerful than the senses; for, in their presence the senses, though well under control, become unmanageable. The mind is more powerful than sense objects; for when it dwells on them, their absence does not count for much. Conviction is more powerful still; for without it, the mind can do nothing; and it merely follows conviction. The *jīva* is more powerful than conviction; for he is the thinker and doer; and because he controls everything—conviction, the mind, and the senses—he is said to be great (*mahān*). The body is more powerful than the *jīva*; for all his efforts to reach his goal depend upon the co-operation of the body. The most powerful is the highest

Ātmā, the inner ruler of all, and the end of the road ; for the efforts of everything down to the *jīva* are subject to His will (1).

Now, in the two verses under consideration all the things mentioned in the metaphor are referred to by their own names, except the body, and in its place the term *avyakta* is found. Hence, it may be concluded on the authority known as *sthāna* that that term indicates the body. This being so, there is no reference whatever to the *pradhāna* (matter) of the *sāṅkhya*. If the question of control is not intended, the verses must refer to the relation of cause and effect ; for that is the relation between *māhat* and *avyakta*, and the same relation must be intended in the other cases also.

(1) This point, *viz.*, that the *jīva*'s doership depends upon the highest *Ātmā*, will be stated in chapter II, section 3, *sūtra* 40. He, that is the final help by which the *jīva* will complete his meditation, is also the highest goal. This is stated in the last part of the text under consideration. The *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* begins with the words "who stands in the *ātmā*," and states that the highest *Ātmā* sees everything and controls everything. It then by the words 'There is no seer other than this' denies another controller. *Bhagavad-gītā* is also to the same effect: "The body, the *ātmā*, the five organs of action, *prāṇa*, and *Daivam*, the fifth in the list of causes" (XVIII, 14). The term '*Daivam*' in this verse is the highest *Ātmā* ; for it is stated in the same work—"I am seated in the heart of every one ; from Me flow remembrance, knowledge, as well as inability to see" (XV, 15). The means of securing His grace is to fall down at His feet, and nothing else. This is also stated—"The ruler of all has mounted all beings on the wheel of the body, and being in their hearts, He makes them go round and round with the help of attractive sense-objects. Appeal to Him alone for help (XVIII, 61 and 62).

But sense-objects are not the causes of the senses according to the *sāṅkhya* ; nor the mind the cause of sense objects. Next, *buddhi* is understood by Him to mean *mahat* ; and *mahat* cannot therefore be the cause of *buddhi*, i.e., of itself ; and the application of the epithet *ātmā* to it would be inappropriate. Hence the term *avyakta* must mean the body.

The last part of the *sūtra* shows that this must be the interpretation. Verse 12 states that the highest *Ātmā* cannot be seen by one whose mind and the senses are not under control ; and the next verse states :

A wise man should place speech under the control of the mind ; that should be placed under the control of *buddhi* in regard to the *ātmā* ; *buddhi* should be placed under the control of the great *ātmā* ; he should be placed under the control of the *Ātmā* free from the six evils.

See *Vedic Texts*, and the notes on this verse therein.¹

How can the term *avyakta* mean the body, which is *vyakta* or one that is capable of being seen ? The next *sūtra* replies :

2. सूक्ष्मं तु तदहत्त्वात् !

It is the subtle (*avyakta*) that becomes the body ; because only in that condition is it fit.

The meaning is that the term *śarīra* (body) being first mentioned in verse 3, while the term *avyakta* is

¹ The original explains this verse in full. This, being embodied in the *Vedic Texts*, is omitted here.

The opponent draws attention to the following verse :

Who is ever without sound, ever without touch, ever without colour, and therefore ever without decay ; who is similarly ever without taste, ever without smell ; who is ever without beginning or end ; who is greater than the great (the *jiva*) and is unchanging, one that meditates on Him is released from the jaws of death. (III-15.)

He observes that this description applies to *avyakta* and that it is said to be greater than *mahat* (the great). *Reply.* No ; the Being to be meditated on according to this verse is the all-knowing *Brahma*. For, the context refers to Him alone as the subject of meditation. See verses 9 and 12 of *valli* 3 in Vedic Texts. For the same reason by the statement 'There is nothing greater than *purusha*' a *tatva* other than the twenty-fifth, *i.e.*, the *jiva*, is not denied. The attributes mentioned apply to Him (*vide muṇḍa*, I-1-6) ; and He is greater than *mahat*, which from the preceding verses must be the *jiva*.

6. त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च ।

And because the question related only to three things as fit to be known and they are thus expounded.

These three things are the means, the Being to be reached, and the person that is to reach Him. No reference is made to *avyakta* or to anything else. See the narrative in *Vedic Texts* under chapter I, section 2, sub-section 2. As the third boon *Nachiketas* asked for information as to the nature of *moksha* (release) ; and

this was practically as to the three things mentioned. This was in verse 20 of section 1. See the note under it. Death tested him as to his fitness for receiving instruction, and then taught him in verse 12 of section 2. This refers to three matters: (i) by the words 'He meditates on *Deva*' to the Being to be reached; (ii) by the words 'meditates on himself' to the *jiva*, who is to reach Him; and (iii) by the words 'meditates and abandons joy and grief' to meditation on *Brahma*. *Nachiketas* then requested fuller information on these points in verse 14. See note 2 on this verse. Death replied, first praising *praṇava*; and referring to the three matters generally, taught him the *praṇava* (verse 15). He again praised the *praṇava* in verses 16 and 17; and then described the nature of the *jiva* in verses 18 and 19; the nature of the highest *Ātmā* in verses 20 to 22 and 25; and the nature of the means, *viz.*, meditation in verse 23. In the first verse of the third section he pointed out that the highest *Ātmā* was in man's heart, and that meditation on Him was therefore easy; and in the remaining verses down to verse 14 the mode of meditation and its fruit—the reaching of *Vishṇu*—are described and the subject is brought to a close in verse 15, which was quoted by the opponent under *sūtra* 5. Hence there is no reference to the *avyakta* of the *sāṅkhya*.

7. महद्वच ।

And like *mahat*.

In the two verses first considered, the term *mahat* has not been understood to mean the *mahat* of the *sāṅkhya*; because the word *ātmā* was placed in apposition with it. Similarly, the term *avyakta* does not indicate the *avyakta* of the *sāṅkhya*, as *avyakta* is said to be greater than *mahat*, the *ātmā*.

In the following five sub-sections the same contention is raised by the opponent and is rejected. But the reasons therefor are different in each case. The intention is not to deny the existence of *prakṛiti*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and the rest forming the bodies of *Brahma* and supported and controlled by Him; for their existence is stated by the *veda* and the *smṛitis*. In support of the last statement see the texts shown at the foot of the page (1).

(1) *Mantrika upanishad*—*Prakṛiti*, the creator of products (the five senses, the five organs of action, the mind and the five great elements); non-intelligent; appearing in eight forms (*prakṛiti*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, and the five *tanmātrās*); without birth or death. (I, verse 3); she enters into the willing of *Brahma*; directed by Him, she comes into the gross condition (as the great elements); again directed by the very same, she creates the universe consisting of objects of enjoyment and the means and places of enjoyment (verse 4). She is a cow, without beginning or end; the creator of the great elements and of the diverse products of evolution; white, black, and red (through the products fire, water and earth) and yielding every amusement to the all-Ruler (verse 5). She is impartial (changing in accordance

SUB-SECTION 2

The next text cited is from the *śvetāśvatara* :

One unborn (*ajū*) red, dark and white, and producing numerous offspring like herself. One unborn attends on her,

with the *karmas* of the *jivas*); persons of dull intelligence, not knowing themselves, enjoy her (verse 6). One *Brahma*, a shining Being, being His own master (*i.e.*, not subject to *karma*) derives amusement from her, who is subject to Himself (verse 7). This *Bhagavān*, the all-Ruler by willing and creation derives amusement controlling her (verse 8); Her, who treats all bound *jivas* alike, and gives enjoyment, being prompted by those that do *yāgas* (offerings) (verse 9). *Vyakta* and *avyakta* numbering twenty-four is He alone (*Ibid.*, II-4).

Thus the nature of *prakṛiti* and the rest has been described. *Brahma*, who is their *ātmā*, is thus stated. Some say that He is the twenty-sixth; others that He is the twenty-seventh; He whom the *atharva śīras* knows to be *puruṣa*, without qualities (*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), and to be *jñāna* (*Ibid.*, 3).

(ii) The causes are eight, and the products are sixteen.

(iii) *Śvetāśvatara*. The all-Ruler supports this universe made up of *kshara* (material products) and *akshara* (*jivas*) blended together, whether they be in the subtle or gross condition. The *jiva*, not being his own master, is bound from a hankering after enjoyment; knowing the shining one, he is released from all bondage (I-8). Two persons are unborn; but they are respectively all-knowing and ignorant; ruler and ruled; one unborn exists for the purpose of affording enjoyment to the *jivas* (verse 8). *Ātmā*, of whom the whole world is a body, and the excellence of whose good qualities has no limit, does not do *karma* as the *jiva* does; for He does not desire the fruits of *karma*; when one thus perceives the three he becomes like *Brahma* (verse 9). Matter is *kshara* (perishable); the *jiva*, who is immortal, and who takes material products for

and following her he remains; another unborn, having enjoyed her, abandons her (verse 5 of section IV).

Here reference is evidently made to matter in the subtle condition. It is red, dark and white; because it possesses the three qualities *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

enjoyment, is *akshara*; one the shining being controls both *kshara* and the *ātmās*; by constantly thinking on Him, by concentrated meditation, and by the emergence of the nature one abandons all bondage to matter at the close of worldly existence (verse 10). The *vedas*, the *karmas* enjoined (*yajnas*, *kratus*, and *vratas*), and what past and future the *vedas* describe, all this the lord of *māyā* creates from this; in it another is bound, deluded by *māyā*; know *māyā* to be *prakṛiti*; and the lord of *māyā* to be the great Ruler; all this world is pervaded by the *jīvas*, who are His parts (*Ibid.*, IV-9 and 10). The lord of matter and of embodied *jīvas*, and the ruler of *jñāna* and the other five qualities and the cause of *samsāra*, of release therefrom and of its continuance (*Ibid.*, 16). (iv) *Bhagavad-gītā*. Know that the body and the *ātmā* both have had no beginning; know also that changes take place, and *guṇas* manifest themselves in the body (XIII-19). The body is said to be concerned, when the body or the senses act; the *ātmā* is said to be concerned, when pleasure and pain are experienced (*Ibid.*, 20). For, the *ātmā*, seated in the body, experiences the *guṇas* manifested in the body, and their effects. Attachment to the *guṇas* and their effects causes his birth in good or evil wombs (verse 21); *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* the *guṇas* manifested in the body, bind the changeless *ātmā* seated in the body (XIV-5); All the beings at the end of a world-age come to My *prakṛiti*. At the beginning of another world-age I send them forth again (IX-7). Energising and controlling My *prakṛiti*, I send forth again and again all these beings, who are helpless being under the control of matter. (*Ibid.*, 8); with Me to direct *prakṛiti* sends forth from itself the world with the moving and unmoving things. From this cause the world goes round from evolution to dissolution and from dissolution to evolution (*Ibid.*, 10).

From it are formed many products, in all of which the same three qualities appear ; and they are therefore said to be like itself. The one unborn (the word is in the masculine gender) is the bound *jīva* immersed in the pleasure of sense-objects ; while the other unborn is he, who is disgusted with such enjoyment and leaves it.

This verse and all other verses, which give the impression that matter by itself is the world-cause, are considered here. The doubt arises from the fact that matter is non-intelligent, and from the use of the word 'producing,' which naturally indicates independent creation. The alternatives are whether the matter referred to in the text is the *pradhāna* of the *sāṅkhya* or whether it is what is controlled by the highest *Ātmā*. *First view.* It is the former. For, the word *ajā* (unborn), shows that it is not a product of evolution ; and it is said to create many objects of the same kind ; but no reference is made to anything else as controlling it. On the other hand the termination in the term *srija-mānām* (producing) denotes cause of the action (*kartā*) ; and it is said by the grammarian to be independent.

The *sūtra* refutes this view :

8. चमसवृदविशेषान् ।

Because. (the term *ajā*) is not particularised. It should be treated like the term *chamasa*.

Here the term *ajā* from its etymology denotes merely what is not born ; and there is nothing to indicate that reference is made to matter, which is

independent of the highest *Ātmā*. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text (see *Vedic Texts*)

There is a cup with its mouth below, and its bottom above (IV-2-3).

The term cup (*chamasa*) merely refers to a vessel for drinking, and does not indicate what the particular instrument is. When the etymological meaning of a word is taken, it naturally denotes an object in general terms; and the particular object has to be found from the capacity of the word, from other words in the same sentence or from connected sentences which follow it. Without considering these the particular object cannot be known. In the case of the cup (*chamasa*) the sentence, which follows, indicates that it is the human head. The same plan should be followed here; but there is nothing in the context to show that it is the *prakṛiti* of the *sāṅkhya*. The termination in the term *sṛijamānām* does not possess the necessary capacity. The independence shown by it means that it is the seat of its own action, and not that it is not controlled by another. This is seen in the sentence 'The car goes'; on the other hand, there is reason to hold the view that it is matter controlled by the highest *Ātmā*.

9. ज्योतिर्वक्रमा तु तथा ह्यधीयत एके ।

It is only a product of evolution from fire; for so some read in their *veda*.

The term 'fire' here is *Brahma*, from whom it evolves. The *taittirīya* (*nārāyaṇam*—X) begins with the sentence :

Subtler than the subtle, and greater than the great ; *Ātmā* is placed in the cave of the heart of the *jīva*.

The reference is to *Brahma*, who is present in the heart in order that He may be meditated on. The *upanishad* goes on to state that from Him all the worlds, and all beings beginning with the four-faced one came forth, and then repeats the verse under consideration with one slight change. Here the evolution of every thing else from *Brahma* is described, and the mention of *ajā* in this connection shows that it also has evolved from *Brahma* like the rest, *prāṇas*, the seas and the hills. Hence, *ajā* is not independent of *Brahma* ; but controlled by Him it becomes the various products of evolution. This follows from the rule stated in note (1) on page 147. As the particular *chamasa* is found from a connected sentence that follows, so we determine what the *ajā* is from a text in another branch of the *veda*, which is of the same form, and the meaning of which is recognised as identical with the meaning of the text under consideration. Hence, the *ajā* is what is controlled by *Brahma*.

2. *Objection.* The text does not refer to creation ; the subject was broken off with the third verse ; in the next verse the highest *Ātmā* is identified with the four-faced one and others ; then the text under consideration comes ; and in this the freed *jīva*, whose creation is inappropriate, is mentioned. *Reply.* The verse does refer to creation of many products of the same kind ; and the reference to the freed *jīva*, like the reference to the bound one, is with the object of stating something about the *ajā*. On the other hand, the *ajā* is mentioned

not to serve any other purpose, and as it is found in a place where creation is described, the conclusion stated holds. The identification of the highest *Ātmā* with the four-faced one and the rest rests on the fact that they are all products of evolution ; and the cause and product are one. As the four-faced one is placed on a par with the eagle and the buffalo, this must be the meaning.

3. In the *śvetāśvatara* itself there are indications as to what the *ajā* is. The *upanishad* begins with the question "*Brahma*, the cause of the world, what is He?" and the reply is next stated as follows :

They perceived by meditation matter, the inseparable attribute of the being known as *Deva* and *Ātmā*, with its own qualities *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (I-3).

Further on in section IV after the verse under consideration this verse occurs :

All this *māyī* (owner of *māyā*) creates from this ; and in that one other than He is confined. Know *māyā* to be *prakṛiti*, and Him, who has the *māyā*, to be the great Ruler. . . . who, being one controls the causes of the world's evolution, *prakṛiti*, *mahat* and the rest.

Hence there is no reference in the text to an independent matter alleged by the *sāṅkhya*.

How can *prakṛiti* be *ajā* (unborn) and also a thing produced by evolution from fire ? The next *sūtra* replies :

10. कल्पनोपदेयाच्च मध्वादिब्रह्मविरोधः ।

Because here evolution is taught. There is no conflict, as in *mādhva vidyā*.

From matter in the subtle condition, which is inseparable from Himself, *Brahma* makes the world evolve. Matter in this condition is *ajā*. It is then one with *Brahma*; it has no names and forms; and it is subtle. In the condition of evolution its qualities—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—become perceptible; it appears in diverse forms and with diverse names; it is referred to by *vyakta* and other terms; it evolves as fire, water and earth; and it is seen to be red, white and black. In this condition it evolves from *Fire*. Hence, there is no inconsistency. In illustration of this explanation the *sūtra* refers to the two conditions of the sun to be meditated on in the *madhu vidyā*. See chapter I, section 3, sub-section 8. In one condition the sun is one with *Brahma*; in the other or manifested condition it rises and sets, and is then enjoyed by groups of *devas* as honey.

Criticism. Others construe the verse under consideration differently. They state that the verse refers to a single she-goat, marked by fire, water and earth. Let us ask—What do you mean by the words ‘marked by fire, water and earth?’ Do you refer (i) to fire, water and earth only; (ii) or to *Brahma* in the form of fire, water and earth; (iii) or to some thing else that is the cause of them all?

Reply. To fire, water and earth.

Questioner. They are many; and the statement that they are one she-goat would not be correct.

Reply. Though they are more than one, yet as they have been compounded, they have become one.

Questioner. In spite of the composition their being more than one does not disappear ; for each of them is a compound of the three elements formed in different proportions.

Reply. *Brahma* in the form of fire, water and earth is a single she-goat.

Questioner. Do you mean that *Brahma* is a single she-goat, when he has evolved as fire, water and earth or when he has not evolved, but remains as He is.

Reply. I mean the first alternative.

Questioner. Then being more than one does not disappear ; they cannot be a single she-goat.

Reply. Take the second alternative.

Questioner. Then, the *ajā* cannot be red, black and white ; for *Brahma* in His own nature has no colour ; and if you say that He has the colours indirectly, you must admit that matter, that has the colours, forms His body ; and this will be accepting our view.

Reply. What is the cause of fire, water and earth is a single she-goat.

Questioner. You must then mention the words, fire, water and earth, and then by them refer to their causal condition. It is better by the term *ajā* itself to refer to the causal condition ; for this is stated by the *veda*.

2. Again, the statement that *prakṛiti* (*ajā*) is likened to a she-goat is inappropriate ; for it serves no purpose. In the verses considered in the preceding subsection the body was likened to a chariot in order to

show the means to the reaching of *Brahma*. In the *upanishad* considered in section 3, sub-section 8, the sun was likened to honey, to show that he was an object of enjoyment to the *vasus* and other *devu*-groups. If *prakṛiti* be likened to a she-goat as is done by you, where is the comparison useful? It is not merely that the comparison is useless; but it is objectionable. *Prakṛiti* is the cause, from which the whole world evolves; while a she-goat brings forth only a few young ones. The connection of the *jivas* with the former has had no beginning; and all the *jivas* have been connected with it; while the connection of he-goats with the latter is casual; and all he-goats are not connected with it. The former serves as the means to every kind of enjoyment to them, and also serves as the instrument in the attainment of release; while the latter yields very petty fruit, *viz.*, milk. The former is unintelligent, and is incapable of abandoning one, that is connected with it; while the latter is intelligent, and can leave those, with whom it is connected. Further, the term *ajā* would denote a she-goat, while the term *aṣṭa* would mean one unborn; thus the same word would have different meanings in the same verse.

Reply. To obviate the last objection the term *ajā* will denote goats in both the places.

Questioner. The verse states that a *jiva*, who has obtained knowledge of the true nature of things, abandons *prakṛiti* completely; while a he-goat may after once leaving the she-goat go to it again, or to another

Reply. Though they are more than one, yet as they have been compounded, they have become one.

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Reply. To obviate the last objection the term *ajā* will denote goats in both the places.

Questioner. The verse states that a *jiva*, who has obtained knowledge of the true nature of things, abandons *prakṛiti* completely; while a he-goat may after once leaving the she-goat go to it again, or to another

she-goat; and to liken one to the other is extremely objectionable.

SUB-SECTION 3

The next text cited is from the *bṛihad-ūraṇyaka* :

On whom the five *pancha-janas* and ether rest, another who thus meditates on that *Ātmā* as *Brahma*, as immortality, becomes immortal (VI-4,17).

The opponent contends that this verse refers to the *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya*; because the term *pancha-jana* means five *janas* and it is qualified by the word five. It therefore means twenty-five beings. Five-*jana* is a group of five *janas*, and there are five groups. Thus there are twenty-five *janas*. What are these? The context refers to one that is qualified for release; and what he has to know are the *tatvas* or substances well-known in the *smṛiti* of *Kapila*. These are *mūla prakṛiti*, which is not a product; *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and the five *tanmātrās*, seven in number, which are themselves products and give rise to other products; sixteen, which are only products, *viz.*, the five great elements, mind, the five senses and the five motor organs; and *puruṣa*, who is not a product, and from whom no product evolves—in all twenty-five.

The reply to the opponent is given in the *sūtra* :

11. न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च ।

No; even if the number be accepted; because the things mentioned are different, and because the number is exceeded.

Assuming that the text refers to five groups of five *tatvas*, they are not those mentioned in the *sāṅkhya smṛiti*. For they rest on something, which is referred to by the term 'whom' (*yasmin*); and this is correlated to the term that (*tam*), which denotes *Brahma*. Hence they rest on *Brahma*, while the *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya* do not. Next, in addition to the twenty-five *tatvas*, there are ether and *Brahma*, on whom they rest. Hence this verse refers to the highest *Ātmā*, the ruler of all, and the support of all *tatvas*, who is well-known in the *veda* "He is said to be the twenty-sixth; by others He is said to be the twenty-seventh".

Lastly, it is not correct to say that reference is made to five groups of five things; for there are no marks or properties common to the members of each group, such as will constitute them a group. This is indicated by the word 'even' (*api*) in the *sūtra*. *Opponent*. There are five organs of action, five senses, five great elements, five *tanmātrās* (subtle conditions of the elements) and the remaining five. *Reply*. As ether is separately mentioned, the group of five great elements does not exist.

What then are the five-*janas*? *Reply*. The term does not denote a group; it is a special name (*Pāṇini*,

II-1-50), as is shown by the termination of the compound. There are five of them. The next *sūtra* shows what they are :

12. प्राणाद्यो वाक्यशेषात् ।

Prāṇa and the rest, as shown by the connected sentence, which follows (1) :

The very next verse reads.

Those that know the *Ātmā* to be the *prāṇa* of *prāṇa*, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, and the mind of the mind, have known in truth the ancient, highest *Brahma*.

This is the reading of the *kānvas*. The *māndhyan-dinas* have in addition the expression "the *anna* of

(1) *The connected sentence, which follows* : Reference is made to the rule deduced in *pūrva mīmāṃsā*, I-4-19. In the text 'Place near each other small lime stones dipped in an oily substance ; ghee is indeed *tejas* (a shining substance),' the injunction does not state what the oily substance is ; and what it is has to be determined. The *first view* is : The first clause gives the injunction ; and it occurs first in the sentence, while the second clause is an *arthavāda*, and it occurs later. Hence the latter is weaker than the former ; and any oily substance may be selected. The *final decision* is that ghee alone should be used. The objection will hold, if there were any conflict between the two clauses ; but there is none. The first clause refers to an oily substance in general ; and ghee is one of the things, which may come under this description. As the direction in general terms cannot be carried out, we desire to know what the substance should be ; and the second clause helps us in finding it out. Further, as ghee is praised, it is an indication that it is intended by the injunction ; for it is the business of an *arthavāda* to praise what is enjoined.

anna” between the ear and mind. In the *māndhyandina* reading three senses are mentioned—eye, ear and mind, and two others—*prāṇa* and *anna*, and in accordance with the majority rule (note (1) on page 147), the two latter also should be the senses. And all of them are dependent on the highest *Ātmā* for support in the performance of their functions.

Here the following objections are raised : (i) In the *kāṇva* reading no mention of *anna* is made ; and the number five is therefore inappropriate. (ii) The term *prāṇa*, occurring first in the verse, prevails on the beginning rule (*Intro.*, para 24), and its meaning by recognized usage should not be interfered with. Hence, the majority rule does not apply. The next *sūtra* has been framed to meet these objections :

13. ज्योतिषकेषामसत्यने ।

With the term *jyotis* (fire); even though the term *anna* is not found in the reading of some.

Ignore the *kāṇva* reading for a moment. With the verse as read by the others, a decision can be arrived at with the help of the term *jyotis* in the preceding verse ; which has the ending of the possessive plural. This runs as follows :

Below whom the year with its days limits life, on that Being, who is the light of lights (*jyotishām*), who is life, who is immortality, the *devas* meditate.

This verse has a need—how many are the lights ; and the text under consideration also has a need—what are the five ? By this mutual need they are connected to form a *prakaraṇa*. It follows that the five are lights—*i.e.*, what reveal objects, and that they are the senses. This being settled, the term *prāṇa*, though occurring first in that verse, should be understood to mean one of the senses by the adoption of a secondary meaning. It denotes the sense of touch, which is connected with the element air, and *prāṇa* is only a variety of that element. The term *anna* denotes both the senses of smell and taste ; for they are connected with earth, which is the meaning of the term *anna*. Smell is the quality of the element earth, and the sense of smell is connected with it ; and the sense of taste is connected with food, which is a variety of earth. As both these senses are denoted by the same term, there is no conflict with the mention of the number five ; for they form a group, and the number of the members of the group is neglected. Here is a precedent for this form of expression. “The twelve months are five *ṛitus*.” The term *ṛitu* means a group of two months ; and though there should be six *ṛitus*, the last two of them are treated as forming one group. The first objection raised may now be answered. The expression ‘*annam of annam*’ should be added in the *kāṇva* reading ; for the subject being the same, what is found in one place should be added in the other, where it is not found. The conclusion is that the *sāṅkhya* gets no support from this text.

SUB-SECTION 4

The *sāṅkhya* makes a last stand on behalf of his *pradhāna* as the world-cause. All creation texts, which contain doubtful words, from the denotation of which it is not possible to exclude matter, are here for consideration. This is his contention. If the *vedānta* referred to one thing only as the cause of the evolution of the universe, it may be possible to affirm that the highest *Ātmā* is that single cause. But it mentions *sat* and *asat* indifferently as the cause (1); and these terms exclude each other. On the other hand it is possible to assert that *pradhāna* is the cause. Here is a text:

Then this was *avyākṛitam*; the same by itself was made into the universe possessing diverse names and forms (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7).

The first clause states the dissolution of the universe in *pradhāna*, which was then without names and forms, and which is therefore referred to by the term *avyākṛita*. The second clause shows evolution from the same. Being indestructible in its substance, it may be said to be *sat* (what exists); and being subject to change of conditions, it may be said to be *asat*; and these terms used by creation-texts will therefore not be inappropriate in *pradhāna*, as they would be in the highest *Ātmā*, who is not subject to change.

(1) Before creation, my dear, this was *sat* only (*chāndo*, VI-2-1); Before creation this was *asat* only (*ūna*, VII); Before creation this was *asat* only; it became *sat*; it became the universe (*chāndo*, III-19-1).

2. Here an objection is raised. In a sentence, which follows, it is stated

He breathes and receives the name *prāṇa* ; He speaks, and receives the name speech ; He sees, and receives the name eye ; He hears and receives the name ear ; He thinks, and receives the name mind. These are His names indicative of his actions.

This shows *avyākṛita* to be an intelligent being. *Reply.* From the word *avyākṛita*, which is first found, the world-cause is known to be non-intelligent ; and on the beginning rule (Intro., para 24), this should prevail ; and the seeing and the rest should be understood in a secondary sense (1). The terms *brahma* and *ātmā*, which are used in regard to the world-cause, are applicable to *pradhāna* alone, as being great, and all-pervading. And this is also well-known from the *smṛiti* of *Kapila* as the world-cause.

This view of the *sāṅkhya* is refuted in the *sūtra* :

14. कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः ।

But in the texts containing the word *ākāśa* and the rest that Being is referred to as the world-cause, who has been described as all-knowing, as possessing an unfrustrated will, etc.

(1) This is necessary even to the *vedāntin*. He admits that matter exists, and that being without a beginning, it is the final cause ; for this is well-known from *vedānta* texts. He states that the aggregate made up of matter, *jīvas* and the highest *Ātmā* is the cause, and that evolution is preceded by willing. But all of them cannot will ; and as regards the matter element, willing not being possible, resort to a secondary sense must be accepted.

It is possible to decide that the universe evolves only from the highest *Ātmā*. Take the *ānandavalli* text. This refers to *Brahma* as all-knowing by the term *vipaśchit*, and then states "From that *Ātmā ākāśa* (ether) came forth". Here before stating the, creation creative Being is referred to as all-knowing ; and before the word *sambhūta* (came forth) the term *Ātmā* occurs, which in itself is confined by usage to intelligent beings. In the *chāndogya* text also first willing to become many is stated, and then the evolution of fire. The same course is followed in other *upaniṣads* also.

Before creation this was *Ātmā* indeed ; one only ; He willed I will create the worlds ; He created these worlds. (*aita.*, I-2.) He knows everything, and knows every (attribute) of everything ; His *tapas* is thought ; from Him came forth this *brahma*, name, form and *anna*. (*muṇḍa.*, I-1-10.)

In another place beginning with the statement "*Nārāyaṇa* alone was it is stated

He found no pleasure in being alone ; He thought of another object of desire in His mind ; it become a golden egg ; in it the four-faced *Brahmā* was born.

In all these texts as willing is mentioned first and creation after it, it must be understood in accordance with the beginning. One or two texts cited by the opponent cannot prevail over so many, which speak with one mind and state the highest *Ātmā* only as the world-cause. The texts quoted by the opponent must therefore refer to creation by the highest *Ātmā*.

Why is it then stated that *asat* was the cause in the *ānandavallī* text?

15. समाकर्षात् ।

Because reference backward or forward is made (in such cases).

This verse is quoted as witness of what was stated before, *viz.*, that *Brahma* is all-knowing, that His will is never frustrated, that He is full of bliss, that He evolved the world, and that He entered into everything and was therefore its inner ruler. Similarly, He is referred to in the next section of the *upanishad*, and control of all and possession of infinite bliss are affirmed. Hence, the *asat* in the verse is the all-knowing *Brahma*. He is referred to as *asat* or non-existent, because having then no name and form He did not exist as possessed of them. The same interpretation should be applied to the *aitareya* text quoted. As to the term *avyākṛita* it indicates only *Brahma*, as the inner ruler of *avyākṛita*. For, reference is made to *avyākṛita* by the term 'he' in the sentence which follows, and it is stated

He has entered into this (the universe) to the very tips of the finger-nails. (*Ibid.*)

He, who enters into the products of evolution, makes names and forms and controls them, is well-known to be *Brahma*. Hence *avyākṛita* is the Being that ensouls it. The *pradhāna* of the *sāṅkhya*, being non-intelligent, cannot enter into things in this manner for the purpose of control.

The sentence "The same by itself was made into the universe possessing diverse names and forms" means that the same *Brahma*, all-knowing and having an unfrustrated will, who was without diverse names and forms, became possessed of them, and that this change was brought about by Himself. Understanding the text in this manner, it will be observed that willing and the rest may be taken in their primary sense, and that the terms *Brahma* and *Ātmā*, meaning as they do what is immeasurably great, and what pervades others for the purpose of control, can never apply to *pradhāna*.

SUB-SECTION 5

The *sāṅkhya* gives up *pradhāna* for good, and comes forward to plead for his *puruṣa*, who being intelligent, cannot be rejected in the same way. He quotes the following text from the *kaushītaki*:

He, who made these persons, and whose this *karma* is, should be meditated on (III).

See the narrative in *Vedic Texts*. *Bālāki* offered to speak to *Ajātaśatru* about *Brahma*, but referred to a number of *jivas* in the sun, the moon and many other places, *Ajātaśatru* rebuked him for vainly saying that he would speak about *Brahma*, and began to teach him, beginning with the text quoted.

First view. The *sāṅkhya* argues: Here reference is made to one, who is connected with *karma*; *karma* is

good and bad deeds, and pertains only to a *jīva*, who is bound. Hence the *puruṣa*, who controls *pradhāna* and derives enjoyment, is put before the student for meditation ; and he must be *Brahma* ; and from the context it cannot be any other ; for the *Brahma* of the *vedāntin* has no connection with *karma*.

2. Here he anticipates an objection, which may be raised by the *vedāntin*. The term *karma* means, taking the etymological meaning, what is made, and refers to the universe brought up before the mind by sense perception ; and it is this that is indicated by the expression—' this *karma* '. The instruction given is therefore that He, who made all this world, should be meditated on ; and He must be other than a bound *jīva*. The *sāṅkhya* replies. Then the second half of the text would merely repeat the first half, and would have no meaning. Also, the term *karma* is well-recognised as meaning good and bad deeds in the *veda* and in the literature of the world.

3. *Question*. If the text refers to a bound *jīva*, how is the statement ' Who made these persons ' to be understood ? *Reply*. The world is made, so that every one may experience the fruits of his own *karma* ; and a bound *jīva* may appropriately be said to be the cause of creation. He needs objects of enjoyment and places of enjoyment ; and the sun, the moon and the rest and the persons who control them are made for him. He becomes the cause of this through his *karma* ; and *Ajāta śatru* taught that his nature, as divorced from matter, should be known.

4. This view is confirmed in three places in the same context of the *upanishad*. First, both the teacher and student went to a sleeping person ; and the teacher called by names which referred to *prāṇa*, the *jīva*'s instrument ; and the person not replying, he pushed him with a stick, whereupon he awoke. These are marks indicative of a *jīva*. Secondly, the illustration of the great man of the world points to the same conclusion. This is what the *upanishad* states :

As the great man obtains enjoyment with his people as instruments, and as his people profit by the great man, so that all-knowing *Ātmā* obtains amusement with these *jīvas* ; these *jīvas* enjoy Him and become happy.

5. Lastly, *Ajātaśatru*, referring to the sleeper, asked

Bālāki, where did this person sleep then ; where was it (the group of his instruments) ; and whence did it come forth.

Bālāki, being unable to reply, *Ajātaśatru* himself gave the answers :

There are blood-vessels of the heart, known as *hitā*, . . . in which the person was then, when he sleeps and sees no dream of any kind ; next it (*i.e.*, the group of his instruments) becomes one with this *prāṇa* ; then speech becomes one with it with all its activities ; . . . the mind with all its activities ; when he awakes, then as from a burning fire sparks go forth in all directions, so from this *ātmā* *prāṇas* go forth, each to its place, etc. ¹

Here reference is made to a *jīva*, who exists in three conditions—the dreaming, sleeping and waking

¹ This text is interpreted so as to suit the *first view*. For the correct interpretation see Vedic Texts.

conditions, to whom speech, and other instruments go in sleep, suspending their functions, and from whom they return. The words 'this *prāṇa*' mean 'this *jīva*'; for the *jīva* bears *prāṇa*, and he is therefore denoted by that word. This must be the meaning; for by the word 'he' in 'when he awakes' reference is made to *prāṇa*; and he that awakes must be a *jīva*. Neither the instrument *prāṇa* nor the highest *Ātmā* sleeps or awakes. This interpretation of the term *prāṇa* has resort to a secondary sense; and this may be avoided by taking the words 'this' and *prāṇa* as not being in apposition. The meaning will then be 'with *prāṇa* which is in this (*jīva*). Though the term *prāṇa* is taken to mean the *jīva*'s instrument, it is the *jīva* that is considered in this context, *prāṇa* itself being his instrument.

6. The conclusion is that *Brahma*, whom the teacher began to speak about, is *puruṣa* alone; and there is no *Īṣvara* other than he. The willing and other attributes of the world-cause, which are said to pertain only to intelligent beings, are appropriately found in him alone. Hence, *pradhāna* only under his control is the world-cause.

This view of the *sāṅkhya* is refuted in the *sūtra*:

16. जगद्वाचित्वात् ।

(No); because the term *karma* indicates the world.

Here reference is made not to the *jīva* under bondage to *karma*, but to the highest *Ātmā*. The term *karma* is qualified by the term 'this' (*etad*), which refers to what

is present before the mind ; and what this is must be determined from the sentence, in which it is found, or from the context, or from other marks showing the intention. Here neither the sentence nor the context will help. The term does not refer to the persons mentioned in the same sentence ; for it is in the neuter singular, while the term denoting the persons is in the masculine plural. Next, it does not refer to *karma* in the form of good and bad deeds ; as it has not been mentioned in the context. Thirdly, though not mentioned, it cannot be assumed, on the plea that reference is made to the creation of the persons and a cause is implied ; for this will lead to delay in understanding the term. Lastly, it cannot draw attention to the action in the form of creating the persons ; for as this has been mentioned by the clause ' who made those persons,' there will be redundancy. Hence, the term *etad*, not being in any way limited, draws attention to the whole world, made up of the intelligent and non-intelligent elements. This is seen from sense perception ; and the reference to the persons in the sun and the rest, who are a part of the world, brings up the whole before the mind. The term *karma*, being connected with this, cannot refer to good and evil deeds.

2. Next, let the context be examined. *Bālāki* came forward with the offer to teach *Brahma* to *Ajātaśatru*, and failed ; for he only referred to the persons in the sun and other places, and they are not *Brahma*. *Ajātaśatru* undertook the task of teaching him *Brahma*, whom he did not know. This purpose will not be served, if his

attention was drawn to persons who were connected with *karma* ; for *Bālāki* already knew the persons in the sun, the moon, etc., and other persons would be of the same description. The Being, whom he did not know, and whom *Ajātaśatru* wished to show him, must therefore be a Being without good and evil deeds. Hence also the term *karma* cannot be interpreted as proposed ; and it will be as inappropriate here, as action in general will be, which is another meaning of the term by established usage.

3. *Objection.* The word 'he' in 'he should be meditated on' refers to the *jiva* by the mark that he is connected with *karma*, and draws attention to his true nature as the thing to be known for meditation ; and this is a thing which *Bālāki* did not know ! *Reply.* In this case the ordinary meaning of the term 'whose' will be laid aside ; for it indicates connection with *karma*, and it must be understood as bringing up before the mind absence of such connection. If reference to *karma* were needed to indicate the person, whose true nature should be known, the more direct form would have been 'whose *karma* exists' ; and the word 'this' (*etad*) would be superfluous.

4. *Further objection.* The clause 'whose this *karma* is' would be purposeless under your interpretation. *Reply.* It is not so ; for this is what *Ajātaśatru* meant. "You have mentioned several persons as being *Brahma*. All of them were made by a superior Being. Why should I single out these ? The whole world is His work—high or low, intelligent or non-intelligent, and in

this respect, *viz.*, being products of evolution from Him, they are all alike."

5. Lastly, the impression that a bound *jiva* is the cause of evolution of other persons through his *karma* is untenable. His *karma* may have led to the evolution of the world; but he cannot himself create objects of enjoyment and instruments of enjoyment. He merely utilises them, when they are made for him by the highest *Ātmā*; as a person for whom a cup is made, uses it for drinking, though it is made by another, the potter.

17. जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेत्तद्व्याख्यातम् ।

If it be contended "No; because the marks of a *jiva* and the further mark in the mention of his instrument *prāṇa* occur"; the reply is "This objection has already been answered."

In section 1, sub-section 11, the rule was laid down that when on the consideration of the beginning and end of an *upanishad* it is decided that it refers to *Brahma*, then the marks of other things should be understood in accordance therewith. Here also the *upanishad* begins with the offer to teach *Brahma*. A text in the middle has been examined in the preceding *sūtra* and shown to refer only to Him. In the end it is stated

One, that knows this and meditates on that *Ātmā*, abandons all evil deeds, attains pre-eminence and supremacy among all beings and becomes his own master (IV-20).

The abandoning of all evil deeds and becoming free follow only on meditation on the highest *Ātmā*. Hence, this portion of the *upanishad* refers only to Him; and the term *prāṇa* in the clause "Then he becomes one

with this *prāṇa* " means the inner ruler of *prāṇa*. The terms 'this' and *prāṇa* are in apposition; and this should be assumed, unless the context directs otherwise. This mode of expression is adopted to show that the highest *Ātmā* should be meditated on as the inner ruler of *prāṇa*.

18. अन्यथं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेकं ।

(The mention of the *jīva*) was to show a Being other than he. So does *Jaimini* think. This is seen from the question put and the explanation offered. So some read.

The mention of the *jīva*'s marks is explained in another way. The particle *tu*, which occurs in the original, expresses dissent from the *sāṅkhya*'s view that the context refers to the *jīva*, because of his mention. *Ajātaśatru* took *Bālāki* to a sleeping person, whose *prāṇa* was wide awake. To show that the sleeper was different from his *prāṇa*, he called *prāṇa* by its names; but there was no response. He then pushed the sleeper with a stick, and he arose at once. *Ajātaśatru* next wished to show him that there was a being other than the *jīva*, viz., the highest *Ātmā*; and he put to him three questions: "Where did this person sleep then *Bālāki*; where was he; whence did he come forth." As *Bālāki* was unable to reply, he himself explained. The answers were—*first question*—"In these (the blood-vessels) the person was then". *Second question*—"Next when he sleeps and sees no dream of any kind, he is then one with this *prāṇa*". *Third question*—"From that *Ātmā prāṇas* go forth each to his place.' They refer only to one that

is other than the *jīva*, viz., the highest *Ātmā*. He is well-known to be the place, to which the *jīva* goes in deep sleep, forgets the joys and griefs experienced in the waking and dream conditions to the distraction of his mind, and enjoys peace. He it is from whom he goes forth to resume the daily turmoil. Here is the authority :

He is then, my dear, united to *Sat* (*chāndo.*, VI-8-1) ; Embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, he does not know what is outside ; he does not know what is inside (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-21).

It is thus clear from the questions and answers that the mention of the *jīva* was in order to show that there was another than he—viz., the highest *Ātmā* (1).

2. The remarks of the *sāṅkhya* in para 5 of the *first view* are not sound. First, the place to which the *jīva* goes in deep sleep is not the blood-vessels known as *hitā* ; for they are the place, being in which he dreams. See the quotation in the same para. The term *atha* (next) separates the condition of the *jīva* indicated by the word then (*tadā*) from the condition of deep sleep.

(1) The above shows that the *sūtra* was needed to remove a further doubt. In sub-section 11 of section 1 there were marks of the *jīva* at the beginning ; and the context as a whole related to the highest *Ātmā*. Here, however, the marks of the *jīva* are found in the beginning, the middle and the end ; and one cannot be certain that the intention is that the terms used should be understood as denoting the inner ruler of what they ordinarily denote. This is the further doubt. It is removed by showing that though the three kinds of meditation are not possible, the rule deduced in that sub-section may be applied, as the purpose is to show that there is another, that is, other than a *jīva*.

The statement that he sees no dreams in this condition implies that he sees them in the other. Two conditions are therefore stated—in the first or dream condition the *jīva* is in the blood-vessels known as *hitā* and sees dreams; in the second or deep sleep condition he becomes one with *prāṇa* and sees no dreams. The clause ‘when he sleeps and sees no dream’ should be connected with the next sentence ‘with this *prāṇa*, etc.’. The answer ‘In these the person was then’ refers to the dream condition, and is the reply to the first question ‘where did this person sleep’. The answer ‘Next, when he sleeps and sees no dream of any kind, he is then one with this *prāṇa*’ refers to the deep sleep condition, and is the reply to the second question ‘where was he then’. The *first view* overlooks this difference and makes one condition of both; but as shown at the beginning of this paragraph this is incorrect.

3. Next, the view that the second question “Where was he then” refers to the group of the *jīva*’s instruments is incorrect. The term he (*etad*) refers to what has been mentioned before, and this is the person referred to in the first question; and no reference whatever was made before to the group of instruments. *Objection.* The neuter gender of the word *etad* makes it inapplicable to the person. *Reply.* This is not a serious objection. The principal part of the word—the root—makes the reference to the person, and the termination is of less importance as compared with it. Understanding the first two questions to refer to the same person, and the replies to them to deal with the dream and deep sleep

conditions, the first two questions will also relate to these two conditions—otherwise, there would be incongruity, the question relating to the deep sleep condition and the answers to both the conditions.

4. *Question.* Why is reference made to the group of the *jiva's* instruments? *Reply.* It is for the purpose of explaining what is meant by his becoming one with *prāṇa*. In this condition his instrument *jñāna* does not go forth through the various senses, which cease to function then. As this cessation of functions is a part of the deep sleep condition, a separate question in regard to them was unnecessary.

5. The opponent's remark that in the sentence 'when he awakes,' the word 'he' refers to *prāṇa* is also incorrect. The natural connection is between the person who sleeps and the person who awakes; and the sleeper being a person, the same must be taken to arise from sleep.

6. Hence, the conclusion stands—*viz.*, that the *jiva* with his instruments becomes one with *prāṇa*, and that *prāṇa* is the highest *Ātmā*.

7. The last portion of the *sūtra* confirms the conclusion that *prāṇa* here is the highest *Ātmā*. In the parallel passage from the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, which treats of the same subject, the highest *Ātmā* is distinguished from the sleeping *jiva*: "That ether (*ākāśa*) in the heart on Him he lies" (*bṛihad.*, IV-1-17). This ether is well-known to be the highest *Ātmā*. Hence this portion of the *upanishad* does not mention as the world-cause either *pradhāna* or the *jiva* as directing it.

SUB-SECTION 6

Once more the *sāṅkhya* quotes a portion of an *upanishad* as relating to the *purusha* mentioned in *Kapila's smṛiti*, and contends that there is no *Īṣvara* other than he. The portion is what is known as *Maitreyī brāhmaṇa*, in which *Yājñavalkya* teaches *brahma-vidyā* to his wife *Maitreyī*. See *Vedic Texts*. *Maitreyī* requested instruction in regard to the means to immortality; and *Yājñavalkya* began with the following words:

A husband does not become dear, because the husband wishes it in order to obtain what he desires; but to carry out the wish of the *Ātmā* the husband becomes dear.

Then follow similar verses for wife, sons, wealth, *brāhmaṇa*, *kshattriya*, *svarga* and similar worlds, *devas*, beings and all things. Then he added:

Ātmā, dear, should be seen, be heard about, be thought about, be meditated on. *Maitreyī*, dear, by the seeing, hearing about, thinking about and meditating on of the *Ātmā* all this becomes known (IV-4-5).

Who is it that is taught in this text as being the object of seeing? Is he the *purusha* of the *sāṅkhya* or the highest *Ātmā*?

First view. He is the *purusha*; for in the beginning, middle, and end of this *upanishad* reference is made only to him. In the beginning reference is made to husband, wife, sons and wealth being dear. In the middle the birth and death of the *ātmā* are stated

(verse 12); and in the end these words are found—"By what means, my dear, can he see the knower?" (verse 14). Hence, this *upanishad* deals with the *purusha* of *Kapila's smṛiti*.

2. Here an objection is raised. The beginning shows that the means to immortality is taught. How can it be said to relate to the *purusha*? *Reply*. It is for this very reason that the *purusha* is mentioned. That *smṛiti* teaches that knowledge of the true nature of the *purusha*, divorced from the condition, in which he fancies himself to be the seat of the attributes of non-intelligent *prakṛiti*, leads to immortality. Hence the text quoted states that this true nature should be known.

3. Other portions of the *upanishad* support this conclusion. (i) The true nature of all *ātmās* divorced from matter is of one character; hence one by knowing his own true nature knows all *ātmās*; and the statement that by knowing *ātmā* everything is known is borne out. (ii) In all beings beginning with *devas* and ending with the vegetable kingdom, as the *ātmās* have but one character, *viz.*, intelligence, the teaching was that all *ātmās* are one (verse 6). (iii) As the forms in which these beings appear are not the forms of the *ātmās*, the notion that they are different was condemned (verse 6). (iv) The *ātmās* being alike, and the differences among them relating to their bodies, the impression that the differences are in the *ātmās* is stated to be illusion (verse 14); and (v) As the *purusha* directs the evolution of *prakṛiti*, and is therefore the operative

cause, the description of evolution from him is appropriate (verse 10).

If this *upanishad* be decided to deal with the *purusha*, as other *upanishads* should agree with it, the whole of the *vedānta* describes the *purusha* of *Kapila's smṛiti*; *pradhāna* directed by him is the world-cause; but not *Īśvara*.

Final decision. The *ātmā* to be known is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

19. वाक्यान्वयात् ।

Because only in this view will the mutual relation of all the sentences forming a connected whole be natural.

First, *Maitreyi* treated wealth with contempt, and desired to know the means to immortality, and *Yājñavalkya* instructed her to meditate on *ātmā*. This *ātmā* must be the highest *Ātmā*. For the *upanishads* teach meditation on Him as the only means to immortality (1). *Opponent.* Should not the true nature of the *jīva* be known? *Reply.* This knowledge is needed only as subsidiary to the meditation on the highest *Ātmā*, but not as an independent means. For the *jīva*, who has to reach Him, being among the things controlled by Him, He is not known fully, unless the *jīva* also is known. Hence the highest *Ātmā* alone is taught as the means to immortality by the words 'should be seen'.

(1) Meditating on Him alone one overcomes death (*śveta.*, III-8); One, that thus meditates on Him here, becomes immortal; no other path lies to the goal (*puru*).

2. Next, the statement that by knowing *ātmā* everything is known will be appropriate only, if the *ātmā* be the highest *Ātmā*, who is the inner ruler of all. The explanation on this point in para 3 (1) of the *first view* is not satisfactory ; for it ignores matter, which will not be known (verse 5). At the end of the next verse it is said : “ *Ātmā* is all this,” reference being made by the term ‘all this’ to the universe consisting of matter and *jivas*, which every one sees ; and *Ātmā* is identified with it. This identification will be inappropriate in the case of the *jiva*, who when bound is controlled by matter and is powerless, and who when freed is not competent to deal with the world. The highest *Ātmā* alone, pervading the universe, can be said to be the world. Hence, one who regards anything as existing independently of Him is condemned in the same verse. In verse 10 everything is said to come forth from *ātmā*. This must be the highest *Ātmā*, as the evolution of the world is His function. The bound and freed *jivas* are powerless as stated already ; and the *purusha* of the *sāṅkhya* is according to his own showing incompetent to will and cannot therefore be the operative cause. Lastly, in verse 12 of the first of the two *upanishads*, which cover the same ground, the *ātmā* under consideration is stated to be a great Being—unlimited in His nature and in His attributes. This description applies only to the highest *Ātmā*, who is therefore dealt with in this *upanishad*.

3. The opening sentences of verse 5 may now be considered : They state that a husband is dear, not

because he wishes it ; but to bring about what the *ātmā* desires, such as pleasure. These sentences are connected with the sentence containing the injunction to seek the *ātmā*, who, as shown in paras 1 and 2, is the highest *Ātmā* ; and their purpose is to induce one to seek Him.

4. *The opponent asks.* Have I not observed that at the very outset the *jīva* is stated to be an object to be sought, the *jīva*, who is connected with things that are dear, as husband, wife, sons, wealth, cattle and the like ? These sentences therefore relate to him. *Reply.* Yes ; but what you said is not sound. If the term *ātmā* in these sentences be taken to mean a *jīva*, they will not be connected with the injunction-text. As already observed, they have to render a service to that text ; but this will not happen. By the statement that the husband and the rest become dear the *jīva*, to whom they are dear, will not be induced to abandon them, and seek his own nature ; for he will naturally seek what is dear ; but not his own nature, in which the connection with the dear things will disappear. It is not merely that the sentences will serve no purpose ; but there is an absurdity. The husband and the rest become dear, not for their own purpose, but for the purpose of the *jīva*, to whom they become dear. Hence that *jīva* should seek them alone for his own purpose. To ask him to reject them and seek what will not be connected with the dear things is absurd. *Opponent.* Let not the sentences be connected with the injunction-text. *Reply.* This will itself be a flaw ; for when it is possible to

regard the sentences and the injunction-text as a connected whole dealing with one topic, to treat them as unconnected and as dealing with two different matters is not legitimate. Even if this flaw be put up with, they will serve no purpose. Hence, the sentences and the injunction-text should be so explained, that one will be induced to abandon all dear things as husband and the rest and seek the *Ātmā* alone.

5. This is the explanation. The term *ātmā* should be taken to mean the highest *Ātmā*. The sentences will mean that the husband and the rest are not dear by nature ; for this is a passing trait ; while they are dear in some respects, they may be repulsive in others ; and they cannot be the dearest. This we all see. They become dear to carry out the will of the highest *Ātmā*, who rewards His worshippers by giving them a drop of bliss in accordance with their *karmas* by making certain things dear to them. He, on whose will this bliss depends, must be limitless bliss (1) ; and He should be sought, the petty dear things being rejected. That things become dear at the will of the highest *Ātmā* is stated by the *veda* ' He indeed confers bliss ' (*āna.*, vii). That things are not desirable or undesirable in their own nature is stated.

(1) *Must be limitless bliss.* The Being, on whose will the pleasure which the wife derives from her husband depends, must be unlimited bliss. If one gives wealth or imparts learning to another, his own wealth or learning must be very great.

Because the same thing having given pleasure, subsequently leads to pain; and because the same thing first leads to anger, and afterwards leads to good will, there is nothing, that in itself is painful or pleasurable.

6. The sentences may be explained in another way also, taking the term *ātmā* to be a *jīva* in those sentences, and to be the highest *Ātmā* in the injunction-text. The husband becomes dear to the wife, not because he wishes it, in order that he may attain what he desires; and the wife has to accept him as such, having no choice; but she herself of her own choice to attain what she desires regards him as dear to herself. Instead of doing so, she should seek one, that in his nature, is dear beyond measure and free from imperfections; and such an *ātmā* is the highest *Ātmā*. The husband and the rest are not like Him; the pleasure which they give is petty; it is alloyed with pain and leads to subsequent pain. And their being dear or otherwise depends entirely on the highest *Ātmā*.

7. Of the two explanations the first is preferable, as the *upanishad* deals only with the highest *Ātmā*; and as reference is made only to Him by words, that denote a *jīva*. This occurs in verse 12. This great Being unlimited in His nature and in His attributes is *viññāna-ghana* only. The term *viññāna-ghana* denotes a *jīva*, who is by nature all-knowing. The other terms in the verse denote the highest *Ātmā*; as the term *viññāna-ghana* is in apposition with them, it must be taken to denote the highest *Ātmā* alone.

The question arises why the highest *Ātmā* is referred to by a term, that ordinarily denotes a *jīva*. This is replied to in the next three *śūtras* :

20. प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर्लिङ्गमाश्रयः ।

(The reference made to the highest *Ātmā* by words that ordinarily denote a *jīva* is) a mark which proves the declaration. So *Aṣmarathya* thinks.

The declaration is made in the *chāndogya* (VI-1-1 to 3) and is that by knowing one thing all things are known. It is proved on the theory that the highest *Ātmā* appears by evolution as the *jīva*, and that He is therefore one with him. If this were not so, the *jīva*, being different from Him, cannot be known by knowing Him. This theory is supported by these texts :

Before creation this was *Ātmā* indeed ; one only (*aita.*, I-1-1) ; As from a blazing fire sparks similar to it go forth by thousands, so from *Akshara* come forth, dear, various beings ; and they are dissolved in the very same (*muṇḍa.*, II-1-1).

Hence the highest *Ātmā* and *jīvas* are one ; and words ordinarily indicating them are used with reference to Him.

21. उत्क्रमिष्यत एवम्भावादित्यौदुलोमिः ।

Because the *jīva*, when he rises (finally) from the body, becomes so (*i.e.*, *Brahma*). This is the view of *Auḍulomi*.

The view of *Aṣmarathya* is unsound ; for the *jīva* is said to be unborn in the text 'The *jīva*, who is fit to become all-knowing is not born, nor does he die' (*kaṭha*, I-2-18). It is admitted that the universe

is created in order that the *jīvas* may experience the fruits of their previous *karmas*; if this be not admitted, the creation of differences cannot be explained. If *jīvas* were products of *Brahma*, *moksha* (release) would be their return to the *Brahma*-condition; and this would be as inevitable as the dissolution of ether and the rest. Then the pointing out of the means to *moksha*, and its adoption would be purposeless. *Moksha*, would mean return to the causal condition like the conversion of a jar to dust, and would be destruction. It would therefore cease to be an end that man will seek. There are certain texts no doubt, which speak of the *jīva*'s creation and destruction; they will be explained later on. Hence as the *jīva* becomes *Brahma*, when he rises from his body (*chāndo.*, VIII-3-4, and *munḍa.*, III-2-8), the highest *Ātmā* is denoted by a term, that denotes a *jīva*.

22. अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ।

Because *Brahma* dwells (in the *jīva*); this is the view of *Kāśakṛtsna*.

The view of *Auḍulomi* too is unsound; for it cannot stand examination. Before the *jīva* rises from his body, he was not *Brahma*. Does this previous condition pertain to nature, or was it brought about by an *upādhi* (1)? In the former alternative. the *Brahma*-condition

(1) *Upādhi* is something, by connection with which a thing assumes a new aspect. In *Bhāskara*'s theory the *upādhi* is real, and consists of the mind or *antaḥ karaṇa*, by contact with which *Brahma* assumes the *jīva*-condition. In *Śankara*'s theory it is unreal *avidyā*, under the influence of which *Brahma* perceives an unreal world as existing.

cannot be attained ; for the previous condition being natural, the *jiva*'s difference from *Brahma* pertains to his nature ; and it cannot disappear, so long as he remains. If it be said that he disappears along with the difference, then as he no longer exists, there is no *Brahma*-condition. There is also the objection that the result will not be what man will seek.

2. Let us next consider the second alternative. If the previous condition was brought about by an *upādhi*, was that condition real or unreal ? If it were real, he that rises from the body was *Brahma* only before ; and it is not correct to say that the *Brahma*-condition is now attained, there being no difference between the two conditions. In this view there are only two things—*Brahma* and *upādhi* ; nothing else ; *Brahma* has no parts, which the *upādhi* can contact. It must therefore contact *Brahma* Himself. Now, as what is contacted by the *upādhi* becomes a *jiva*, the whole of *Brahma* will become a *jiva* ; and there will be no *Brahma* left. Hence, the *upādhi* itself must be a *jiva*. Then *Brahma* will retain his natural condition.

3. If the previous condition brought about by the *upādhi* were unreal, it should be stated who it is that attains the *Brahma*-condition ? *Śankara* replies : *Brahma* Himself whose nature suffered *tiro-dhāna*, i.e., did not appear, owing to *upādhi* in the form of *avidyā*. This reply is untenable ; for *Brahma* being ever free, being light (*jnāna*), and requiring no help for being known, He could not be prevented by *avidyā* from appearing. A thing is said to experience *tiro-dhāna*,

when its light is not made to appear, while the thing itself remains. As it is stated that *Brahma* is only light, its appearance cannot be prevented : if it be, it must cease to exist. Hence, as His nature ever appears, in His attaining the *Brahma*-condition on rising from the body there is no difference. Hence the words ' when he rises from the body ' serve no purpose. In the text, which was in *Audulomi*'s mind, by the reference to one's appearing in his own nature, it is not meant that he becomes *Brahma*. It only means that his own nature, which previously existed, but was not perceived, now emerges. This will be explained in chapter IV, section 4, sub-section 1.

4. The correct explanation is that the *jīva* forms the body of *Brahma* ; that He remains within the *jīva* as his *ātmā* ; and that therefore *Brahma* is referred to by terms that ordinarily denote *jīvas*. This is the view of *Kāṣakṛitsna*. It has been explained that the term *jīva* does not end in denoting a *jīva* only ; but that it goes on to denote *Brahma* also (*vide* paras 13 to 16 of the final decision on pages 186 to 190). When this view is taken, all *vedic* texts will convey consistent teaching—those that affirm of *Brahma* freedom from imperfections, omniscience and the like ; those that state that the *jīva*, who is ignorant and suffers misery, attains release by meditation on *Brahma* ; those that describe the evolution and dissolution of the universe ; and those that identify *Brahma* with the universe. Hence the author of the *śūtras* has accepted the view of *kāṣakṛitsna* alone.

In this interpretation the *upanishad* contains this teaching. On *Maitreyi's* enquiring as to the means to immortality, *Yājñavalkya* stated meditation on the highest *Ātmā* to be the means (verse 5). The marks of this *Ātmā* and the control of the mind and the senses as a help to the meditation were next stated in general terms (verses 5, 7, 8 and 9). In verse 10 His being the single cause of all the world was explained more fully ; and in verse 11 the need for the control of the mind and of all the organs of perception and action was expatiated on. In verse 12 in order to stimulate efforts towards meditation, the all-knowing character of the highest *Ātmā* was pointed out ; and the conditions of the *jīva* in bondage and in release were contrasted ; it was shown that though by nature his attribute *jñāna* is unlimited, in bondage he follows the movements of his body, coming into the world with it, and disappearing on its dissolution ; and that in release he no longer confounds himself with the body. This portion of the teaching is given by referring to the highest *Ātmā* as appearing in the form of the *jīva*, the object being to point out that in all conditions the *jīva* is supported by the highest *Ātmā*, and that he is never independent. Though attributes of the *jīva* are predicated of the highest *Ātmā*, yet as in the sentence "The revered man-lion is white" they should be connected with the *jīva*, who forms His body, and only indirectly with Him. In verse 14 it is stated that to regard anything as independent of the highest *Ātmā* is an error ; that it arises from ignorance ; that one, from whom all ignorance is

expelled, will perceive the whole world as *Brahma*; and that there being no object other than *Brahma*, he will not see any difference. The *upanishad* closes with the following remarks: The *jīva* knows all this, being given *jñāna* by the highest *Ātmā*, who abides in himself as his *ātmā*. He cannot know Him by any other means. The highest *Ātmā*, the ruler of all, stands apart from all things, intelligent and non-intelligent; He has every thing as His body, and remains as its *ātmā*; and He is therefore not touched by the imperfections of the intelligent and non-intelligent objects that form His bodies. One cannot see the highest *Ātma*, who differs from all else, who is the sole cause of all the worlds and who sees everything, by any means other than the meditation pointed out. This meditation alone is the means to immortality; and the attainment of *Brahma* alone is that immortality. Hence this *upanishad* deals only with the highest *Ātmā*; He alone is the world-cause; but not the *purusha* of the *sāṅkhya*, nor the *pradhāna* directed by him.

SUB-SECTION 7

In the first six sub-sections of this section the view that *pradhāna* directed by *purusha* was the world-cause was refuted. In the first three the opponent referred to this as an alternative to the highest *Ātmā*, while in the next three he ventured to put it forward as the only cause. Though all the texts quoted seemed to be similar to sentences in *sāṅkhya* works, the view that the highest *Ātmā* was not the world-cause was not directly connected

with the section and came in for consideration only incidentally. Thus the athiestic *sāṅkhya* has been silenced. In this sub-section the *sāṅkhya*, who accepts the existence of the highest *Ātmā*, comes forward, and pleads that He is the operative cause ; that *pradhāna* is the material cause ; that each needs the other ; and that both are connected with the same work—the evolution of the universe.

First view. The view that the highest *Ātmā* is the world-cause, on the ground that willing implies an all-knowing Being, is accepted. But the same *vedānta*, which supports this view, points out *pradhāna* only as the material cause. For, the highest *Ātmā* is all-knowing, is not subject to change of substance, and directs ; while *pradhāna* is non-intelligent, is subject to change, and is directed. And He cannot be the world-cause without it. This is stated :

He is without parts, without action, without the six evils, without imperfections, and without attachment (*śvetā.*, VI-19). He is indeed the great *Ātmā* without birth, without old age, without death (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-25).

These texts show that the highest *Ātmā* does not change. On the other hand *pradhāna* is stated to change and to be directed by Him :

Prakṛiti, the creator of products, non-intelligent, appearing in eight forms, without birth or death. She enters into the willing of *Brahma* ; directed by Him, she comes into the gross condition (as the great elements) ; again directed by the very same, she creates the universe consisting of objects of enjoyment and the means and places of enjoyment. She is a cow, without beginning or end ; the creator of the great elements and of the diverse products of evolution (*mantrikopanishad*).

Similarly, He creates only with *pradhāna* as the material :

From this the lord of *māyā* creates this world. Know *māyā* to be *prakṛiti* and the lord of *māyā* to be the great Ruler (*śvetā.*, IV-9-10). With Me to direct *prakṛiti* brings forth the world with the moving and unmoving things (*bhagavad-gīta*, IX-10).

2. Even if this were not stated by *vedic* texts, the evolution of the world from Him cannot happen, unless the existence of *pradhāna* and its direction by Him be accepted. For He does not change ; and a thing that is capable of becoming the universe is needed ; and this being non-intelligent, some one is required to direct its evolution. This complete difference between the material and operative causes is seen in the world also. The non-intelligent lump of earth or piece of gold is the material, out of which jars or bracelets are made ; and the intelligent potter or goldsmith is the maker ; and this is perceived to be invariably the case. Further, the making of a product is seen to require invariably a number of causes, as every one sees (1). *Upanishad* texts cannot overlook these necessary conditions, and assert that the single *Brahma* is both the material and the maker. There are thus in support of the *first view*,

(1) This may be put into logical form thus : (i) *Īśvara* is not the material cause in the making of a substance ; for He is an intelligent being, like the *jīva* ; (ii) The material cause under dispute is other than the operative cause of its products ; for it is a material cause, like the lump of earth ; (iii) The products under dispute need more than one cause ; for they are products, like the jar.

vedic texts, the need for the assumption of *pradhāna* to justify *vedic* statement, and the arguments set out ; and these prevail over mere texts, which like the statement 'The *yūpa* (post) is the sun,' must be understood differently. Hence, the highest *Ātmā* is the operative cause only ; not the material cause. It is *pradhāna* directed by Him, that is that cause.

Final decision. This is stated in the *śūtra* :

23. प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ।

The highest *Ātmā* is the material cause also ; only in this view will the declaration and the illustrations not become nullified.

Reference is made here to the *chāndogya* text VI-1-3 to 6. See *Vedic Texts* under chapter I, section 1, and sub-section 5. The declaration is that by knowing one thing every thing will be known. Three illustrations are given, which show that by knowing the cause its products are known. For, the cause itself by a change of condition becomes the products. Now, if the highest *Ātmā* were only the operative cause, then by knowing Him the whole world could not be known. By knowing only the potter the vessels made by him are not known. Hence both the declaration and its illustrations would be nullified. If the highest *Ātmā* is the material cause in addition to being the operative cause, by knowing Him the whole world will be known ; being its material cause. Hence it is concluded that He is the material cause also.

2. The statement in the *first view* that *vedic* texts themselves show difference between the material and

operative causes is not correct ; for they show them to be one. The father asked ' Did you enquire about that *Ādeṣa*, hearing about whom everything not heard before is heard ' (*chāndo.*, VI-1-3). Here the term *ādeṣa* means controller : the root meaning to control and the termination the instrument in the control. The controller Himself being the most efficient instrument of control, the termination denoting the instrument is used to denote the controller. It may be objected that there is a departure from the natural meaning. The only other way to understand the term is to take it to mean what is taught ; but this is common to many other things, while what is needed here is some attribute that is found only in the highest *Ātmā*. There is a departure in both cases from the natural meaning ; for to teach is not the natural meaning of the root. But the root being more important than the termination, and the meaning controller being required, the other interpretation is rejected. The text then means—by hearing about the controller, what is not heard before is heard about. Thus oneness of the two causes is affirmed. The same teaching is conveyed by the creation-text, which follows, by the assertion of the existence of one thing only before creation, and by the denial of a second.

3. The texts from the *mantrikopanishad* quoted in para 1 of the *first view*, which, it is stated, show *pradhāna* to be without beginning and end, and therefore eternal, and to be the material cause of the world, have now to be explained. The texts refer to the highest *Ātmā* in the causal condition, in which He was without

names and forms ; for then nothing else existed. On the theory of *Kāśākṛitsna*, which the author of the *śūtras* adopts, He is the inner ruler of every thing intelligent and non-intelligent, and at all times (1). Sometimes He has names and forms differing from one another ; He is then said to be many and to be products. Sometimes He is without them ; He is said to be one, without a second, and to be in the causal condition. In this condition He is referred to by the terms 'go (cow) without beginning or end' and 'the creator of products' (2).

(1) See *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa*, *subālopanishad* and *bṛihad.*, IV-4-6, and 14 ; and VI-5-15), and *chāndo.*, III-14-1 and VI-8-7.

(2) *Question*. Is it not stated that *avyakta* and *akshara* come into existence and are finally dissolved ? "*Mahat* is dissolved in *avyakta* ; *avyakta* is dissolved in *akshara* (*subā*). From it *avyakta* comes forth with its three *guṇas*. In *Brahma* without action, *avyakta* is dissolved (*bhārata*). *Reply*. This is no objection ; for *Brahma* clothed in unintelligent matter has two conditions—in one the matter is so subtle, that it cannot be spoken of as separate from Him, even as His body. In this condition it is denoted by the term *tamas*. In the other condition it becomes gross ; and its three qualities are manifested. This is a product and is known as *avyakta*. The texts quoted refer to this latter condition. Even in the condition of complete cosmic rest (*pralaya*) matter in a very subtle form exists as the body of *Brahma*, as stated in the text, "when *tamas* existed, there was neither day nor night". Hence it is stated, '*akshara* is dissolved in *tamas* ; *tamas* becomes one with the highest *deva*' (*subā*) ; thus there is no destruction of *tamas*. By the term 'becomes one' reference is made to the existence of *Brahma* in His matter element without diverse names and forms. The term does not mean destruction. This will be clear from the following texts. "*Tamas* existed before ; by *tamas* the world was enveloped and could not be well

4. In the world clay and other material causes, being non-intelligent, cannot direct the change from one condition to another; while the potter and other operative causes are unable themselves to change in this unusual manner; and do not possess an unfrustrated will. Hence the two causes are seen to be different. But the highest *Ātmā* stands apart from everything else; and He is omniscient and omnipotent. He can therefore be both the causes at the same time.

24. अभिध्यापदेशाच्च ।

And because willing by the highest *Ātmā* is stated.

The statement is made in *chāndogya* (VI-2-2). "He willed I will become many" and in the *ānanda-valli* (VI-2) "He desired 'I will become many'. Here the creator willed Himself to become many. He was therefore the material cause; and as this becoming many was by the same Being who willed, He was also the operative cause. The becoming many was not by *avatāras*

perceived; from *tamas* one came forth in a gross form"; "This was in the condition of *tamas*, and could not be perceived; for it had no marks like colour; it could not be known by arguments; it could not be known as separate from *Brahma*; it was, like one in deep sleep, united to *Brahma*; this was not a partial union, but a thorough going one" (*manu*, 2-5). In the second text reference is made first to the condition, in which *tamas* may be known to be separate from *Brahma* as His body, and then to the condition in which it is not so separated.¹

¹ The text regarding the creation of the world from *mūṃyā* will be presently explained; for *Brahma* does not undergo change of substance.

as *Rāma* and *Kṛishṇa*, but by appearing in the form of the elements first, and then of the products of evolution.

25. साक्षाच्चोभयान्नानत् ।

And because both (the causes) are expressly declared.

We are not dependent solely on the reasons stated in the two preceding *śūtras*. There is the following text:

Brahma was the forest ; *Brahma* was the tree ; from which heaven and earth were shaped. You wise ones, I tell you having decided with my mind ; *Brahma* bearing the worlds used Himself as the instruments.

This was the reply to a question put from the worldly point of view—what was the material cause on which *Brahma* worked and what were His instruments. The answer was that He himself was the material cause and the instruments. Being entirely different from everything else, omnipotence of this kind was not inappropriate.

26. आत्मकृतेः ।

Because He made Himself (as material).

In *ānandavalli*—7-1 reference is made to *Brahma* as wishing to evolve as the world, and it is stated. “Then He of Himself made Himself.” Here *Brahma* was both the maker in the work of evolution, and the object made. The maker was the Being without name and form ; and the object made was the same Being with diverse names and forms—i.e., the world. There

is therefore no impropriety in one being both the maker and the object made. Hence He was both the causes.

The opponent here raises an objection. How can *Brahma* become the world? He is by nature without evil of any kind found in matter and *jīvas*, and is the seat of unlimited *jñāna* and bliss; while the world is full of endless misery? The next *śūtra* is the reply:

27. परिणामात् ।

Because everything evolves in its own way.

The evolution taught here is not such as to bring imperfections on *Brahma*. On the other hand, it shows His unlimited power of control. The evolution is thus described. When the period of cosmic activity came to an end, all the products of evolution, which formed His bodies, and of which He was the *ātmā*, were dissolved in Him alone. The order of dissolution is thus stated in the *subūla upanishad*—earth is dissolved in water (1); water in fire; fire in air; air in ether; ether and the senses (2) in

(1) Earth passes through an intermediate stage known as *gandha tanmūtra*. So do water, fire, air and ether pass through their own *tanmūtras*.

(2) The original has "ether in the senses; the senses in *tanmūtras*". Here the term dissolves (*liyate* and *liyante*) used before and after is not found. Hence the meaning is that ether, and the senses unite; the former is dissolved in the *śabda tanmūtra*, and the senses unite with it. The *tanmūtra* and the senses are then dissolved in *ahamkāra*. The plural of the word *tanmūtras* was not intended; for reference is made to the *śabda tanmūtra*, which is one.

ṣabda tanmātra ; *ṣabda tanmātra* in *ahamkāra* ; *ahamkāra* in *mahat* ; *mahat* in *avyakta* (1) ; *avyakta* in *akshara* ; and *akshara* in *tamas*. The term *tamas* means matter in the finest condition. All the products disappeared ; and *tamas* alone remained, and became one with *Brahma*. This means that it became so subtle, that it could not be spoken of as separate even as His body. Even then the matter and *jiva* elements existed ; and the *karmas* of the *jivas* and the tendencies developed by them in the period of cosmic activity survived. When the period of cosmic rest came to a close, *Brahma* embodied in His inseparable elements willed I will become many. This means that He willed to become the universe, in which the matter and *jiva* elements of His body would come to a gross condition and would be fit to appear in diverse forms and bear diverse names. It is stated :

He made *tapas* ; and having made *tapas*, He created all this (*āna.*, VI-2).

The term *tapas* means consideration ; and *Brahma* considered what the form of the universe was in the

(1) *Tamas* exists in two conditions—in one it is in a position to evolve as *akshara* ; and in the other it is not. In this latter condition it becomes one with *Brahma*. *Akshara* and *avyakta* are further stages in evolution ; and in all of these the three *guṇas*, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are balanced. The differences among these conditions are thus illustrated. *Tamas*, that is one with *Brahma* is like a grain in a granary ; the next condition of *tamas* is like the same grain put into the ground ; *akshara* is the same grain, when it is wet and its parts are loosened ; and *avyakta* is the same, when it has swollen ; *mahat* is the same, when it sends forth a shoot.

preceding evolution. For in every world-age the mode of evolution is the same. This is stated :

The creator made the sun and the moon as before ; and heaven, earth, the intermediate world, and the *svār* world (*nūrā*., I-38) * (1).

He then successively evolved up to the formation of the great elements, the matter and *jīva* elements being His body at every stage (2). He then became the universe consisting of *devas*, men, beasts and vegetables, every product among which being a mixture of matter and *jīva*. He, who was the *ātmā* in the causal condition, became the *ātmā* of the products of evolution, and appeared as those products. The purpose of the evolution was play (*līlā*), and the matter and *jīva* elements were His toys (3).

(1) The same thing is stated in a *smṛiti* text. As the marks of *ṛitus* (a group of two months) are different in different *ṛitus*, and as when they come round, the marks of each *ṛitu* alone appear in that *ṛitu*, as it did before, so in *yugas* and *kalpas* the same things appear as before (*viśṇu*, I-5-65).

(2) That the whole world forms the body of *Brahma* and that He is its *ātmā* is stated (See *bṛihad.*, V-7 in *Vedic Texts* under chap. I, section 2, sub-section 4). The *upanishad* enumerates many things, and states that every one of them is the body of the inner ruler. The *subāla upanishad* has the following additions—*buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *chitta*, *avyakta*, *akshara* and *mṛityu*. The last term denotes *tamas* ; for the order of dissolution is stated in the same *upanishad* thus—*avyakta*, *akshara*, and *tamas*. As it is the cause of the contraction of the *jñāna* of all *jīvas*, and as this is an unwelcome thing, *tamas* is stated to be *mṛityu*, which means death.

(3) This is stated in the following texts : All this, beginning with *avyakta* and ending with the diverse products

In the aggregate thus formed of *Brahma*, matter and *jivas* the *jiva*-element evolved by a slight expansion of its consciousness, and all the misery experienced in the world falls to its lot; and the matter element evolved by change of substance. *Brahma* evolved by becoming the inner ruler of the products of evolution; and being such He is not touched by the changes of the one or by the painful experiences of the other. And this is stated in the *ānandavalli*, 6-3.

He became *sat* (*jivas*) and *tyad* (material products); but He himself remained unchanged.

In order to indicate this freedom of *Brahma* from the changes undergone by the elements, that form His body, the *upanishad* states "From this the lord of *māyā* creates this world," and speaks as if He were separate from matter, whereas before evolution commenced, they were one, *i.e.*, both matter and *jivas* were in such a subtle condition that they could not be spoken of as being different from *Brahma* even as His bodies (1).

of the world, exhibiting change and growth, are the toys of *Hari*; know all this to be *kshara* (perishable); *Vyakta*, *avyakta*, *purusha*, and time (*kāla*) are *Vishṇu*, *i.e.*, are His aspects; and they are to Him what toys are to a child that is playing; hear His doings (*vishṇu*, I-2-20); as a child with his toys (*vāyu purāṇa*). This will be stated in *sūtra*, II-1-33.

(1) The interpretation given here is the correct one, as it should agree with the following texts: Then He of Himself made Himself¹ (*āna.*, 7-1); 'Desiring to create

¹ *I.e.*, used Himself as the material.

28. योनिश्च हि गीयते ।

And because He is declared to be *yoni*.

This is in the *munḍaka* :

The wise perceive Him to be the cause (*yoni*) of all that exists (I-1-6); and When the meditator sees the brilliant Maker and Ruler, who is *purusha* and the world-cause (*yoni*) (III-1-3).

The term *yoni* refers to the material cause, as will be seen from the text which follows the former text (I-1-8) (1).

diverse products from His own body, He considered, and created first the materials for forming the egg-shaped universe (*manu*, I-8).

(1) The *śūtras* of this sub-section are thus connected: In the first oneness of the two causes was established; and in the second a reason found in a verse, which follows the first text, was urged. By these two *śūtras* the authority known as *arthūpatti* was applied to the two texts. The third *śūtra* cited a *vedic* text, and the fourth *śūtra* brought up another text, which was clearer, and which was therefore independent of any help. It was for this reason that the particle 'and' (*cha*) finds no place in the *śūtra*. The fifth *śūtra* removes a doubt raised by a consideration of this text with those before and after it. The texts of the last *śūtra* labour under two defects. One of them states the fruit of meditation on the world-cause; and the other relates only to the material cause. To indicate the operative cause it has to be connected with certain verses, which precede it; and it therefore conveys its teaching with some delay. It is therefore made the last *śūtra*.

